{ "id": 511321, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MAURICE DEAN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Dean", "decision_date": "1999-04-01", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201496\u20141495", "first_page": "758", "last_page": "762", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "303 Ill. App. 3d 758" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "176 Ill. 2d 499", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 544904 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/176/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 243853 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "15" }, { "page": "17-18" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/186/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "295 Ill. App. 3d 34", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 45748 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/295/0034-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 Ill. 2d 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477908 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244-45" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/163/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 Ill. App. 3d 16", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1260448 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "21-22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/284/0016-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801339 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "43" }, { "page": "46" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 Ill. 2d 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 909161 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "152" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/169/0132-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 527, "char_count": 9310, "ocr_confidence": 0.788, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.007242587278462e-07, "percentile": 0.541065328519153 }, "sha256": "f2811e4e2e3844a57ecf53e7796cf4949de1db8bcd4fdae6a138b6c5326934cf", "simhash": "1:ca227f237a165f39", "word_count": 1502 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:41:17.679955+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MAURICE DEAN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GALASSO\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter a bench trial, defendant, Maurice Dean, was convicted of armed violence (720 ILCS 5/33A\u20142 (West 1996)) predicated on aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12\u20144(a)(1) (West 1996)) and home invasion (720 ILCS 5/12\u201411(a) (West 1996)). He received 10 years\u2019 imprisonment for armed violence and 6 years\u2019 imprisonment for home invasion. On appeal, defendant argues that (1) the evidence did not prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) his conviction of armed violence must be reversed because it is improperly based on aggravated battery with a deadly weapon (720 ILCS 5/12\u20144(b)(1) (West 1996)); and (3) his sentence for armed violence is not subject to the \u201ctruth-in-sentencing\u201d law (730 ILCS 5/3\u20146\u20143(a)(2)(ii) (West 1996)).\nWe hold that (1) the evidence proved defendant guilty; (2) defendant\u2019s armed violence conviction is properly based on aggravated battery involving great bodily harm; and (3) defendant is not entitled to day-for-day good-conduct credit against his sentence for armed violence. We affirm the judgment as modified.\nDefendant contends, first, that he was not proved guilty because the State\u2019s occurrence witnesses, the victim, and the victim\u2019s girlfriend, were unworthy of belief. Defendant observes that, before the stabbing, the victim had been drinking beer for several hours. A test shortly after the stabbing showed the victim\u2019s blood-alcohol content was 0.316, more than three times the minimum for legal intoxication (see 625 ILCS 5/11\u2014501(a)(1) (West 1996)). According to defendant, the victim\u2019s girlfriend had also been drinking the day of the stabbing. Defendant asserts that the witnesses\u2019 drinking habits and alcohol consumption on the day of the offense make their testimony inherently untrustworthy.\nDefendant notes other infirmities in the testimony. According to the officer who showed them a photographic lineup, neither the victim nor his girlfriend positively identified defendant; the girlfriend picked out someone else, although the victim did say that defendant\u2019s photograph looked like the attacker. Also, the victim and his girlfriend had a history of domestic violence, including several incidents where the police were called and the victim or his girlfriend soon dropped the charges. They admitted that, shortly before the stabbing, they had an argument of some sort. Defendant\u2019s posttrial motion introduced proof that, a week after the jury convicted defendant, the victim pleaded guilty to the aggravated battery of his girlfriend. As he did at trial, defendant urges that the witnesses may have framed him to cover up the result of one of their recurrent quarrels.\nOur review is limited to asking whether all the evidence, when considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is sufficient to convince any rational fact finder that the elements of the offense have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Brown, 169 Ill. 2d 132, 152 (1996). We do not retry the defendant. People v. Digirolamo, 179 Ill. 2d 24, 43 (1997). The fact finder weighs the credibility of the witnesses and resolves any conflicts or inconsistencies in their testimony, and we may not substitute our judgment on these matters for that of the fact finder. Digirolamo, 179 Ill. 2d at 46.\nGiven our deference to the fact finder\u2019s credibility decisions, we cannot say the evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt is insufficient. In court, both the victim and his girlfriend identified defendant as the perpetrator. They gave reasonably, although not entirely, consistent accounts of the events leading up to and following the attack. The victim also stated that a photograph of defendant looked like the perpetrator, although he did not make a positive identification.