{ "id": 257140, "name": "In re DARRELL W. MILLER, a Person Found Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Darrell W. Miller, Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Miller", "decision_date": "1998-12-31", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201498\u20140185", "first_page": "1060", "last_page": "1073", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "301 Ill. App. 3d 1060" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "627 N.E.2d 1166", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1170", "parenthetical": "Knecht, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "255 Ill. App. 3d 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2988294 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373", "parenthetical": "Knecht, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/255/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209988 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "682 N.E.2d 1189", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1190" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 Ill. App. 3d 842", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 351111 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "844-45" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/289/0842-01" ] }, { "cite": "672 N.E.2d 893", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "894", "parenthetical": "\"The burden is upon the State to affirmatively demonstrate that it has complied with the mandates of the Code\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "284 Ill. App. 3d 691", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1260342 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "693", "parenthetical": "\"The burden is upon the State to affirmatively demonstrate that it has complied with the mandates of the Code\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/284/0691-01" ] }, { "cite": "679 N.E.2d 818", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "820" }, { "page": "821" }, { "page": "821" }, { "page": "821" }, { "page": "821", "parenthetical": "based on the notice requirements set forth in sections 3 - 611 (405 ILCS 5/3 - 611 (West 1994)) and 2 - 107.1(a)(1) of the Code, \"separate hearings would have to be held,\" that is, hearings held'on different days" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "287 Ill. App. 3d 1088", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 521028 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1091" }, { "page": "1092" }, { "page": "1092" }, { "page": "1092" }, { "page": "1092" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/287/1088-01" ] }, { "cite": "641 N.E.2d 345", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "356-57" }, { "page": "351" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 Ill. 2d 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 783189 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "225-27" }, { "page": "214" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/161/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "607 N.E.2d 134", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "140-41" }, { "page": "140" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 Ill. 2d 406", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4738342 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419-20" }, { "page": "419" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/153/0406-01" ] }, { "cite": "572 N.E.2d 883", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "886" }, { "page": "886" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 Ill. 2d 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5591886 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "231-32" }, { "page": "232" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/143/0225-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 978, "char_count": 29454, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.707711870934642e-07, "percentile": 0.8932256282123012 }, "sha256": "6d10db15d8088752e79648dc1cb1799dcd1973584d3b9cf10d040240da9264a6", "simhash": "1:a8643006b0c8f852", "word_count": 4695 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:13:21.929948+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re DARRELL W. MILLER, a Person Found Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Darrell W. Miller, Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn January 27, 1998, following a bifurcated hearing, the trial court entered two separate orders (1) finding that respondent, Darrell W Miller, was in need of involuntary admission to the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities (Department) at the George A. Zeller Mental Health Center (Zeller) (405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 700 et seq. (West 1996)); and (2) directing the staff at Zeller or Provena United Samaritans Medical Center (Provena) to administer psychotropic medication to respondent (405 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 107.1 (West Supp. 1997) (eff. December 1, 1997)).