{
  "id": 257117,
  "name": "LONG GROVE MANOR, Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD et al., Respondents-Appellees",
  "name_abbreviation": "Long Grove Manor v. Property Tax Appeal Board",
  "decision_date": "1998-12-18",
  "docket_number": "No. 2\u201497\u20141078",
  "first_page": "654",
  "last_page": "657",
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      "cite": "301 Ill. App. 3d 654"
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    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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    {
      "cite": "182 Ill. 2d 359",
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      "year": 1998,
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          "page": "368"
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  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 401,
    "char_count": 8010,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.764,
    "pagerank": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:13:21.929948+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "LONG GROVE MANOR, Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD et al., Respondents-Appellees."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE HUTCHINSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPetitioner, Long Grove Manor, appeals the order of the Property Tax Appeal Board (the Board) assessing petitioner\u2019s property at $558,646 for 1995. Petitioner contends that the Board erred by assessing an improvement on the property although the improvement was not initially occupied until 1996. We affirm.\nThe improvement in question is a nursing home that petitioner had constructed on a parcel it owns in Long Grove. Petitioner obtained excavation and building permits in 1994 and began construction. By January 1995, the building was under roof. The Village of Long Grove issued petitioner a temporary occupancy permit on October 17, 1995, for the sole purpose of allowing petitioner to receive a permit from the state health department.\nA contractor\u2019s affidavit dated October 23, 1995, showed that the construction of the building was complete. The Illinois Department of Public Health issued an operating permit on December 26, 1995. On January 5, 1996, Long Grove issued another temporary occupancy permit and subsequently issued a final permit.\nGary Raupp, the Vernon Township assessor, testified that in 1994 he assessed the parcel as vacant land. In 1995, he determined that the structure was substantially completed because it was under roof as of January 1, 1995. He, therefore, valued it for assessment purposes. However, because the building was not occupied, he imposed only a \u201ctoken assessment\u201d of 25%, which was his policy in all such cases. This resulted in an assessment of $358,883 for the improvement.\nThe Board of Review reduced the assessment to $347,284. Petitioner then appealed to the Board, arguing that the assessment should be $0. The Board disagreed and upheld the assessment. Petitioner timely appealed directly to this court. See 35 ILCS 200/16\u2014195 (West 1996).\nPetitioner contends that the Board erred in determining that the building was substantially completed, and thus assessable, in January 1995. Petitioner relies on section 9 \u2014 180 of the Property Tax Code (the Code) (35 ILCS 200/9 \u2014 180 (West 1994)), which provides as follows:\n\u201cThe owner of property on January 1 also shall be liable, on a proportionate basis, for the increased taxes occasioned by the construction of new or added buildings, structures or other improvements on the property from the date when the improvement was substantially completed and initially occupied or initially used, to December 31 of that year.\u201d 35 ILCS 200/9 \u2014 180 (West 1994).\nPetitioner argues that under section 9 \u2014 180 an improvement must be both substantially completed and initially occupied before it can be assessed. According to petitioner, although the building was substantially completed by January 1, 1995, it was not initially occupied until 1996 (or at the earliest, December 26, 1995, when the health department issued a permit). Petitioner thus contends that the improvement should not have been assessed for any amount in 1995.\nThe Board and the Lake County Board of Review (Lake County) respond that section 9 \u2014 180 is not the only section of the Code that applies to this case. The Board and Lake County contend that section 9 \u2014 180 controls when a building can be fully assessed but does not prevent a partial assessment before that time.\nSection 9 \u2014 160 of the Code provides:\n\u201cOn or before June 1 in each year other than the general assessment year *** the assessor shall list and assess all property which becomes taxable and which is not upon the general assessment, and also make and return a list of all new or added buildings, structures or other improvements of any kind, the value of which had not been previously added to or included in the valuation of the property on which such improvements have been made, specifying the property on which each of the improvements has been made, the kind of improvement and the value which, in his or her opinion, has been added to the property by the improvements. The assessment shall also include or exclude, on a proportionate basis in accordance with the provisions of Section 9 \u2014 180, all new or added buildings, structures or other improvements, the value of which was not included in the valuation of the property for that year, and all improvements which were destroyed or removed.