{
  "id": 2621460,
  "name": "Lancer Industries, Inc., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The City of Aurora, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "Lancer Industries, Inc. v. City of Aurora",
  "decision_date": "1975-08-15",
  "docket_number": "No. 73-445",
  "first_page": "962",
  "last_page": "963",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "30 Ill. App. 3d 962"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "366 Ill. 516",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        2578646
      ],
      "year": 1937,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "519"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/366/0516-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "150 Ill. 616",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        5471290
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/150/0616-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 262,
    "char_count": 3217,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.727,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 2.1937869685226116e-07,
      "percentile": 0.7741119269887936
    },
    "sha256": "edb7b0d5a0e43bca570f1783a0a4a15b620fd1f910b1213dafdf632e22a92bd1",
    "simhash": "1:ad61fda79f642cad",
    "word_count": 536
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:28.126609+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Lancer Industries, Inc., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The City of Aurora, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE THOMAS J. MORAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe trial court found the defendant\u2019s zoning ordinance invalid as applied to the plaintiff\u2019s property and directed the defendant to issue plaintiff a building permit. The defendant raises a number of issues for review but, because of our holding, we consider only whether the trial court as trier of fact committed reversible error by considering its personal view of the subject property as part of the evidence.\nAt the close of all the evidence, plaintiff requested that the case be continued to allow the trial court to view the subject property. Defendant questioned the procedure of the judge viewing the premises and, assuming that all the evidence had been presented, moved for a directed verdict. The trial court responded, \u201cWell, we still have a little visual evidence to get in,\u201d and reserved any ruling pending its viewing of the subject property.\nAfter viewing the premises in company with the court reporter, the trial court dictated the following into the record:\n\u201cThe subject property is behind a Clark Oil station and a 7-Eleven store, and is approximately 250 feet long and 73 feet wide. To the south of the property is a turn-around for a car wash which abuts at the northwest comer. In viewing the property it would appear that it would take a very unusual sort of an eccentric to consider using it for residential purposes. Across Indian Trail Road is vacant property owned by Standard OU which would have ingress and egress on Farnsworth Avenue, but would continue to the west on Indian Trail Road past the property line of the subject property.\nIt appears clear from the view of the subject property and the surrounding property that the highest and best use is clearly business, and its use as residential property is very impractical.\u201d\nIt is well established that, except in condemnation cases, facts gained in a viewing cannot be considered in evidence, and that on the question of viewing a more strict standard must be applied in a bench trial.\n\u201c* * * The common law m\u00ede in force in this State, regarding the viewing by the court of property in litigation, is stated in Vane v. City of Evanston, 150 Ill. 616, at page 624, and followed in City of Carbondale v. Reith, 316 id. 538, and City of Chicago v. Koff, 341 id. 520. The only legitimate purpose for viewing the property by the trial judge was to enable him to understand the issues and apply the evidence.\u201d Behnke v. President and Board of Trustees, 366 Ill. 516, 519 (1937).\nWe conclude in this case that the two afore-quoted statements by the trial court demonstrate that it went beyond the m\u00ede and that its judgment was swayed by facts derived from tire personal inspection.\nThe judgment is therefore reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.\nJudgment reversed; cause remanded.\nRECHENMACHER, P. J., and DIXON, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE THOMAS J. MORAN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "William J. Foote, Corporation Counsel, of Aurora (Ralph Ketchum, Assistant Corporation Counsel^ of counsel), for appellant.",
      "Redman, Shearer, O\u2019Brien & Blood, of St. Charles, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Lancer Industries, Inc., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The City of Aurora, Defendant-Appellant.\n(No. 73-445;\nSecond District (2nd Division)\nAugust 15, 1975.\nWilliam J. Foote, Corporation Counsel, of Aurora (Ralph Ketchum, Assistant Corporation Counsel^ of counsel), for appellant.\nRedman, Shearer, O\u2019Brien & Blood, of St. Charles, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0962-01",
  "first_page_order": 988,
  "last_page_order": 989
}