{ "id": 2621901, "name": "Arthur Bohleber et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Carmi Township Hospital et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Bohleber v. Carmi Township Hospital", "decision_date": "1975-07-22", "docket_number": "No. 74-290", "first_page": "969", "last_page": "974", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "30 Ill. App. 3d 969" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "22 Ill. App.2d 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5202337 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "91" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/22/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 Ill. 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5276569 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/359/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "363 Ill. 409", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2588668 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/363/0409-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 Ill. 347", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2558614 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/381/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "267 Ill. 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2404223 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/267/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "27 Ill.App.2d 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5787338 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/27/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "46 A.L.R. 3d 1244", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 N.W.2d 456", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10776289 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "state Labor Management Relations Act" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/169/0456-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 N.Y.S. 2d 154", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "insurance policy" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 Misc. 2d 776", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Misc. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1167347 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "insurance policy" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/misc2d/49/0776-01" ] }, { "cite": "244 N.Y.S. 2d 761", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "certificate of incorporation" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 Misc. 2d 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Misc. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1134327 ], "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "certificate of incorporation" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/misc2d/41/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 So.2d 630", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 10073122 ], "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "insurance policy" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/76/0630-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 S.W.2d 787", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1944, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "zoning law" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 Ky. 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ky.", "case_ids": [ 2806086 ], "year": 1944, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "zoning law" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ky/298/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 Colo. 380", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Colo.", "case_ids": [ 1927874 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1949, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "bond issue" }, { "parenthetical": "bond issue" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/colo/120/0380-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 659, "char_count": 12033, "ocr_confidence": 0.728, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.4793276177203605e-08, "percentile": 0.28065342805700255 }, "sha256": "d6a0e9906cd7af2d0e364ca898e01cc6c672c779c834a160404ce8c489963363", "simhash": "1:fe1c4aa5e0cfb8b4", "word_count": 1921 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:28.126609+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Arthur Bohleber et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Carmi Township Hospital et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE CARTER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is an appeal from a summary decree of the White County Circuit Court dismissing plaintiffs\u2019 amended complaint and holding that Carmi Township Hospital does have the authority to construct and operate a nursing home and that said hospital did have authority to contract without calling for competitive bids. The ruling of the circuit court that plaintiffs had standing as taxpayers is not challenged on appeal.\nCarmi Township Hospital entered into a contract with Lexington House Franchise Co. on December 6, 1972, for the construction of a nursing care facility adjoining the hospital. Plaintiffs-appellants Arthur Bohleber and Stanley B. Abelson, as residents and taxpayers of Carmi Township, filed suit in February 1973, after construction had commenced, seeking to void the contract and restrain the hospital from operating the nursing home unit. Named as defendants were the hospital, its board of directors, and Lexington House Franchise Co. Since the suit was filed construction has been completed and the nursing home, which is connected to the hospital by a corridor, is now operating under the hospital administration. The nursing home was originally licensed under the Nursing homes, sheltered care homes, and homes for the aged Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 111V2 \u00a7 35.16 et seq.), but is now licensed under the Hospital Licensing Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 111%, \u00a7 142 et seq.).