{ "id": 1352852, "name": "THE PEOPLE ex rel. THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. SOCCER ENTERPRISES, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "People ex rel. Department of Labor v. Soccer Enterprises, Inc.", "decision_date": "1998-12-21", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201497\u20144469", "first_page": "481", "last_page": "486", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "302 Ill. App. 3d 481" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5549613 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "506" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 Ill. App. 3d 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3554904 ], "weight": 10, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451" }, { "page": "452" }, { "page": "452" }, { "page": "452" }, { "page": "457" }, { "page": "457" }, { "page": "458" }, { "page": "457" }, { "page": "458" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/175/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 Ill. App. 3d 553", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2569581 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "558", "parenthetical": "determining that Amigleo's interpretation of section 12 was dicta" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/205/0553-01" ] }, { "cite": "203 Ill. App. 3d 903", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2583136 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/203/0903-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 Ill. 2d 262", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 864528 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "270" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/182/0262-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 544909 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/176/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "210 Ill. App. 3d 985", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2534027 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "993" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/210/0985-01" ] }, { "cite": "286 Ill. App. 3d 21", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1544398 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "23" }, { "page": "23" }, { "page": "23" }, { "page": "23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/286/0021-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 555, "char_count": 12156, "ocr_confidence": 0.76, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.817684715086474e-08, "percentile": 0.5331917034545257 }, "sha256": "88243e4e36bfac3e44399cee9b6978141511271608729b4a7789341b51da23ae", "simhash": "1:54b2cef7631334f8", "word_count": 1985 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:49:29.885307+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE ex rel. THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. SOCCER ENTERPRISES, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019BRIEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn April 1994, plaintiff, the Illinois Department of Labor (hereinafter Department), investigated defendants, Soccer Enterprises and Peter Richardson, regarding alleged violations of child labor laws. During the course of the investigation, the Department determined that from April 1992 through April 1994 defendants failed to pay overtime wages to 22 employees as required by the Minimum Wage Law (820 ILCS 105/12 et seq. (West 1992) (hereinafter the Act)). On August 19, 1997, the Department filed a complaint against defendants to recover the amount of the unpaid overtime wages, plus punitive damages and costs. Defendants filed a combined motion to dismiss under section 2 \u2014 619.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2\u2014619.1 (West 1994)), alleging in pertinent part that the Department\u2019s cause of action was barred by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in section 12(a) of the Act (820 ILCS 105/12(a) (West 1994)). Defendants also sought the imposition of sanctions against the Department, including attorney fees and costs. The trial court determined that the Department\u2019s cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations set forth in section 12(a) of the Act and dismissed the complaint. The trial court denied defendants\u2019 motion for sanctions. The Department appeals the trial court\u2019s order dismissing its complaint. Defendants cross-appeal the trial court\u2019s order denying them attorney fees and costs as sanctions. We reverse the trial court\u2019s order dismissing the Department\u2019s complaint, affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court\u2019s order denying defendants\u2019 motion for sanctions, and remand for further proceedings.\nThe first issue is whether the trial court erred in applying the three-year limitations period set forth in section 12(a) of the Act to the Department\u2019s cause of action, which was brought under section 12(b).\nThe resolution of this issue requires us to construe section 12 of the Act. Because the construction of a statute is a matter of law, we need not defer to the trial court\u2019s construction of the Act. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n, 286 Ill. App. 3d 21, 23 (1996); Monahan v. Village of Hinsdale, 210 Ill. App. 3d 985, 993 (1991).\nThe primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent of the legislature. Peoples Gas, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 23. In determining legislative intent, the court first considers the statutory language (Peoples Gas, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 23), which is given its plain and ordinary meaning. Advincula v. United Blood Services, 176 Ill. 2d 1, 17 (1996). The court should evaluate the statute as a whole and, if possible, construe it so that no term is rendered superfluous or meaningless. Texaco-Cities Service Pipeline Co. v. McGaw, 182 Ill. 2d 262, 270 (1998). Where the statutory language is clear, it will be given effect without resort to other aids for construction. Peoples Gas, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 23.\nAccordingly, we begin our analysis by examining the relevant language of section 12:\n\u201c(a) If any employee is paid by his employer less than the wage to which he is entitled under the provisions of this Act, the employee may recover in a civil action the amount of any such underpayments together with costs and such reasonable attorney\u2019s fees as may be allowed by the Court, and any agreement between him and his employer to work for less than such wage is no defense to such action. At the request of the employee or on motion of the Director of Labor, the Department of Labor may make an assignment of such wage claim in trust for the assigning employee and may bring any legal action necessary to collect such claim, and the employer shall be required to pay the costs incurred in collecting such claim. Every such action shall be brought within 3 years from the date of the underpayment. ***\n(b) The Director is authorized to supervise the payment of the unpaid minimum wages and the unpaid overtime compensation owing to any employee or employees under Sections 4 and 4a of this Act and may bring any legal action necessary to recover the amount of the unpaid minimum wages and unpaid overtime compensation and an equal additional amount as punitive damages, and the employer shall be required to pay the costs.\u201d 820 ILCS 105/12 (West 1994).\nThe clear and unambiguous language of section 12(a) authorizes actions brought by employees on their own behalf and actions employees have assigned to the Department. Section 12(a) then imposes a three-year limitations period on \u201c[e]very such action.\u201d 820 ILCS 105/12(a) (West 1994). Under its plain and ordinary meaning, \u201c[e]very such action\u201d must refer to the actions earlier mentioned in section 12(a). Thus, section 12(a)\u2019s three-year limitations period applies only to employees\u2019 private causes of actions and to actions employees have assigned to the Department.\nThe clear and unambiguous language of section 12(b) authorizes the Department to \u201cbring any legal action necessary to recover the amount of the unpaid minimum wages.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 820 ILCS 105/12(b) (West 1994). The appellate court has construed this language as authorization for the Department to bring an independent action in the absence of an assignment by the employee. See People ex rel. Martin v. Schwartz Oil Field Services, Inc., 203 Ill. App. 3d 903 (1990); People ex rel. Martin v. Smith, 205 Ill. App. 3d 553 (1990). No period of limitation is prescribed in section 12(b).\nIn the present case, the Department waited more than three years after the date of underpayment before bringing its action against defendants pursuant to section 12(b). The trial court applied the three-year limitations period set forth in section 12(a) and dismissed the complaint. This was error. As discussed above, section 12(a)\u2019s limitations period applies only to actions brought under that section; section 12 (a)\u2019s limitations period does not apply to actions brought by the Department under section 12(b). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court\u2019s dismissal order and remand for further proceedings.\nAmigleo v. Bernardi, 175 Ill. App. 3d 449 (1988), cited by defendants in support of their argument that the three-year statute of limitations applies to both sections 12(a) and 12(b), is factually inapposite. In Amigleo, plaintiffs Amigleo and Yanong were two employees who filed claims with the Department to recover unpaid overtime compensation from their employer. Amigleo, 175 Ill. App. 3d at 451. After an investigation, the Department found that the employer owed Amigleo $9,514.36 and Yanong $3,347.50. Amigleo, 175 Ill. App. 3d at 452. Those amounts were for unpaid overtime compensation for the two-year period prior to the date of the filing of their claims with the Department. Although plaintiffs had claimed unpaid wages for a period of more than two years, departmental policy at the time prohibited investigation of claims that were more than two years old. Amigleo, 175 Ill. App. 3d at 452.