\nRespondent appeals, arguing as follows: (1) certain procedural defects require reversal of the trial court\u2019s order, including (a) the State\u2019s failure to provide formal notice of the petition for administration of psychotropic medication and the hearing to be held thereon, and (b) the trial court\u2019s conducting a single, combined proceeding on that petition and the petition for involuntary hospitalization; (2) certain omissions in the petition for administration of psychotropic medication require reversal; (3) certain omissions in the court\u2019s order directing the administration of psychotropic medication require reversal of the order; and (4) the evidence presented was insufficient to support the court\u2019s orders directing involuntary hospitalization and administration of psychotropic medication. We affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nOn January 19, 1998, respondent\u2019s community caseworker filed a petition under section 3 \u2014 700 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) (405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 700 et seq. (West 1996)) to have respondent involuntarily admitted to a mental health facility. The petition alleged that respondent was mentally ill and, because of that illness, he could reasonably be expected to inflict serious physical harm to himself or another in the near future. The petition also alleged that when the caseworker brought respondent a \u201cspending check\u201d on January 19, respondent became angry and cursed at the caseworker for being late. Respondent also allegedly lunged at the caseworker and said, \u201cI\u2019ll kill you next time.\u201d\nOn January 20, 1998, the trial court ordered that respondent be detained for examination. That same day, respondent\u2019s attending physician at Provena, Dr. Brumyong Lee, petitioned the court under section 2 \u2014 107.1 of the Code for an order authorizing his facility\u2019s clinical staff to administer psychotropic medication to respondent against respondent\u2019s will (405 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 107.1 (West Supp. 1997)).\nOn January 22, 1998, respondent was given notice of a hearing to be held on January 27, 1998, but that notice did not indicate the nature or substance of the hearing, nor does the record indicate that respondent ever personally received a copy of either the petition for involuntary hospitalization or the petition for psychotropic medication.\nOn January 27, 1998, the trial court conducted a hearing on the petition for involuntary hospitalization. At that hearing, Lee, a psychiatrist, testified that he was very familiar with respondent\u2019s case and had treated him numerous times, both as an inpatient and an outpatient. When respondent \u201cbecame decompensated,\u201d that is, when he did not follow his recommended treatment, he suffered from auditory hallucinations and became paranoid. Based on Lee\u2019s personal knowledge of respondent\u2019s case, his discussions with other members of respondent\u2019s treatment team, and his review of respondent\u2019s mental health records, Lee opined that respondent was suffering from a chronic psychotic condition \u2014 that is, some form of schizophrenia.\nWhen Lee examined respondent on January 19, 1998, pursuant to the trial court\u2019s order, respondent had a \u201cdirty\u201d appearance and did not seem able to take care of his basic needs, such as bathing. Respondent also refused any type of treatment or medication and told Provena staff members that they were trying to poison him. In addition, staff members observed respondent carrying on conversations with imaginary persons, although respondent denied that he was hearing voices.\nLee opined that respondent reasonably could be expected to inflict serious harm to himself or another in the future. Lee based his opinion on respondent\u2019s history of violent behavior when he does not take his prescribed medication, including (1) a prior arrest for criminal damage to property; and (2) respondent\u2019s threat of physical harm to and near attack of his caseworker on January 19, 1998. Lee also opined that, because of respondent\u2019s mental illness, he was unable to care for himself or provide for his basic needs. When respondent takes his prescribed medication, he is able to take care of himself and act more reasonably; however, his compliance \u201chas been extremely poor.\u201d Because respondent has such poor compliance with his recommended treatment, Lee recommended that respondent be admitted to Zeller and receive \u201clong-term treatment to stabilize his condition.\u201d\nOn cross-examination, Lee testified that he had never actually seen respondent damage property, nor had respondent exhibited violent behavior toward Lee. Lee stated that respondent was not malnourished. He also stated that he had never visited respondent\u2019s apartment.