{ "id": 1352952, "name": "EVA DREIKURS FERGUSON, Indiv. and as Ex'r of the Estate of Sadie E. Dreikurs, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BILL BERGER ASSOCIATES, INC., Defendant-Appellant (Bill Berger, Defendant)", "name_abbreviation": "Ferguson v. Bill Berger Associates, Inc.", "decision_date": "1998-12-08", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201497\u20142991", "first_page": "61", "last_page": "79", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "302 Ill. App. 3d 61" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "634 N.E.2d 476", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) requires that argument be supported with citation of authorities and the failure to do so results in waiver" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "261 Ill. App. 3d 778", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5370840 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) requires that argument be supported with citation of authorities and the failure to do so results in waiver" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/261/0778-01" ] }, { "cite": "630 N.E.2d 121", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "258 Ill. App. 3d 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2879579 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/258/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "630 N.E.2d 551", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "procedural due process mandates that a party be afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard and to conduct a defense" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "258 Ill. App. 3d 491", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2882713 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "procedural due process mandates that a party be afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard and to conduct a defense" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/258/0491-01" ] }, { "cite": "667 N.E.2d 683", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 Ill. App. 3d 1090", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 150159 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/281/1090-01" ] }, { "cite": "649 N.E.2d 384", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "165 Ill. 2d 25", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 483549 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/165/0025-01" ] }, { "cite": "632 N.E.2d 1015", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1017", "parenthetical": "\"[a] corporation is a legal entity which exists separate and distinct from its shareholders, directors and officers\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780296 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "172", "parenthetical": "\"[a] corporation is a legal entity which exists separate and distinct from its shareholders, directors and officers\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "664 N.E.2d 328", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "331" }, { "page": "331", "parenthetical": "a party seeking to pierce the corporate veil has the burden to make a substantial showing that the corporation is really a dummy or sham for another dominating entity" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 Ill. App. 3d 1084", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1156778 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1088" }, { "page": "1088" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/278/1084-01" ] }, { "cite": "568 N.E.2d 883", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "891" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 Ill. 2d 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3236561 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "538-39" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/142/0523-01" ] }, { "cite": "489 N.E.2d 429", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "432", "parenthetical": "annual report of Administrative Office of Illinois Courts is proper source to consider when assessing relative court congestion in counties in Illinois" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 Ill. App. 3d 969", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3532474 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "972", "parenthetical": "annual report of Administrative Office of Illinois Courts is proper source to consider when assessing relative court congestion in counties in Illinois" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/140/0969-01" ] }, { "cite": "655 N.E.2d 1016", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1020" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 Ill. App. 3d 292", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 906710 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "297" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/275/0292-01" ] }, { "cite": "696 N.E.2d 780", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 Ill. App. 3d 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 910205 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/297/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 N.E.2d 1322", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 Ill. 2d 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3045513 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/84/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "618 N.E.2d 647", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "the trial judge is presumed to disregard all incompetent evidence" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "248 Ill. App. 3d 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2946107 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "the trial judge is presumed to disregard all incompetent evidence" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/248/0584-01" ] }, { "cite": "34 N.E. 784", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1893, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defining agencies coupled with an interest which are not terminated upon death of principal" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 N.Y. 284", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.", "case_ids": [ 24618 ], "year": 1893, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defining agencies coupled with an interest which are not terminated upon death of principal" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ny/139/0284-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 N.E.2d 818", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 Ill. App. 3d 766", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3136112 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/93/0766-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 N.E.2d 609", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1947, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 Ill. App. 