{ "id": 257167, "name": "In re M.G., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. M.G., a Minor, Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. M.G.", "decision_date": "1998-11-20", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201497\u20141440", "first_page": "401", "last_page": "413", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "301 Ill. App. 3d 401" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "285 Ill. App. 3d 965", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1295554 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "no jurisdiction problem where mother was present at both adjudicatory and dispositional hearings, despite fact that service to mother was unsuccessful and she was not present at hearing on motion to suppress" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/285/0965-01" ] }, { "cite": "87 Ill. 2d 56", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3031635 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62", "parenthetical": "mother waived formal service of process and submitted to jurisdiction where she appeared in court and participated actively in the proceedings without objection" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/87/0056-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 Ill. 2d 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477978 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "270" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/163/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3125654 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "issue waived where minor failed to raise in trial court any question regarding the failure to identify or locate a noncustodial parent whose identity or address was unknown" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "385 U.S. 554", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11341302 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "559-60" }, { "page": "611" }, { "page": "651" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/385/0554-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 U.S. 263", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1777320 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/445/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777553 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66-67" }, { "page": "69-70", "parenthetical": "\"court may not seize upon 'the best interests of the child mandate' to enlarge its statutory powers\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 Ill. 2d 307", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 222749 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/167/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "6 Ill. 2d 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2708807 ], "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/6/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3069839 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/79/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 Ill. 2d 67", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5473462 ], "weight": 10, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "82" }, { "page": "71-73" }, { "page": "79" }, { "page": "79" }, { "page": "80" }, { "page": "80" }, { "page": "80" }, { "page": "81" }, { "page": "81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/83/0067-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3129856 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/108/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 Ill. 2d 471", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 295791 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "486" }, { "page": "489" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/175/0471-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1002, "char_count": 29629, "ocr_confidence": 0.786, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1238072675493662e-07, "percentile": 0.5741286461102558 }, "sha256": "b7a34346a4a920e555dbe0000b8d569d60ec9b33fbc398d39148702a7658b903", "simhash": "1:3998507cc668179b", "word_count": 4810 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:13:21.929948+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re M.G., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. M.G., a Minor, Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GREIMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nRespondent M.G., a 13-year-old, challenges his adjudication of delinquency and disposition pursuant to section 5 \u2014 36 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (commonly known as the Violent Juvenile Offender Act) (705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 36 (West 1996)), for aggravated discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24 \u2014 1.2(a)(2) (West 1996)). M.G. argues (1) that the mandatory disposition provision of the Violent Juvenile Offender Act violates the United States Constitution and the Illinois Constitution; (2) the State failed to provide sufficient notice of the proceedings to his father; and (3) the State failed to provide M.G. with adequate notice of its intent to prosecute him under the Violent Juvenile Offender Act. We affirm.