{ "id": 257174, "name": "In re TERRY L. MOORE, a Person Found Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Terry L. Moore, Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Moore", "decision_date": "1998-12-18", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201497\u20141083", "first_page": "759", "last_page": "767", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "301 Ill. App. 3d 759" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "615 N.E.2d 1244", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1250" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "246 Ill. App. 3d 362", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5386828 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "370" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/246/0362-01" ] }, { "cite": "667 N.E.2d 720", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "727" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 Ill. App. 3d 956", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 150248 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "967" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/281/0956-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 N.E.2d 574", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "19 Ill. 2d 230", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2743762 ], "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/19/0230-01" ] }, { "cite": "527 N.E.2d 1264", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1269" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 Ill. 2d 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550589 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "312-13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/123/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 N.E.2d 569", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 192", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3152614 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 N.E.2d 167", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3152411 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "680 N.E.2d 790", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "791" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 Ill. App. 3d 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1596937 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "525" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/288/0523-01" ] }, { "cite": "531 N.E.2d 64", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "69" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "176 Ill. App. 3d 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3587816 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/176/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "623 N.E.2d 942", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "944" }, { "page": "944" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "251 Ill. App. 3d 887", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2959188 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "888" }, { "page": "888" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/251/0887-01" ] }, { "cite": "596 N.E.2d 1171", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1172" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 Ill. App. 3d 917", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5202150 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "919" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/231/0917-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 881, "char_count": 18483, "ocr_confidence": 0.777, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.3525621476121827e-07, "percentile": 0.793389112647108 }, "sha256": "0c7b5cc9ce9406f2df072e41262cf05041cab98fd1f9c3b5d49e82acdb3783b9", "simhash": "1:1a373c3148d90f3c", "word_count": 3062 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:13:21.929948+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re TERRY L. MOORE, a Person Found Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Terry L. Moore, Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GARMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nRespondent Terry Moore appeals an order of the circuit court of Macon County, finding him to be a person subject to involuntary admission under section 3 \u2014 601 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) (405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 601 (West 1996)). He argues that (1) he was not examined by a psychiatrist within 24 hours of admission, as required by section 3 \u2014 610 of the Code (405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 610 (West 1996)), and (2) the evidence was insufficient. We affirm.\nOn June 11, 1997, a petition was filed alleging that Moore was a person subject to involuntary admission. The petition stated th\u00e1t on the morning of June 10, 1997, Moore awakened his sister-in-law, Gail Durbin, and told her to leave the house because he had turned on the gas and was going to kill himself. The petition also stated that there was a strong odor of gas in the house. Moore was admitted to St. Mary\u2019s Hospital (St. Mary\u2019s). He was examined and certified by a physician on June 10, 1997, at 9:41 a.m. and by a psychiatrist on June 11, 1997, at 9 a.m. The certificates expressed the opinion that Moore was mentally ill and reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon himself or another in the near future. These opinions were based upon Moore\u2019s reported suicide attempt, alcohol intoxication, and a history of suicide threats. The certificates were filed with the petition. On motion of Moore\u2019s court-appointed counsel, Moore was examined by an independent psychiatrist.