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5044935 ], "year": 1947, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/332/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 Misc. 2d 690", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Misc. 2d", "case_ids": [ 918303 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "death of principal revokes the authority of the agent" }, { "parenthetical": "death of principal revokes the authority of the agent" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/misc2d/159/0690-01" ] }, { "cite": "672 N.E.2d 34", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "284 Ill. App. 3d 97", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1260425 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/284/0097-01" ] }, { "cite": "456 N.E.2d 98", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "a state has an interest in providing a forum when the plaintiff is a resident of that state" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 Ill. 2d 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3121605 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "a state has an interest in providing a forum when the plaintiff is a resident of that state" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/98/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "649 N.E.2d 582", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "586", "parenthetical": "\"[t]he location of the documents is becoming an increasingly less significant factor in the forum non conveniens analysis\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "272 Ill. App. 3d 271", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 251550 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278", "parenthetical": "\"[t]he location of the documents is becoming an increasingly less significant factor in the forum non conveniens analysis\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/272/0271-01" ] }, { "cite": "630 N.E.2d 905", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "912", "parenthetical": "where parties have not yet identified their witnesses, the court should not engage in speculation as to their travel to testify" }, { "page": "912", "parenthetical": "\"a compensated expert would be more inclined to testify wherever instructed\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "258 Ill. App. 3d 567", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2880848 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "577", "parenthetical": "where parties have not yet identified their witnesses, the court should not engage in speculation as to their travel to testify" }, { "page": "577" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/258/0567-01" ] }, { "cite": "573 N.E.2d 234", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "235", "parenthetical": "\"one of the parties will be forced to bear the expense and inconvenience of out-of-State travel\"" }, { "parenthetical": "finding that Illinois court could apply Arizona law in a common law negligence action" }, { "page": "236" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "213 Ill. App. 3d 813", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2606037 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "815" }, { "parenthetical": "finding that Illinois court could apply Arizona law in a common law negligence action" }, { "page": "816" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/213/0813-01" ] }, { "cite": "506 N.E.2d 1291", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1294" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 Ill. 2d 217", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5542906 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "224" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/116/0217-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 U.S. 501", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 354212 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "508" }, { "page": "1062" }, { "page": "843" }, { "page": "509" }, { "page": "1063" }, { "page": "843" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/330/0501-01" ] }, { "cite": "579 N.E.2d 857", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "859" }, { "page": "859" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 Ill. 2d 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5592505 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "310" }, { "page": "311" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/144/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "554 N.E.2d 209", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "211" }, { "page": "212" }, { "page": "212" }, { "page": "214", "parenthetical": "\"the location of expert witnesses should not be accorded undue weight in the forum non conveniens analysis; otherwise, parties to a lawsuit could easily frustrate the *** doctrine through the selection of their expert witnesses\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 Ill. 2d 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3255085 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "106" }, { "page": "108" }, { "page": "108" }, { "page": "112" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/136/0101-01" ] }, { "cite": "607 N.E.2d 214", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 10, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "216" }, { "page": "216" }, { "page": "216" }, { "page": "216" }, { "page": "216", "parenthetical": "\"[a] plaintiffs 'home forum' for purposes of an interstate forum non conveniens motion is the plaintiffs home State\"" }, { "page": "216" }, { "page": "216" }, { "page": "216" }, { "page": "216" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 Ill. 2d 550", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4738037 ], "weight": 10, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553" }, { "page": "553" }, { "page": "553" }, { "page": "553" }, { "page": "553" }, { "page": "553" }, { "page": "554" }, { "page": "554" }, { "page": "553" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/153/0550-01" ] }, { "cite": "674 N.E.2d 105", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "108" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 Ill. App. 3d 459", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1295617 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "463" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/285/0459-01" ] }, { "cite": "599 N.E.2d 1145", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1147" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "234 Ill. App. 3d 839", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5186724 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "842-43" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/234/0839-01" ] }, { "cite": "520 N.E.2d 368", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 Ill. 2d 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3201960 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/121/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "683 N.E.2d 929", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "934" }, { "page": "934" }, { "page": "934" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 Ill. App. 3d 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 456204 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "317" }, { "page": "318" }, { "page": "317" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/291/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "673 N.E.2d 358", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 Ill. App. 3d 267", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1295612 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/285/0267-01" ] }, { "cite": "619 N.E.2d 702", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777553 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "667 N.E.2d 91", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "172 Ill. 2d 386", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 55982 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/172/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "521 N.E.2d 913", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5549737 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "632 N.E.2d 621", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "622" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "260 Ill. App. 3d 197", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2863202 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "198" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/260/0197-01" ] }, { "cite": "636 N.E.2d 1079", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "263 Ill. App. 3d 858", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5367490 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/263/0858-01" ] }, { "cite": "650 N.E.2d 245", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "272 