{ "id": 2834721, "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Clyde Smith, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Smith", "decision_date": "1972-02-17", "docket_number": "No. 11393", "first_page": "958", "last_page": "962", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "3 Ill. App. 3d 958" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "108 N.E.2d 455", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "413 Ill. 123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5313919 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/413/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 N.E.2d 803", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 Ill.2d 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2788762 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/22/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "141 N.E. 196", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 Ill. 292", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5104046 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/309/0292-01" ] }, { "cite": "244 N.E.2d 842", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill.App.2d 12", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1601111 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/104/0012-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 N.E.2d 595", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "3 Ill.2d 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2696705 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/3/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 N.E.2d 321", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "325" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "402 Ill. 74", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2617944 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "80" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/402/0074-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 N.E.2d 553", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "117 Ill.App. 2d 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1586071 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/117/0344-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 551, "char_count": 9094, "ocr_confidence": 0.751, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.346956382057246e-07, "percentile": 0.8745100583084188 }, "sha256": "ac060cd9dc41909111640b672279260da80ad39d41053179f12cd9f8babfe443", "simhash": "1:b2975c0f94237e3a", "word_count": 1508 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:53:03.474127+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Clyde Smith, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE SMITH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant appeals from a conviction for aggravated battery the sentence for which was three to five years. The victim was his wife. This occurred on June 4. The indictment was returned November 7 and on the trial proof was permitted of a scuffle over an ax on November 9 between them. The exact testimony of the wife was that \u201cme and him was scuffling with it [the ax] and finally my son got to him and talked him out of it\u201d. It is argued now that the admission of this incident over objection warrants a new trial. In addition, or rather, in the alternative, defendant requests that we modify the sentence under Supreme Court Rule 615.\nOf course, evidence of other crimes committed by a defendant not connected with the offense charged are inadmissible, not so much for the reason that they lack relevancy as such, but rather that they prove a IegaUy non-recognizable materiality \u2014 hence a legal immateriahty\u2014 the propensity or disposition of the defendant to commit crime, which suggests in turn the inference that a defendant therefore committed the crime for which he is on trial, i.e., that he in all likelihood is guffty. Notwithstanding this inference, evidence of other crimes may be admitted to prove such material elements in a given case as knowledge, intent, motive, design, plan, identification, and to negate defenses of mistake or inadvertence, or to show an absence of good faith, and, important here, to evidence a consciousness of guHt or guilty consciousness.\nIf for the sake of argument we construe the \u201cscuffling\u201d with the ax at the very least to be an intimidation of the complaining witness and at the very most an attempt to remove her as a witness, such conduct is indeed evidence then of consciousness of guilt from which an inference can be drawn that the defendant is guffty of the offense charged. Consciousness of guilt is very potent evidence of just that, and \u201cnothing but an haUucination or a most extraordinary mistake will otherwise explain its presence\u201d. (II Wigmore on Evidence 106, section 273(1).) Of course, if the conduct sought to be admitted bears no relationship to the offense charged, it would be the duty of the court to reject such evidence, but not otherwise. Specifically here, if it can be said, and we think it can, that defendant\u2019s conduct was an attempt at the very least to suppress evidence by intimidation, then a very clear inference can be drawn that defendant was conscious that he was guffty of the offense charged. As was stated in People v. Gambony, 402 Ill. 74, 80, 83 N.E.2d 321, 325; \u201cIn a criminal prosecution any attempted intimidation of a witness is properly attributable to a consciousness of guilt, and testimony relating thereto is relevant and admissible in evidence\u201d.\nIn People v. Bennett, 3 Ill.2d 357, 121 N.E.2d 595, defendant was told that an acquaintance had given the authorities incriminating information \u2014 \u201chad sold him [defendant] the stuff\u201d \u2014 and in response defendant had stated that \u201che would take care of [him] when he got out on bond\u201d. Over objection this evidence was admitted and on appeal held properly so:\n\u201cThe occurrence in question took place the morning after the arrest, when plaintiff in error was confronted for the first time with the fact that Cardosi had impffcated him. His reaction to this new information was, we think, admissible. The jury was entitled to believe that his reply was that he would take care of Cardosi when he got out on bond, and was entitled to consider that reply as indicative of guilt\u201d.