\nOn October 15, 1996, a petition was filed for an adjudication of wardship alleging that on October 11, 1996, M.G. committed the offense of reckless discharge of a firearm in violation of section 24\u2014 1.5(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/24 \u2014 1.5(a) (West 1996)). The trial court first heard the matter that same day, with M.G. receiving legal representation from the Northwestern University Legal Clinic. The court questioned M.G. and he identified his mother, who was present in court that day. M.G. identified his father as Albert G. M.G.\u2019s mother added that the father was incarcerated, and M.G. indicated that his father was in \u201cPontiac.\u201d The petition includes the names of M.G.\u2019s parents but lists Albert G.\u2019s address as \u201cunknown.\u201d However, there is handwriting on the document indicating \u201cPontiac.\u201d The court stated \u201cMother in court; certified mail to father.\u201d\nAt that initial hearing, the State requested leave to amend the petition to include a second count for aggravated discharge of a firearm. The court then asked M.G. if he understood this count and he said, \u201cYes.\u201d M.G. waived formal reading of the petition.\nOn October 18, 1996, the court conducted an emergency hearing with only a representative of the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office being present. The State sought leave to file a notice of intent to prosecute M.G. as a violent juvenile offender. The assistant State\u2019s Attorney indicated that he gave notice to M.G.\u2019s attorneys via fax the day before the hearing. The attorney further stated:\n\u201cI have spoken to Northwestern Legal Clinic this morning. Sheryl Graves is not in town, and her partner on the case Angela [Coin] is also not in town. I spoke with a Steven Drizin *** and he has faxed a note to me indicating that, in fact, their office was in receipt of the State\u2019s motion and notice of motion as of 1:09 p.m. yesterday ***. However, Mr. Drizin also wanted this Court to be informed that in no way are they at this time conceding whether the service was proper nor timely, and wanted me to make that representation to the Court.\u201d\nThere is no indication that M.G. was present or absent from that hearing. The court held the matter over until October 22, 1996.\nOn October 22, 1996, Angela Coin of the Northwestern University Legal Clinic appeared on behalf of M.G. She moved to quash the State\u2019s notice of intent to file as a violent juvenile offender. She stated that on the afternoon before the date of the last hearing, the State faxed her office the notice. However, the two attorneys and the law students working on the case were not in town that day and did not receive the notice. The trial court denied the motion to quash the notice. M.G. then moved to dismiss the notice of intent to prosecute the minor as a violent offender.\nOn December 4, 1996, the court heard the matter again. At that hearing, the assistant State\u2019s Attorney stated, \u201cI need to make a record that summons by certified mail was tendered to Albert [G.], the father of the minor respondent. I have received a green card. I\u2019d like to make that of record and put it in the file.\u201d There was no objection.\nOn December 13, 1996, the parties presented argument on the motion challenging the constitutionality of the Violent Juvenile Offender Act. The court found it constitutional and denied the motion to dismiss. On January 14, 1997, a jury was selected, and on January 15, 1997, the jury heard the testimony of several witnesses. M.G.\u2019s mother was present. The jury found M.G. delinquent by reason of aggravated discharge of a firearm.\nOn February 28, 1997, the trial court denied M.G.\u2019s motions for a new trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The court then began to conduct a dispositional hearing. The court recognized, however, that it had no discretion in selecting the appropriate disposition. The court stated it could consider evidence but, according to the statute, the disposition would be to commit M.G. to the Department of Corrections regardless of the evidence. The State tendered a verified statement indicating that M.G. was previously adjudicated delinquent for the offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault, a Class X felony, on March 8, 1996.\nThe trial court found that M.G. was served with written notice of the intent to prosecute under the Violent Juvenile Offender Act within the statutory time period; he was previously adjudicated delinquent for the offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault which, had he been an adult, would have been a Class 2 or greater felony involving the use or threat of physical force or violence on an individual; and he was adjudicated delinquent for the subsequent offense of aggravated discharge of a firearm which, had he been prosecuted as an adult, would have been a Class 2 or greater felony involving the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual. M.G. was adjudicated a violent juvenile offender and committed to the Department of Corrections until his twenty-first birthday.