Ill. App. 3d 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 253315 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/272/0132-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1452, "char_count": 44618, "ocr_confidence": 0.772, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.724425542238372e-07, "percentile": 0.8304571038697622 }, "sha256": "85a453f3204a0b4c6b2cd3241ed0f54ecec2c23a3dc4efede3792e2da379164a", "simhash": "1:aa5ebccebfefb4e4", "word_count": 7385 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:49:29.885307+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "EVA DREIKURS FERGUSON, Indiv. and as Ex\u2019r of the Estate of Sadie E. Dreikurs, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BILL BERGER ASSOCIATES, INC., Defendant-Appellant (Bill Berger, Defendant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE GORDON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn this permissive interlocutory appeal taken pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 306 (155 Ill. 2d R. 306), defendant, Bill Berger Associates, Inc., appeals from the denial of its motion to dismiss the complaint of plaintiff Eva Dreikurs Ferguson. In that complaint, which was filed by Ferguson individually and as executor of the estate of Sadie E. Dreikurs, the plaintiff sought a declaration cancelling the literary agency relationship between the defendants, Bill Berger and Bill Berger Associates, Inc., and the plaintiffs deceased father, Rudolf, and her deceased mother, Sadie. She also sought an accounting of royalty and commission transactions received by the defendants in connection with that relationship. Defendant, Bill Berger Associates, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as defendant), a corporation with its principal place of business in New York, moved to dismiss plaintiffs action, contending that the action violated the forum selection provision of a contract entered into between the plaintiffs father and a German publisher. The defendant alternatively contended that the complaint should be dismissed on the grounds of forum non conveniens. The trial court denied the defendant\u2019s motion, and the defendant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal to this court was granted pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 306. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the denial of the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss on the grounds of forum non conveniens. We also find that we are without jurisdiction to hear defendant\u2019s appeal from the portion of the order denying dismissal on the grounds of forum selection.\nBACKGROUND FACTS\nThe pleadings and affidavits of the parties alleged the following facts. The plaintiff is the daughter of deceased author Doctor Rudolf Dreikurs, owner of certain copyrights in connection with books he authored or co-authored. Upon Rudolfs death, the ownership rights to those copyrights passed to plaintiffs mother, Sadie E. Dreikurs, and upon her death temporarily passed to plaintiff as executor of Sadie\u2019s estate. (Upon the closure of that estate, the plaintiff will succeed to all ownership rights in the copyrights.) The pleadings alleged that Rudolf entered into a literary agency relationship with the defendant in 1963 and also at that time executed a publication contract between Meredith Press, a division of Meredith Publishing Company, and himself for the publication of \u201cChildren: The Challenge,\u201d a book he co-authored. The complaint also alleged that in 1964 Rudolf executed an agreement with a German publisher, Ernst Klett Verlag, for the German language rights pertaining to that book. (The defendant alleged that it had prepared these contracts for the parties\u2019 signatures.) Each of these agreements, which were attached to plaintiffs complaint and defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, set forth defendant\u2019s status as Rudolfs agent and authorized the defendant to collect and receive monies due Rudolf and to otherwise act on Rudolfs behalf. The German agreement, unlike the Meredith Press agreement, contained forum selection and choice of law clauses, respectively requiring that all disputes be settled by \u201cdefendant\u2019s competent home courts, or at claimant\u2019s election by arbitration in Zurich, Switzerland,\u201d and that the terms of the agreement be governed and interpreted according to the laws of the State of New York.\nThe plaintiffs complaint alleged that no independent written contracts were executed between Rudolf, Sadie or Eva and the defendant authorizing the defendant to collect royalties and to retain a portion thereof, to make payments to other representatives out of the royalty payments received, or to enter into publishing agreements or addenda to those agreements on their behalf. The plaintiff sought a declaration that, pursuant to the common law and to the Durable Power of Attorney Law (755 ILCS 45/2\u20141 et seq. (West 1996)), any authority of the defendant to represent the Dreikurs\u2019 copyright interests, pursuant to any agency agreement or power of attorney, terminated by operation of law as of the date of Sadie\u2019s death on February 26, 1996. The plaintiff sought a further declaration that the defendant was not authorized to permit Paul & Peter Fritz AG (unidentified in the complaint) to execute an addendum to the German contract on June 6, 1996.\nIn its motion to dismiss, the defendant alleged that the gravamen of the plaintiffs complaint arose from execution of an addendum to the German agreement concerning the right to sell Rudolfs book in quality paperback volume form. The defendant alleged that the addendum was executed by Paul & Peter Fritz AG, the successor to Linder AG, defendant\u2019s foreign subagent. (The 1964 German Agreement authorized Linder AG, \u201cacting on behalf of Bill Berger Assoc.,\u201d to act as Rudolfs agent with respect to collecting money due under the terms of the agreement and to act on Rudolfs behalf.) The defendant cited to the forum selection provision of the original German agreement and the requirement that the dispute be resolved in the defendant\u2019s home court, namely, the New York court. The defendant alternatively argued that the dispute should be dismissed on the basis of forum non conveniens. In this argument, which was supported by the affidavit of William Berger and by a letter written by Peter S. Fritz of Paul & Peter Fritz AG, the defendant contended that trial in New York would be more convenient and would better serve the ends of justice. The defendant argued that such a conclusion was warranted by a consideration of the location of the parties and witnesses, the location of the documents, the relative difference in the economic burdens imposed upon the parties by the choice of the forum state, the place of execution and performance of the contract, the choice of law provision in the German agreement, and the public interest factor of burdening Illinois courts with a matter having no \u201cmeaningful connection\u201d to Illinois.