\nOn redirect examination, Lee testified that he relied upon information he had received regarding respondent\u2019s arrest for criminal damage to property in forming his opinions regarding respondent\u2019s mental illness. It was Lee\u2019s understanding that respondent became upset because his stove did not work, and respondent tossed the stove outside his apartment and destroyed it. Lee stated that this type of information is the sort customarily relied upon by experts in his field in making diagnoses. Lee also opined that based upon Lee\u2019s experience with respondent and respondent\u2019s diagnosis, any threats of physical harm by respondent should be taken more seriously than some other individual\u2019s \u201cstray comment.\u201d\nFollowing the close of the State\u2019s case in chief, the trial court allowed the State to amend the petition for involuntary hospitalization to allege that respondent was mentally ill and unable to provide for his basic needs and protect himself from harm.\nRespondent testified on his own behalf that he received $40 per week from his caseworker, but that amount of money was not enough for him to \u201cbuy shampoo, laundry soap, food and cigarettes, that and everything else.\u201d When asked if he ever gets angry at others, respondent stated \u201cWell \u2014 well, I \u2014 not all the time. When they do things to me.\u201d He also stated that he would not hurt anyone, he just told people that he would. When asked why he was not taking his prescribed medication, respondent stated as follows:\n\u201cBecause \u2014 because one time Dr. Lee told me he was going to overdose me before, and \u2014 and I tell him I have side effects and they say that\u2019s just in your head or something, that ain\u2019t this, and I tried to tell them that the medication ain\u2019t right and I don\u2019t \u2014 and I don\u2019t like needles, and I try \u2014 and I tried other medicines and they \u2014 they\u2014and\u2014and they say, um \u2014 they say, well, that\u2019s got side effects real bad \u2014 side effects and things and he say, well, it will be okay.\u201d\nRespondent further stated that he sometimes experiences side effects from his medication, such as stomachaches and other unspecified pain. Respondent also stated that when he was in jail, \u201cthey tried to poison food and everything else.\u201d\nRespondent also testified that he can take care of himself and he cooks his own meals. Respondent stated that sometimes he was clean but his clothes were dirty, and he \u201ctook baths and everything else at home, and then them people tried to double charge me at the grocery store and everything else.\u201d\nOn cross-examination, respondent testified that the jail staff tried to poison him by spraying something on his food and \u201cthey\u2019re all trying to do me in.\u201d Respondent stated that he became upset when his landlord would not \u201cfix things,\u201d so he picked up the stove and set it outside his apartment. He also stated that he was not taking his prescribed medication because \u201cthey try to do [him] in.\u201d\nAfter considering the evidence and arguments of counsel, the trial court found that respondent, by virtue of his mental illness, presented a threat of harm to himself and others and was unable to care for his own basic needs. The court thus ordered that respondent be involuntarily admitted to the Department at Zeller for a period not to exceed 180 days.\nImmediately following the hearing on the petition for involuntary hospitalization, the parties proceeded with the hearing on the petition for administration of psychotropic medication. At that hearing, Lee once again testified that respondent suffers from chronic mental illness, specifically schizophrenia. Lee stated that respondent had a history of multiple hospitalizations and a pattern of not taking his prescribed medication once he becomes stabilized. He also stated that respondent was currently refusing to take his prescribed medication (Haldol), and respondent\u2019s ability to function had noticeably deteriorated because of his noncompliance. Lee also stated that when respondent takes his prescribed medication, he is able to function. Lee further stated that respondent often complained about feeling sleepy when he was taking Haldol, but Lee had not observed any \u201charmful side effects\u201d over the years he had treated respondent. He opined that the benefit of treating respondent with psychotropic medication outweighed the harm. Lee had tried other \u201cless restrictive alternatives\u201d in treating respondent, but none had worked. He also opined that Haldol (administered by injection) is \u201cappropriate and necessary\u201d for respondent\u2019s mental health.\nOn cross-examination, Lee testified that a patient using Haldol may experience side effects, including irreversible involuntary movement, constipation, sedation, dizziness, dry mouth, and blurred vision. Lee had tried other psychotropic medications, such as Navane, but none of those medications had been effective due to respondent\u2019s poor compliance in taking medication orally. No cure exists for schizophrenia; the only treatment option constitutes psychotropic medication to stabilize patients with schizophrenia.\nAfter considering the evidence and the arguments of counsel, the trial court ordered the staff at Zeller or Provena to administer psychotropic medication to respondent for a period not to exceed 90 days.