{ "id": 257208, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL COLEMAN, JR., Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Coleman", "decision_date": "1998-11-20", "docket_number": "No. 5\u201496\u20140099", "first_page": "290", "last_page": "302", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "301 Ill. App. 3d 290" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "695 N.E.2d 380", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391" }, { "page": "392" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "182 Ill. 2d 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 864518 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "192-93" }, { "page": "193" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/182/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "538 N.E.2d 481", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "487" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 Ill. 2d 66", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3229038 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/128/0066-01" ] }, { "cite": "456 N.E.2d 276", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 Ill. App. 3d 1084", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5660497 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/118/1084-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 N.E.2d 157", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 147", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3069989 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/79/0147-01" ] }, { "cite": "492 N.E.2d 1269", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1275" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 Ill. 2d 154", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5538082 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "168" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/112/0154-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 N.E. 165", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1914, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 Ill. 448", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4780233 ], "year": 1914, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "477" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/265/0448-01" ] }, { "cite": "644 N.E.2d 1172", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1183" }, { "page": "1183" }, { "page": "1187" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "163 Ill. 2d 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477614 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "210" }, { "page": "210" }, { "page": "218" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/163/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "239 N.E.2d 441", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 Ill. 2d 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2856293 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/40/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "525 N.E.2d 30", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "34" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5551204 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/123/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "461 N.E.2d 393", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 Ill. 2d 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3160843 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/101/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 U.S. 60", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 374640 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1942, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/315/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "486 U.S. 153", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6212318 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "160" }, { "page": "149" }, { "page": "1698" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/486/0153-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1159, "char_count": 28116, "ocr_confidence": 0.789, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3789857016583427e-07, "percentile": 0.6401174354180494 }, "sha256": "55400c4cc23b59f0a91070a302acec59ccbe4ff6aab3b78df37058e3b3af0929", "simhash": "1:a6e3fff0fe8281cd", "word_count": 4456 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:13:21.929948+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL COLEMAN, JR., Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KUEHN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis case examines what happens when counsel is blind to his duty of undivided loyalty and insists upon representing several people with interests that unmistakably conflict. It underscores why the representation of people whose interests are at odds is a decidedly bad practice that lawyers should try to avoid.