\nPlaintiffs brought a mandamus action to compel the Department to prosecute their wage claims and for injunctive relief to stop the Department from limiting their unpaid wage collections to a two-year period. Amigleo, 175 Ill. App. 3d at 452. The Department argued in response that an investigation of a claim takes about one year, after which any claim that was more than two years old would be beyond section 12(a)\u2019s three-year statute of limitations. Amigleo, 175 Ill. App. 3d at 457. The Department based its two-year policy on its interpretation that the three-year limitations period set forth in section 12(a) applied to actions brought by the Department under section 12(b). Amigleo, 175 Ill. App. 3d at 457.\nThe appellate court found for the Department, holding that the Department\u2019s two-year policy was not unreasonable. Amigleo, 175 Ill. App. 3d at 458. In reaching its decision, the court reasoned that a \u201clogical interpretation of section 12 would be to apply the three-year limitations period to 12(b) as well as 12(a).\u201d Amigleo, 175 Ill. App. 3d at 457.\nThe court\u2019s interpretation of section 12 was based in part on the \u201cgreat deference [accorded to the Department] in its policy regarding its enforcement of claims under section 12.\u201d Amigleo, 175 Ill. App. 3d at 458. However, the Department has since changed its interpretation of section 12 and abandoned the two-year, policy deferred to by the Amigleo court. Therefore, Amigleo has limited, if any, precedential value in the present case. See also People ex rel. Martin v. Smith, 205 Ill. App. 3d at 558 (determining that Amigleo\u2019s interpretation of section 12 was dicta).\nDefendants assert that the Department should be bound by its prior interpretation of section 12, under which the limitations period of section 12(a) applies to section 12(b). We disagree. \u201c[A]n agency is not required to adhere to a certain policy or practice forever ***. The standard is one of rationality.\u201d Greer v. Illinois Housing Development Authority, 122 Ill. 2d 462, 506 (1988). The Department\u2019s current interpretation of section 12, under which the limitations period of section 12(a) does not apply to section 12(b), is rational and therefore permissible. See our discussion above.\nNext, defendants cross-appeal the trial court\u2019s order denying them sanctions under Supreme Court Rule 137. Rule 137 provides in relevant part:\n\u201cThe signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.\u201d 155 Ill. 2d R. 137.\nDefendants contend that the Department\u2019s complaint was unwarranted under the law or the facts of the case and deserving of sanctions. Specifically, defendants contend that the Department filed the complaint after the three-year limitations period set forth in section 12(a) of the Act and without any assignment of claims by the employees involved. As discussed above, though, section 12(b) authorizes the Department to file an action in the absence of assignment by the employees; further, section 12(a)\u2019s limitations period does not apply to an action filed pursuant to section 12(b). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court\u2019s denial of defendants\u2019 motion for sanctions premised on the Department\u2019s alleged violation of section 12 of the Act. Defendants also argue for sanctions premised on (1) the alleged lack of substantive merit to the Department\u2019s complaint and (2) various \u201charassing\u201d actions taken by the Department pursuant to the complaint. Since we are reversing the trial court\u2019s dismissal order and remanding for a determination on the merits of the Department\u2019s complaint, any decision on a motion for sanctions premised on the alleged meritless nature of said complaint is premature. Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the trial court\u2019s order denying defendants\u2019 motion for sanctions based on the complaint\u2019s alleged lack of merit and the Department\u2019s \u201charassing\u201d actions taken pursuant thereto. We remand the matter for a new hearing after the trial court has made a decision on the substantive merits of the complaint.\nDismissal order reversed; sanctions order affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.\nGALLAGHER and O\u2019HARA FROSSARD, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019BRIEN" } ], "attorneys": [ "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Barbara A. Preiner, Solicitor General, and Royce A. White, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellant.", "Pinderski & Pinderski, Ltd., of Palatine (Paul C. Pinderski and Jerome W. Pinderski, Jr., of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE ex rel. THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. SOCCER ENTERPRISES, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellants.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1\u201497\u20144469\nOpinion filed December 21, 1998.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Barbara A. Preiner, Solicitor General, and Royce A. White, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellant.\nPinderski & Pinderski, Ltd., of Palatine (Paul C. Pinderski and Jerome W. Pinderski, Jr., of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0481-01", "first_page_order": 499, "last_page_order": 504 }