\nThis appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Exception to the Mootness Doctrine\nThe material in this section is not to be published pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23. 166 Ill. 2d R. 23.\nB. Procedural Defects\nRespondent first argues that certain procedural defects require this court to reverse the trial court\u2019s order directing the staff at Zeller or Provena to administer psychotropic medication to respondent. Specifically, he contends that the following defects require reversal: (1) the State\u2019s failure to provide him with formal notice of the petition for administration of psychotropic medication and the hearing to be held thereon; and (2) the court\u2019s conducting a single, combined proceeding on both that petition and the petition for involuntary hospitalization.\nIn response, the State argues, in part, that respondent has forfeited any claimed procedural defects because (1) respondent failed to object at the January 27, 1998, hearing; (2) both respondent and his attorney were present at that hearing and specifically waived any error during that hearing; and (3) no prejudice resulted. In light of the unique circumstances of this case, we agree with the State.\nSection 2 \u2014 107.1 of the Code provides, in pertinent part, as follows:\n\u201c(1) Any person 18 years of age or older, including any guardian, may petition the circuit court for an order authorizing the administration of authorized involuntary treatment to a recipient of services. *** The petitioner shall deliver a copy of the petition, and notice of the time and place of the hearing, to the respondent, his or her attorney, any known agent or attomey-in-fact, if any, and the guardian, if any, no later than 10 days prior to the date of the hearing. ***\n(2) The court shall hold a hearing within 14 days of the filing of the petition. Continuances totaling not more than 14 days may be granted to the recipient upon a showing that the continuances are needed in order to prepare adequately for a hearing under this [s]ection. The court may, in its discretion, grant additional continuances if agreed to by all parties. The hearing shall be separate from a judicial proceeding held to determine whether a person is subject to involuntary admission.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 405 ILCS 5/2\u2014 107.1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West Supp. 1997).\n\u201cAuthorized involuntary treatment\u201d is defined in section 1 \u2014 121.5 of the Code and includes psychotropic medication. 405 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 121.5 (West Supp. 1997).\nThe Supreme Court of Illinois has held that a trial court\u2019s failure to strictly comply with notice requirements in an involuntary hospitalization proceeding did not require reversal when (1) the respondent failed to object; and (2) the respondent had actual notice of the proceedings. See In re Splett, 143 Ill. 2d 225, 231-32, 572 N.E.2d 883, 886 (1991); In re Nau, 153 Ill. 2d 406, 419-20, 607 N.E.2d 134, 140-41 (1992).\nIn Splett, the respondent did not receive formal notice of the hearing on the involuntary hospitalization petition but was present at the hearing and was represented by counsel, who actively presented a defense. The supreme court held that the defect in notice did not require reversal of the order. In so holding, the court focused on the fact that the respondent had clearly received actual notice of the hearing on the petition and the respondent was in no way prejudiced by the lack of formal notice. Splett, 143 Ill. 2d at 232, 572 N.E.2d at 886.\nIn Nau, the respondent was served with a notice of hearing on a petition for emergency involuntary admission, but he was served before the petition was filed. Citing Splett, the supreme court affirmed the commitment order because (1) the respondent had received actual notice of the hearing; (2) neither the respondent nor his counsel ever objected in the trial court to being served with notice of a hearing before the petition was filed; and (3) the \u201crespondent does not assert, and the record does not indicate, that respondent was in any manner prejudiced by the fact that the notice was served before the trial court had a chance to direct it.\u201d Nau, 153 Ill. 2d at 419, 607 N.E.2d at 140.\nMore recently, in In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d 200, 225-27, 641 N.E.2d 345, 356-57 (1994), the supreme court applied Splett in holding that the trial court\u2019s failure to strictly comply with notice requirements in proceedings to administer psychotropic medication did not amount to a due process violation where the respondent had (1) actual notice of the proceedings, and (2) ample opportunity to prepare a defense.