\nThis appeal is a case of first impression calling upon this court to examine the Violent Juvenile Offender Act. M.G. contends that the Violent Juvenile Offender Act\u2019s mandatory disposition provision violates the Illinois Constitution as well as the due process and equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution.\nThe Violent Juvenile Offender Act provides in pertinent part:\n\u201c\u00a7 5 \u2014 36. Violent Juvenile Offender.\n(a) Definition. A minor having been previously adjudicated a delinquent minor for an offense which, had he or she been prosecuted as an adult, would have been a Class 2 or greater felony involving the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual or a Class 2 or greater felony for which an element of the offense is possession or use of a firearm, and who is thereafter adjudicated a delinquent minor for a second time for any of those offenses shall be adjudicated a Violent Juvenile Offender if:\n(1) The second adjudication is for an offense occurring after adjudication on the first; and\n(2) The second offense occurred on or after January 1, 1995.\n(b) Notice to minor. The State shall serve upon the minor written notice of intention to prosecute under the provisions of this Section within 5 judicial days of the filing of a delinquency petition, adjudication upon which would mandate the minor\u2019s disposition as a Violent Juvenile Offender.\n(c) Petition; service. A notice to seek adjudication as a Violent Juvenile Offender shall be filed only by the State\u2019s Attorney.\nThe petition upon which the Violent Juvenile Offender notice is based shall contain the information and averments required for all other delinquency petitions filed under this Act and its service shall be according to the provisions of this Act.\nNo prior adjudication shall be alleged in the petition.\n(d) Trial. Trial on the petition shall be by jury unless the minor demands, in open court, and with advice of counsel, a trial by the court without a jury.\nExcept as otherwise provided in this Section, the provisions of this Act concerning delinquency proceedings generally shall be applicable to Violent Juvenile Offender proceedings.\n(f) Disposition. If the court finds that the prerequisites established in subsection (a) of this Section have been proven, it shall adjudicate the minor a Violent Juvenile Offender and commit the minor to the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division, until his or her 21st birthday, without possibility of parole, furlough, or non-emergency authorized absence. However, the minor shall be entitled to earn one day of good conduct credit for each day served as reductions against the period of his or her confinement. The good conduct credits shall be earned or revoked according to the procedures applicable to the allowance and revocation of good conduct credit for adult prisoners serving determinate sentences for felonies.\nFor purposes of determining good conduct credit, commitment as a Violent Juvenile Offender shall be considered a determinate commitment, and the difference between the date of the commitment and the minor\u2019s 21st birthday shall be considered the determinate period of his or her confinement.\n(g) Nothing in this Section shall preclude the State\u2019s Attorney from seeking to prosecute a minor as a habitual juvenile offender or as an adult as an alternative to prosecution as a Violent Juvenile Offender.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 36 (West 1996).\nAt the outset, we observe that there is \u201c \u2018a strong presumption of constitutionality\u2019 \u201d that attaches to any legislative enactment and \u201c \u2018the burden rests upon the challenger to demonstrate its invalidity.\u2019 \u201d In re S.G., 175 Ill. 2d 471, 486 (1997), quoting Sanelli v. Glenview State Bank, 108 Ill. 2d 1, 20 (1985). M.G. first challenges the constitutionality of the Violent Juvenile Offender Act\u2019s mandatory disposition provision.\nThe Illinois Constitution mandates that \u201c[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 11. M.G. contends that the Violent Juvenile Offender Act violates this constitutional protection by requiring the juvenile court to commit a juvenile adjudicated under it to the Department of Corrections until his twenty-first birthday regardless of any other considerations. This argument is essentially the same as his argument that the same provision violates the due process clause of the United States Constitution. M.G. contends that by setting a mandatory disposition, regardless of mitigating circumstances, the Violent Juvenile Offender Act effectively eliminates the due process safeguard in the juvenile system that the courts are to serve the best interests of the minor child.