\nAfter a jury trial, defendant was found guilty on five separate counts of first-degree murder. He now serves life imprisonment. His appeal raises the issue of the conflicts of interest his lawyer labored under during that trial.\nThe conflicts were apparent before trial began. The State sought counsel\u2019s disqualification and removal because of them. Prosecutors argued that counsel could not effectively champion defendant\u2019s interests because he represented the interests of three prosecution witnesses. Their arguments predicted that counsel\u2019s conflicting representations would taint his performance and necessitate another trial. Today, those concerns prove prophetic as counsel\u2019s contemporaneous representation of witnesses for the prosecution dictates a new trial. We reverse and remand.\nThomas Hildebrand was defendant\u2019s lawyer, a role that carried a duty to advance defendant\u2019s interests with unwavering allegiance. His professional undertaking required the confrontation of Robert Lockett, Michael Lockett, and Travon Watt, witnesses for the prosecution. Each of these witnesses faced future uncertain punishment for previously adjudicated guilt on unrelated cases, and each hoped to gain the State\u2019s favor in return for testimony.\nThese three witnesses shared something else in common. Each had hired Hildebrand to advance their interests on the very cases that awaited sentencing and provided impetus for their testimony against defendant.\nThis uncommon circumstance was addressed by the State\u2019s motion to disqualify. At the hearing on the motion, the State argued that Hildebrand\u2019s conflicts were \u201cglaring.\u201d He responded:\n\u201cMR. HILDEBRAND: Well, number one, since it\u2019s glaring I am amazed that the State waits until this date to tell me about it.\nNumber two, I don\u2019t represent Robert Lockett. I did represent him at one time. I sure as heck don\u2019t represent him now ***.\nNumber three, Michael Lockett *** is being sentenced this afternoon. That doesn\u2019t have anything to do with Michael Coleman. I am unaware of anything.\nTravon Watt pled guilty already and if I do recall he has already been sentenced *** [and] that\u2019s got nothing to do with this case. Those cases are done.\u201d\nHildebrand\u2019s protestations notwithstanding, his conflicts were clearly disabling. But rather than remove Hildebrand, the judge turned to defendant and asked if he perceived any problem:\n\u201cTHE COURT: Mr. Coleman, *** your attorney has got a conflict of interest here because he has been representing some of these people who are going to testify or may testify in this trial, those being Robert Lockett, Michael Lockett, and Travon Watt. Do you have any problem with that? ***\nDEFENDANT COLEMAN: No sir. As long as nobody harm [sic] me.\nTHE COURT: Pardon, sir?\nDEFENDANT: No, sir.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThe judge accepted this and Hildebrand remained on the case.\nOn the eve of trial, Hildebrand\u2019s conflicts were revisited. When the State asked the judge to reconfirm defendant\u2019s willingness to waive Hildebrand\u2019s conflicts, the judge turned to Hildebrand:\n\u201cTHE COURT: All right. Has your client been afforded a list of witnesses?\nMR. HILDEBRAND: Yes, your Honor. We have gone over the witness list several times.\nTHE COURT: Does your client understand the problem with the fact that you have in the past and presently represent some of these witnesses?\u201d\nHildebrand, rather than responding to the judge\u2019s question, stated:\n\u201cMR. HILDEBRAND: Only person *** who I am still listed as attorney of record for is Michael Lockett ***. If that\u2019s going to be a problem, if the Court will grant me leave to withdraw *** someone else can handle the sentencing. *** Everyone else is a prior client of mine.\nMr. Coleman is aware of that. We have discussed all these people ***\nTHE COURT: Do you understand the problem here and possible conflict your attorney has and [sic] as he just put it on the record, just laid it on the tablet?] Do you understand that possible problem?\nDEFENDANT COLEMAN: Yes, sir.\nTHE COURT: Are you willing to waive any problem or use the big words \u2018conflict of interest?\u2019 Do you want to do that?\nDEFENDANT COLEMAN: Yes, sir.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThe judge accepted this and Hildebrand remained on the case. Hildebrand entered trial with his obligation to champion Michael Lockett\u2019s interests intact. Everyone, including defendant, accepted Hildebrand\u2019s view that his duty of undivided loyalty allowed the representation of Lockett, provided Lockett\u2019s interests were abandoned prior to his testimony. And Travon Watt was declared by implication to be a past client.