{ "id": 257205, "name": "In re MARRIAGE OF DEBI HELDEBRANDT, Petitioner, and JAMES RICHARD HELDEBRANDT, Respondent-Appellant (The Department of Public Aid, Intervenor-Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "In re Marriage of Heldebrandt", "decision_date": "1998-12-02", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201498\u20140225", "first_page": "265", "last_page": "272", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "301 Ill. App. 3d 265" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "624 N.E.2d 928", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "931" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "253 Ill. App. 3d 677", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5421704 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/253/0677-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 A.L.R.5th 557", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 5th", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00a7 10" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "268 N.W2d 289", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "trial court correctly denied father's action to terminate support based on his 13-year-old daughter's refusal to visit him" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 Mich. App. 68", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich. App.", "case_ids": [ 2157095 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "trial court correctly denied father's action to terminate support based on his 13-year-old daughter's refusal to visit him" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mich-app/83/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "593 So. 2d 1131", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7516106, 7516042 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "support is not dependent on visitation rights" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/593/1131-02", "/so2d/593/1131-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 A.D.2d 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "A.D.2d", "case_ids": [ 3776, 3393 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "adolescent son's refusal to see his father would not result in the termination of support obligations when the father made minimal effort to establish and maintain a relationship with the son" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ad2d/202/0264-01", "/ad2d/202/0264-02" ] }, { "cite": "608 N.Y.S.2d 649", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "case_ids": [ 3393 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "adolescent son's refusal to see his father would not result in the termination of support obligations when the father made minimal effort to establish and maintain a relationship with the son" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ad2d/202/0264-02" ] }, { "cite": "690 N.E.2d 1052", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1056" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 Ill. App. 3d 747", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 35449 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "752" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/294/0747-01" ] }, { "cite": "688 N.E.2d 864", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "873", "parenthetical": "it is well settled that a custodial parent's violation of visitation terms does not excuse a noncustodial parent from supporting his children" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 Ill. App. 3d 471", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 847570 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "482", "parenthetical": "it is well settled that a custodial parent's violation of visitation terms does not excuse a noncustodial parent from supporting his children" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/293/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "622 N.E.2d 1231", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1235" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "251 Ill. App. 3d 648", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2959741 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "654" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/251/0648-01" ] }, { "cite": "433 N.E.2d 1158", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1160" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Ill. App. 3d 56", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5472996 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "59" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/105/0056-01" ] }, { "cite": "375 N.E.2d 925", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "928" }, { "page": "929" }, { "page": "931" }, { "page": "931" }, { "page": "1160" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Ill. App. 3d 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3359620 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "459" }, { "page": "460-61" }, { "page": "464" }, { "page": "464" }, { "page": "464" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/59/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 N.E.2d 912", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "922", "parenthetical": "the duty of a parent, even a noncustodial one, to support his or her child arises out of the parent-child relationship" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 Ill. App. 3d 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3465766 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "100", "parenthetical": "the duty of a parent, even a noncustodial one, to support his or her child arises out of the parent-child relationship" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/155/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "692 N.E.2d 1313", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1317" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 Ill. App. 3d 383", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 45711 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/295/0383-01" ] }, { "cite": "398 N.E.2d 5", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "8" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 Ill. 2d 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3073145 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/78/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "687 N.E.2d 