\nIn his affidavit attached to defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, William Berger, president and sole shareholder of the defendant corporation, averred that he was a New York resident and that the defendant was a New York corporation with its principal place of business being in New York. He stated that he was 74 years of age, legally blind, and unable to travel without assistance. He further averred that he never travelled to Illinois to transact literary agency business; that he did not contact Rudolf Dreikurs in Illinois to offer him literary representation; and that Berger Associates did not solicit business in Illinois. He stated that the contract between Rudolf and Meredith Press relative to \u201cChildren: The Challenge\u201d was negotiated from the office of Bill Berger Associates in New York; that the contract was last signed by the publisher\u2019s agent in New York and was to be performed in New York; and that Meredith Press\u2019 assignee, Penguin USA, is headquartered in New York. Berger averred that the contract between Rudolf and the German publisher Ernst Klett Verlag was negotiated from the office of Bill Berger Associates in New York and from the office of Berger\u2019s subagent, Linder AG (now known as Paul & Peter Fritz AG), in Switzerland. He stated that all royalties were paid to and collected by Bill Berger Associates in New York and that payments to Doctor Dreikurs and his heirs were made from New York. He also stated that, to the best of his knowledge, all of the files and persons involved with the publishing contract, other than the foreign edition, were New York residents. He further stated that all of the publishing industry and literary agency experts that he would retain to render opinion testimony resided in New York.\nAlso attached to defendant\u2019s motion as an exhibit was a letter from Peter S. Fritz of Paul & Peter Fritz AG. In the letter, Fritz stated that Linder AG underwent a name change in 1984 to Paul & Peter Fritz AG and that the German publisher Ernst Klett Verlag underwent a name change to Klett-Cotta Verlag. He stated that neither entity operated offices in Illinois and that each of their principal contacts in the United States was with agents and publishers in New York. Fritz also stated that travel to Illinois in connection with the lawsuit would be very costly and inconvenient whereas travel to New York could be connected with other business matters to offset travel costs.\nIn response, the plaintiff moved to strike the letter exhibit because it was unverified, unsworn and not in affidavit form as required by Supreme Court Rule 187 (134 Ill. 2d R. 187). The plaintiff also argued that the defendant could not rely on the forum selection provision of the German agreement because the defendant was not a party to that contract. The plaintiff further argued that the gravamen of her complaint was not the execution of the addendum to the German agreement but, rather, defendant\u2019s agency status and the termination of that status by operation of law upon the death of Sadie Dreikurs. The plaintiff contended that her complaint also cited the Meredith Press contract, which did not have a forum selection clause, and the Illinois Durable Power of Attorney Law (755 ILCS 45/2\u20141 et seq. (West 1996)). With respect to the defendant\u2019s forum non conveniens contention, the plaintiff argued that Illinois was her home forum; that deference should be given to her choice of forum; and that either party would have to bear the burden of out-of-state litigation, including the costs of document production and witness travel. The plaintiff further contended that her action only would require the testimony of plaintiff and William Berger and that the inconvenience to William Berger was not sufficient to justify the dismissal of the Illinois action.\nThe trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, finding that the Illinois court could easily determine the key issue in the case which dealt with the relationship between Rudolf Dreikurs and the defendant and the alleged termination of that relationship. The court found that the defendant could obtain evidence from William Berger by way of an evidence deposition if necessary. The court also rejected defendant\u2019s forum selection contention, finding that the forum selection provision was only present in the German agreement and that that agreement did not create the agency relationship between Rudolf Dreikurs and the defendant.\nThe defendant appeals, contending that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss on the basis of violation of the forum selection clause and on the basis of forum non conveniens.\nDISCUSSION\nI. Forum Selection\nInitially, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction to review defendant\u2019s appeal from the denial of his motion to dismiss on the grounds of a forum selection clause violation. It is axiomatic that an appellate court may only hear appeals from final judgments, unless an exception specified by the supreme court rules apply. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, \u00a7 6; 155 Ill. 2d R. 301; Saddle Signs, Inc. v. Adrian, 272 Ill. App. 3d 132, 650 N.E.2d 245 (1995); Bezan v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 263 Ill. App. 3d 858, 636 N.E.2d 1079 (1994). Supreme Court Rules 306, 307 and 308 (155 Ill. 2d Rs. 306, 307, 308) provide for appeals from certain specified orders that are not final judgments either by leave of the appellate court (155 Ill. 2d Rs. 306, 308) or as of right (155 Ill. 2d R. 307). In the instant case, the defendant\u2019s appeal was taken pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 306. That rule permits appeals from orders of the circuit court granting new trials and orders granting or denying certain motions by permission of the appellate court. 155 Ill. 2d R. 306. The defendant contends that subparagraphs (a)(2) and (a)(4) provide support for a conclusion that this court has jurisdiction over an appeal involving forum selection. Those provisions allow permissive appeals as follows:\n\u201c(2) from an order of the circuit court allowing or denying a motion to dismiss on the grounds of forum non conveniens, or from an order of the circuit court allowing or denying a motion to transfer a case to another county within this State on such grounds;\n(4) from an order of the circuit court granting or denying a motion for a transfer of venue based on the assertion that the defendant is not a resident of the county in which the action was commenced, and no other legitimate basis for venue in that county has been offered by the plaintiff.\u201d 155 Ill. 2d Rs. 306(a)(2), (a)(4).\nSupreme court rules are to be construed in the same manner as statutes. 134 Ill. 2d R. 2, Committee Comments. Thus, when construing supreme court rules, the court must ascertain and give effect to the intention of the supreme court by examining the language of the rules. Killoren v. Racich, 260 Ill. App. 3d 197, 632 N.E.2d 621 (1994). \u201c \u2018If the language is clear, the court must give it effect and should not look to extrinsic aids for construction.\u2019 \u201d Killoren, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 198, 632 N.E.2d at 622, quoting Weingart v. Department of Labor, 122 Ill. 2d 1, 7, 521 N.E.2d 913 (1988). So, too, when the language is plain and unambiguous, courts cannot add exceptions, limitations or otherwise amend or alter a statute, no matter how beneficial or desirable the result. E.g., Nottage v. Jeka, 172 Ill. 2d 386, 667 N.E.2d 91 (1996); In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 619 N.E.2d 702 (1993); In re Rami M., 285 Ill. App. 3d 267, 673 N.E.2d 358 (1996).