\nTravon Watt testified. His testimony refuted defendant\u2019s claim that he did not know his codefendant Williams. Watt testified that defendant and Williams were fellow gang members who routinely rode in a green minivan, the type of vehicle seen leaving the murder scene. Watt acknowledged prior convictions for \u201cdrugs and weapons and burglary.\u201d He was then asked:\n\u201cQ. And any other charges?\nA. Burglary charge.\nQ. And is that pending?\nA. Yes, sir.\nQ. And have you received any offers in return for your testimony regarding that burglary charge?\nA. No, sir.\u201d\nHildebrand represented Watt on the pending burglary. He also represented Watt on a pending retail theft charge. Watt failed to disclose the pending theft, implying that a burglary charge was all that jeopardized his freedom. Watt was not asked about his interest in the pending theft. There was no inquiry into his motives for testifying. There was no effort at impeachment.\nIn April of 1995, Watt and Hildebrand appeared for Watt\u2019s sentencing. Watt, a convicted felon several times over, received three-year concurrent prison terms for the 1993 burglary, the 1994 retail theft committed while on bond, and a 1995 burglary (charged after his testimony). The State sought a four-year prison term when Watt entered his burglary plea in 1993. Watt remained on bond after the plea, committed additional crimes, testified against defendant, and received less punishment for three crimes than he faced when the original burglary plea was entered.\nRobert Lockett testified. A formal agreement in return for his testimony allowed him to remain free on bail pending sentencing and promised a six-year prison sentence for home invasion.\nRobert Lockett told the jury that he, his brother Michael, and defendant were cohorts in crime. One of the crimes they had planned to commit was an armed robbery of the same victims that were robbed and killed in this case. It was a plan frustrated by Michael Lockett\u2019s arrest for an unrelated crime before the robbery could take place.\nRobert Lockett testified that in Michael\u2019s presence defendant confessed to the murders. He related how the jailhouse confession came to pass:\n\u201cA. Mr. Hildebrand was representing me at the time. He pulled all of his clients out for a conference.\nQ. Let me get this straight now. Who was your lawyer at that time?\nA. Mr. Hildebrand.\nQ. Okay. And he pulls all of his clients out of the jail at one time?\nA. Yes.\nQ. And puts you in a big conference room?\nA. Correct.\u201d\nAccording to Robert Lockett, defendant confessed while Robert, his brother Michael, and defendant waited to see Hildebrand.\nHildebrand cross-examined:\n\u201cQ. As soon as you had this alleged conversation with Mr. Colemanf,] how soon after that did you decide that you wanted to be a good citizen?\nA. After you came and told me they wasn\u2019t [sic] going to accept my plea for six years and wanted to give me 15.\u201d\nHildebrand turned to what the State promised, and Robert Lockett explained:\n\u201cA. They told me that my offense did not carry [a] probation sentence so therefore the only lenience they can [sic] give me was six years and at that time I decided, okay, that\u2019s better than 15.\nQ. Or 30?\nA. No. You told me 15 is what they wanted to give me as a cop out. That\u2019s what you told me.\nQ. But you could get?\nA. But you told me as my attorney that I was looking at 15 years as a cop out.\nQ. That\u2019s right. That\u2019s right.\nA. Okay. So not 30, 15.\u201d\nHildebrand shifted to charges the State dismissed:\n\u201cQ. Well, how about the fact that in return for your plea of guilty the State dismissed *** charges against you for Attempt Murder *** and Aggravated Battery with a Firearm?\nA. Well, you told me they didn\u2019t have me on those.\nQ. Excuse me?\nA. You told me they didn\u2019t have me on those.\nQ. Sir, I was not your attorney when you did this plea. This was a deal that you had with the State\u2019s Attorney.\nA. Mr. Hildebrand, you initially pleaded for me.\nQ. Mr. Lockett, you plead [sic] guilty on April 21st and I wasn\u2019t your attorney at that time, was I?\nA. When did you come to get the deal for me?\n. Q. Sir, my question is[,] you plead [sic] guilty on April 21st, 1994, right?\nA. Whatever day is stamped.\u201d\nHildebrand did not testify. Thus, it appeared that Hildebrand tried to broker a deal for Robert Lockett to testify against defendant and that Hildebrand\u2019s attempts to discredit testimony because of the deal were insincere.\nThe final Hildebrand client to testify for the prosecution was Michael Lockett. Hildebrand withdrew as Michael Lockett\u2019s attorney moments before Michael Lockett testified. Lockett testified under a unique arrangement. His future sentence was open. He and the State were free to seek any sentence within the sentencing range. After sentence was imposed, the State would pursue a 10-year reduction. This somewhat illusory concession was obtained while Hildebrand was Michael Lockett\u2019s attorney, but without Hildebrand\u2019s help.