1080", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1087" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 Ill. App. 3d 25", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 847525 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "34" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/293/0025-01" ] }, { "cite": "602 N.E.2d 902", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "906" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "236 Ill. App. 3d 739", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5784199 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "744" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/236/0739-01" ] }, { "cite": "672 N.E.2d 57", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "60" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "284 Ill. App. 3d 339", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1260330 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "342" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/284/0339-01" ] }, { "cite": "623 N.E.2d 780", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "784" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "251 Ill. App. 3d 950", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2958933 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "956" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/251/0950-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 854, "char_count": 16272, "ocr_confidence": 0.786, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.034489097263532e-08, "percentile": 0.37382256648939766 }, "sha256": "c8da1068b9537a400c5624707626120c84a1ebd995725c535d0c2896d929dd84", "simhash": "1:9bec582655d1ccd4", "word_count": 2640 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:13:21.929948+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re MARRIAGE OF DEBI HELDEBRANDT, Petitioner, and JAMES RICHARD HELDEBRANDT, Respondent-Appellant (The Department of Public Aid, Intervenor-Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn September 1997, respondent, James Heldebrandt, filed a motion to reduce or terminate his child support obligation because (1) two of his five children had reached the age of majority; and (2) his children had so vehemently and persistently resisted visitation with him that any semblance of his relationship with them no longer existed. In December 1997, the trial court conducted a hearing on James\u2019 motion and later denied it. James appeals, arguing only that the court abused its discretion by denying his motion. We affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nJames and Debi Heldebrandt were married in 1976. Michael Heldebrandt, the oldest of their five children, was born in 1977. Their youngest child, Cody, was born in 1985. In 1989, the trial court dissolved the couple\u2019s marriage and awarded custody of the children to Debi. James was granted visitation rights but did not see any of the children for a year or more after the divorce. According to James\u2019 testimony, a \u201cbig blow up\u201d occurred between him and all of the children at the time of the divorce. He told Debi and the children that he did not want to see the children until he was \u201cready,\u201d but if the children felt they were \u201cready\u201d sooner, they could call him. In 1991, James tried to initiate visitation, but the children resisted. James remarried early in' 1992, and Debi remarried in the summer of the same year.\nIn May 1992, James filed a petition to modify visitation. At the June 1992 hearing on the petition, the children testified about James\u2019 behavior both before and after the divorce. Several of the children remembered him as having a bad temper, and they testified to specific incidents in which they experienced that temper firsthand. They recalled that James threw things at them, ripped a telephone out of the wall in a fit of anger, chased them with a knife and plastic baseball bats, disciplined Cody with a belt, and at various times made verbal threats of physical harm. The trial court ordered a psychological assessment of the children and James to determine an appropriate visitation arrangement. In early 1993, the court ordered supervised visitation with the two youngest children and telephone contact with all of them, with increased visitation dependent on James\u2019 successful completion of counseling.\nJames successfully appealed that ruling because the trial court denied him the opportunity to cross-examine the expert witness who conducted the psychological assessment. Heldebrandt v. Heldebrandt, 251 Ill. App. 3d 950, 956, 623 N.E.2d 780, 784 (1993). In May 1994, on remand, the trial court conducted another hearing at which Debi testified that since the previous court date, James had visited three times with three of the children, but he had not visited the other two at all. In June 1994, the court granted James supervised visits with two children at a time on alternating weekends and with all of the children (except Michael) on the Fourth of July and Labor Day holidays and alternating holidays thereafter. On the Fourth of July and Labor Day holidays in 1994, James attempted visitation, but the children refused to go with him. James and his children have not spoken to or seen each other since then.\nIn May 1995, the trial court modified James\u2019 child support order' by reducing his payments to 40% of his income because of his financial difficulties.\nIn September 1997, James filed the instant motion to reduce or terminate his child support obligation. At that time, he had not seen or contacted his children in over three years. In January 1998, the trial court denied his motion. In February 1998, in response to James\u2019 motion to reconsider, the court reduced his child support obligation to 28% of his income in consideration of both parties\u2019 incomes and expenses. Later in February, the court modified the order again to reflect an additional reduction to 25% of James\u2019 income upon the emancipation of the parties\u2019 second child. This appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Effect of Custodial Parent\u2019s Actions with Respect to Visitation\n1. Standard of Review\nWhen reviewing a ruling on a motion to modify child support, this court will allow the trial court\u2019s factual findings to stand unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Marriage of Charles, 284 Ill. App. 3d 339, 342, 672 N.E.2d 57, 60 (1996). Further, modification of a child support order lies within the trial court\u2019s discretion, and we will not disturb its decision absent an abuse of discretion. People ex rel. Hines v. Hines, 236 Ill. App. 3d 739, 744, 602 N.E.2d 902, 906 (1992).