{ "id": 511393, "name": "GLORYA KAYSER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE VILLAGE OF WARREN, Defendant-Appellee (Stagecoach Trail Association, Defendant)", "name_abbreviation": "Kayser v. Village of Warren", "decision_date": "1999-02-16", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201498\u20140413", "first_page": "198", "last_page": "204", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "303 Ill. App. 3d 198" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "202 Ill. App. 3d 638", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2588142 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/202/0638-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 Ill. App. 3d 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2506532 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "155" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/192/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "277 Ill. App. 3d 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1172352 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/277/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "281 Ill. App. 3d 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 150213 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243" }, { "page": "243-44" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/281/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 Ill. App. 3d 877", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499438 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "880" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/232/0877-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 Ill. App. 3d 573", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1352888 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "577" }, { "page": "577" }, { "page": "575" }, { "page": "578" }, { "page": "578" }, { "page": "578" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/302/0573-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 F.3d 599", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 7414309 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "604" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/44/0599-01" ] }, { "cite": "277 Ill. App. 3d 896", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1172443 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/277/0896-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 Ill. App. 3d 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 381899 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/268/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 Ill. App. 3d 711", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2504962 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding section 3-106 applies to restroom on park grounds" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/192/0711-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801360 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "509" }, { "page": "508" }, { "page": "508" }, { "page": "510" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0500-01" ] }, { "cite": "258 Ill. App. 3d 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2882571 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/258/0419-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 Ill. 2d 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 222754 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378" }, { "page": "383" }, { "page": "381-82" }, { "page": "381" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/167/0372-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 616, "char_count": 13082, "ocr_confidence": 0.786, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0278145661480097e-07, "percentile": 0.5471817082772007 }, "sha256": "60e723d65afd38743124a8336d03cba23783a0af610be3ce1a4025496e270d34", "simhash": "1:332e2dd7b165147c", "word_count": 2050 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:41:17.679955+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "GLORYA KAYSER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE VILLAGE OF WARREN, Defendant-Appellee (Stagecoach Trail Association, Defendant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE RAPP\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Glorya Kayser (Kayser), brought a negligence action against the Village of Warren (Village), an Illinois municipal corporation and the owner of the Warren community building, after she was injured exiting the Warren community building. The circuit court of Jo Daviess County dismissed Kayser\u2019s complaint pursuant to section 2\u2014619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/1\u2014101 et seq. (West 1996)), ruling that Kayser\u2019s claim was barred by the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/3\u2014106 (West 1996)). We affirm.\nKayser\u2019s complaint alleged that on June 22, 1997, Kayser was selling T-shirts in a booth during the annual Stagecoach Trail Festival. After she delivered T-shirts to storage inside the Warren community building, Kayser was injured exiting the building. Kayser fell as she attempted to maneuver around a chair propped inside the exit door.\nThe Village moved to dismiss Kayser\u2019s complaint, asserting that it was immune from liability for negligence under section 3\u2014106 of the Tort Immunity Act, which provides as follows:\n\u201cNeither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury where the liability is based on the existence of a condition of any public property intended or permitted to be used for recreational purposes, including but not limited to parks, playgrounds, open areas, buildings or other enclosed recreational facilities, unless such local entity or public employee is guilty of willful and wanton conduct proximately causing such injury.\u201d 745 ILCS 10/3\u2014106 (West 1996).\nIt is undisputed that the Village is a local public entity and that the Warren community building is public property. See 745 ILCS 10/1\u2014206, 3\u2014101 (West 1996).