{ "id": 257166, "name": "DIANA L. WHITE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VICKI L. STEVENS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "White v. Stevens", "decision_date": "1998-12-18", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201498\u20140298", "first_page": "709", "last_page": "712", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "301 Ill. App. 3d 709" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "154 Ill. App. 3d 1064", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3648262 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1075" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/154/1064-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 Ill. App. 3d 524", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1260339 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "529-30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/284/0524-01" ] }, { "cite": "137 Ill. 2d 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3251812 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" }, { "page": "186-87" }, { "page": "185-86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/137/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "5 Ill. App. 2d 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5135363 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "178-79" }, { "page": "177-78" }, { "page": "178" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/5/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 Ill. App. 3d 60", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3535672 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/145/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 Ill. App. 3d 143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2548032 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "146" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/208/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "36 Ill. 2d 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5378169 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "267" }, { "page": "267-68" }, { "page": "266-67" }, { "page": "267-68" }, { "page": "266-67" }, { "page": "266-67" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/36/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "285 Ill. App. 3d 459", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1295617 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "463" }, { "page": "467" }, { "page": "467-68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/285/0459-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 Ill. 2d 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3164374 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391-92" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/99/0389-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 421, "char_count": 6907, "ocr_confidence": 0.774, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.010205614304154412 }, "sha256": "03812de11fdc7cbb773ebebf54a6fa43013ce17b92854b1716e4efd6f40c172a", "simhash": "1:7fbaf56dd7c44cfc", "word_count": 1133 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:13:21.929948+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "DIANA L. WHITE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VICKI L. STEVENS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE COLWELL\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Diana White, was injured when her motorcycle collided with a car driven by defendant, Vicki Stevens. Plaintiff brought this negligence action, and a jury awarded her $22,500 in damages. After the court denied defendant\u2019s posttrial motion, defendant timely appealed.\nOn appeal, defendant argues that plaintiffs improper argument deprived her of a fair trial. Specifically, she maintains that plaintiffs counsel exceeded the bounds of fair comment when, in rebuttal closing argument, he told the jury to make sure that its answer to a special interrogatory (see 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1108 (West 1996)) was consistent with its verdict. We agree with defendant and hold that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her posttrial motion. Therefore, we reverse and remand the cause for a new trial.\nThe record does not include the full transcript of the trial. However, we have the common-law record, several evidence depositions, and a transcript of plaintiff\u2019s rebuttal closing argument. We believe this record is sufficient for defendant to establish her claim of error. See generally Foutch v. O\u2019Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984).\nThe trial court gave the jury the following special interrogatory: \u201cWas the Defendant\u2019s negligence the proximate cause of the Plaintiffs alleged injuries or damages?\u201d In his rebuttal closing argument, plaintiffs counsel stated:\n\u201cNow, as to the special interrogatory \u2014 ***\nShe tells you that she wants you to say \u2018No\u2019 on there. I would merely point out to you that if you find for Diana *** and if you award her damages, that on your jury form \u2014 on the verdict form it says that you award her damages which were proximately caused by this accident. So if you fill in any dollar amounts at all, you are \u2014 \u201d\nDefendant objected. After a sidebar, plaintiffs counsel continued:\n\u201cIf you find in Diana\u2019s favor \u2014 as everything in this case tells you that you must do \u2014 and if you award her damages, under the basic instructions it says you will award her those damages which were proximately caused by this accident. So once you start filling in dollar amounts, you will be saying it was proximately related.