\nUnder section 510 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act), a substantial change of circumstances is required to change an order for child support. 750 ILCS 5/510 (West 1996); In re Marriage of Singleteary, 293 Ill. App. 3d 25, 34, 687 N.E.2d 1080, 1087 (1997). Because the judgment \u201cis res judicata as to the facts which existed at the time it was entered but not as to facts arising thereafter, only new conditions warrant modification of a divorce decree.\u201d Waggoner v. Waggoner, 78 Ill. 2d 50, 55, 398 N.E.2d 5, 8 (1979).\n2. Respondent\u2019s Proposed Standard:\nNo Visitation, No Support\nThe thrust of James\u2019 argument is that he should be relieved of his obligation to support his children because (1) they have repeatedly refused to see him and have \u201cabandoned\u201d him; (2) Debi has not sufficiently encouraged the children to spend time with him; and (3) the children and Debi have established a new family unit that excludes him. In effect, James proposes a three-part \u201ctest,\u201d which would warrant the reduction or termination of child support when the following circumstances exist: (1) a continuous refusal by the children to visit and communicate with the noncustodial parent despite his reasonable efforts at visitation; (2) continuous and repeated expressions of hostility and resentment by the children toward the noncustodial parent; and (3) a lack of any meaningful effort on the part of the custodial parent to foster and encourage visitation after being instructed to do so by the trial court. James further suggests that trial courts should be required to make express findings of fact on these elements and provide a factual basis for rulings on such motions. We reject James\u2019 proposal.\nUnder Illinois law, both parents have an obligation to financially support their minor children. Department of Public Aid ex rel. Jones v. Jones, 295 Ill. App. 3d 383, 389, 692 N.E.2d 1313, 1317 (1998); see also In re Marriage of Betts, 155 Ill. App. 3d 85, 100, 507 N.E.2d 912, 922 (1987) (the duty of a parent, even a noncustodial one, to support his or her child arises out of the parent-child relationship).\nEven though James acknowledges the duty of a noncustodial parent to support his children, he nonetheless contends that Cooper v. Cooper, 59 Ill. App. 3d 457, 375 N.E.2d 925 (1978), and Weinert v. Weinert, 105 Ill. App. 3d 56, 433 N.E.2d 1158 (1982), have paved the way for Illinois courts to reduce child support payments on the basis of a noncustodial parent\u2019s being deprived of his visitation rights. We are not persuaded.\nIn Cooper, a noncustodial father petitioned for a reduction in child support payments on several grounds. His petition contained examples of the custodial parent\u2019s use of the child in \u201cpsychological warfare\u201d with, the petitioner and further alleged that the custodial parent had poisoned the child\u2019s mind against him. Cooper, 59 Ill. App. 3d at 459, 375 N.E.2d at 928. The trial court dismissed the petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Cooper, 59 Ill. App. 3d at 460-61, 375 N.E.2d at 929. The appellate court held that the petitioner was entitled to a hearing but declined to comment on petitioner\u2019s likelihood of success. Cooper, 59 Ill. App. 3d at 464, 375 N.E.2d at 931. The court explained that \u201c[w]e simply acknowledge the novel possibility that defendant\u2019s obligation for child support could be terminated or suspended should he prove the extreme and unusual allegations of his petition.\u201d Cooper, 59 Ill. App. 3d at 464, 375 N.E.2d at 931. Nonetheless, in the next sentence, the court restated the well-settled law in Illinois that \u201ca mere violation of visitation terms will not excuse the father\u2019s obligation to support his children.\u201d Cooper, 59 Ill. App. 3d at 464, 375 N.E.2d at 1160.\nIn Weinert, the appellate court reversed the trial court\u2019s dismissal of a noncustodial parent\u2019s petition to modify his support obligation. The appellate court held that the children\u2019s refusal to visit with their father, coupled with the possibility that the custodial parent actively interfered with the petitioner\u2019s visitation rights, may establish a substantial change in circumstance warranting modification of petitioner\u2019s obligation. Weinert, 105 Ill. App. 3d at 59, 433 N.E.2d at 1160.\nIn both Cooper and Weinert, the petitioner alleged active and extreme interference by the custodial parent. In contrast, James\u2019 motion did not allege that Debi had engaged in such egregious behavior. Instead, James simply alleged that, absent any fault on his part, \u201cnone of [his] minor children have exercised visitation with [him],\u201d and, although he had sought and attempted visitation, he was unable to do so and the courts were ineffective in obtaining reasonable visitation.\nAnother difference between the present case and both Cooper and Weinert is that in those cases the trial court dismissed the petition to modify child support without conducting a hearing on the merits. In contrast, the trial court here conducted a hearing on James\u2019 motion at which the court heard testimony from each of James\u2019 children, his current wife, his sister-in-law (who had supervised visits between James and his children), Debi, a psychologist, and James himself.\nMoreover, we view James\u2019 contention that interference on Debi\u2019s part can relieve him of his obligation to support his children as a stale argument. One of our sister districts recently faced a similar argument and wrote the following:\n\u201cAs trial judges and attorneys who handle divorces can attest, the most popularly held belief and excuse of litigants concerning their obligation of child support is that it is not owed because visitation has not occurred or has been denied. We will reiterate once more that visitation and child support are not dependent and both are for the benefit of the children. Section 509 of the Act specifically provides that visitation and child support are independent and \u2018[i]f a party fails to comply with a provision of a judgment, order or injunction, the obligation of the other party to make payments for support or maintenance or to permit visitation is not suspended.