\nAlthough the victim was almost certainly quite intoxicated when he was stabbed, there was \u2014 as the trial court noted \u2014 no evidence of how much his intoxication interfered with his ability to perceive the nature of the attack or identify his attacker. The victim\u2019s girlfriend testified that, in the hours before the stabbing, she had little to drink; the trial court could have credited this assertion. Defendant\u2019s characterization of these two witnesses as \u201chabitual drunkards and alcoholics\u201d inherently unworthy of belief is an overstatement, and one the trial court surely could properly reject after observing them testify. This case turned on the witnesses\u2019 credibility; once the trial court believed them, it had ample evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt.\nDefendant\u2019s second contention is that his conviction of armed violence was an impermissible double enhancement because it was predicated on aggravated battery with a deadly weapon (720 ILCS 5/12\u20144(b)(1) (West 1996)). The trial court found that the conviction was properly predicated on aggravated battery causing great bodily harm (720 ILCS 5/12\u20144(a) (West 1996)). We agree with the trial court.\nArmed violence may not be predicated on aggravated battery by use of a deadly weapon but may be based on aggravated battery causing great bodily harm. People v. Miller, 284 Ill. App. 3d 16, 21-22 (1996). As pertinent here, the indictment states that defendant, \u201cwhile armed with a dangerous weapon, a knife, performed acts in violation of Illinois Compiled Statutes, Chapter 720, Section 5/12\u20144A [sic], and committed the felony of Aggravated Battery in that he stabbed [the victim].\u201d Observing that the aggravated battery statute has no section \u201c12\u20144A,\u201d defendant asserts that the use of the phrase \u201carmed with a dangerous weapon\u201d implies that the armed violence charge is predicated on aggravated battery by the use of a deadly weapon (720 ILCS 5/12\u20144(b)(1) (West 1996)).\nWe believe that the indictment properly charges defendant with armed violence based on section 12\u20144(a) and that the reference to \u201cSection 5/12\u20144A\u201d is an inconsequential typographical error. A formal defect in an indictment may be corrected at any time. 725 ILCS 5/111\u20145 (West 1996); People v. Kimbrough, 163 Ill. 2d 231, 244-45 (1994).\nWe reject defendant\u2019s assertion that the indictment actually charges armed violence based on aggravated battery with a deadly weapon. The count of the indictment charging defendant with armed violence nowhere refers to subsection 12\u20144(b)(1). The phrase \u201carmed with a dangerous weapon\u201d merely tracks the armed violence statute itself. See 720 ILCS 5/33A\u20142 (West 1996).\nDefendant\u2019s third contention is that the \u201ctruth-in-sentencing\u201d law (see 730 ILCS 5/3\u20146\u20143(a) (2)(ii) (West 1996)) does not apply to his 10-year sentence for armed violence. In People v. Reedy, 295 Ill. App. 3d 34 (1998), this court held that Public Act 89\u2014404 (Pub. Act 89\u2014404, eff. August 20, 1995), through which the legislature originally enacted the truth-in-sentencing law, violated the Illinois Constitution\u2019s single subject rule (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV \u00a7 8(d)). However, the legislature passed another act (Pub. Act 89\u2014462, eff. May 29, 1996) with the same truth-in-sentencing law. In this case, the defendant\u2019s offense occurred on June 22, 1996, after Public Act 89\u2014462 took effect. Therefore, if Public Act 89\u2014462 is valid, the defendant could still be deprived of day-for-day good-conduct credit.\nRecently, our supreme court upheld this court\u2019s decision in Reedy. People v. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d 1 (1999). In addition the supreme court also held that Public Act 89\u2014462 did not serve as curative legislation for any portion of Public Act 89\u2014404. People v. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d at 15. The court concluded as follows:\n\u201cIn light of our previous discussion with respect to curative legislation, we note that, unlike all preceding amendments to Public Act 89\u2014404, Public Act 90\u2014592 [(Pub. Act 90\u2014592, eff. June 19, 1998)] truly served to cure the effect that the former act\u2019s invalidation had on the truth-in-sentencing law. Like the curative legislation deemed applicable in [Johnson v. Edgar], 176 Ill. 2d 499 (1997)], Public Act 90\u2014592 recodified the truth-in-sentencing legislation in its entirety. Noting that the best evidence of the legislature\u2019s intent is found in the plain language of a statute [citations] and that subsection (a)(2) of Public Act 90\u2014592 clearly states the legislature\u2019s intention to apply the revisited truth-in-sentencing law in a prospective manner only, we hold that these reenacted provisions do not apply to defendants in this case. This result is mandated by the language of subsection (a)(2), which applies the curative truth-in-sentencing legislation to offenses committed on or after June 19, 1998.\u201d Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d at 17-18.\nSince the offense in this case took place prior to June 19, 1998, the defendant is entitled to day-for-day good-conduct credit against his sentence for armed violence, and we modify the judgment in this case to so specify.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is affirmed as modified.\nAffirmed as modified.\nGEIGER and INGLIS, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GALASSO" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "David R. Akemann, State\u2019s Attorney, of St. Charles (Martin P Moltz and David A. Bernhard, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MAURICE DEAN, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201496\u20141495\nOpinion filed April 1, 1999.\nG. Joseph Weller, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nDavid R. Akemann, State\u2019s Attorney, of St. Charles (Martin P Moltz and David A. Bernhard, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0758-01", "first_page_order": 776, "last_page_order": 780 }