{ "id": 257228, "name": "In re TIMOTHY H., Alleged to be a Person in Need of Involuntary Psychotropic Medication (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Timothy H., Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Timothy H.", "decision_date": "1998-12-28", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201497\u20140910", "first_page": "1008", "last_page": "1017", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "301 Ill. App. 3d 1008" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "2 Ill. App. 2d 370", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5126529 ], "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "377" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/2/0370-01" ] }, { "cite": "212 Ill. App. 3d 492", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3596795 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441" }, { "page": "440" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/126/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 Ill. 2d 540", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3228677 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "562" }, { "page": "562-63", "parenthetical": "requiring a trial court to offer an instruction sua sponte if it relates to the elements of the crime charged, the presumption of innocence, and the question of burden of proof" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/128/0540-01" ] }, { "cite": "277 Ill. App. 3d 1046", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1172445 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1050" }, { "page": "1051" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/277/1046-01" ] }, { "cite": "244 Ill. App. 3d 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5102234 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/244/0569-01" ] }, { "cite": "285 Ill. App. 3d 8", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1295647 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "utilizing the definition from Bazydlo in determining whether the trial court's decision in its case was manifestly erroneous" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/285/0008-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 Ill. 2d 207", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477000 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "213" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/164/0207-01" ] }, { "cite": "267 Ill. App. 3d 790", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 333181 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "820" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/267/0790-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 Ill. App. 3d 116", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3465924 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "123" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/155/0116-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 Ill. App. 3d 1084", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3594635 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1087", "parenthetical": "defining clear and convincing evidence as \"proof which leaves no reasonable doubt in the mind of the trier of fact\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/120/1084-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 Ill. App. 3d 8", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5607813 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/79/0008-01" ] }, { "cite": "1 Ill. 2d 319", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5315470 ], "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "324" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/1/0319-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 Ill. 265", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5310770 ], "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "269" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/410/0265-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 Ill. 440", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3441498 ], "year": 1912, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/253/0440-01" ] }, { "cite": "20 Ill. 2d 548", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2737854 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "555" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/20/0548-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 Ill. App. 3d 552", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5109132 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/243/0552-01" ] }, { "cite": "249 Ill. App. 3d 86", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5409471 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "92-93" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/249/0086-01" ] }, { "cite": "249 Ill. App. 3d 861", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5410902 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "866" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/249/0861-01" ] }, { "cite": "115 Ill. App. 3d 686", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3558473 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "689" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/115/0686-01" ] }, { "cite": "127 Ill. 2d 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5564516 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "258" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/127/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 Ill. App. 3d 718", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5425741 