\nThe first issue raised by plaintiffs-appellants is whether Carmi Township Hospital had the legal authority to construct and operate a nursing facility. We hold in the affirmative. The statutory authority under which the hospital was originally established and on which defendants rely for the construction and operation of the nursing home is the township hospital act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 139, \u00a7\u00a7 160.6 \u2014 160.16), which provides in part:\n\u201c\u00a7 1. Any town having a population of less than 500,000 is authorized to establish, acquire by purchase or otherwise, construct, improve, extend, repair, equip, maintain and operate a public hospital in and for said town, as in this Act provided.\n# # #\n\u00a7 6. The Board of Directors constitute the governing body of the public hospital and are the corporate authorities of said town for that purpose and constitute a body corporate and politic separate and distinct from other officers of the town. The Board of Directors shall exercise all the powers and manage and control all of the affairs and property of the public hospital * *\nConstruing section 1 (par. 160.6) in conjunction with section 6 (par. 160.11), the authority of the township extends only to the establishment of a public hospital (by election, par. 160.7) and the board of directors is to exercise the remaining powers, i.e., of acquiring, constructing, improving, extending, repairing, equiping, maintaining, and operating, the hospital. Thus, the issue here is whether the board of directors of a township hospital has the authority to \u201cimprove\u201d and \u201cextend\u201d said hospital by constructing an adjoining nursing care facility. We are not faced with the question whether a township has the authority to \u201cestablish\u201d a separate nursing home.\nAs a general proposition the definition of \u201chospital\u201d would include a nursing home. Black\u2019s Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951) defines \u201chospital\u201d as \u201cAn institution for the reception and care of sick, wounded, infirm, or aged persons.\u201d (Accord, 41 C.J.S. Hospitals \u00a71 (1944); 21 Ill. L. & Pr. Hospitals 109 (1956); 40 Am. Jur. 2d Hospitals and Asylums \u00a7 1 (1968).) Defendants cite numerous cases from other jurisdictions construing in various contexts the word \u201chospital\u201d to include a nursing home. (McNichols v. City & County of Denver, 120 Colo. 380, 209 P.2d 910 (1949) (bond issue); Crain v. City of Louisville, 298 Ky. 421, 182 S.W.2d 787 (1944) (zoning law); McKinney v. American Security Life Insurance Co., 76 So.2d 630 (La. App. 1954) (insurance policy); Kew Gardens Sanitarium, Inc. v. Wyman, 41 Misc. 2d 90, 244 N.Y.S. 2d 761 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1963) (certificate of incorporation); Connors v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Association, 49 Misc. 2d 776, 268 N.Y.S. 2d 154 (Monroe County Ct. 1966) (insurance policy); St. Vincent\u2019s Nursing Home v. Department of Labor, 169 N.W.2d 456 (N.D. 1969) (state Labor Management Relations Act); Appeal of Ferguson, 54 Mun. 179 (Pa. 1962) (zoning law).) With respect to the coverage of hospitalization insurance policies for nursing home care, see Annot, 46 A.L.R. 3d 1244 (1972). The only Illinois case cited by the parties dealing with the definition of \u201chospital\u201d is Bennett v. Bennett, 27 Ill.App.2d 24, 30, holding that services provided in a State mental hospital (\u201ccaring for, treating, detaining and training\u201d) were necessaries, and that a husband was liable to his wife\u2019s estate for payment therefor. The court stated that the wife was in a hospital, as the term is commonly understood. A hospital is a place for the care of the sick whether in mind or body. Thus, Bennett stands for a broad definition of the word \u201chospital.\u201d\nThis case must be resolved, however, according to the legislative intent. \u201cThe intention of the law-makers is the law. This intention is to be gathered from the necessity or reason of the enactment and meaning of the words, enlarged or restricted according to their real intent.\u201d (Warner v. King, 267 Ill. 82, 87.) The parties cite various examples of both broad and narrow constructions of the powers of municipal corporations, but agree on the general principles that a municipal corporation may only exercise the powers delegated to it by the legislature and that statutes granting such powers are strictly construed, that any fair and reasonable doubt of the existence of a power is resolved against the municipal corporation, and that implied powers are only those necessarily incident to express powers. (City of Bloomington v. Wirrick, 381 Ill. 347.) But, \u201cnecessarily incident\u201d does not mean \u201cabsolutely indispensible\u201d (People ex rel. Sweitzer v. City of Chicago, 363 Ill. 409), and \u201cstrict construction\u201d does not connote \u201cthe narrowest possible meaning\u201d (Franklin County Coal Co. v. Ames, 359 Ill. 178).\nThe power relied upon by defendants is granted in broad terms to the board of directors, a municipal corporation, to \u201cimprove\u201d and \u201cextend\u201d the hospital. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 139, \u00a7\u00a7 160.6, 160.11.) Plaintiffs do not argue that the addition of nursing facilities does not improve or extend the hospital, but point to various legislative distinctions between hospitals and nursing homes.\nPlaintiffs argue that since a township is given the specific authority to lease a nursing home from a county (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 139, \u00a7\u00a7 160.29, 160.30), it does not have the authority to construct one. But we are not dealing here with a township\u2019s power to establish or acquire a nursing home, we are dealing with the scope of a township hospital\u2019s power of improvement or expansion.