\nMichael Lockett duplicated his brother\u2019s testimony. At the prosecutor\u2019s request, he told the jury that Hildebrand was his lawyer at the time defendant confessed to him.\nHildebrand cross-examined. Michael Lockett, like his brother before him, exploited Hildebrand\u2019s representation. The jury saw and heard the following:\n\u201cQ. Now, why did you wait until May 20th to contact the Madison County Sheriffs office *** regarding this case?\nA. Because I would have did [sic] it sooner but you told me I was going to walk on my charges. ***\nQ. At this point you are telling because in effect they have got you jammed up and you are waiting possible\u2014\nA. I am telling for two reasons. One, you lied to me; two, Mr. Coleman did in fact say it; and, three, it helps me out, yes, because I am telling the truth.\nQ. It helps you out because you expect that you are going to get \u2014 I am not going to get in a discussion about what I supposedly lied to you about. It\u2019s not worth it.\nMR. JENSEN: I object to Mr. Hildebrand\u2019s commentary. If he has a question he may ask it.\nTHE COURT: Mr. Hildebrand, confine your remarks to questions, not to editorializing.\nMR. HILDEBRAND: Very well, your Honor. I am not the person sitting here with pending Home Invasion charges.\nMR. JENSEN: Your Honor\u2014\nTHE COURT: Mr. Hildebrand, that is highly improper.\nA. Hey, man. You been [sic] lying from day one. What\u2019s the fuck wrong with you?\nTHE COURT: Mr. Hildebrand, that\u2019s highly improper. You have been admonished.\u201d\nOn redirect, inquiry explored Hildebrand\u2019s conflicting representation:\n\u201cQ. Now, when you indicated that Mr. Hildebrand lied to you[,] what do you mean?\nA. I mean, man, you have to be there to see it.\nMR. HILDEBRAND: I am going to object to this particular line of inquiry. If you want to get into\u2014\nTHE COURT: If it was brought out on cross-examination *** is that your objection?\nMR. HILDEBRAND: My objection is that this is probably something we better discuss out of the presence of the jury.\nTHE COURT: Make a record later.\n\u00edj; ;\u00a1:\nQ. What do you mean he lied to you?\nA. I was supposed to walk on these charges pending on me.\nQ. Did he represent you in the trial?\nA. Yes, he did. Did he call any of my witnesses? No he didn\u2019t.\nQ. What kind of witnesses did you have?\nA. I had two witnesses.\nQ. Alibi witnesses?\nA. Yes.\nQ. He did not call them?\nA. No.\nQ. At that point in time was he still representing you?\nA. Yes, he was.\nQ. When did he withdraw?\nA. Today.\nQ. At the time that Mr. Hildebrand was representing you in that trial did he know that your brother was going to testify against his other client?\nA. Yes, he did.\nMR. HILDEBRAND: Objection, your Honor. How could he possibly know that especially when I didn\u2019t know it and didn\u2019t represent him[?]\nA. Yes, you did, man. You knew because he told you in the attorney\u2019s booth that day.\nMR. HILDEBRAND: I withdrew in that case quite sometime prior to this case, to Mr. Lockett\u2019s case going to trial.\nA. And he told you he was going to testify against Mr. Coleman. That\u2019s the reason you withdrew from his case.\u201d\nHildebrand asked the judge to instruct the jury to disregard the derogatory remarks Michael Lockett made about him. He questioned their relevancy, to which the prosecutor responded, \u201cIt has to do with the credibility of the witness, your Honor, and I moved, *** there should be a disqualification.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThe judge instructed the jury to disregard certain aspects of Michael Lockett\u2019s testimony. The following day, the jury was told:\n\u201cLY] ester day you heard testimony from Michael Lockett. I want you to please disregard any disagreement which occurred involving witness Michael Lockett and Attorney Thomas E. Hildebrand. I also want you to please disregard any disparaging remarks that were made by witness Michael Lockett in reference to Mr. Hildebrand\u2019s character.\u201d\nThe instruction did not erase the damage. It did not directly address highly prejudicial messages conveyed to defendant\u2019s jury. The jury no doubt considered the possibility that Hildebrand threw Michael Lockett\u2019s case because he was standing watch over defendant\u2019s interests, that Hildebrand.knew about defendant\u2019s confession from the Lockett brothers (who confided it to Hildebrand at the first available opportunity), that Hildebrand believed the Locketts and attempted to broker deals and assure outcomes to keep them silent, and that Hildebrand abandoned the Locketts\u2019 interests only when his efforts to control their testimony failed.