{ "id": 511313, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DARWIN ANDERSON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Anderson", "decision_date": "1999-03-25", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201497\u20140014", "first_page": "1050", "last_page": "1060", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "303 Ill. App. 3d 1050" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "604 N.E.2d 275", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 Ill. 2d 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5602986 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "58" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/152/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "661 N.E.2d 287", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 Ill. 2d 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 909161 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144" }, { "page": "150" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/169/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "603 N.E.2d 477", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 Ill. 2d 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3291708 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/151/0419-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 U.S. 503", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11718904 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/373/0503-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 N.E.2d 23", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "43 Ill. App. 3d 1059", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2727815 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1061-62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/43/1059-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 N.E.2d 783", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 Ill. App. 3d 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3390600 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "508" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/52/0500-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 N.E.2d 512", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 Ill. App. 3d 288", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3261740 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308-09" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/73/0288-01" ] }, { "cite": "449 N.E.2d 927", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 Ill. App. 3d 1018", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3592108 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1024" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/114/1018-01" ] }, { "cite": "541 N.E.2d 132", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "184 Ill. App. 3d 412", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2640311 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "428" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/184/0412-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 N.E. 169", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1929, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 Ill. 333", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5233998 ], "year": 1929, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/337/0333-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 N.E.2d 346", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"It was improper for the trial court to disregard defendant's uncontroverted testimony\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "18 Ill. App. 3d 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2610530 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116", "parenthetical": "\"It was improper for the trial court to disregard defendant's uncontroverted testimony\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/18/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "606 N.E.2d 1186", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 Ill. 2d 335", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4738160 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "349-50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/153/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 N.E.2d 61", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5549964 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "112" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "636 N.E.2d 105", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "263 Ill. App. 3d 906", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5370131 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "912" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/263/0906-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444" }, { "page": "706-07" }, { "page": "1612" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 U.S. 477", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6187603 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484-85" }, { "page": "386" }, { "page": "1884-85" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/451/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "625 N.E.2d 719", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "253 Ill. App. 3d 15", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5422015 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "33" }, { "page": "33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/253/0015-01" ] }, { "cite": "692 N.E.2d 1109", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 297", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821396 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0297-01" ] }, { "cite": "606 N.E.2d 1186", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "153 Ill. 2d 335", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4738160 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/153/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 U.S. 477", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6187603 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484-85" }, { "page": "386" }, { "page": "1884-85" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/451/0477-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 937, "char_count": 