\nThe defendant concedes that Supreme Court Rule 306 does not on its face set forth the appellate court\u2019s authority to review the denial of a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the proceedings are violative of a forum selection clause in a contract. The defendant contends, however, that the requirements for the determination of a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens are \u201csubstantially identical\u201d to those for forum selection and that the practical effect of the denial of a motion to dismiss on either ground is the same. While we would agree that the effect of a denial of the dismissal motion on either basis is similar, in that the action would not be dismissed and would proceed to trial in the court in which it was brought, we disagree with defendant\u2019s contention that the determination of each ground requires a similar analysis. A forum selection issue requires application of contract principles and contract construction to determine the parties\u2019 preexistent contractual forum choice. As will be discussed more fully below, however, a forum non conveniens issue requires consideration of noncontractual factors including principles of convenience and fairness to choose between two forums proposed by the parties at the time of the controversy. Clearly, these legal theories are not \u201csubstantially identical\u201d such that the denial of a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum selection is not a denial of a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens. Thus, if we were to allow defendant\u2019s appeal on the forum selection issue, we would be expanding the scope of Rule 306(a)(2) beyond the grounds specified therein, thereby usurping the rulemaking authority of the supreme court. See Nottage, 172 Ill. 2d 386, 667 N.E.2d 91; In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 619 N.E.2d 702; In re Rami M., 285 Ill. App. 3d 267, 673 N.E.2d 358.\nDefendant\u2019s forum selection issue also does not fall within Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(4), which allows permissive appeal from the denial of a motion for transfer of venue to a court within another county in the state. Defendant\u2019s motion for dismissal based on forum selection did not seek the transfer of plaintiff\u2019s action to another county within the state but, rather, the transfer of plaintiff\u2019s action to another state. Thus, defendant\u2019s forum selection contention is beyond the plain language of Rul\u00e9 306(a)(4), and we are without authority to grant leave to appeal from the nonfinal order disposing of that issue.\nII. Forum Non Conveniens\nIn reviewing the denial of defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens, which we have specific authority to consider (155 Ill. 2d R. 306(a)(2)), we note the standard of review applicable to the trial court\u2019s order. The trial court is vested with broad discretion to determine whether a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens should be granted. It is not the function of this court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court or even to determine wheth\u00e9r the trial court exercised its discretion wisely. Elling v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 291 Ill. App. 3d 311, 317, 683 N.E.2d 929, 934 (1997). This court must only determine whether the trial court abused its discretion. E.g., McClain v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R. Co., 121 Ill. 2d 278, 520 N.E.2d 368 (1988); Trent v. Caterpillar, Inc., 234 Ill. App. 3d 839, 599 N.E.2d 1145 (1992). A trial court has abused its discretion when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by it. E.g., O\u2019Connell v. City of Chicago, 285 Ill. App. 3d 459, 463, 674 N.E.2d 105, 108 (1996).\nForum non conveniens is an equitable doctrine under which principles of convenience and fairness are weighed in order to choose between two or more forums having jurisdiction. E.g., Kwasniewski v. Schaid, 153 Ill. 2d 550, 607 N.E.2d 214 (1992); Griffith v. Mitsubishi Aircraft International, Inc., 136 Ill. 2d 101, 554 N.E.2d 209 (1990). This common law doctrine applies to actions involving interstate as well as intrastate matters. Vinson v. Allstate, 144 Ill. 2d 306, 579 N.E.2d 857 (1991). When ruling on a forum non conveniens motion, the court must consider private interest factors affecting convenience of the litigants and public interest factors affecting administration of the courts. Vinson, 144 Ill. 2d 306, 579 N.E.2d 857; Trent, 234 Ill. App. 3d 839, 599 N.E.2d 1145. Relevant private factors include accessibility of sources of proof, availability of witnesses, availability of compulsory service of process to compel the appearance of unwilling witnesses, costs of obtaining witnesses, viewing the premises in question, if appropriate, convenience of the parties, and \u201c \u2018all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.\u2019 \u201d Trent, 234 Ill. App. 3d at 842-43, 599 N.E.2d at 1147, quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508, 91 L. Ed. 1055, 1062, 67 S. Ct. 839, 843 (1947); accord Kwasniewski, 153 Ill. 2d at 553, 607 N.E.2d at 216; Vinson, 144 Ill. 2d at 310, 579 N.E.2d at 859; Griffith, 136 Ill. 2d at 106, 554 N.E.2d at 211. Relevant public factors include \u201cthe administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; \u2018a local interest in having localized controversies decided at home\u2019; and the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty.\u201d Bland v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 116 Ill. 2d 217, 224, 506 N.E.2d 1291, 1294 (1987), quoting Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 509, 91 L. Ed. at 1063, 67 S. Ct. at 843; accord Kwasniewski, 153 Ill. 2d at 553, 607 N.E.2d at 216; Vinson, 144 Ill. 2d at 311, 579 N.E.2d at 859. An additional public factor is the appropriateness of having the case heard in a forum familiar with the state law that governs the case. Simantz v. Prime Motor Inns, Inc., 213 Ill. App. 3d 813, 573 N.E.2d 234 (1991).\nA further consideration in ruling on a forum non conveniens motion is the plaintiffs choice of forum. \u201cA plaintiff is given the right to select the forum, and unless the public and private interest factors strongly weigh in favor of transfer, a plaintiffs choice of forum will rarely be disturbed.\u201d Kwasniewski, 153 Ill. 2d at 553, 607 N.E.2d at 216. Less deference is given where the plaintiff is not a resident of the chosen forum (Kwasniewski, 153 Ill. 2d at 553, 607 N.E.2d at 216, citing McClain, 121 Ill. 2d 278, 520 N.E.2d 368); but, even when the plaintiffs forum choice is entitled to less deference, the test remains whether the relevant factors, viewed in their totality, strongly favor transfer to the forum suggested by the defendant. Griffith, 136 Ill. 2d at 108, 554 N.E.2d at 212; Elling, 291 Ill. App. 3d at 318, 683 N.E.2d at 934.\nIn the instant case, the defendant first argues that no deference should be given to the plaintiffs choice of forum, Cook County, because the plaintiffs county of residence is Madison County. We disagree. When a forum non conveniens motion involves choosing between interstate forums rather than intrastate forums, the plaintiffs home forum is the entire state in which the plaintiff resides rather than the county within the state in which the plaintiff resides. Kwasniewski, 153 Ill. 2d at 553, 607 N.E.2d at 216 (\u201c[a] plaintiffs \u2018home forum\u2019 for purposes of an interstate forum non conveniens motion is the plaintiffs home State\u201d). Thus, in the instant case, while the plaintiff does not reside in Cook County, her home forum is any county within the State of Illinois. Unless the private and public interest factors strongly weigh in favor of transfer, the plaintiffs choice of forum must prevail. Kwasniewski, 153 Ill. 2d at 553, 607 N.E.2d at 216; Griffith, 136 Ill. 2d at 108, 554 N.E.2d at 212.\nWith respect to the private and public interest factors, the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss argued that those factors strongly weighed in favor of dismissing plaintiff\u2019s Illinois action. As to the private interest factors, the defendant cited the following considerations: William Berger\u2019s blindness and inability to travel without assistance; the location of all of defendant\u2019s witnesses in New York or Europe, the latter finding travel to New York more convenient; the probability that defendant\u2019s experts would reside in New York; the location of most, if not all, of the relevant documents in defendant\u2019s New York office; the cost of transporting witnesses and documents to a location other than New York; the fact that the contract was executed and performed in New York; and the applicability of New York law to the contract dispute. As to the private interest factors, the defendant contended that an Illinois jury would have no meaningful connection with the circumstances of the litigation and that the court dockets in New York would allow for somewhat faster disposition.