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "721-22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/253/0718-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209988 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491-92" }, { "page": "498" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0482-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 899, "char_count": 19577, "ocr_confidence": 0.782, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.466863891534006e-07, "percentile": 0.6584244872963636 }, "sha256": "3123c864e42ce40efadc9b5e85543f6f5662e5ecb533d834cb53c3df9b6e3a68", "simhash": "1:3bae3ca63de45595", "word_count": 3136 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:13:21.929948+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re TIMOTHY H., Alleged to be a Person in Need of Involuntary Psychotropic Medication (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Timothy H., Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HUTCHINSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn May 2, 1997, the State filed a petition to administer psychotropic medication to respondent, Timothy H., pursuant to section 2 \u2014 107.1 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (the Code) (405 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 107.1 (West 1996)). The case proceeded to trial, in which the jury returned a verdict granting the petition, and judgment was entered on the verdict. Respondent appeals the trial court\u2019s order authorizing the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication for up to 90 days to respondent. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.\nOn August 25, 1997, a jury trial was held on the State\u2019s petition to administer psychotropic medication to respondent. The record reflects that respondent, respondent\u2019s counsel, and counsel for the State were present and conducted voir dire of prospective jurors without a court reporter. The State\u2019s first witness was Douglas Brown, respondent\u2019s caseworker. Brown described respondent\u2019s interaction with others as \u201cloud.\u201d He added that respondent would \u201cattack people verbally\u201d and question their sexual orientation and religious beliefs. He believed that respondent\u2019s behavior was disruptive to other patients and to the staff at Elgin Mental Health Center (the Center). On cross-examination, Brown stated that respondent never tried to strike him, but that he had seen respondent attempt to hit another individual. Brown could not offer any further details regarding the incident.\nDr. Chandragupta Vedak, a psychiatrist for the Center, testified as an expert witness. He described how the police brought respondent to the Center in November 1996 after finding him lying on the side of a creek in freezing temperatures with inadequate clothing. Vedak opined that respondent was not capable of providing food, shelter, and medical treatment for himself. He added that respondent has interpersonal difficulties such that he has difficulty trusting others, perceives other males as homosexuals, and uses derogatory words to describe others. Respondent has few social skills and reflects an inability to maintain a \u201cpersonal space\u201d with others. Vedak characterized respondent\u2019s behavior with others as disruptive. In Vedak\u2019s opinion, respondent suffers from manic-depressive illness of rapid cycling type with psychotic features.\nVedak next discussed possible treatments, including antipsychotic medications and mood-stabilizing medications. He described the benefits of the medications as well as the harmful side effects. He noted that respondent refuses to voluntarily take the medications. Vedak, however, testified that he did not believe that respondent has the capacity to make a reasoned decision about psychotropic medication. Vedak also believes that respondent is unable to understand the advantages and disadvantages of the available treatments. Vedak opined that medicating respondent would be the least restrictive measure in treating respondent.\nOn cross-examination, Vedak testified that, in a prior jury trial on a petition to administer psychotropic medication to respondent, the jury found that respondent was not subject to involuntary medication. Vedak also explained the side effects in greater detail.\nThe parties proceeded to an instructions conference. The State proffered 11 instructions, to which respondent\u2019s counsel made no objection. Respondent\u2019s counsel objected to the State\u2019s instruction No. 12, which was a verdict form finding in favor of respondent. The instruction was subsequently substituted and admitted. Counsel for respondent proffered no instructions.\nThe State rested, and respondent testified on his own behalf. Respondent testified that he did not wish to take medication because it was against his religion and because nothing was wrong with him. He discussed the circumstances that brought him to the Center. He also explained an incident at the Center in which he was \u201cattacked\u201d twice by a homosexual individual and had to defend himself. Respondent testified that he tries to avoid violence.\nRespondent stated that he did not want to take medication. On cross-examination, respondent discussed the philosophy of his religion, why he was near the creek, the incident of being touched by a homosexual individual, and the side effects of medication.\nAfter closing arguments, the trial court instructed the jury. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the State, finding that respondent was \u201ca person with a serious mental illness, and *** someone who qualifies for the administration of psychotropic medication.\u201d The trial court entered its judgment on the verdict. Respondent timely appeals from the trial court\u2019s order authorizing the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication.\nInitially, we note that this case is moot. See In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482 (1998). The trial court\u2019s order authorizing the administration of psychotropic medication was limited in duration to 90 days, which have since passed. This court has, however, previously recognized an exception to the mootness doctrine for mental health cases. See In re Slaughter, 253 Ill. App. 3d 718, 721-22 (1993).\nRecently, though, our supreme court analyzed the qualification of a case for review when it would otherwise be moot. See In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d at 491-92. The supreme court utilized the two-part test enunciated in In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d 247 (1989), in determining whether Barbara H. should receive the benefit of the exception to the mootness doctrine. To receive the benefit, the In re A Minor case states that the complaining party must demonstrate that (1) the duration of the challenged action is too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation, and (2) a reasonable expectation exists that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again. In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d at 258. In determining that both requirements were present, the court in In re Barbara H. subsequently addressed its appeal on the merits.\nIn the present case, we also find that the exception to the mootness doctrine applies. The trial court\u2019s order, dated August 25, 1997, was for 90 days and, therefore, too short in duration to permit appellate review. Furthermore, the record reflects respondent\u2019s history of mental illness as well as a prior petition for the administration of psychotropic medication. Given that, one could reasonably expect that respondent in this case may again be subject to this type of petition. Therefore, we will proceed with the merits of this appeal.\nRespondent first contends that the trial court\u2019s order must be reversed because he was denied his statutory right to a verbatim record of the jury selection proceedings. Section 3 \u2014 817 of the Code states that \u201c[a] verbatim record shall be made of all judicial hearings held pursuant to this Chapter.\u201d 405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 817 (West 1996). The record reflects that \u201cQ]ury selection was had off the record.\u201d The State argues respondent failed to object to proceeding in this manner and, had he objected, a recording of the jury selection process could have been made. The State also argues that a bystander\u2019s report pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 323(c) (166 Ill. 2d R. 323(c)) could have been provided. Respondent\u2019s appellate counsel answers that they were unable to obtain a bystander\u2019s report due to a lack of cooperation by respondent\u2019s trial counsel. The. State counters by referring to its own investigation, including conversations with the circuit clerk\u2019s office, misunderstandings between the circuit clerk\u2019s office and respondent\u2019s appellate counsel, and the diligence of respondent\u2019s appellate counsel in securing a bystander\u2019s report.\nWithout more accurate information than the allegations of each party in the briefs, we cannot say this is reversible error. The record fails to reflect whether a mutual waiver of the jury selection proceedings existed or whether there was any arrangement between the parties to provide a bystander\u2019s report. The State blames respondent\u2019s appellate counsel for failing to procure a bystander\u2019s report, and respondent\u2019s appellate counsel blames respondent\u2019s trial counsel for his lack of cooperation. Notwithstanding the parties\u2019 tangential accusations, respondent is the appellant and it is his duty as such to present an adequate record to this court. See In re Hays, 115 Ill. App. 3d 686, 689 (1983). We do, however, note our concern about the failure of the trial court to make a verbatim record of the jury selection process and strongly suggest the use of court reporters during such proceedings in the future. See In re Stone, 249 Ill. App. 3d 861, 866 (1993), citing In re Friberg, 249 Ill. App. 3d 86, 92-93 (1993).\nAlthough respondent presents other issues for review, we find that we need only address one additional issue, namely, whether respondent was denied his due process right to a fair trial. Respondent asserts that he was denied his due process right to a fair trial in that the jury was inadequately instructed.\nIn the present case, petitioner presented the following instructions:\n\u201cThe Petitioner has the burden of proving each of the following propositions by clear and convincing evidence:\nIf you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each one of these propositions has been proved by clear and convincing evidence, you should find for the Petitioner.