{ "id": 2621998, "name": "The City of Chicago, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Leo Santor, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "City of Chicago v. Santor", "decision_date": "1975-07-21", "docket_number": "No. 60659", "first_page": "792", "last_page": "798", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "30 Ill. App. 3d 792" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "189 Ill.App. 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 2904065 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/189/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 Ill.App. 427", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 3130479 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/241/0427-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 N.E.2d 846", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 Ill.App.2d 16", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5207897 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/24/0016-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 N.E.2d 209", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 Ill.2d 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2822711 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "478" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/29/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "242 N.E.2d 152", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 Ill.2d 245", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2854029 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "251" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/41/0245-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 N.E. 315", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "263 Ill. 368", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4760436 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "372" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/263/0368-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 N.E.2d 216", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "3 Ill.App.3d 46", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2839520 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "51" }, { "page": "51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/3/0046-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 N.E.2d 763", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "18 Ill.App.3d 230", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2614503 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "237" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/18/0230-01" ] }, { "cite": "13 N.E.2d 63", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "368 Ill. 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2569246 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/368/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "13 N.E.2d 987", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "368 Ill. 282", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2571593 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/368/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 N.E. 7", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 Ill. 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5147912 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/317/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "134 N.E. 740", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 Ill. 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5012389 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/302/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 N.E. 484", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "weight": 2, "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 Ill. 471", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5249490 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "474, 475" }, { "page": "475" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/341/0471-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 748, "char_count": 12971, "ocr_confidence": 0.742, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.031340664931945e-08, "percentile": 0.4652856208991335 }, "sha256": "ef4cd16f7e359658a07c08451f4a411698be6016819010f46d68634236de8a98", "simhash": "1:23517ed41e12d4f8", "word_count": 2155 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:28.126609+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The City of Chicago, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Leo Santor, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE GOLDBERG\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe City of Chicago filed a complaint against Leo Santor (defendant) charging him with operating a public garage in Chicago without a license. After trial, the court found defendant guilty and assessed a fine. Defendant appeals.\nThe proof showed that defendant owns a garage building in Chicago which he has occupied since 1951, as an office and for his own truck leasing business. Approximately one-half of the space, which defendant does not require for his own use, is leased out to tenants for operation of their own businesses. The tenants pay monthly rental computed on a square foot basis. They use their portions of the space for storage, maintenance and repair of their own trucks and for parking of cars owned by themselves and their employees. Also, they store various personal property and some use the space as a workshop and for servicing of their own vehicles. No work upon any vehicle is done by defendant or his employees. There are 18 tenants who operate a total of 26 vehicles from the garage space. The individual spaces of each separate tenant are designated by lines marked on the floor.\nThere is no identification such as windshield decals for any of the vehicles which use the space. There is no sign or other indication outside or in the building regarding rental of space and no rates are posted inside the garage. No attendant is on duty but each tenant has his own key. The building has a vehicle door with a sign \u201cTruck Entrance.\u201d There is also a side service door for access by individuals.