\u2019 [750 ILCS 5/509 (West 1996).]\u201d In re Marriage of Avery, 251 Ill. App. 3d 648, 654, 622 N.E.2d 1231, 1235 (1993).\nWe agree with the Avery court and reject James\u2019 contention that misconduct on Debi\u2019s part can relieve him of his support obligation. See In re Marriage of Tatham, 293 Ill. App. 3d 471, 482, 688 N.E.2d 864, 873 (1997) (it is well settled that a custodial parent\u2019s violation of visitation terms does not excuse a noncustodial parent from supporting his children).\nTo grant James\u2019 motion would have the effect of punishing his children for their apparent inability to forgive and forget his outbursts and absences during their childhoods. Authorizing a reduction in child support payments by noncustodial parents in James\u2019 position would put a premium on parental misbehavior toward \u2014 or neglect of \u2014 their children. Such a decision might be viewed by noncustodial parents who consider themselves burdened by child support payments as containing the following message: behave badly enough toward the children and maybe the courts will reduce or eliminate those payments. This is a message the courts must never send.\n3. Sufficiency of the Evidence\nJames also contends that the trial court\u2019s findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, James claims that the trial court ignored those facts that support his contention that Debi\u2019s interference fueled the children\u2019s resistance to him. We disagree.\nBy James\u2019 own testimony, he abandoned his children for over a year immediately after the divorce. One could expect that to rebuild a relationship with one\u2019s children after an emotional \u201cblow up\u201d and prolonged separation would be a gradual and difficult undertaking. The evidence suggests that James\u2019 past behavior left one or more of the children distrustful and resistant. Perhaps, unfortunately for all concerned, James\u2019 response to their resistance was impatience followed by withdrawal. The trial court specifically found \u201cconsistent testimony elicited that [Debi] told the children to give [James] a chance to establish a relationship\u201d but that the children refused to do so. The court further stated: \u201cWhether this refusal was due to [James\u2019] past actions, the siblings\u2019 negative remarks about [James], the children\u2019s experiences during visits, or some personality clashes, the [cjourt did not hear evidence showing that [Debi] was the cause.\u201d We have reviewed the record and we conclude that the evidence supports the trial court\u2019s finding that the breakdown in this relationship was due to James\u2019 own conduct and his children\u2019s responses to it, rather than any interference by Debi. Accordingly, we hold that the court\u2019s findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nWe also reject James\u2019 contention that the trial court improperly placed the burden upon him to prove Debi\u2019s conduct amounted to bad-faith interference with his relationship with the children. Limiting child support is a \u201cdrastic sanction\u201d and the movant appropriately bears a \u201cheavy burden of proof.\u201d Department of Public Aid ex rel. Nale v. Nale, 294 Ill. App. 3d 747, 752, 690 N.E.2d 1052, 1056 (1998). James simply failed to meet it.\nB. Effect of Children\u2019s Opposition to or Disinterest in Visitation\nJames next contends that he should be relieved of his child support obligation because the children \u201cabandoned\u201d him. We disagree.\nAs noted by the intervenor, the Department of Public Aid, courts from other jurisdictions have rejected respondent\u2019s \u201cabandonment-negates-duty-to-support\u201d argument. See Jaffee v. Jaffee, 608 N.Y.S.2d 649, 202 A.D.2d 264 (1994) (adolescent son\u2019s refusal to see his father would not result in the termination of support obligations when the father made minimal effort to establish and maintain a relationship with the son); Carroll v. Carroll, 593 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (support is not dependent on visitation rights); Henshaw v. Henshaw, 83 Mich. App. 68, 268 N.W2d 289 (1978) (trial court correctly denied father\u2019s action to terminate support based on his 13-year-old daughter\u2019s refusal to visit him). See generally Annotation, What Voluntary Acts of Child, Other Than Marriage or Entry into Military Service, Terminate Parent\u2019s Obligation to Support, 55 A.L.R.5th 557, \u00a7 10(b), at 622-27 (1998). We agree with this line of authority.\nC. Effect of New Family Unit\nLast, James argues that the establishment of a new family unit by the children and Debi should be grounds for reduction or termination of James\u2019 child support payments. He cites no cases to support this proposition and \u201c[b]are contentions in the absence of argument or citation of authority do not merit consideration on appeal.\u201d Obert v. Saville, 253 Ill. App. 3d 677, 682, 624 N.E.2d 928, 931 (1993). Moreover, this contention appears to be nothing other than a reiteration of arguments we have already rejected.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nAffirmed.\nKNECHT, EJ., and CARMAN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Howard W Feldman (argued) and Stanley N. Wasser, both of Feldman, Wasser, Draper & Benson, of Springfield, for appellant.", "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Barbara A. Preiner, Solicitor General, and Patrick W Carlson (argued), Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re MARRIAGE OF DEBI HELDEBRANDT, Petitioner, and JAMES RICHARD HELDEBRANDT, Respondent-Appellant (The Department of Public Aid, Intervenor-Appellee).\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201498\u20140225\nArgued October 21, 1998.\nOpinion filed December 2, 1998.\nHoward W Feldman (argued) and Stanley N. Wasser, both of Feldman, Wasser, Draper & Benson, of Springfield, for appellant.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Barbara A. Preiner, Solicitor General, and Patrick W Carlson (argued), Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0265-01", "first_page_order": 283, "last_page_order": 290 }