\nThen you are going to get this question that will say \u2018Were the damages proximately related?\u2019 Folks, if you are going to be consistent, you, of course, say \u2018Yes.\u2019 She wants you to say \u2018No.\u2019 The \u2014 if you give her Dollar One, you have to say \u2018Yes\u2019 to be consistent. Thank you.\u201d\nDefendant did not object further. However, her motion for a new trial argued that counsel\u2019s remarks improperly told the jury that its answer to the special interrogatory had to be consistent with its verdict. On appeal, defendant reiterates this assertion. Without citing any authority, plaintiff responds that there is nothing wrong with asking the jury to be consistent. While this logic has a superficial appeal, we believe that ample precedent rightly prohibits the type of argument at issue here.\nWe will not reverse a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion for a new trial unless the court abused its discretion. O\u2019Connell v. City of Chicago, 285 Ill. App. 3d 459, 463 (1996). However, because the case law clearly supports defendant, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her posttrial motion.\nThe purpose of a special interrogatory is to provide a check on the jury\u2019s deliberations by testing the general verdict against the jury\u2019s determination of one or more specific issues of ultimate fact. Sommese v. Maling Brothers, Inc., 36 Ill. 2d 263, 267 (1966); Kosrow v. Acker, 208 Ill. App. 3d 143, 146 (1991). The special interrogatory cannot serve this salutary function if the jury views its answer as merely a foregone conclusion from the general verdict it has already reached. See Sommese, 36 Ill. 2d at 267-68; Massa v. G. Helmkamp Excavating & Trucking Co., 145 Ill. App. 3d 60, 70 (1986); Swanson v. Chester Johnson Electric Co., 5 Ill. App. 2d 175, 178-79 (1955). Thus, it is generally reversible error for the plaintiffs counsel to tell the jury that, to protect a verdict for the plaintiff, it must answer the special interrogatory in a particular way. See Batteast v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 137 Ill. 2d 175, 186 (1990); Sommese, 36 Ill. 2d at 266-67; O\u2019Connell, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 467. The error is especially serious where counsel\u2019s improper comments are not brief or isolated, the court does not sustain an objection, or there is no curative instruction. See Batteast, 137 Ill. 2d at 186-87; O\u2019Connell, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 467-68; Wojtowicz v. Cervantes, 284 Ill. App. 3d 524, 529-30 (1996). Moreover, the error may be preserved for appeal even absent a contemporaneous objection. Sommese, 36 Ill. 2d at 267-68.\nThese considerations convince us that plaintiffs counsel\u2019s comments were reversible error. The natural import of the quoted remarks is that the jury should first award plaintiff damages, then answer the special interrogatory solely with a view to protecting the award. This argument denigrates the role of the special interrogatory by treating it as no more than a function of the general verdict. Courts have repeatedly forbade arguments in the form \u201cif you reach verdict A, you must give the special interrogatory answer B.\u201d This prohibition is especially well established against suggestions \u2014 such as that given here \u2014 that the plaintiff will be unable to recover any damages unless the jury gives the special interrogatory the answer counsel requests. See Batteast, 137 Ill. 2d at 185-86; Sommese, 36 Ill. 2d at 266-67; Burris v. Madison County, 154 Ill. App. 3d 1064, 1075 (1987).\nNeither counsel nor the trial court may explicitly tell the jury that it must harmonize its answer with the general verdict. Sommese, 36 Ill. 2d at 266-67; Swanson, 5 Ill. App. 2d at 177-78. The availability of the special interrogatory presupposes that a jury might answer a factual question inconsistently with its general verdict. It is this very potential for inconsistency that enables the special interrogatory to serve as a check on the jury\u2019s deliberations. Swanson, 5 Ill. App. 2d at 178.\nHere, the error was especially serious because the improper remarks were neither brief nor inadvertent and the trial court did not sustain defendant\u2019s objection or give a curative instruction. Because the impermissible argument required a reversal, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant a new trial.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nTHOMAS and RAP I) JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE COLWELL" } ], "attorneys": [ "Pamela R. Boucher, of Eannace, Lowery & Meade, of Rockford, for appellant.", "Edward M. Maher, of Law Office of Edward M. Maher, of Rockford, for appellee. ." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DIANA L. WHITE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VICKI L. STEVENS, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201498\u20140298\nOpinion filed December 18, 1998.\nPamela R. Boucher, of Eannace, Lowery & Meade, of Rockford, for appellant.\nEdward M. Maher, of Law Office of Edward M. Maher, of Rockford, for appellee. ." }, "file_name": "0709-01", "first_page_order": 727, "last_page_order": 730 }