\nThe legal power of the city to regulate garages stems from a statute last amended in 1961. In its present form, it provides (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 24, par. 11 \u2014 42\u20148):\n\u201cThe corporate authorities of each municipality may locate and regulate the use and construction of breweries, distilleries, livery, boarding, or sale stables, blacksmith shops, foundries, machine shops, garages, parking lots, camps, accommodating persons in house trailers, house cars, cabins or tents, laundries, and bathing beaches.\u201d\nThe legislative history of this enactment shows that it was originally adopted in 1872, at which time, as we would expect, the words \u201cgarages, parking lots\u201d did not appear. (See Crerar Clinch Coal Co. v. City of Chicago, 341 Ill. 471, 474, 475, 173 N.E. 484; also Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 24, par. 11 \u2014 42\u20148, Historical Note at pages 191, 192 (Smith-Hurd 1962).) At that time, the section read:\n\u201cTo direct the location and regulate the use and construction of breweries, distilleries, livery stables, blacksmith shops and founderies [sic] within the limits of the city or village.\u201d\nIn 1911, the section was amended by insertion of the word \u201cgarages\u201d and by other amendments not material here. In 1919 and 1921, there were further amendments which were declared unconstitutional. (People ex rel. Roos v. Kaul, 302 Ill. 317, 134 N.E. 740.) Thereafter, the supreme court held that the statute in foim as amended in 1911 remained in force. (Rippinger v. Niederst, 317 Ill. 264, 148 N.E. 7.) The word \"garage\u201d has persisted in amendments made in 1927 and 1941. The words \u201cparking lots\u201d were added in 1941, in accordance with City of Chicago v. Ben Alpert, Inc., 368 Ill. 282, 13 N.E.2d 987, and Steams v. City of Chicago, 368 Ill. 112, 13 N.E.2d 63. In 1961, the section was given its present form by the inclusion of \u201ccamps accommodating persons in house trailers, house cars, cabins or tents #\nThe word \u201cgarages,\u201d as used in this statute, has been authoritatively construed by the supreme court as meaning \u201cpublic garages\u201d only; thus negating power or authority in the city to regulate or license private garages. (Crerar Clinch Coal Co. v. City of Chicago, 341 Ill. 471, 173 N.E. 484.) The supreme court based this conclusion upon the then firmly established principle that cities were creatures of the legislature without inherent powers and derived all of their authority from statutes which granted it. These statutes were to be strictly construed with any fair or reasonable doubt regarding the existence of the power to be resolved against the municipality. See 341 Ill. 471, 475, and cases there cited.\nThe ordinances in question before us are sections 156-13 and 156-15 of the Municipal Code of Chicago enacted in 1939, which provide:\n\u201c156-13. The term \u2018public garage\u2019 as used in this chapter is hereby defined as meaning any budding, structure, premises, enclosure, or other place, except a public way, within the city, where two or more motor vehicles are stored, housed, or parked for hire, in a condition ready for use, or where rent or compensation is paid to the owner, manager or lessee of the premises for the housing, storing, sheltering, keeping, or maintaining of such motor vehicles. # # #\n# e #\n156-15. No person shall engage in the business of a public garage without first having obtained a license therefor.\u201d\nSection 156-15 appears to be within the legal authority of the city as above set forth. However, in our opinion, the resolution of the case before us depends upon whether the definition of \u201cpublic garage\u201d as set forth in section 156-13 is authorized by the grant of power contained in the enabling statute. It would seem clear and definite that the city cannot broaden its legal powers by the strategem of adopting an overbroad and legally impermissible definition of \u201cpublic garage.\u201d\nIn this regard, we have considered the Illinois Constitution of 1970, article VII, section 6(a), which classifies the City of Chicago as a home rule unit and which provides that it \u201cmay exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs including, but. not limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and welfare-, to license; to tax; and to incur debt.\u201d This provision of the constitution has been construed as intending \u201cto give a qualifying unit of local government constitutional authority to exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs.\u201d Forestview Homeowners Association, Inc. v. County of Cook, 18 Ill.App.3d 230, 237, 309 N.E.2d 763.\nThis provision became effective on July 1, 1971, long after passage of the ordinance here involved. Therefore, it cannot be depended upon as a basis for the legal power of the city to enact the ordinance. That power can only exist, if at aU, by action of the legislature in the statute above cited. In Two Hundred Nine Lake Shore Building Corp. v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill.App.3d 46, 278 N.E.2d 216, this court held that enabhng legislation purporting to grant power to a city, but passed after the date of the ordinanc\u00e9 there in question, could not constitute a source of legislative authority to adopt the ordinance. This court there held that since the ordinance was \u201cvoid for want of express statutory authority to enact it, it had no legal existence whatsoever.\u201d (3 Ill.App.3d 46, 51.) In other words, \u201cThe subsequently enabhng legislation could not and did not bring vitafity to this otherwise barren attempt of the municipafity to regulate the social evil.\u201d (3 Ill.App.3d 46, 51.) We agree completely with this principle of law stated in Two Hundred Nine Lake Shore Building Corp. In our opinion, the same result must foHow regarding attempted application of the 1970 Constitution to the ordinance before us. To hold otherwise would give this provision of the 1970 Constitution retroactive effect which was neither expressed, nor intended by its framers or by the people of IHinois.