\u201d 35 ILCS 200/9 \u2014 160 (West 1994).\nWe agree with the Board and Lake County that section 9 \u2014 160 authorizes the procedure the assessor used here. When construing a statute, the primary concern is to give effect to the legislature\u2019s intention. Zekman v. Direct American Marketers, Inc., 182 Ill. 2d 359, 368 (1998). Undefined terms should be given their ordinary and popularly understood meanings. Texaco-Cities Service Pipeline Co. v. McGaw, 182 Ill. 2d 262, 270 (1998).\nHere, section 9 \u2014 160 requires the assessor to record any new improvements and to determine the value they have added to the property. By its terms, section 9 \u2014 180, applies only after a building has been substantially completed and initially occupied. Reading these two sections together, section 9 \u2014 160 clearly requires the assessor to value any substantially completed improvements to the extent that they add value to the property. Section 9 \u2014 180 then defines the time when the improvement can be fully assessed. This occurs when the building is both substantially completed and initially occupied. We note parenthetically that the legislature has amended section 9 \u2014 180 to provide that an improvement may be fully assessed when it is either substantially completed or initially occupied. 35 ILCS 200/9 \u2014 180 (West 1996). However, the parties do not contend that the amended section 9 \u2014 180 applies to this case.\nHere, Raupp testified that he determined the building to be substantially completed because it was under roof as of January 1, 1995. He then valued the building based on the valuation of other nursing homes in the area. However, because it was unoccupied, he imposed a \u201ctoken assessment\u201d of 25% of the assessed value. He testified that, if sold, the property would be worth more because of the partially completed building. This procedure complied with section 9 \u2014 160. The building was assessed based on the value it added to the property but was not fully assessed because it was not then both substantially completed and initially occupied. Accordingly, the Board did not err in upholding the assessment.\nIn Michigan-Grand Building Corp. v. Barrett, 350 Ill. 291 (1932), our supreme court rejected the contention that a building could not be taxed because it was not under roof by the start of the tax year. The court stated that, if during the year improvements were placed on a parcel, it became the assessor\u2019s duty \u201cto determine the amount, in its opinion, of any change in the value by reason of the improvements thereon and add to the assessment accordingly.\u201d Michigan-Grand Building Corp., 350 Ill. at 304; see also People ex rel. McDonough v. Marshall Field & Co., 355 Ill. 633, 640 (1934).\nBecause of our disposition of this contention, we need not determine whether the Board correctly determined that the building was substantially complete or properly applied a 25% multiplier to account for the fact that it was not occupied.\nThe order of the Property Tax Appeal Board is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nMcLAREN and THOMAS, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE HUTCHINSON"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Allen A. Lefkovitz, of Allen A. Lefkovitz & Associates, PC., and Lawrence M. Templer, of Jolivette & Templer, PC., both of Chicago, for petitioner.",
      "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Barbara A. Preiner, Solicitor General, and Jill A. Dougherty and Michael A. Rakov, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for respondent Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board.",
      "Michael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Jacob Marc Steinfink, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for respondent Lake County Board of Review."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "LONG GROVE MANOR, Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD et al., Respondents-Appellees.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201497\u20141078\nOpinion filed December 18, 1998.\nAllen A. Lefkovitz, of Allen A. Lefkovitz & Associates, PC., and Lawrence M. Templer, of Jolivette & Templer, PC., both of Chicago, for petitioner.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Barbara A. Preiner, Solicitor General, and Jill A. Dougherty and Michael A. Rakov, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for respondent Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board.\nMichael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Jacob Marc Steinfink, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for respondent Lake County Board of Review."
  },
  "file_name": "0654-01",
  "first_page_order": 672,
  "last_page_order": 675
}