\nIf, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one of these propositions has not been proved by clear and convincing evidence, you should find for the Respondent ]\u201d\nand\n\u201cWhen I say that the petitioner has the burden of proof on any proposition, or use the expression \u2018if you find,\u2019 I mean you must be persuaded, considering all of the evidence in the case, that the proposition on which the petitioner has the burden of proof has been proven by clear and convincing evidence.\u201d\nNo instruction defining \u201cclear and convincing evidence\u201d was offered by either party. Following deliberations, the jury found respondent had a serious mental illness and qualified for the administration of psychotropic medication.\nRespondent argues that an instruction defining \u201cclear and convincing evidence\u201d should have been given and, by failing to give the instruction, the trial court committed reversible error. The State counters that respondent has waived this issue by failing to object to the other instructions or propose alternative instructions (see Aguinaga v. City of Chicago, 243 Ill. App. 3d 552 (1993)). We reject the State\u2019s claim that respondent has waived the issue. Pursuant to Muscarello v. Peterson, 20 Ill. 2d 548 (1960), reviewing courts may review and consider issues on appeal under the plain error doctrine, even though no objection was made and no ruling made or preserved at the trial level. Muscarello, 20 Ill. 2d at 555.\nThe definition of \u201cclear and convincing evidence\u201d warrants a brief history. In 1912, it was defined as evidence that \u201c \u2018strike[s] all minds alike as being unquestionable ***.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d Lines v. Willey, 253 Ill. 440, 449 (1912). In the 1950s, clear and convincing evidence \u201c[left] the mind well satisfied [of the truth of a proposition]\u201d (Hotze v. Schlanser, 410 Ill. 265, 269 (1951)) and was evidence that was so \u201cclear, strong, unequivocal and so convincing as to lead to but one conclusion\u201d (Johnson v. Johnson, 1 Ill. 2d 319, 324 (1953)). Clear and convincing evidence then became defined as \u201cmore than a preponderance while not quite approaching the degree of proof necessary to convict a person of a criminal offense.\u201d In re Estate of Ragen, 79 Ill. App. 3d 8, 14 (1979). Still later, it was defined in terms of reasonable doubt. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hutchins, 120 Ill. App. 3d 1084, 1087 (1984) (defining clear and convincing evidence as \u201cproof which leaves no reasonable doubt in the mind of the trier of fact\u201d).\nIn 1987, the reviewing court in In re Estate of Casey, 155 Ill. App. 3d 116 (1987), eschewed the \u201creasonable doubt\u201d terminology. It posited that \u201cperhaps the term *** is best left undefined,\u201d but if it were to be defined, \u201cthen the definition should be one which will aid jurors and clearly distinguish it from the other degrees of proof.\u201d In re Estate of Casey, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 123. Casey was followed as recently as 1994 in Washington Courte Condominium Ass\u2019n-Four v. Washington-Golf Corp., 267 Ill. App. 3d 790 (1994). In Washington Courte, the parties tendered to the trial court three different jury instructions defining the term \u201cclear and convincing evidence.\u201d The trial court refused all three, concluding the term was best left undefined. The reviewing court agreed, stating that the definitional instructions likely would have misled the jury, as the instructions were similar to those found misleading in Casey. Washington Courte, 267 Ill. App. 3d at 820.\nIn February 1995 our supreme court in Bazydlo v. Volant, 164 Ill. 2d 207 (1995), noted the following:\n\u201cCourts have defined \u2018clear and convincing\u2019 evidence most often as the quantum of proof that leaves no reasonable doubt in the mind of the fact finder as to the truth of the proposition in question. Although stated in terms of reasonable doubt, courts consider clear and convincing evidence to be more than a preponderance while not quite approaching the degree of proof necessary to convict a person of a criminal offense.\u201d Bazydlo, 164 Ill. 2d at 213.\nSee also In re Jones, 285 Ill. App. 3d 8 (1996) (utilizing the definition from Bazydlo in determining whether the trial court\u2019s decision in its case was manifestly erroneous).\nShortly after Bazydlo was decided, however, the Illinois Supreme Court Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions added a new instruction in response to a statutory amendment that became effective in August 1995. See 720 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 2(e) (West 1996) (changing the burden of proof for a defendant wishing to present a defense of insanity from a \u201cpreponderance of the evidence\u201d to \u201cclear and convincing evidence\u201d in showing that a defendant was not guilty by reason of insanity). Clear and convincing evidence is defined, according to Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 4.19, as \u201cthat degree of proof which, considering all the evidence in the case, produces the firm and abiding belief that it is highly probable that the proposition on which the defendant has the burden of proof is true.\u201d Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 4.19 (3d ed. Supp. 1996). Therefore, during the course of the instant proceeding, there existed an Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction containing the definition of the phrase \u201cclear and convincing evidence.