\nIn In re Robinson, 287 Ill. App. 3d 1088, 1091, 679 N.E.2d 818, 820 (1997), the petition for administration of psychotropic medication was filed on the day of the hearing for involuntary hospitalization. Thus, the respondent did not receive a copy of the petition for the administration of psychotropic medication or notice of hearing on that petition 10 days prior to the date of hearing,- as required by section 2 \u2014 107.1(a)(1) of the Code. The transcript of the single hearing conducted on both petitions showed that the respondent\u2019s counsel announced that he was ready for trial and neither the respondent nor her counsel objected to the State\u2019s failure to serve her with a copy of the petition or the notice of hearing. Nonetheless, this court vacated the trial court\u2019s medication order and wrote the following:\n\u201cHere, unlike Splett and its progeny, we do not believe the procedural defects can be deemed harmless or that respondent had actual notice of the petition for psychotropic medication with ample opportunity to prepare for a defense. *** [Instead,] respondent had no notice of the petition for administration of psychotropic medication until the day of the hearing and had no opportunity to prepare a defense.\u201d Robinson, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 1092, 679 N.E.2d at 821.\nIn so concluding, this court noted that it could not determine from the record that counsel\u2019s performance demonstrated that he had an opportunity to prepare for a hearing on the petition for administration of psychotropic medication. Robinson, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 1092, 679 N.E.2d at 821.\nThis court in Robinson also addressed the Code\u2019s separate hearing requirement as follows:\n\u201c[I]n enacting the requirement of \u2018separate\u2019 hearings for petitions for involuntary commitment and administration of psychotropic medication under section 2 \u2014 107.1(a)(2) [citation], the legislature apparently intended to ensure that psychotropic medication petitions are not just simply appended to involuntary commitment petitions. Based on the notice requirements, if followed, an involuntary commitment proceeding would have to be held within five days of filing the petition [citation], where administration of psychotropic medication proceedings could not be held any earlier than 10 days after filing the petition [citation]. Thus, separate hearings would have to be held.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Robinson, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 1092, 679 N.E.2d at 821.\nAlthough the record in the present case contains a petition for administration of psychotropic medication, it does not contain a proof of service of that petition. See In re Ellis, 284 Ill. App. 3d 691, 693, 672 N.E.2d 893, 894 (1996) (\u201cThe burden is upon the State to affirmatively demonstrate that it has complied with the mandates of the Code\u201d). In addition, although the record contains a notice of hearing to be conducted on January 27, 1998, that notice did not state the substance or nature of that hearing. However, the transcript of the January 27, 1998, hearing clearly shows that that hearing originally was set only for the petition for involuntary hospitalization.\nThus, similar to the situation in Robinson, respondent here had no actual notice \u2014 until immediately following the hearing on the petition for involuntary hospitalization \u2014 that the trial court also was going to conduct a hearing on the petition for administration of psychotropic medication. Like this court in Robinson, we cannot determine from the record that counsel\u2019s performance indicates that she had ample opportunity to prepare for a hearing on the petition for administration of psychotropic medication. However, unlike Robinson, not only did respondent and his counsel fail to object to the State\u2019s failure to serve him with a copy of the petition for administration of psychotropic medication or notice of hearing, respondent and his counsel unequivocally waived the 10-day notice of hearing requirement and specifically agreed to a hearing on that petition immediately following the involuntary hospitalization hearing.\nThus, this case presents the question of whether a respondent may make an informed waiver of his statutory right to receive notice of hearing on a petition for administration of psychotropic medication at least 10 days prior to the date of the hearing, pursuant to section 2 \u2014 107.1(a)(1) of the Code (405 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 107.1(a)(1) (West Supp. 1997). The legislature, as the policy-making body of the State of Illinois, has determined, and appropriately so, that with regard to persons who are mentally ill, before government massively intervenes (no matter how well motivated), it must comply with procedural protections such as the 10-day notice requirement. Those procedural safeguards are not mere technicalities which may be routinely disregarded by the State. Rather, they are essential tools to protect the liberty interests of persons alleged to be mentally ill. In re DeLong, 289 Ill. App. 3d 842, 844-45, 682 N.E.2d 1189, 1190 (1997). Morebver, because the involuntary administration of mental health services, implicates fundamental liberty interests, statutes governing the applicable procedures should be construed narrowly. In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 498 (1998).