\nThe court is also aware that counties are given separate powers for the establishment of hospitals (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 34, \u00a7\u00a7501 et seq., 5351 et seq.), and for the establishment of nursing homes (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 34, \u00a7\u00a7 3561 et seq., 5361 et seq.). But nowhere is a nursing home precluded from providing some medical care, nor is a hospital precluded from providing some nursing care. In fact, the provisions enabling a township to lease a nursing home from a county authorize the lease of \u201ca county home, infirmary or hospital\u201d (emphasis supplied) operating under the County Home Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 34, \u00a7 5361 et seq.). Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 139, \u00a7 160.29.\nPlaintiffs also point out the distinction between hospitals and nursing \u2022homes in the respective licensing statutes. Section 3 of the Hospital Licensing Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 111%, \u00a7 144), provides in part:\n\u201cA. \u2018Hospital\u2019 means any institution * * * devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for the diagnosis and treatment or care of two or more unrelated persons admitted for overnight stay or longer in order to obtain medical, including obstetric, psychiatric and nursing, care of illness, disease, injury, infirmity, or deformity.\ne # *\nThe term \u2018Hospital\u2019 does not include (1) any * * * institution required to be licensed pursuant to [Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 111%, \u00a7 35.16 et seq.].\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nAnd the Nursing homes, sheltered care homes, and homes for the aged Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 111%, par. 35.16) defines \u201cnursing home\u201d as an institution \u201cwhich provides * * * maintenance, personal care, or nursing.\u201d That section further provides that the term \u201cnursing home\u201d does not include an institution \u201cwhich is required to be licensed under the \u2018Hospital Licensing Act.\u2019 \u201d\nThe limiting phrases in each definition (\u201cdoes not include * * *\u201d) indicate legislative awareness of the overlap of the definitions: that hospitals do provide some nursing care, and nursing homes, some medical care. The emphasized language in the definition of \u201chospital,\u201d above, provides further support for the notion of overlapping functions and shows that the operation of the nursing home in this case under a hospital license is within the legislative intent.\nThe Board of Directors of Carmi Township Hospital has been granted powers in nonspecific terms. We are asked to decide whether the construction and operation of a nursing care facility as part of said hospital is within the board\u2019s powers. The general definitions and authorities from foreign jurisdictions suggest that a nursing home is a hospital. Several Illinois statutes on their face indicate a sharp distinction, but upon closer analysis evince overlapping functions and a general acceptance of nursing facilities as a part of a hospital. We are not unaware, moreover, of widespread deficiencies in nursing home care that have been uncovered in recent years (see Wilson, Nursing Home Law Handbook (National Senior Citizens Law Center 1975); Nursing Home Care in the United States: Failure in Public Policy (Special Committee on Aging, U.S. Senate 1974)), and of the value in operating a nursing unit as awing of a public hospital. Such a combination facilitates the often difficult transfer of patients who no longer require intensive medical treatment or surgery, while providing easy access to such care if the need should arise. It is for all of the foregoing reasons that we affirm the holding of the circuit court that Carmi Township Hospital has the authority to construct and operate a nursing home in conjunction with its hospital.\nThe second issue raised by plaintiffs is whether Carmi Township Hospital had the authority to enter into the construction contract without competitive bidding. Plaintiffs contend that \u201cAn Act relating to township purchasing\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 139, par. 191) requires competitive bidding. But defendants argue, and we agree, that that Act applies by its terms only to \u201cAny purchase by a township.\u201d As we have previously noted Carmi Township Hospital is not governed by or a part of Carmi Township, but is a separate municipal corporation. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 139, par. 160.11.) \u201cIn the absence of some statutory provision, competitive bidding is not an essential prerequisite to the validity of contracts by and with public bodies.\u201d People ex rel. Adamowski v. Daley, 22 Ill. App.2d 87, 91.\nThe summary decree of the Circuit Court of White County dismissing plaintiffs\u2019 amended complaint, is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nEBERSPACHER and KARNS, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE CARTER" } ], "attorneys": [ "George W. Woodcock, of Woodcock & Hux, of Mt. Carmel, and David L. Stanley, of Carmi, for appellants.", "John C. Parkhurst, of Letter, Newlin, Fraser, Parkhurst & McCord, of Peoria, for appellee Lexington House Franchise Co.", "Craig & Craig, of Mt. Vernon, and Conger & Elliott, of Carmi, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Arthur Bohleber et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Carmi Township Hospital et al., Defendants-Appellees.\n(No. 74-290;\nFifth District\nJuly 22, 1975.\nGeorge W. Woodcock, of Woodcock & Hux, of Mt. Carmel, and David L. Stanley, of Carmi, for appellants.\nJohn C. Parkhurst, of Letter, Newlin, Fraser, Parkhurst & McCord, of Peoria, for appellee Lexington House Franchise Co.\nCraig & Craig, of Mt. Vernon, and Conger & Elliott, of Carmi, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0969-01", "first_page_order": 995, "last_page_order": 1000 }