\nIn People ex rel. Carey v. Chrastka, 83 Ill. 2d 67 (1980), the Illinois Supreme Court addressed several challenges to the then existing section of the Juvenile Court Act commonly known as the Habitual Juvenile Offender Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1980 Supp., ch. 37, par. 705 \u2014 12 (now 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 35 (West 1996))). The supreme court considered three consolidated cases in which judges of the circuit court held the statute unconstitutional. The supreme court ruled that the statute did not violate the state or federal constitution and granted the State\u2019s petitions for writs of mandamus. Chrastka, 83 Ill. 2d at 82. The Habitual Juvenile Offender Act provided that any minor having been twice adjudicated delinquent for offenses which, had he been prosecuted as an adult, would have been felonies and who is thereafter adjudicated delinquent for a third time be adjudged an habitual juvenile offender. The trial court must commit an habitual juvenile offender to the Department of Corrections until his twenty-first birthday. Chrastka, 83 Ill. 2d at 71-73, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat., 1980 Supp., ch. 37, par. 705 \u2014 12.\nThe Chrastka court rejected the minors\u2019 arguments that the Habitual Juvenile Offender Act violated the due process clause of the federal constitution and the mandate concerning penalties in our state constitution, stating:\n\u201c[T]he legislature has the authority to define offenses against the People and to determine sentences, and this authority, by definition, enables the legislature to establish minimum sentences. Such legislative action necessarily limits the inquiry and function of the judiciary in imposing sentences, but this alone does not render the legislation violative of the constitutional provisions upon which respondents rely. Any resulting diminution of the judiciary\u2019s role is adequately remedied by the legislature\u2019s clear and comprehensive treatment of the subject, and we cannot say that the means chosen by the legislature is not \u2018 \u201c*** reasonably designed to remedy the evils which the legislature has determined to be a threat to the public health, safety and general welfare.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Chrastka, 83 Ill. 2d at 79, quoting People v. Bradley, 79 Ill. 2d 410, 417 (1980), quoting Heimgaertner v. Benjamin Electric Manufacturing Co., 6 Ill. 2d 152, 159 (1955).\nThe court further recognized that, under the Habitual Juvenile Offender Act, a court is faced with a juvenile who has allegedly committed three offenses within a short period of time. The two predicate adjudications afforded the juvenile the opportunity to present mitigating evidence at a hearing where the trial judge could exercise his or her discretion in determining the appropriate disposition. Chrastka, 83 Ill. 2d at 79. The court determined that the legislature could conclude that an individual who has committed three offenses has benefited little from the rehabilitative measures of the juvenile court and shows little prospect for restoration to meaningful citizenship within that system. Chrastka, 83 Ill. 2d at 80. Thus, the court did not find that the rehabilitative purposes of the system were forsaken. Rather, after the commission of the third serious offense, the interest of society in being protected from such conduct receives additional consideration. The court found it \u201centirely reasonable and constitutionally permissible\u201d for the legislature to authorize the disposition specified in the Habitual Juvenile Offender Act. Chrastka, 83 Ill. 2d at 80.\nM.G. contends that the supreme court\u2019s reasoning in Chrastka should not apply to the instant case because the Habitual Juvenile Offender Act mandates a disposition after there has been a pattern of conduct, that is, after two prior offenses. The Violent Juvenile Offender Act, on the other hand, imposes the disposition after only one prior offense. We find M.G.\u2019s distinction between the two statutes unpersuasive. Chrastka establishes that neither of the constitutional provisions cited is violated merely because the legislature mandates a disposition in certain situations. While legislative action may limit the courts\u2019 discretion, it is not necessarily unconstitutional. The limitation of the courts\u2019 role can be remedied by the legislature\u2019s treatment of the subject. Indeed, the issues of seriousness of the offense and rehabilitation have apparently already been considered in the disposition set by the legislature in the Violent Juvenile Offender Act.