\nNor need the quantum of proof of other offenses be that of beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Clark, 104 Ill.App.2d 12, 244 N.E.2d 842.) There it was said:\n\u201cCountless Illinois decisions establish that evidence of other crimes is properly admissible to prove identity, intent, knowledge, or a common scheme or plan [citing cases] * # The same decisions, People v. Spaulding, 309 Ill. 292, at 303 \u2014 304, 141 N.E. 196, in particular, require us to reject the further contention of defendant that in order for evidence of other offenses to be admissible, it must first be proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed such offenses\u201d.\nAnd in People v. Jackson, 22 Ill.2d 382,176 N.E.2d 803:\n\u201cWhile we are familiar with the rule that evidence proving or suggesting the commission of another crime is generally inadmissible if relevant only for the purpose of showing a disposition to commit crime and inviting an inference of guilt for that reason [citing cases], at the same time evidence of other offenses may be admissible to show guilty knowledge * * \u00b0. In a criminal case, where evidence is relevant and otherwise admissible it is not to be excluded because it may also have a tendency to prejudice the accused\u201d.\nIn Spaulding, cited above in Clark, it was further stated: \u201cModern decisions establish the rule that all efforts by either party to a suit, directly or indirectly, to destroy, fabricate or suppress evidence may be shown as a circumstance indicating that the party\u2019s cause is an unrighteous one. Evidence that the accused has attempted to destroy evidence against himself is always admissible for the purpose of showing consciousness of guilt\u201d. To the same effect is People v. Fiorito, 413 Ill. 123, 108 N.E.2d 455.\nDefendant argues that the limited proof made here does not rise to a showing that the defendant was attempting to intimidate the complaining witness \u2014 his wife.He acknowledges that direct proof is not necessary, but that here the closeness of dates between November 7 \u2014 9, as proof of intimidation is at best only a \u201ctenuous conclusion\u201d. However, that he certainly knew his wife would be the star witness against him cannot be doubted, and, we think, it can reasonably be said, too, that he must have known that absent her testimony his chances of acquittal would be immeasurably improved. The fact that this incident of November 9 was merely one in a series of quarrels and fights which the defendant and his wife seemed to have been carrying on seriatim since day 1, while an argument against intimidation, is only just that \u2014 and the weight the jury may have accorded to this incident because of such seriatim scuffles and fights may have been very scant indeed. Regardless of credibility, there were sufficient facts and inferences as such for the admission of the incident as evidence of an attempt to intimidate the complaining witness. Whether anyone actually believed this to be true, is beside the point \u2014 and an argument against its admission being reversible error in all events.\nNext it is said that the sentence of three to five years is inappropriate, that is, excessive, considering the circumstances of the offense and defendants background. His wife, it is argued, came out of the indictment much better than he did \u2014 as he received two bullet wounds, was hospitalized and then held in jail. That may be, but is our opinion it is not an argument for reducing the sentence \u2014 here relatively modest under the circumstances. We agree that a 1952 sentence of six years in Tennessee for housebreaking, larceny, and receiving stolen property should probably be ignored in fixing sentence \u2014 and, of cornse, maybe it was. This offense has a spread of one to ten years. We think we should give credence to the trial judge\u2019s determination in the sentence he imposed \u2014 that is, it was not excessive in the context rendered.\nAccordingly, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nTRAPP, P. J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE SMITH" }, { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE CRAVEN\nconcurring in part and dissenting in part:\nI agree with my colleagues that this conviction should be affirmed. I do not agree that the sentence is proper nor defensible.\nThe majority opinion suggests that the trial judge\u2019s sentence determination was not excessive in the context rendered. Excessiveness of sentence is not the sole issue here.\nThe sentence as imposed offends against the principle of indeterminacy. It divests the parole board of portions of its discretionary authority and by approving a sentence with the minimum and the m\u00e1ximums so closely related, this court abdicates its responsibility of appellate review of sentence. This court has approved and the other districts of the appellate court have approved specifically or as a general principle the standards promulgated by the American Bar Association with reference to sentencing which suggests that the minimum sentence should be no more than one-third of the maximum. (See People v. Scott, 117 Ill.App. 2d 344, 253 N.E.2d 553 (and cases there cited).) No reason is suggested by this record why substantial compliance with such standards should not be required in this case.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE CRAVEN" } ], "attorneys": [ "John F. McNichols, District Defender, Illinois Defender Project, of Springfield, (J. Daniel Stewart, of counsel,) for appellant.", "Paul R. Welch, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington, for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Clyde Smith, Defendant-Appellant.\n(No. 11393;\nFourth District\nFebruary 17, 1972.\nCRAVEN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nJohn F. McNichols, District Defender, Illinois Defender Project, of Springfield, (J. Daniel Stewart, of counsel,) for appellant.\nPaul R. Welch, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington, for the People." }, "file_name": "0958-01", "first_page_order": 978, "last_page_order": 982 }