\nDefendant now complains of Hildebrand\u2019s conflicts. There is no question that Hildebrand labored under a host of them. The State knows this, for it raised the same conflicts in its removal effort. However, the State now questions the nature of those conflicts and argues that defendant must show actual prejudice. The State also argues that defendant waived his right to a conflict-free attorney.\nWe maintain \u201can independent interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them.\u201d Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160, 100 L. Ed. 2d 140, 149, 108 S. Ct. 1692, 1698 (1988). It is not our purpose to police the practice merely to assure the maintenance of professional ethics. Conflicts of interest in criminal practice implicate an accused\u2019s constitutional rights. The right to the effective assistance of counsel under the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to the undivided loyalty of counsel, free from conflicting interests or inconsistent obligations. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 L. Ed. 680, 62 S. Ct. 457 (1942); People v. Washington, 101 Ill. 2d 104, 461 N.E.2d 393 (1984).\nAn attorney\u2019s relationships vis-a-vis certain clients can, without more, create a disabling conflict that taints trial\u2019s outcome. Counsel\u2019s contemporaneous association with either the crime victim or a State\u2019s witness forms such a relationship and creates a conflict per se. People v. Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d 1, 14, 525 N.E.2d 30, 34 (1988). Our high court has consistently maintained that conflicts per se eliminate any need to show a prejudicial effect in order to secure a conviction\u2019s reversal. People v. Stoval, 40 Ill. 2d 109, 113, 239 N.E.2d 441, 444 (1968). The per se conflict rule \u201c \u2018is a rigid one, designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to preclude the honest practitioner from putting himself in a position where he may be required to choose between conflicting duties.\u2019 \u201d People v. Lawson, 163 Ill. 2d 187, 210, 644 N.E.2d 1172, 1183 (1994), quoting People v. Gerold, 265 Ill. 448, 477, 107 N.E. 165, 177 (1914).\nWhere defense counsel has represented a State\u2019s witness, a per se conflict of interest exists if \u201cthe professional relationship between the attorney and the witness is contemporaneous with counsel\u2019s representation of the defendant.\u201d People v. Free, 112 Ill. 2d 154, 168, 492 N.E.2d 1269, 1275 (1986); see also People v. Robinson, 79 Ill. 2d 147, 402 N.E.2d 157 (1979); People v. Strohl, 118 Ill. App. 3d 1084, 456 N.E.2d 276 (1983).\nInitially, we note that the State\u2019s brief conspicuously addresses only one of counsel\u2019s dual representations. The State argues that counsel\u2019s representation of prosecution witness Michael Lockett was not contemporaneous with Lockett\u2019s testimony and therefore did not constitute a conflict per se. We disagree.\nThe State offers People v. Flores, 128 Ill. 2d 66, 538 N.E.2d 481 (1989). We think that case calls for a broader definition of contemporaneous representation than Hildebrand\u2019s midtrial withdrawal presupposes and the State\u2019s argument would have us apply.\nFlores was on trial for murder. A prosecution witness sought representation from Flores\u2019 attorney. Flores\u2019 attorney had represented the witness on a different matter at an earlier time. That matter was over. Flores\u2019 attorney advised his former client of the conflict and refused representation. The supreme court noted:\n\u201c[N]othing in the record shows that defense counsel represented Ramos at the time of defendant\u2019s trial.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Flores, 128 Ill. 2d at 83, 538 N.E.2d at 487.\nHildebrand represented Michael Lockett at the time of defendant\u2019s trial. He may not have procured the benefits Lockett was to receive in return for testimony, but he clearly owed a duty to see that Lockett obtained them. He owed that duty when he prepared for trial, interviewed Lockett about his testimony, selected a jury, considered opening statement, and confronted other prosecution witnesses.\nThe State\u2019s view of contemporaneous representation is too narrow. The conflict per se rule accepts that certain conflicts spell harm without an actual showing of prejudice. Stoval, 40 Ill. 2d 109, 239 N.E.2d 441. The reason is twofold:\n\u201c[UJnfairness to the accused, who could not determine whether his representation was affected, even subliminally, by the conflict; and the additional burden placed on defense counsel, by being unnecessarily exposed to later charges of less than faithful representation.\u201d Lawson, 163 Ill. 2d at 210, 644 N.E.2d at 1183.\nThese reasons attach to dual representation immediately before trial and during trial\u2019s initial phases. Moreover, the duty of confidentiality owed Lockett precluded the use of any helpful information that Lockett may have divulged to Hildebrand.