\nA comprehensive examination and social investigation report was filed. It indicated that Moore was being given certain medications, including anti-depressants. The social investigation completed by a licensed clinical social worker found that Moore was a chronic substance abuser who had threatened suicide three times in the previous month. He had moved to Illinois from Florida in late 1996, but had been unable to maintain employment due to his alcoholism. This was his third admission to St. Mary\u2019s within the last 50 days. He did not follow through on recommendations made upon his last two discharges. The report suggested both inpatient and outpatient treatment for depression and alcoholism at the Geoffrey M. Geoghegan Recovery Center (Geoghegan), the substance-abuse arm of the Decatur Mental Health Center. The report rejected outpatient treatment as not restrictive enough and hospitalization in a state facility as too restrictive.\nAt the June 19, 1997, hearing on the State\u2019s petition, Officer Gene Pistorius of the Decatur police department testified that he responded at 7:23 a.m. on June 10, 1997, to a call from Durbin stating that Moore had turned on the gas and was threatening to kill himself. Pistorius stated that since May 1997, officers had been called to that residence 10 times, 5 times for domestic calls and 5 times to check on a possible attempted suicide.\nWhen Pistorius arrived at the house, he found glass from the front porch door on the walkway. Moore indicated his brother, Les, had broken out the glass and had been arrested. Moore was intoxicated and, when Pistorius entered the house, there was a \u201creal strong odor\u201d of natural gas. Although Moore stated the pilot light on the stove had gone out, Pistorius felt the odor was too strong to have been caused by an extinguished pilot light. He was concerned enough to have the fire department check to see that the gas was turned off and try to get some ventilation in the house. Pistorius believed Moore to be a danger to himself or others and, for that reason, he took Moore into custody and called for an ambulance to transport him to St. Mary\u2019s.\nOn cross-examination, Pistorius stated that Moore told him he had just arrived at the residence. If that was true, Pistorius agreed that Moore could not have been involved in any gas leak because there was too much gas at that point.\nChoudary Kavuri, psychiatrist at St. Mary\u2019s, testified that he first met Moore on June 1, 1997, during a prior admission to the emergency room. That incident also involved an alleged suicide attempt by Moore while intoxicated. Moore told Kavuri that he had lost his job in Florida and his relationship with his wife or girlfriend had ended. Moore stated that after he was discharged on May 25, 1997, from a previous hospitalization, he was supposed to go to Geoghegan for treatment but did not do so. Kavuri\u2019s diagnosis for Moore was severe depression and alcohol dependency. The depression was likely caused by Moore\u2019s personal problems. Sometimes depression and alcohol dependency go hand in hand. While alcohol use might temporarily relieve some symptoms of depression, eventually it will make the depression worse.- This results in a \u201cCatch 22\u201d situation in which the person becomes depressed, drinks alcohol, the depression gets worse, and more alcohol is consumed.\nKavuri did not see any evidence indicating that Moore was a danger to himself at the time but, because he did not recall the circumstances of Moore\u2019s hospitalization, thought Moore could be a threat to others or to property. Based on Moore\u2019s three hospitalizations within a 50-day period involving alcohol consumption and suicide attempts, Kavuri opined that Moore is potentially a danger to himself in the near future. Kavuri noted that, during Moore\u2019s hospitalization, he has been cooperative in taking his medications; however, he appears to have no insight into his alcohol problem. Kavuri recommended that Moore be placed as an in-patient at Geoghegan as the least restrictive alternative. If this alternative is not satisfactory, Moore should go the McFarland Mental Health Center.\nOn cross-examination, Kavuri stated that Moore was first evaluated by the emergency room physician. After this, and while Moore was still in the emergency room, Kavuri met with a \u201ctreatment team\u201d to discuss what could be done for Moore in light of the fact he had been discharged only five days prior to the June 10, 1997, admission. He was aware at that time that Moore was in the emergency room on an involuntary petition. Kavuri is aware of no threats Moore has made toward others or aggressive conduct toward others.\nWhen questioned regarding what time Moore was admitted, Kavuri stated this depends on when he \u201cactually steps on the [psychiatric] unit.\u201d That was at 11:45 a.m. on June 10, 1997. The \u201cadmission sheet\u201d or \u201cface sheet\u201d states that Moore was admitted to St. Mary\u2019s at 7:56 a.m. on June 10, 1997. Kavuri certified Moore at 9 a.m. on June 11, 1997; Kavuri denied this was more than 24 hours after Moore was admitted to the facility.\nOn redirect examination, Kavuri stated that the seventh-floor psychiatric unit at St. Mary\u2019s is the only place in the hospital that is licensed as a mental health facility.\nAt the close of the State\u2019s evidence, Moore\u2019s counsel moved for a directed verdict, arguing that Moore had not been examined by a psychiatrist within 24 hours of admission, as required by statute. The trial court denied the motion.\nVicky Carr\u00f3n, Moore\u2019s sister, testified that at 6:55 a.m. on June 10, 1997, Moore called her. Her \u201ccaller I.D.\u201d showed that he called from a pay phone at a gas station. That station was approximately eight or nine blocks from their brother\u2019s house. Moore told Carr\u00f3n that he had spent the night in a doorway and he asked for a ride to her house, where he had been staying. She had no vehicle, so she was unable to pick him up. She presumed he then walked to their brother\u2019s house. The stove at that house is in very bad shape. The insulation is gone and the pilot light does not stay on. Carr\u00f3n has been in the house when the gas smell was very strong.