\nAs discussed above, the trial court considered these factors and found that they did not strongly favor transfer to New York. We cannot say that the court\u2019s conclusion was an abuse of discretion or that no reasonable person would adopt that view. First, the inconvenience of defendant\u2019s witnesses having to travel to Illinois is not persuasive. As the trial court noted, it is not clear that the testimony of individuals from the New York and European publishers would be relevant to resolution of the issues in controversy. Plaintiffs complaint asserts the existence of a contractual agency relationship between defendant and Rudolf Dreikurs which, apparently, was never memorialized in a written contract. The contracts between Rudolf and the New York and German publishers do not purport to set forth the terms and conditions of the agency relationship that should control between Rudolf, his heirs and the defendant. Those contracts appear to draw upon the preexistence of such an agency relationship insofar as they set forth the publishers\u2019 obligations to remit all sums due Rudolf under the respective contracts to Rudolfs agent, the defendant. Thus, since it is unlikely that defendant\u2019s witnesses from the publishing companies could testify regarding the contractual relationship between the Dreikurs and the defendant, the need for their testimony is speculative at best; and the inconvenience to them in testifying in Illinois would be of little import. See Hulsey v. Scheidt, 258 Ill. App. 3d 567, 577, 630 N.E.2d 905, 912 (1994) (where parties have not yet identified their witnesses, the court should not engage in speculation as to their travel to testify). Similarly, the location of defendant\u2019s expert witnesses in New York is of minimal weight. Since those witnesses would be compensated for their travel, any inconvenience with regard to travel would not appear to be pivotal. See Hulsey, 258 Ill. App. 3d at 577, 630 N.E.2d at 912 (\u201ca compensated expert would be more inclined to testify wherever instructed\u201d); see also Griffith, 136 Ill. 2d at 112, 554 N.E.2d at 214 (\u201cthe location of expert witnesses should not be accorded undue weight in the forum non conveniens analysis; otherwise, parties to a lawsuit could easily frustrate the *** doctrine through the selection of their expert witnesses\u201d). Moreover, even if the testimony of any of these witnesses would be pertinent and even if they would be otherwise reluctant to travel to Chicago to testify, their testimony could be made available by way of an evidence deposition. See Kwasniewski, 153 Ill. 2d at 554, 607 N.E.2d at 216, citing 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 202, 203, 204, 212(b).\nThe only witness whose testimony would be clearly relevant and significant, and who would be most inconvenienced by travel to Illinois, is William Berger, defendant\u2019s president. Berger suffers from blindness and needs assistance in order to travel. However, that condition would be so even if Berger were to testify in New York. Moreover, as the trial court suggested, the defendant could submit Berger\u2019s evidence deposition in New York, thereby alleviating travel to Illinois, an option also available to defendant\u2019s other out-of-state witnesses. See Kwasniewski, 153 Ill. 2d at 554, 607 N.E.2d at 216, citing 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 202, 203, 204, 212(b). Balanced against Berger\u2019s inconvenience would be the expense and inconvenience of out-of-state travel to the plaintiff were the case to be heard in New York. See Simantz, 213 Ill. App. 3d at 815, 573 N.E.2d at 235 (\u201cone of the parties will be forced to bear the expense and inconvenience of out-of-State travel\u201d).\nSimilarly, defendant\u2019s claim that most of the relevant documents are held in its New York office would not weigh in favor of dismissal. In present times, the location of documents is of little importance because they can be photocopied and transported with ease and with little expense. See Hayes v. Fireman\u2019s Fund Mortgage Corp., 272 Ill. App. 3d 271, 278, 649 N.E.2d 582, 586 (1995) (\u201c[t]he location of the documents is becoming an increasingly less significant factor in the forum non conveniens analysis\u201d). Moreover, as the plaintiff contends, she, too, has numerous documents which she would have to transport to New York upon the granting of defendant\u2019s motion.\nWith respect to public interest factors, the defendant argued that it would be unfair to burden an Illinois jury with a case that has no meaningful connection to its state and where the jury would have to apply New York law. According to the defendant, New York law would apply because its contract with the Dreikurs was performed from its New York office, because the New York publishing contract with Meredith Press was last signed in New York and because the German contract contained a choice of law clause requiring the application of New York law. The plaintiff contends that Illinois law, specifically, the Illinois Durable Power of Attorney Law (755 ILCS 45/2\u2014 1 et seq. (West 1996)) and the common law, should be applied to resolve the instant action and the issue of when, if ever, the agency relationship between the Dreikurs and the defendant terminated. She further contends that, even if New York law governed the instant action, the applicable laws of New York and Illinois are identical such that the burden upon the Illinois court to apply New York law would not be burdensome.\nThe trial court noted when ruling on defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss that the determination of which state law would apply to the controversy was far from clear and that further facts about the agency relationship need to be presented before the determination of which state law to apply could be made. We agree. As discussed above, no written contract was executed by Rudolf and the defendant to establish defendant\u2019s relationship to Rudolf and his literary agent. There is no indication that that relationship was not established by oral contract or other course of dealings between Rudolf and the defendant. While the German agreement acknowledged defendant as Rudolfs agent for purposes of collecting monies due Rudolf under that contract, that agreement could have been an implementation of the preexisting relationship between Rudolf and the defendant. Moreover, the German agreement did not purport to cover the gamut of the relationship between those two parties. Consequently, while the German agreement provided for application of New York law to any controversy regarding its terms, it did not purport to apply New York law to all controversies arising out of the agency relationship between Rudolf and the defendant. The same is true of the Meredith Press contract, which in fact does not purport to have a choice of law provision, although it was allegedly last signed in New York and could, for that reason, militate in favor of the application of New York law.\nEven assuming the application of New York law to the instant controversy, however, that factor would not weigh in favor of dismissal of the Illinois action. Illinois courts can readily adapt to apply foreign laws to actions pending before them. See Simantz v. Prime Motor Inns, Inc., 213 Ill. App. 3d 813, 573 N.E.2d 234 (1991) (finding that Illinois court could apply Arizona law in a common law negligence action). Thus, the fact that the choice of law may refer to another jurisdiction would not suffice to overcome the connection between the plaintiff and Illinois arising from plaintiffs residence in this state. See Simantz, 213 Ill. App. 3d at 816, 573 N.E.2d at 236, stating:\n\u201cIllinois courts can apply the law of a foreign State in appropriate circumstances, although they should not be burdened with doing so unless there are strong policy reasons and Illinois has a strong connection with the case. [Citation.] Inasmuch as Illinois is the home of two of the plaintiffs and is their chosen forum, there are strong policy interests involved and strong connections with the case.