\nIt foHows necessarily that the prosecution of defendant for operating his business without a license must stand or fall upon the grant of legislative power in the statute above cited. In other words, if the evidence shows that the defendant was operating a public garage as that term is legaHy defined in accordance with statutory definition, the prosecution was proper. If not, it cannot stand. The ordinance may not depart from its legal authority by broadening its definition of \u201cpubfic garage\u201d to include a private garage. We have carefully considered and must necessarily reject the city\u2019s contention regarding the rationale for requiring licensing of the type of facility here involved predicated upon production of noise and presence and use of gasoline. (See People ex rel. Busching v. Ericsson, 263 Ill. 368, 372, 105 N.E. 315.) The decisive issue then is the proper legal definition of the term \u201cpubfic garage.\u201d\n\u201cPubfic\u201d and \u201cprivate\u201d are ordinary words of accepted meaning. Actually each is the antithesis of the other. Webster defines \u201cpublic,\u201d used here as an adjective, as \u201caccessible to or shared by aH members of the community.\u201d \u201cPrivate\u201d is defined as \u201cintended for or affecting a particular person, group, or class.\u201d Webster\u2019s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary.\nThe legal definition of these words is quite similar. For example, a highway is \u201cpublic\u201d when \u201cthe public generally has the free and unrestricted right to use it.\u201d (City of Chicago v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 41 Ill.2d 245, 251, 242 N.E.2d 152, and cases there cited.) The actual use of the road or other facility is not of controlling importance \u201cas it is the right of public travel and not the exercise of the right which constitutes a road a public highway.\u201d (Department of Public Works & Buildings v. Farina, 29 Ill.2d 474, 478, 194 N.E.2d 209.) See also Rauworth v. Commercial Insurance Co., 24 Ill.App.2d 16, 19, 163 N.E.2d 846, citing Wakem & McLaughlin, Inc. v. Royal Indemnity Co., 241 Ill.App. 427, defining \u201cpublic entrances, halls and stairways\u201d covered by a policy of insurance as those \u201copen to the use of the general public\u201d and \u201cnot under the sole control of the insured\u201d and as being the opposite of \u201cprivate.\u201d\nApplying this definition here, a public garage is one which motorists generally have free and unrestricted right to use subject, of course, to unform conditions such as payment of charges and availability of space. On the contrary, a private garage is one in which use of the premises is restricted to designated persons which other members of the public have no right to use. Neither the extent of the space, nor the number of vehicles involved affects the classification of the garage for this purpose. The central and indispensable test of a public garage is existence of the right of public access and use thereof.\nIt follows from this analysis that the ordinance definition is far too broad. Section 156 \u2014 13 covers in the first portion thereof, any premises where two or more vehicles are stored for hire. This would include a vast number of strictly private garages. Alternatively the balance of the section covers premises where rent is paid to an owner or lessee for storing of motor vehicles. This language also includes many private garages. The definition in the ordinance is thus not in conformity with the legal power of the city and with the proper legal definition of the term \u201cpublic garage.\u201d\nIt is equally evident that defendant\u2019s business is not that of a public garage. The premises are operated as a garage but not as a public garage. Motorists in general have no right to use or access. The public has no unrestricted right to use the premises subject only to availability of space or payment of necessary charges. Private arrangements must be made with defendant for lease of the premises. In the context of the factual situation here presented, neither the number of tenants, nor the number of vehicles involved has any decisive bearing upon classification of defendant\u2019s business from this point of view. Nor, as the city contends, is the situation before us an attempt to disguise a public garage by adopting a private form as in City of Chicago v. Logan Square Motor Club, 189 Ill.App. 142. There, a public garage organized a not for profit \u201cclub\u201d and charged \u201cdues\u201d to its otherwise unrestricted membership for the parking privilege. It follows that the city has no legal right to license defendant\u2019s garage.\nA caveat must be stated. Our conclusions that the definition of \u201cpublic garage\u201d as stated in the ordinance includes matters beyond the legal authority of the city as it existed when the ordinance was enacted and that defendant is not operating a public garage within the accepted legal definition of that term are decisive of the litigation. We expressly abstain from deciding the issue not before us regarding the rights of the parties in event of passage of a new ordinance upon this subject matter.\nThe judgment appealed from is accordingly reversed.\nJudgment reversed.\nBURKE, P. J., and SIMON, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE GOLDBERG" } ], "attorneys": [ "Springer & Carstedt, of Chicago (William D. Carstedt, of counsel), for appellant.", "William R. Quinlan, Acting Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Daniel Pascale and Lucia T. Thomas, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "The City of Chicago, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Leo Santor, Defendant-Appellant.\n(No. 60659;\nFirst District (1st Division)\nJuly 21, 1975.\nSpringer & Carstedt, of Chicago (William D. Carstedt, of counsel), for appellant.\nWilliam R. Quinlan, Acting Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Daniel Pascale and Lucia T. Thomas, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0792-01", "first_page_order": 818, "last_page_order": 824 }