\nCarr\u00f3n testified that it would take Moore some time to walk from the gas station he called from to their brother\u2019s house, because he has a \u201cmessed up\u201d hip. Carr\u00f3n offered to allow Moore to live with her and her family. She and her husband do not drink or allow any alcohol in the house. Moore is not a dangerous person; however, when he and their brother get together, they start drinking and getting into trouble. Carr\u00f3n stated she would see that Moore, gets treatment and takes his medication.\nThe court admitted into evidence the report of the independent psychiatrist, Marvin Lemaster. He diagnosed Moore as having major depression, severe and recurrent, and alcohol dependence. Lemaster concluded that Moore\u2019s judgment is severely impaired and he is an imminent danger to himself or others outside a structured environment. He lacks impulse control. Lemaster recommended continued hospitalization in a safe environment.\nThe trial court found that the State had proved by clear and convincing evidence that Moore is subject to involuntary admission. He ordered Moore placed in Carron\u2019s custody for 180 days. Moore was directed to seek outpatient treatment at Geoghegan. Carr\u00f3n was ordered to notify the State\u2019s Attorney if Moore moves or fails to obtain treatment.\nMoore\u2019s counsel filed a motion for modification or reconsideration, alleging that the evidence did not support the court\u2019s finding and that Moore had not been examined by a psychiatrist within 24 hours as required by law. The motion was denied on October 23, 1997, and Moore now appeals.\nMoore first contends that the standard of review should be de novo, arguing that this case involves mixed questions of law and fact and the trial court\u2019s order impacts Moore\u2019s fundamental liberty interests. We reject this argument as it pertains to the question of sufficiency of the evidence. The correct standard of review is whether the judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Knapp, 231 Ill. App. 3d 917, 919, 596 N.E.2d 1171, 1172 (1992). The trial court\u2019s decision is given great deference and, providing it is not against the manifest weight of the evidence, \u201c \u2018will not be set aside at the appellate level, even if the reviewing court, after applying the clear and convincing standard, would have ruled differently.\u2019 \u201d In re Bennett, 251 Ill. App. 3d 887, 888, 623 N.E.2d 942, 944 (1993), quoting In re Orr, 176 Ill. App. 3d 498, 505, 531 N.E.2d 64, 69 (1988). This standard of review is the appropriate one because the trial- court, having seen and heard the witnesses testify, is in the best position to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of the witnesses. Bennett, 251 Ill. App. 3d at 888, 623 N.E.2d at 944.\nMoore next argues that the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the petition where Moore was not examined by a psychiatrist within 24 hours of admission. As the facts are not in dispute on this issue and the question is one of law, de novo review is appropriate. People v. Saunders, 288 Ill. App. 3d 523, 525, 680 N.E.2d 790, 791 (1997).\nMoore was admitted to St. Mary\u2019s under the provisions of section 3 \u2014 606 of the Code (405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 606 (West 1996)), which allows a peace officer to take a person into custody and transport him to a mental health facility when there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person is subject to involuntary admission and is in need of immediate hospitalization to protect that person or others from physical harm. Section 3 \u2014 610 of the Code provides:\n\u201cAs soon as possible but not later than 24 hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays[,] and holidays, after admission of a respondent pursuant to this Article, the respondent shall he examined by a psychiatrist. The psychiatrist may be a member of the staff of the facility but shall not be the person who executed the first certificate. If the respondent is not examined or if the psychiatrist does not execute a certificate pursuant to Section 3 \u2014 602, the respondent shall be released forthwith.\u201d 405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 610 (West 1996).\nMoore argues that he was admitted for purposes of section 3 \u2014 610 of the Code when he was admitted to the emergency room of St. Mary\u2019s at 7:56 a.m. on June 10, 1997. Thus, according to Moore, Kavuri\u2019s examination of him at 9 a.m. on June 11, 1997, was not within the required 24-hour period and he should have been released. The State argues that Moore was admitted under the Code when he stepped onto the seventh-floor psychiatric unit at 11:45 a.m. on June 10, 1997; thus, Kavuri\u2019s examination took place within 24 hours of Moore\u2019s admission.\nThe parties have not cited, nor has our own research revealed, any cases dealing with this precise question. Moore argues that section 3 \u2014 610 of the Code is directed to time, not place. However, the time element becomes significant only after a respondent is admitted to a mental health facility under the Code. Admission to such a facility triggers the running of the 24-hour period within which the respondent must be examined by a psychiatrist and a certificate executed.\nMoore envisions situations in which respondents are detained for hours, or even days, in other parts of a hospital before being taken to the psychiatric floor. However, such a scenario is unlikely in these days of hospital cost cutting and health maintenance organization restrictions. What is more likely to happen, should we agree with Moore\u2019s interpretation of the statute, is that persons in need of mental health treatment would be released without that treatment, because personnel in the psychiatric unit of a large hospital were unaware of their presence in some other part of the hospital. If the 24 hours pass without an evaluation under section 3 \u2014 610 of the Code, immediate release is mandatory. On the other hand, persons admitted to a standalone mental health facility would not run the same risk of not receiving treatment. We reject an interpretation of the statute that would result in such disparate treatment of mentally ill persons.