\nHildebrand\u2019s withdrawal moments before Lockett testified did not cure the conflict. It merely assured heightened prejudice because of it. The prosecutor made sure the jury knew when Hildebrand quit the watch over Lockett\u2019s interests. By so doing, the prosecutor demonstrated that cross-examination was disingenuous. The State made adroit use of Hildebrand\u2019s prior representation to bolster Lockett\u2019s credibility. Even if Hildebrand\u2019s withdrawal was of some import, the conflict still proved prejudicial.\nHildebrand\u2019s withdrawal raises a far more salient question, one that draws a notable silence from the State. If Hildebrand thought that withdrawal as Lockett\u2019s attorney was necessary to free him from a disabling conflict, what was Hildebrand thinking when Watt testified?\nThe State does not address the representation of Watt. The State\u2019s brief simply acknowledges:\n\u201cIn a supplement to the record on appeal, the defendant has presented portions of the record in People v. Travon Watt[,] No. 93 \u2014 CF \u2014 1355 ***. The supplemental record shows that counsel continued to represent Watt subsequent to the trial in the instant case.\u201d\nHildebrand represented Watt\u2019s competing interests despite statements to the contrary. The extent to which Watt\u2019s competing interests actually fettered defendant\u2019s defense need not be determined. Watt\u2019s representation constituted a conflict per se that removes the need to find actual prejudice.\nWe note that actual prejudice abounds in the testimony of the Locketts. The crippling effect of the conflicts is manifest. The conflicting representations themselves were placed in issue to enhance testimony and dilute cross-examination.\nWe hold that the assistance of counsel provided this defendant was constitutionally infirm.\nWe turn to the question of defendant\u2019s waiver of a conflict-free attorney. The question turns on whether the various conflicts Hildebrand labored under were knowingly waived. We note that the question of whether conflicts of this nature can be waived is not before us.\nIt is well settled that trial courts must adequately inform defendants of a conflict\u2019s significance before any waiver of such a conflict can be accepted. A defendant must actually understand how the conflict could affect his attorney\u2019s representation, before his right to a conflict-free attorney can be knowingly waived. Lawson, 163 Ill. 2d at 218, 644 N.E.2d at 1187.\nHere, defendant was merely informed that Hildebrand represented witnesses for the prosecution, and then he was asked if he had any problem with it. His response indicated that he had no problem provided the contemporaneous representation caused him no harm. The judge should have determined whether defendant fully understood the significance of Hildebrand\u2019s conflicting loyalties and further understood how loyalties to prosecution witnesses could hamper Hildebrand\u2019s effectiveness. Before a determination of knowing waiver could be made, the judge needed to make sure that defendant understood how Hildebrand\u2019s allegiance to the interests of other paying clients, who were key witnesses against defendant, could impair Hildebrand\u2019s ability to perform on defendant\u2019s behalf.\nThe first inquiry into Hildebrand\u2019s ongoing representations was insufficient to produce a knowing waiver. In fact, defendant said nothing that constituted waiver. Furthermore, defendant was not told of the conflicts\u2019 potential harm. Defendant could not have been told. The watch over Watt\u2019s interests was declared complete.\nThe second inquiry into Hildebrand\u2019s ongoing representations was directed at Hildebrand rather than defendant. Hildebrand was asked whether defendant understood the ramifications of Hildebrand\u2019s conflicts. Instead of answering this critical question, Hildebrand merely insisted that all prosecution witnesses save Michael Lockett were former clients. There was never any explanation of what Hildebrand\u2019s conflicts were or what they potentially meant. Nor was defendant\u2019s understanding of Hildebrand\u2019s conflicts ever determined. Hildebrand\u2019s recital erroneously suggested that any potential harm could be cured by a midtrial withdrawal from Lockett\u2019s representation, and his recital erroneously declared Watt a prior client.\nThe judge followed Hildebrand\u2019s recital by asking whether defendant understood the possible conflict his attorney just mentioned. This inquiry was too limited. It was also deficient in its reliance upon the accuracy of Hildebrand\u2019s statements.