\nUnder the Violent Juvenile Offender Act, the court is faced with a juvenile who has allegedly committed two very serious violent offenses within a short period of time. On the predicate offense, the juvenile had the opportunity to present mitigating evidence that allowed the trial judge to exercise his or her discretion in determining an appropriate disposition. While the Violent Juvenile Offender Act involves one less offense than the Habitual Juvenile Offender Act, as in Chrastka, the legislature could legitimately conclude that an individual who has committed two serious violent offenses has benefited little from the rehabilitative measures of the juvenile court system and exhibits little prospect for restoration to meaningful citizenship within that system. The rehabilitative purposes of the system are not forsaken but, after the commission of a second serious offense, the interest of society\u2019s protection receives additional consideration. We hold it constitutionally permissible for the legislature to authorize the disposition specified in the Violent Juvenile Offender Act.\nBoth M.G.\u2019s brief and the amicus brief rely on other language in the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (the Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 1996)) regarding its purpose and goals to support the contention that the Violent Juvenile Offender Act is unconstitutional. Delinquency proceedings are protective in nature and the Juvenile Court Act\u2019s purpose is to correct and rehabilitate, not to punish. In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d 307, 320 (1995). However, the Violent Juvenile Offender Act specifically instructs that other provisions in the Juvenile Court Act concerning delinquency proceedings are generally applicable to violent juvenile offender proceedings \u201c[ejxcept as otherwise provided\u201d in the Violent Juvenile Offender Act. 705 ILCS 405/5\u201436(d) (West 1996). Thus, there is no reason not to follow the mandatory disposition provision merely because other sections of the Juvenile Court Act may be contradictory. Furthermore, the scope and application of the Juvenile Court Act are defined solely by the legislature and while the Juvenile Court Act should be liberally construed, a reviewing court may not engage in judicial legislation by rewriting the Violent Juvenile Offender Act. See In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 66-67 (1993); see also S.G., 175 Ill. 2d at 489, quoting M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 69-70 (\u201ccourt may not seize upon \u2018the best interests of the child mandate\u2019 to enlarge its statutory powers\u201d).\nM.G. next argues that the Violent Juvenile Offender Act\u2019s mandatory disposition provision violates the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. In Chrastka, the court also considered an equal protection challenge to the Habitual Juvenile Offender Act\u2019s similar disposition provision and found no violation, stating:\n\u201cThe apparent predominant purpose of the [Habitual Juvenile Offender] Act is to protect society from an individual who, having committed three serious offenses, would appear to have gained little from the rehabilitative measures of the juvenile court system. In furtherance of this purpose, the legislature has determined that an individual who is subject to the [Habitual Juvenile Offender] Act shall be confined until the age of 21. As a result, an habitual juvenile offender may be confined longer than one who is older, and it is alleged that this disparity in treatment adversely affects a juvenile\u2019s fundamental interest in liberty and is not justified by any compelling interest. We do not agree with either the suggested analysis or conclusion.\u201d Chrastka, 83 Ill. 2d at 80.\nThe Chrastka court determined that even if it relied on the compelling interest analysis, the interest in protecting society from an habitual juvenile offender was as compelling as the interest in protecting society from an habitual adult offender. Chrastka, 83 Ill. 2d at 81. The court noted that the states\u2019 broad authority to deal with adult recidivists has already been recognized. Chrastka, 83 Ill. 2d at 81, citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 63 L. Ed. 2d 382, 100 S. Ct. 1133 (1980); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-60, 17 L. Ed. 2d 606, 611, 87 S. Ct. 648, 651 (1967). The Chrastka court did not find the disparity of the terms of confinement for habitual juvenile offenders that results from the variance in age of offenders invalidated the means chosen by the legislature to effectuate the purpose of the Habitual Juvenile Offender Act.\nThe Violent Juvenile Offender Act has the apparent purpose of protecting society from an individual who has committed two serious violent offenses involving the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual or possession or use of a firearm. To further its purpose, the legislature determined that a violent juvenile offender should be confined until the age of 21. Like the Habitual Juvenile Offender Act, the interest in protecting society is compelling in cases involving such serious juvenile offenders, and we do not find the disparity resulting from the mandatory disposition to invalidate the statute. While M.G. argues the statutes are different because the Habitual Juvenile Offender Act applies where there have been three offenses, he does not provide a persuasive reason for this court to abandon the Chrastka court\u2019s analysis. Therefore, we affirm the trial court on this issue.