\nIn support of its position that the Warren community building is public property intended or permitted to be used for recreational purposes, the Village filed the affidavit of Warren village attorney Michael A. Toepfer, which stated that functions held at the Warren community building included \u201cfamily picnics, club meetings, receptions, bake sales, book sales, Chamber of Commerce meetings, preschool Christmas concerts, and long range planning committee group supper and meetings.\u201d\nKayser opposed the Villages\u2019s motion, arguing that the Tort Immunity Act did not preclude her suit because the Warren community building could not be characterized as a recreational facility within the meaning of the Act.\nThe trial court agreed with the Village and found that the Warren community building was recreational property under section 3 \u2014 106. Thus, applying the immunity granted under the statute, the trial court dismissed Kayser\u2019s suit.\nOn appeal, the sole issue is whether the Warren community building is \u201cpublic property intended or permitted to be used for recreational purposes\u201d as contemplated by section 3\u2014106 of the Tort Immunity Act. Kayser argues that the Warren community building is not within the purview of section 3\u2014106 because the activities held at the building are not sufficiently \u201csportive\u201d or \u201cactive.\u201d If the Warren community building falls within the purview of section 3\u2014106, however, the Village is immune from liability because Kayser\u2019s complaint contained no allegation of willful and wanton conduct. See 745 ILCS 10/3\u2014106 (West 1996).\nIn general, under section 3\u2014102 of the Tort Immunity Act, municipalities have a duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain their property in a reasonably safe condition. 745 ILCS 10/3\u2014102 (West 1996). Section 3\u2014106, however, provides public entities with an affirmative defense against simple negligence claims arising from conditions present on any public property intended or permitted to be used for recreational purposes, regardless of the primary purpose of the property. Bubb v. Springfield School District 186, 167 Ill. 2d 372, 378 (1995). This section was enacted with the purpose of encouraging the development and maintenance of public parks, playgrounds, and similar recreation areas. Lewis v. Jasper County Community Unit School District No. 1, 258 Ill. App. 3d 419, 422 (1994).\nAs the supreme court recognized, public property may have more than one intended use. Bubb, 167 Ill. 2d at 383. Thus, the character of the property as a whole determines whether section 3\u2014106 immunity applies. Sylvester v. Chicago Park District, 179 Ill. 2d 500, 509 (1997). In addition, section 3\u2014106 may apply to facilities and structures as well. Sylvester, 179 Ill. 2d at 508. These facilities or structures need not be recreational in character; section 3\u2014106 will apply if the usefulness of public property intended or permitted to be used for recreational purposes is increased. Sylvester, 179 Ill. 2d at 508; see Annen v. Village of McNabb, 192 Ill. App. 3d 711 (1990) (holding section 3\u2014106 applies to restroom on park grounds). Section 3\u2014106 does not apply to every public area where recreation might occur; rather, courts consider whether the property was used for recreation in the past or whether recreation was encouraged there. Bubb, 167 Ill. 2d at 381-82.\nCourts have found various types of property immune under section 3\u2014106 as recreational areas. These properties include school playgrounds (see Lewis, 258 Ill. App. 3d 419); a bike path within a city park (Goodwin v. Carbondale Park District, 268 Ill. App. 3d 489 (1994)); a drainage ditch located in a park (Conoway v. Hanover Park Park District, 277 Ill. App. 3d 896 (1996)); a parking lot adjacent to a football stadium (Sylvester; 179 Ill. 2d 500); a public convention center (Diamond v. Springfield Metropolitan Exposition Auditorium Authority, 44 F.3d 599 (7th Cir. 1995)); and, very recently, Chicago\u2019s Navy Pier, a property of over 50 acres of parks, promenades, gardens, shops, restaurants, and entertainment attractions (Wallace v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Authority, 302 Ill. App. 3d 573 (1998)).\nKayser argues that the Warren community building is not recreational because it is not used for \u201csportive\u201d or \u201cactive\u201d purposes. Kayser relies upon John v. City of Macomb, 232 Ill. App. 3d 877 (1992), which stated that \u201cthe legislative intent of the Act is to immunize governmental entities from liability for simple negligence in areas where public activities of a sportive nature *** are permitted.\u201d John, 232 Ill. App. 3d at 880. Accordingly, Kayser contends that the section 3\u2014106 immunity does not apply here.\nRecreation is defined as \u201c \u2018refreshment of the strength and spirits after toil: DIVERSION, PLAY.\u2019 \u201d Ozuk v. River Grove Board of Education, 281 Ill. App. 3d 239, 243 (1996), quoting Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 1899 (1986). Play \u201c \u2018suggests an opposition to work; it implies activity, often strenuous, but emphasizes the absence of any aim other than amusement, diversion, or enjoyment.\u2019 (Emphasis omitted.)\u201d Ozuk, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 243-44, quoting Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 1737 (1986).\nIn Corral v. Chicago Park District, 277 Ill. App. 3d 357 (1995), the court found that Lincoln Park Zoo was property intended for recreational use although attending a zoo is passive activity. The court held that section 3\u2014106 does not apply just to sportive activities and stated, \u201cWe find no language which would support a sportive or active activity limitation and see no reason to engraft one.\u201d Corral, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 360. Subsequently, the supreme court endorsed the Corral language that passive activity is recreational by concluding \u201cspectators of sporting events are engaged in recreation\u201d (Sylvester, 179 Ill. 2d at 510), and the first district explicitly held that the term \u201crecreational purposes\u201d includes passive activity (Wallace, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 577).