\u201d\nJury instructions provide jurors with the correct principles of law applicable to the evidence that has been submitted to them. Gaines v. Townsend, 244 Ill. App. 3d 569, 576 (1993). A trial court\u2019s determination as to the instructions to be given to a jury will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Abbinante v. O\u2019Connell, 277 Ill. App. 3d 1046, 1050 (1996). A trial court abuses its discretion if jury instructions are not clear enough to avoid misleading the jury or if the jury instructions do not accurately state the law. Abbinante, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 1051. According to Supreme Court Rule 239(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 239(a)), the use of Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions is required unless the trial court determines that they are an inaccurate statement of the law. 134 Ill. 2d R. 239(a).\nHere, the State had the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that respondent was qualified to receive psychotropic medication. However, the State failed to propound an instruction defining its burden. Respondent also failed to offer an instruction. Generally, the party desiring a specific instruction bears the burden to present it to the trial court and request that it be given to the jury. People v. Turner, 128 Ill. 2d 540, 562 (1989). However, to ensure a fair trial in the context of a proceeding to involuntarily administer psychotropic medication, we determine that a trial court is required to offer an instruction sua sponte if it relates to the elements ultimately authorizing the administration of psychotropic medication, the question of the burden of proof, and a definition or description of the applicable burden of proof as provided in the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions. Cf. Turner, 128 Ill. 2d at 562-63 (requiring a trial court to offer an instruction sua sponte if it relates to the elements of the crime charged, the presumption of innocence, and the question of burden of proof). \u201c[I]t is essential that jurors receive a definition or description of the applicable burden of proof.\u201d Rikard v. Dover Elevator Co., 126 Ill. App. 3d 438, 441 (1984). In the present case, the instruction concerned the burden of proof.\nWithout jurors being offered a definition of the burden of proof, a danger exists that they may conceivably apply the wrong standard, for example, one with which they were familiar from another trial on which they served. The failure to explain the proper burden of proof could result in extreme prejudice to a respondent. Because involuntary administration of mental health services implicates fundamental liberty interests (In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d at 498, citing Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 368-69, 134 L. Ed. 2d 498, 515, 116 S. Ct. 1373, 1384 (1996)), explaining the proper burden of proof is imperative to ensure that the jury properly applied the facts to the law (see Rikard, 126 Ill. App. 3d at 440). We decline to assume that jurors are sophisticated in the subtle differences in the legal burdens of persuasion that apply in different situations before the courts. Where an Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction defining the applicable burden of proof is available and modifiable, it should be given. In the present case, we find that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to explain \u201cclear and convincing evidence\u201d to the jury.\nWe cannot simply say this was harmless error, either. A trial court\u2019s nondescription of the applicable burden of proof cannot be harmless because the jury\u2019s deliberations, findings, and ultimate decision were rendered through an improper scope of analysis. See People ex rel. Mendez v. Villa, 260 Ill. App. 3d 866, 871 (1994).\nIf a fair trial is to be had before layperson jurors, the issues and instructions must be presented fairly and simply. Aardvark Art, Inc. v. Lehigh/Steck-Warlick, Inc., 212 Ill. App. 3d 492, 496 (1991), citing Rudolph v. City of Chicago, 2 Ill. App. 2d 370, 377 (1954). We hold that the fairness of this trial was compromised when the jurors were insufficiently instructed. Accordingly, we reverse.\nOur determination that respondent was denied his due process right to a fair trial in that the jury was inadequately instructed obviates the need to address the other issues on appeal.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is reversed.\nReversed.\nBOWMAN and RAPR JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HUTCHINSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "William E. Coffin, of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Chicago, and Teresa L. Berge, of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Rockford, for appellant.", "David R. Akemann, State\u2019s Attorney, of St. Charles (Martin E Moltz and Diane L. Campbell, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re TIMOTHY H., Alleged to be a Person in Need of Involuntary Psychotropic Medication (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Timothy H., Respondent-Appellant).\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201497\u20140910\nOpinion filed December 28, 1998.\nWilliam E. Coffin, of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Chicago, and Teresa L. Berge, of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Rockford, for appellant.\nDavid R. Akemann, State\u2019s Attorney, of St. Charles (Martin E Moltz and Diane L. Campbell, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1008-01", "first_page_order": 1026, "last_page_order": 1035 }