\u201d\nHere, the Dreikurs were all residents of Illinois, and Illinois was the plaintiffs chosen forum (see Kwasniewski, 153 Ill. 2d at 553, 607 N.E.2d at 216). See also Weiser v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 98 Ill. 2d 359, 456 N.E.2d 98 (1983) (a state has an interest in providing a forum when the plaintiff is a resident of that state). Moreover, the burden of applying New York law on the issue of agency termination upon operation of death, if that law were to apply, would not even require any special adaptation since, as the plaintiff asserts, New York and Illinois law on the subject is identical. Compare Washington v. Caseyville Health Care Ass\u2019n, 284 Ill. App. 3d 97, 672 N.E.2d 34 (1996), and 755 ILCS 45/2\u20145 (West 1996), with Ferrentino v. Dime Savings Bank, F.S.B., 159 Misc. 2d 690, 606 N.Y.S.2d 554 (Sup. Ct. 1993) (death of principal revokes the authority of the agent). Compare also Olson v. Eulette, 332 Ill. App. 178, 74 N.E.2d 609 (1947), and Farns Associates, Inc. v. South Side Bank, 93 Ill. App. 3d 766, 417 N.E.2d 818 (1981), with Farmers\u2019 Loan & Trust Co. v. Wilson, 139 N.Y. 284, 34 N.E. 784 (1893) (defining agencies coupled with an interest which are not terminated upon death of principal).\nAs a second public interest factor, the defendant contended in its reply to plaintiffs response that the instant lawsuit could be concluded more expeditiously in New York. The defendant supported this contention with an affidavit of a New York attorney admitted to that state\u2019s bar in 1948, with \u201can active general trial practice.\u201d The attorney indicated that, based upon information furnished him by clerks from the New York Supreme Court, a jury or nonjury case would take approximately 1 to IV2 years from inception to completion. Defendant\u2019s reply also stated that, according to its Illinois attorney, matters in the courts of Cook County took two to five years to complete. At the hearing on the defendant\u2019s dismissal motion, plaintiffs counsel asked the court to disregard defendant\u2019s congestion argument because it was raised for the first time in defendant\u2019s reply. On appeal, the plaintiff argues this contention should not have been considered by the trial court because it was not supported with reliable statistical information and because the New York attorney\u2019s affidavit was hearsay.\nInitially, we note that the court made no rulings with respect to the admissibility of court congestion information propounded by the defendant in its reply. However, it is presumed that the trial court considered only admissible evidence. E.g., People v. Koch, 248 Ill. App. 3d 584, 618 N.E.2d 647 (1993) (the trial judge is presumed to disregard all incompetent evidence). In that regard, we presume that the court disregarded the affidavit of the New York attorney because it contained hearsay statements from the New York court clerks regarding the length of time for a case to reach trial in New York. Generally, an expert giving an opinion can rely upon facts or data that need not be admitted or admissible in evidence, if of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field. Wilson v. Clark, 84 Ill. 2d 186, 417 N.E.2d 1322 (1981); Moran v. Erickson, 297 Ill. App. 3d 342, 696 N.E.2d 780 (1998). See generally M. Graham, Cleary & Graham\u2019s Handbook of Illinois Evidence \u00a7 703.1 (6th ed. 1994) (hereinafter cited as M. Graham, Illinois Evidence). In such a case, the expert can disclose those facts and data and they would be admitted for the limited purpose of showing the basis of his opinion. The \u201c[f]acts, data or opinions reasonably relied on by an expert witness are not by virtue thereof substantive evidence; reasonably relied on facts, data, or opinions constitute substantive evidence only if otherwise admitted into evidence.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) M. Graham, Illinois Evidence \u00a7 703.1, at 583. Here, however, assuming the New York attorney was qualified to give an expert opinion as to the length of time for case disposition by trial in New York, a close reading of his affidavit shows that he did not give such an opinion. Rather, he merely disclosed information told to him by New York court clerks. In fact, he concluded his affidavit with the statement, \u201c[s]uch is the information furnished to me.\u201d As such, his affidavit serves only as a conduit for the hearsay obtained from the New York court clerks and thereby remains inadmissible.\nPresumably, too, the court did not consider the representation made in defendant\u2019s reply that, \u201cin the experience of defendant\u2019s counsel, matters routinely proceed from 2 to 5 years before coming to trial.\u201d That assertion was not supported by the affidavit of defendant\u2019s Illinois counsel, setting forth defense counsel\u2019s qualifications to make such an assertion, nor was it supported by official court statistical information which is admissible on the issue of court congestion. See, e.g., Evans v. MD Con, Inc., 275 Ill. App. 3d 292, 297, 655 N.E.2d 1016, 1020 (1995); Boston v. Rockford Memorial Hospital, 140 Ill. App. 3d 969, 972, 489 N.E.2d 429, 432 (1986) (annual report of Administrative Office of Illinois Courts is proper source to consider when assessing relative court congestion in counties in Illinois). Moreover, notwithstanding the absence of admissible evidence on the issue of Illinois court congestion, we note that when deciding forum non conveniens issues, the trial court is in the better position to assess the burdens on its own docket. Boner v. Peabody Coal Co., 142 Ill. 2d 523, 538-39, 568 N.E.2d 883, 891 (1991). Here, it is clear from the record that the trial court considered the docket burdens in the courts of Cook County and determined that the matter could be handled speedily in that county. We cannot say that the court\u2019s conclusion in that regard was erroneous.\nThe trial court considered the private and public interest factors raised by the defendant in its motion to dismiss. It is evident from the record that the trial court weighed those factors and found that none strongly weighed in favor of transfer in contravention of the plaintiff s forum choice. It is not the function of this court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Elling, 291 Ill. App. 3d at 317, 683 N.E.2d at 934. While we might weigh the factors differently, we cannot say that the weight given by them by the trial court was an abuse of discretion or that no reasonable person would have reached the same conclusion. See McClain, 121 Ill. 2d 278, 520 N.E.2d 368; Trent, 234 Ill. App. 3d 839, 599 N.E.2d 1145; see also O\u2019Connell, 285 Ill. App. 3d 459, 674 N.E.2d 105. Thus, we affirm the trial court\u2019s denial of transfer.