\nTherefore, the term \u201crecreational purpose\u201d is not limited to \u201csportive\u201d or \u201cactive\u201d recreation (Spencer v. City of Chicago, 192 Ill. App. 3d 150, 155 (1989)), and property intended or permitted for passive activities involving relaxation and pleasure also falls within the scope of protection afforded by section 3\u2014106. Wallace, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 577. Although we concur with the premise that passive activity may be recreational, whether the passive activity in this case was recreational and whether the Village intended or permitted the Warren community building to be used for these purposes remain to be addressed.\nTwo cases are dispositive of the present case, the seventh circuit case Diamond, 44 F.3d 599, and Wallace, 302 Ill. App. 3d 573. In Diamond, the plaintiff was injured when she tripped in an underground tunnel on her way to attend a career-related conference at the Prairie Capital Convention Center. The convention center, a multipurpose facility, was used for meetings, shows, expositions, rodeos, boxing matches, wrestling events, basketball games and tournaments, karate tournaments, and other public events. The court held that the convention center was public property intended or permitted to be used for recreational purposes under section 3\u2014106 of the Tort Immunity Act. Diamond, 44 F.3d at 604. Subsequently, the supreme court endorsed the seventh circuit\u2019s reasoning. See Bubb, 167 Ill. 2d at 381.\nIn Wallace, the plaintiff was injured on Chicago\u2019s Navy Pier, which consists of over 50 acres of parks, promenades, gardens, shops, restaurants, and entertainment attractions. Wallace, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 575. According to the plaintiff, section 3\u2014106 did not apply because Navy Pier is commercial, not recreational, property. Relying on Diamond, the first district disagreed and found that Navy Pier, a multipurpose facility, was \u201ccertainly property intended or permitted for recreational use.\u201d Wallace, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 578. The court found that recreational activity has occurred and was encouraged at the pier though a \u201cmyriad of activities and attractions, such as carnival rides, movies, theatrical and musical performances and cruises that are designed for the public\u2019s enjoyment.\u201d Wallace, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 578. The court held that the fact that the pier has both recreational and nonrecreational purposes does not defeat the applicability of section 3\u2014106. Wallace, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 578.\nIn the present case, the only evidence of the use of the Warren community building, the Toepfer affidavit, establishes that the building is used for family picnics, club meetings, receptions, bake sales, book sales, Chamber of Commerce meetings, preschool Christmas concerts, and long-range-planning committee group suppers and meetings. Similar to Navy Pier and the Prairie Capital Convention Center, the Warren community building is a multipurpose facility used for recreational and nonrecreational activities.\nHere, the public benefits from the use of a public building in much the same way as it benefits from a park or a playground. Many of the Warren community building\u2019s activities, such as preschool Christmas concerts, receptions, and family picnics, are permitted inside the building solely for the public\u2019s enjoyment, diversion, and amusement; these are activities analogous to Navy Pier\u2019s carnival rides and theatrical and musical performances or the Prairie Capital Convention Center\u2019s expositions, rodeos, and boxing matches. In other words, they are activities the Warren community building permitted for the public\u2019s recreation. We hold, therefore, that the Warren community building is public property intended or permitted to be used for recreational purposes consistent with section 3\u2014106 of the Tort Immunity Act.\nFurthermore, the legislative history of section 3\u2014106 supports this interpretation of the statute. Prior to its amendment in 1986, section 3\u2014106 applied only to public property \u201cintended or permitted to be used as a park, playground or open area for recreational purposes.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 85, par. 3\u2014106. In 1986, the legislature amended the statute to apply to \u201cany public property intended or permitted to be used for recreational purposes.\u201d 745 ILCS 10/3\u2014106 (West 1996). Amended section 3\u2014106 still provided immunity for parks, playgrounds, and open areas but added \u201cbuildings or other enclosed recreational facilities\u201d to the illustrative fist of immunized public properties. This amendment evidences the legislature\u2019s intent to broaden the scope of immunity provided by the Tort Immunity Act beyond parks and playgrounds to encompass other properties where recreational uses are intended or permitted. See Bonfield v. Jordan, 202 Ill. App. 3d 638 (1990).\nFor the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Village is entitled to immunity under section 3\u2014106 of the Tort Immunity Act. Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court of Jo Daviess County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nINGLIS and GEIGER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE RAPP" } ], "attorneys": [ "Steven A. Cox, of Snow, Hunter, Whiton & Fishburn, Ltd., of Freeport, for appellant.", "Thomas J. Potter, of Ludens, Potter & Burch, of Morrison, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "GLORYA KAYSER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE VILLAGE OF WARREN, Defendant-Appellee (Stagecoach Trail Association, Defendant).\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201498\u20140413\nOpinion filed February 16, 1999.\nSteven A. Cox, of Snow, Hunter, Whiton & Fishburn, Ltd., of Freeport, for appellant.\nThomas J. Potter, of Ludens, Potter & Burch, of Morrison, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0198-01", "first_page_order": 216, "last_page_order": 222 }