\nAs we earlier noted, section 2 \u2014 107.1(a)(1) of the Code provides that the \u201cpetitioner shall deliver a copy of the petition, and notice of the time and place of the hearing, to the respondent [and] his or her attorney, *** no later than 10 days prior to the date of the hearing.\u201d 405 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 107.1(a)(1) (West Supp. 1997). Although section 2 \u2014 107.1 does not specifically prohibit waiver, it does not specifically provide for it either. Had the legislature intended to allow a respondent alleged to be in need of involuntary treatment to waive his statutory right to have at least 10 days\u2019 notice prior to a hearing on a petition for administration of psychotropic medication, it would have said so. Indeed, the legislature did just that in section 3 \u2014 805 of the Code, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:\n\u201cEvery respondent alleged to be subject to involuntary admission shall be represented by counsel. *** A hearing shall not proceed when a respondent is not represented by counsel unless, after conferring with counsel, the respondent requests to represent himself and the court is satisfied that the respondent has the capacity to make an informed waiver of his right to counsel.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 805 (West 1996).\nIn our judgment, allowing a respondent to waive his statutory right to have at least 10 days\u2019 notice prior to a hearing on a petition for administration of psychotropic medication is ill-advised because of (1) the underlying legislative intent, which is inconsistent with waiver; (2) the language of section 2 \u2014 107.1(a)(1) of the Code; and (3) the difficulty in the trial court\u2019s making an adequate record of a respondent\u2019s waiver.\nThus, we hold that a respondent alleged to be subject to administration of psychotropic medication against his will cannot make an informed waiver of his right to have at least 10 days\u2019 notice prior to a hearing on a petition for administration of psychotropic medication, pursuant to section 2 \u2014 107.1(a)(1) of the Code. Moreover, consistent with this court\u2019s discussion of the Code\u2019s \u201cseparate\u201d hearing requirement of section 2 \u2014 107.1(a)(2) in Robinson, we also hold that the trial court cannot, consistent with that requirement, attempt to conduct \u201cseparate hearings\u201d during the same hearing and enter separate findings on each petition. See Robinson, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 1092, 679 N.E.2d at 821 (based on the notice requirements set forth in sections 3 \u2014 611 (405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 611 (West 1994)) and 2 \u2014 107.1(a)(1) of the Code, \u201cseparate hearings would have to be held,\u201d that is, hearings held'on different days).\nWe nonetheless affirm the trial court\u2019s decision in this case because (1) no reviewing court has previously so held, at least not explicitly; and (2) the trial court here seemed particularly aware of the concerns at issue and did a very scrupulous job of trying to assure that waiver was in respondent\u2019s best interests. We have chosen to provide no detail regarding what the court did in this case because we do not want to provide a \u201croad map\u201d for future waivers.\nIn so concluding, we urge strict compliance with all procedural safeguards set forth in the Code and caution that failure to follow those procedures creates the likelihood of reversal. See In re Luker, 255 Ill. App. 3d 367, 373, 627 N.E.2d 1166, 1170 (1993) (Knecht, J., dissenting) (\u201cWhen the State points the finger at a person and says you are mentally ill and we want to involuntarily confine you [(or involuntarily medicate you)], the State should be required to follow the rules\u201d).\nC. Form of the Petition for Administration of Psychotropic Medication\nRespondent also challenges the form of the petition for administration of psychotropic medication. Specifically, he contends that the State failed to include the following statutorily mandated components in its petition: (1) that the petitioner had made a good-faith attempt to determine whether respondent had executed a power of attorney for health care or a declaration for mental health treatment; (2) a designation of the \u201cpersons\u201d authorized to administer the medication; and (3) the specific medications and the authorized range of dosages (405 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 107.1(a)(1) (West Supp. 1997)).