\nIn related argument, the defendant contends that the denial of transfer would lead to a denial of its due process rights. Specifically, the defendant contends that if the trial were held in Illinois and if William Berger was unable to attend that trial and instead submitted to an evidence deposition, the defendant would be denied the opportunity to present evidence on its own behalf, to be present for cross-examination of the plaintiff, and to attend the trial and observe the demeanor of the witnesses. We fail to see any merit to defendant\u2019s contention. First, it appears from the context of this argument that the defendant may be interchanging itself with its president and sole shareholder, William Berger, an individual. It would be incorrect to do so because the defendant is a corporate entity separate and apart from William Berger. See Jacobson v. Buffalo Rock Shooters Supply, Inc., 278 Ill. App. 3d 1084, 1088, 664 N.E.2d 328, 331 (1996), citing In re Rehabilitation of Centaur Insurance Co., 158 Ill. 2d 166, 172, 632 N.E.2d 1015, 1017 (1994) (\u201c[a] corporation is a legal entity which exists separate and distinct from its shareholders, directors and officers\u201d). Here, there has been no attempt, by the plaintiff to pierce the corporate veil. See generally Jacobson, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 1088, 664 N.E.2d at 331 (a party seeking to pierce the corporate veil has the burden to make a substantial showing that the corporation is really a dummy or sham for another dominating entity). Moreover, Berger\u2019s potential absence from the Illinois trial would not deny the defendant corporation its right to a hearing as its interests would be represented by counsel and it would have the opportunity to present evidence, including Berger\u2019s evidence deposition, cross-examine the plaintiffs witnesses, and observe the witnesses\u2019 demeanor. See generally Northern Illinois Home Builders Ass\u2019n v. County of Du Page, 165 Ill. 2d 25, 649 N.E.2d 384 (1995); Turner v. Campagna, 281 Ill. App. 3d 1090, 667 N.E.2d 683 (1996); Department of Public Aid ex rel. Moutria v. Roach, 258 Ill. App. 3d 491, 630 N.E.2d 551 (1994) (procedural due process mandates that a party be afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard and to conduct a defense). Berger also could be available in New York to defendant\u2019s counsel for consultation purposes, prior to and during trial, and would be able to give input with respect to facts derived from plaintiffs witnesses previously deposed. Thus, defendant\u2019s due process argument is meritless.\nIn separate argument, the defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by not considering a letter it attached to its motion to dismiss. As discussed above, the letter from Peter Fritz of Paul & Peter Fritz AG, defendant\u2019s German subagent, was submitted in support of the defendant\u2019s contention that its witnesses would be inconvenienced if they had to travel to Illinois for trial. The plaintiff moved to strike the letter because it was not in affidavit form as required by Supreme Court Rule 187(b) (134 Ill. 2d R. 187(b)). The trial court initially granted the motion to strike but later at that same hearing ruled that it would deny the motion and leave the letter, which it found immaterial, \u201cfor p\u00farpos\u00e9s of the record.\u201d\nIn the context of this argument the defendant makes the assertion, without case citation or tither support, that Supreme Court Rule 187(b) does not limit the parties\u2019 filings with respect to a motion to dismiss under forum non conveniens to affidavits only. While we believe this argument is incorrect, it is not necessary to decide this question since the defendant has waived the issue. See 155 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7); Bank of Illinois v. Thweatt, 258 Ill. App. 3d 349, 630 N.E.2d 121 (1994); Eckiss v. McVaigh, 261 Ill. App. 3d 778, 634 N.E.2d 476 (1994) (Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) requires that argument be supported with citation of authorities and the failure to do so results in waiver).\nIn any event, the defendant concedes that the trial court denied the motion to strike and did allow the letter into the record. The defendant argues, however, that the trial court \u201ccompletely disregarded or regarded prejudicially\u201d the material in the letter. We disagree. The record shows that the court considered the content of the letter but found that Fritz\u2019s value to the defendant as a witness was negligible. The court found that Fritz could not testify concerning the 1963 agency agreement between Rudolf Dreikurs and the defendant, that is, how it came about, where it came about, when it came about and the nature of the relationship. As a result, the court gave little weight to the inconvenience that Fritz stated he would experience in having to travel to Illinois. We cannot say that such a conclusion was an abuse of discretion.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the order of the circuit court of Cook County, denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss on the grounds of forum non conveniens, is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nRAKOWSKI and COUSINS, JJ., concur.\nOn the court\u2019s own motion, defendant Bill Berger was dismissed as a party defendant because the plaintiff only alleged conduct by Bill Berger Associates. The court found that Bill Berger could not be personally liable unless the plaintiff pierced the corporate veil, which the plaintiff had not attempted to do in her complaint. Bill Berger is not a party to this appeal.\nPenguin USA succeeded Meredith Press and is now the American publisher of the book \u201cChildren: The Challenge.\u201d\nAs the defendant notes in its brief, the plaintiff refers to various dates in her pleadings and appellate brief upon which she asserts the agency relationship ceased, including the date of Rudolfs death and the date of Sadie\u2019s death. This conflict does not impact upon the resolution of the forum non conveniens issue before this court.\nPersuasive argument can be made that the instant case does not pose a forum selection question. As noted in the facts of this opinion, the forum selection clause exists in the German agreement. The plaintiff argued in the trial court that the defendant was not a party to that agreement and could not claim any rights thereunder. The plaintiff also argued that her lawsuit did not involve a dispute with respect to the German contract but, rather, involved a relationship formed independent of and outside of that contract, namely, the agency relationship between the defendant and Rudolf Dreikurs and his heirs. However, since for the reasons discussed below, we have no jurisdiction to review orders denying motions to dismiss on the basis of forum selection clauses, we need not reach the issue of the applicability of the forum selection clause in the instant proceedings.\nThe plaintiffs parents resided in Cook County before their deaths, and Sadie Dreikurs\u2019 estate, for which the plaintiff was executor, was being probated in Cook County at the time the instant action was filed. We note that the instant action was filed by the plaintiff in her individual capacity and as executor of Sadie\u2019s estate. The defendant contends that the estate was made a party to this action solely for the purpose of creating home forum status in Cook County. We need not reach this issue, however, since, as discussed in the text of this opinion, any county in the State of Illinois is a home forum when choosing between interstate forums.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE GORDON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Mark H. Barinholtz, of Law Office of Mark H. Barinholtz, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Jeffrey T. Saltz, of Morrison, Kamins & Saltz, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "EVA DREIKURS FERGUSON, Indiv. and as Ex\u2019r of the Estate of Sadie E. Dreikurs, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BILL BERGER ASSOCIATES, INC., Defendant-Appellant (Bill Berger, Defendant).\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1\u201497\u20142991\nOpinion filed December 8, 1998.\n\u2014 Rehearing denied January 6, 1999.\nMark H. Barinholtz, of Law Office of Mark H. Barinholtz, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJeffrey T. Saltz, of Morrison, Kamins & Saltz, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0061-01", "first_page_order": 79, "last_page_order": 97 }