\nThe statutory language, read as a whole, supports our decision. The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. In re Marriage of Logston, 103 Ill. 2d 266, 277, 469 N.E.2d 167, 171 (1984). In determining legislative intent, the statute must be read as a whole and all relevant parts must be considered. People v. Jordan, 103 Ill. 2d 192, 206, 469 N.E.2d 569, 576 (1984).\n\u201cWhere the language of a statute admits of two constructions, one of which would make the enactment absurd and illogical, while the other renders it reasonable and sensible, the construction which leads to an absurd result must be avoided. [Citation.] A proper interpretation of a provision cannot simply be based on its language; it must be grounded on the \u2018nature, objects[,] and the consequences that would result from construing it one way or the other.\u2019 \u201d Mulligan v. Joliet Regional Port District, 123 Ill. 2d 303, 312-13, 527 N.E.2d 1264, 1269 (1988), quoting Carrigan v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm\u2019n, 19 Ill. 2d 230, 233, 166 N.E.2d 574, 576 (1960).\nThe Code defines \u201cmental health facility\u201d as follows:\n\u201c \u2018Mental health facility\u2019 means any licensed private hospital, institution, or facility or section thereof, and any facility, or section thereof, operated by the State or a political subdivision thereof for the treatment of persons with mental illness and includes all hospitals, institutions, clinics, evaluation facilities, and mental health centers which provide treatment for such persons.\u201d 405 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 114 (West 1996).\n\u201cLicensed private hospital\u201d is defined as:\n\u201c[A]ny privately owned home, hospital, or institution, or any section thereof which is licensed by the Department of Public Health and which provides treatment for persons with mental illness.\u201d 405 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 113 (West 1996).\nThe language of the foregoing statutory provisions recognizes that there may be sections within a hospital devoted to treatment of mentally ill patients. Those sections or units, and not the entire hospital, are mental health facilities for purposes of the involuntary admission provisions of the Code. Indeed, Kavuri testified that St. Mary\u2019s seventh-floor psychiatric unit is the only section of the hospital licensed as a mental health facility.\nWe therefore conclude that Moore was examined by Kavuri within 24 hours of his admission to a mental health facility under section 3 \u2014 610 of the Code.\nRespondent last argues that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is subject to involuntary admission. No person may be found subject to involuntary admission unless that finding has been established by clear and convincing evidence. 405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 808 (West 1996); In re Rovelstad, 281 Ill. App. 3d 956, 967, 667 N.E.2d 720, 727 (1996).\nThe term \u201cperson subject to involuntary admission\u201d means \u201c[a] person with mental illness and who because of his or her illness is reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon himself or herself or another in the near future.\u201d 405 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 119(1) (West 1996).\nHere, Kavuri testified that Moore was suffering from severe depression and alcohol dependency. According to Kavuri, when these two conditions exist together, they each contribute to the worsening of the other. Moore had been hospitalized three times in the previous 30 days with the same problems. He had consumed alcohol to intoxication and had made suicide attempts. Officer Pistorius testified that he had been to Moore\u2019s residence five times in the previous six weeks to check on possible suicide attempts. Moore had experienced personal problems in the previous six months, which Kavuri testified had contributed to his mental illness. The report of Lemaster, the independent psychiatrist, supports Kavuri\u2019s diagnosis and concerns about Moore\u2019s potential for danger to himself and others.\nWe conclude that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that Moore was subject to involuntary admission. Commitment need not be delayed until someone is actually harmed. In re Clark, 246 Ill. App. 3d 362, 370, 615 N.E.2d 1244, 1250 (1993),\nAccordingly, the trial court\u2019s order finding Moore to be subject to involuntary admission is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nGREEN and McCULLOUGH, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GARMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "John B. Lower and Jeff M. Plesko, both of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Anna, for appellant.", "Lawrence R. Fichter, State\u2019s Attorney, of Decatur (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Jeffrey K. Davison, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re TERRY L. MOORE, a Person Found Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Terry L. Moore, Respondent-Appellant).\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201497\u20141083\nOpinion filed December 18, 1998.\nJohn B. Lower and Jeff M. Plesko, both of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Anna, for appellant.\nLawrence R. Fichter, State\u2019s Attorney, of Decatur (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Jeffrey K. Davison, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0759-01", "first_page_order": 777, "last_page_order": 785 }