\nInitially, we note that section 2 \u2014 107.1(a)(1) of the Code does not require that the petitioner set forth in the petition either a designation of the persons authorized to administer the medication or the specific medications and authorized range of dosages. See 405 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 107.1(a)(1) (West Supp. 1997). However, that section does provide that the petition shall state that the petitioner made a good-faith attempt to determine whether the respondent had executed a power of attorney for health care or a declaration for mental health treatment and obtain copies of those instruments if they exist (405 ILCS 5/2\u2014 107.1(a)(1) (West Supp. 1997)). The petition in this case did not contain such an allegation. Nonetheless, we agree with the State that any error here was harmless because neither the record before us nor respondent in his brief indicates that such instruments actually existed in this case. Once again, however, we caution that because noncompliance with the statute in this case does not result in reversal, it would be incorrect to assume that future instances of noncompliance will yield the same result.\nD. The Trial Court\u2019s Order for Involuntary Hospitalization\nRespondent also contends that the trial court failed to include the following statutorily mandated components in its order: (1) the specific medications and the authorized range of dosages authorized; and (2) a designation of the \u201cpersons\u201d authorized to administer the medication (405 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 107.1(a)(1) (West Supp. 1997)). In response, the State argues that respondent has forfeited this contention on appeal. We agree with the State.\nThe trial court\u2019s order allowing the clinical staff at either Provena or Zeller to administer psychotropic medication to respondent did not include either (1) the specific medications and the authorized range of dosages authorized; or (2) a designation of the \u201cpersons\u201d authorized to administer the medication, pursuant to section 2 \u2014 107.1(a)(6) of the Code (405 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 107.1(a)(6) (West Supp. 1997)). However, respondent failed to object to the alleged errors when the court entered this order, nor does he argue on appeal that he was somehow prejudiced by the omissions in the order. Moreover, the record here shows that Lee had treated respondent for several years and was very familiar with the appropriate medication and dosages for respondent. We believe that, consistent with Splett and Nau, failure to strictly comply with section 2 \u2014 107.1(a)(6) of the Code in this case does not require reversal because (1) respondent failed to object to the alleged errors at the trial level; (2) the evidence presented showed that respondent\u2019s attending physician was intimately familiar with respondent\u2019s treatment protocol; and (3) respondent does not contend that he was prejudiced by the omissions in the court\u2019s order.\nNonetheless, the issue concerns us because no reason exists why it should ever be a problem for a trial court in the first place. Courts who handle these cases should develop a checklist based upon section 2 \u2014 107.1(a)(6) of the Code and use it when entering orders for administration of involuntary treatment.\nWe also note that we agree with respondent that an order for administration of involuntary treatment issued under section 2 \u2014 107.1(a) of the Code should designate the \u201cpersons\u201d authorized to administer such treatment, meaning specifically named individuals, such as Lee, respondent\u2019s attending physician in this case. The requirement of such a designation reflects the legislature\u2019s concerns about the \u201csubstantially invasive nature of psychotropic substances and their significant side effects.\u201d C.E., 161 Ill. 2d at 214, 641 N.E.2d at 351. Thus, this requirement serves to ensure that only a limited number of designated \u2014 and presumably well-trained \u2014 individuals will be able to administer these powerful drugs, pursuant to a court order, to an unwilling recipient.\nE. Sufficiency of the Evidence at the Hearing on the Petition for Administration of Psychotropic Medication\nThe material in this section is not to be published pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23. 166 Ill. 2d R. 23.\nE Sufficiency of the Evidence at the Hearing on the Petition for Involuntary Hospitalization\nThe material in this section is not to be published pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23. 166 Ill. 2d R. 23.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nAffirmed.\nKNECHT, PJ., and McCULLOUGH, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Jeff M. Plesko, of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Anna, and William J. Conroy, Jr., of Athens, for appellant.", "Michael D. Clary, State\u2019s Attorney, of Danville (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and James Majors, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re DARRELL W. MILLER, a Person Found Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Darrell W. Miller, Respondent-Appellant).\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201498\u20140185\nOpinion filed December 31, 1998.\nJeff M. Plesko, of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Anna, and William J. Conroy, Jr., of Athens, for appellant.\nMichael D. Clary, State\u2019s Attorney, of Danville (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and James Majors, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1060-01", "first_page_order": 1078, "last_page_order": 1091 }