\nFinally, after Michael Lockett\u2019s testimony, the prosecutor sought to confirm waiver for a third time. The court addressed defendant:\n\u201cTHE COURT: Mr. Coleman, I have asked you before. Any problems with Mr. Hildebrand representing you?\nDEFENDANT COLEMAN: No, sir.\u201d\nThis last inquiry into defendant\u2019s willingness to surrender the right to a conflict-free attorney suffers from the same deficiencies present in earlier inquiries. Defendant was oblivious to the conflicts\u2019 true nature and significance. Indeed, he was apparently oblivious to the message those conflicts had just conveyed to the jury.\nDespite its effort, the State did not perfect a knowing waiver. Defendant\u2019s initial assent to Hildebrand\u2019s conflicts was conditioned upon the conflicts producing no harm. Defendant was never told of the potential harm those conflicts could produce, and what he was told was seriously inaccurate.\nDefendant\u2019s willingness to allow Hildebrand\u2019s continued representation was not only an uninformed act; it was a misinformed act. Defendant was unaware of his lawyer\u2019s ongoing loyalty to the competing interests of a key witness for the prosecution. Under such circumstances, we cannot say that defendant knowingly surrendered his right to a conflict-free attorney.\nIn conclusion, we are not making a finding as to defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence that would be binding on retrial; rather, we consider the evidence in order to protect defendant\u2019s constitutional right against double jeopardy. See People v. Williams, 182 Ill. 2d 171, 192-93, 695 N.E.2d 380, 391 (1998). We find that, under the evidence presented, a retrial of defendant would not constitute double jeopardy. Williams, 182 Ill. 2d at 193, 695 N.E.2d at 392.\nFor the reasons set forth herein, defendant\u2019s convictions are reversed, and this case is remanded to the Madison County circuit court for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nWELCH, EJ., and HOFKINS, J., concur.\nThese responses embrace several misconceptions. It is not the State\u2019s role to monitor and timely inform Hildebrand of his conflicts. It is Hildebrand\u2019s responsibility to keep loyalties straight and representations sound. However, when, the State raised the issue of Hildebrand\u2019s conflicts, he appears oblivious to the dilemma those conflicts create.\nWhen Michael Lockett, awaiting sentencing, became a prosecution witness, Hildebrand\u2019s loyalties were compromised. His representation of Lockett was at odds with his representation of defendant. Hildebrand\u2019s notion that Lockett had nothing to do with defendant overlooks his duty to procure Lockett the most lenient sentence possible. That duty requires action before sentencing. After sentencing, Lockett can no longer leverage testimony against defendant for concessions.\nSimply put, Hildebrand\u2019s allegiance to Lockett called for pursuit of a course that would help to seal defendant\u2019s fate. His allegiance to defendant ran counter to such a course. He could not ethically choose between these competing interests, much less continue to represent them.\n\u2022 In addition, none of the witnesses\u2019 cases were completed. Contrary to Hildebrand\u2019s claim, the cases of Michael Lockett, Robert Lockett, and Travon Watt were still ongoing. The Locketts still faced sentencing and hoped to minimize punishment by aiding the prosecution in pursuit of defendant\u2019s conviction. Travon Watt faced a sentencing on a burglary plea and a trial on a pending retail theft charge. Hildebrand owed a duty of loyalty and confidentiality to all of them.\nThe prosecutor was candidly on target. Hildebrand\u2019s representation of the Lockett brothers proved quite relevant to their credibility. This was precisely the problem. The State\u2019s failed effort to disqualify Hildebrand was based on the prejudice it feared the conflicts might produce. The State\u2019s effort to disqualify did not license use of those conflicts to produce that prejudice \u2014 at least not without the consequence predicted from the outset.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KUEHN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel M. Kirwan and Janet Gandy Fowler, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.", "William Haine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Edwardsville (Norbert J. Goetten, Stephen E. Norris, and Gerry R. Arnold, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL COLEMAN, JR., Defendant-Appellant.\nFifth District\nNo. 5\u201496\u20140099\nOpinion filed November 20, 1998.\nDaniel M. Kirwan and Janet Gandy Fowler, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.\nWilliam Haine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Edwardsville (Norbert J. Goetten, Stephen E. Norris, and Gerry R. Arnold, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0290-01", "first_page_order": 308, "last_page_order": 320 }