\nM.G. next contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear this case because the State failed to provide sufficient notice to M.G.\u2019s father of the pending adjudication. The State argues that M.G. waived his right to argue that his father was not served. The record reveals that M.G. did not raise this issue to the trial court and therefore the issue could be deemed waived. See In re D.L., 299 Ill. App. 3d (1998) (where minor failed to raise issue in lower court, minor waived issue of lack of notice to custodial father, who lived with mother who was properly served with notice); see also In re J.P.J., 109 Ill. 2d 129 (1985) (issue waived where minor failed to raise in trial court any question regarding the failure to identify or locate a noncustodial parent whose identity or address was unknown). However, we need not rely on waiver to find a basis for affirming the trial court.\nA minor and his parents have a constitutional right of due process to receive adequate notice of juvenile proceedings. In re C.R.H., 163 Ill. 2d 263, 270 (1994). The State does not dispute that notice was required here. Rather, it contends that the record provides conclusive proof that M.G.\u2019s father received notice of all of the proceedings in this case. We agree.\nThe Juvenile Court Act requires that the parents of a minor who are named as respondents in a petition for delinquency be issued summons. 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 15(1) (West 1996). The Juvenile Court Act further provides for notice by certified mail if service of the summons on a parent is not made within a reasonable time. 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 16 (West 1996). \u201cIn such case the clerk shall mail the summons and a copy of the petition to that respondent by certified mail marked for delivery to addressee only. The court shall not proceed with the adjudicatory hearing until 5 days after such mailing. The regular return receipt for certified mail is sufficient proof of service.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 16(1) (West 1996).\nThe record reflects that at the hearing on October 15, 1996, M.G. identified his father. M.G.\u2019s mother stated that the father was incarcerated and M.G. indicated that he was in \u201cPontiac.\u201d The petition lists the father\u2019s address as \u201cunknown,\u201d but there is handwriting on the document indicating \u201cPontiac.\u201d The court then stated, \u201cMother in court; certified mail to father.\u201d\nThe record contains three green certified mail receipt cards addressed to Albert G., Illinois Department of Corrections, Pontiac, Illinois, sent from the clerk\u2019s office or the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office. The cards contained Albert G.\u2019s inmate number. One has a delivery date of November 8, 1996, which indicates that the summons was sent to the father well in advance of the adjudicatory hearing in January. On December 4, 1996, the assistant State\u2019s Attorney stated on the record that the summons was tendered by certified mail to Albert G. and the attorney offered the green card without objection.\nA second green certified mail receipt card indicates a delivery date of January 30, and is postmarked January 30, 1997. This card was sent after the adjudicatory hearing, but before the disposition hearing, and presumably indicates the receipt of notice for the disposition hearing. However, the record also contains a document purporting to be an affidavit of service regarding the service of a summons on Albert G. and indicating that service of the summons was not made within a reasonable time. This affidavit is signed January 28, 1997. These documents suggest that an attempt was made on January 28, 1997, to serve Albert G. in person, but when this did not occur, the State sent the documents by certified mail.\nNevertheless, a third green certified mail receipt card indicates that Albert G. was sent documents. This card does not indicate a date of delivery but is date stamped February 6, 1997. This card does not have a signature of receipt. This card appears to indicate that documents were sent to M.G.\u2019s father at that time, which was before the disposition hearing on February 28, 1997.\nAs the statute provides, a certified mail receipt is sufficient proof of service. M.G. has presented no grounds for concluding that these mail receipt cards are inaccurate or fraudulent. Based on the facts presented, we conclude that the minor\u2019s father was given sufficient notice of the proceedings.\nM.G. also contends he is entitled to a new trial because the State failed to provide him with adequate notice of the supplemental petition. The record indicates, however, that M.G. and his mother were aware of the supplemental petition. Both were present at the hearing when the trial court granted leave to amend the petition to include the additional count. The trial court asked M.G. if he understood this second count and he said, \u201cYes.\u201d The Juvenile Court Act provides that \u201c[t]he appearance of the minor\u2019s legal guardian or custodian, or a person named as a respondent in a petition, in any proceedings under this Act shall constitute a waiver of service of summons and submission to the jurisdiction of the court.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/ 5 \u2014 15(7) (West 1996); see also In re J.W., 87 Ill. 2d 56, 62 (1981) (mother waived formal service of process and submitted to jurisdiction where she appeared in court and participated actively in the proceedings without objection); In re J.E., 285 Ill. App. 3d 965 (1996) (no jurisdiction problem where mother was present at both adjudicatory and dispositional hearings, despite fact that service to mother was unsuccessful and she was not present at hearing on motion to suppress).\nM.G.\u2019s main contention is that he personally did not receive proper notice of the State\u2019s intent to prosecute him as a violent juvenile offender. The Violent Juvenile Offender Act provides that \u201c[t]he State shall serve upon the minor written notice of intention to prosecute under the provisions of this Section within 5 judicial days of the filing of a delinquency petition.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 36(b) (West 1996). The State maintains and the trial court found that the State complied with this section of the Violent Juvenile Offender Act because written notice was served on M.G.\u2019s attorney by fax on October 17, 1996. M.G.\u2019s counsel objected to this service but admitted that her office received the fax. The trial court denied the oral motion to quash the notice of intent, stating:\n\u201c[T]he point is that the legal clinic that you work for which represents the minor did receive notice by [fax]. You received notice on that date within the five days. The minor received notice. He was in court. I informed him of that.\u201d\nM.G. contends this notification violated the statute because the first time he and his mother were aware of the intent to prosecute under the Violent Juvenile Offender Act was on October 22, 1996, which was more than five days after filing the petition. The portion of the transcript cited above suggests that M.G. was present at the October 18, 1996, hearing when the State filed its notice of intent to prosecute pursuant to the Violent Juvenile Offender Act. We note that there is nothing in the transcript from that day indicating whether M.G. was actually present.\nNevertheless, Supreme Court Rule 11(a) (145 Ill. 2d R. 11(a)) provides that \u201c[i]f a party is represented by an attorney of record, service shall be made upon the attorney.\u201d Thus, service of the notice on M.G.\u2019s attorney rather than M.G. was sufficient.\nSupreme Court Rule 11(b)(4) (145 Ill. 2d R. 11(b)(4)) provides that service may be made \u201cvia facsimile machine to the office of the attorney *** who has consented to receiving service by facsimile transmission.\u201d The record does not indicate whether M.G.\u2019s attorney consented to service by fax. Even if the State\u2019s Attorney violated the rule regarding consent to serve notice via fax, it is undisputed that M.G.\u2019s attorney\u2019s office received the fax transmission on October 17. M.G. had actual written notice within five days. Even if there may have been a failure to fully comply with the rule, we do not find reversible error here. M.G.\u2019s attorney received actual notice, within the time period. Further, even though this notice was received very close to the time of the hearing, there was nothing M.G. could have done to prevent the filing of the notice and he was still permitted to and did object to the propriety of prosecution under the Violent Juvenile Offender Act.\nFor the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the adjudication of delinquency and disposition.\nAffirmed.\nHOURIHANE, EJ., and HARTMAN, J., concur.\nAlthough the transcript indicates this hearing occurred in 1997, this appears to be a typographical error. The proper date should be December 4, 1996.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GREIMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Stephan V Beyer and Tamar B. Kelber, both Sidley & Austin, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, James E. Fitzgerald, and Michelle Katz, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.", "Steven A. Drizin, of Children & Family Justice Center, of Northwestern University Legal Clinic, of Chicago, for amicus curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re M.G., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. M.G., a Minor, Respondent-Appellant).\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1\u201497\u20141440\nOpinion filed November 20, 1998.\nStephan V Beyer and Tamar B. Kelber, both Sidley & Austin, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, James E. Fitzgerald, and Michelle Katz, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nSteven A. Drizin, of Children & Family Justice Center, of Northwestern University Legal Clinic, of Chicago, for amicus curiae." }, "file_name": "0401-01", "first_page_order": 419, "last_page_order": 431 }