23578, "ocr_confidence": 0.785, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.304828124825895e-08, "percentile": 0.27120615912356283 }, "sha256": "86aa9f84fe984c02956fe62ce90bb3db18ef9198fbb23945c271c4090d86b8f1", "simhash": "1:1daa20ea7b4bc595", "word_count": 3822 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:41:17.679955+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DARWIN ANDERSON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WOLFSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDarwin Anderson appeals his aggravated robbery conviction. He contends police officers, not he, initiated questioning that led to his signing of a written confession, in violation of his constitutional right to the presence and advice of a lawyer. The trial court found they did not. Although we are bound to apply a manifest weight of the evidence standard to the trial court\u2019s findings, we conclude the defendant\u2019s written confession should have been suppressed.\nFACTS\nOn January 17, 1995, a man dressed completely in navy blue entered the Quagliani Insurance Agency in Homewood around 10:30 a.m. The man spoke with Marilyn Kapes (Kapes) about insuring a car and identified himself as \u201cVincent\u201d Anderson of Dolton. After a brief discussion, the man left the insurance agency, returning around 12:30 p.m., only to say he would return again. Around 2:30 p.m., the man returned, stole Kapes\u2019 diamond engagement ring, and fled in a car.\nLater that day, Aaron Lake, a jewelry dealer in Harvey, purchased a one-half karat diamond solitaire ring from Darwin Anderson (Anderson).\nHomewood police detectives Douglas Roberts (Roberts) and James Denman (Denman) were assigned to investigate Kapes\u2019 robbery. Two blocks from the insurance agency, Roberts and Denman found an abandoned car. The fingerprints on the car led the police to Barbara Jacobowski (Jacobowski), who in turn led them to Anderson. On March 15, 1995, Anderson, who was in custody at the Robbins police department on an unrelated charge, was brought to the Homewood police department.\nOn March 16, 1995, Anderson signed an inculpatory statement. Before trial, Anderson filed a motion to suppress his statement.\nAt the hearing on Anderson\u2019s motion, Roberts testified: On March 16 around 9:30 a.m., Roberts and Denman first met Anderson. Roberts advised Anderson of his Miranda rights, and Anderson indicated he understood his rights. Roberts and Denman interviewed Anderson for approximately 45 minutes, and Anderson made an inculpatory statement: \u201cHe gave us his account of implicating himself in the armed robbery ***.\u201d Roberts made notes of Anderson\u2019s confession and later used these notes to draft a written statement for Anderson to sign.\nAround 1:20 p.m., Denman took Anderson to a lineup. After the lineup, Homewood police summoned assistant State\u2019s Attorneys to interview Anderson. Around 6 p.m., Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Frank Cece told Roberts and Denman that Anderson refused to speak with assistant State\u2019s Attorneys and asked to return to the lockup. Denman took Anderson back to the lockup. Several minutes later, Denman returned from the lockup, saying, \u201cAnderson told [Denman] he [Anderson] would only talk to Homewood detectives.\u201d\nAround 8:15 p.m., Roberts and Denman again spoke with Anderson for approximately 30 minutes. Roberts advised Anderson of his Miranda rights, and Anderson indicated he understood his rights. Roberts then gave Anderson a three-page written statement based on Roberts\u2019 notes of Anderson\u2019s first inculpatory statement that morning. Roberts offered to read the statement to Anderson, but Anderson chose to read the statement himself. Anderson initialed the Miranda waiver, initialed each page, and signed the last page of the statement. The prosecution presented two photographs of Anderson reading the statement.\nRoberts denied he or Denman ever slapped, kicked, or punched Anderson. Roberts also denied Anderson ever complained about lack of sleep or mistreatment by Homewood police.\nDenman testified: On March 16 around 9:30 a.m., Denman and Roberts first met Anderson. Roberts advised Anderson of his Miranda rights, and Anderson indicated he understood his rights. Denman and Roberts interviewed Anderson for approximately 45 minutes. Denman was asked if Anderson denied any involvement in the robbery: \u201cAt first, yes, he denied, not acknowledging that he was the offender, yes.\u201d\nDenman again saw Anderson around 1:20 p.m., when he took Anderson to a lineup. Around 6 p.m., two assistant State\u2019s Attorneys met briefly with Anderson outside the presence of Denman and Roberts. After that meeting, Denman recalled, \u201cState\u2019s attorney [sic] came out and advised that Mr. Anderson did not want to speak to them and that I could go put him in the lockup.\u201d\nAs Denman was walking Anderson to the lockup, Anderson initiated a conversation: \u201cMr. Anderson said that he didn\u2019t want to talk to the state because they put cases on him that he didn\u2019t do. And as we were going into the lockup, he said that he was still interested in talking to me and my partner.\u201d Denman returned to his office, where he informed Roberts and the assistant State\u2019s Attorneys of this conversation. Denman denied he squeezed Anderson\u2019s arm while walking to the lockup.\nAround 8:15 p.m., Denman and Roberts returned to the lockup and asked Anderson if he still wished to speak with them. When Anderson agreed, the detectives took him to their office, where Roberts again advised the defendant of his Miranda rights. Roberts gave Anderson a written statement, which Anderson signed.\nDenman denied he or Roberts ever slapped, kicked, or punched Anderson. Denman also denied Anderson complained about his treatment by the Homewood police.\nAnderson testified: Anderson was interrogated by Roberts and Denman on the night of March 15 when he first arrived at the Home-wood police department. In this preliminary interview, Anderson disclaimed any knowledge about the robbery.\nRoberts and Denman interrogated Anderson again the following morning, March 16, telling him they had a statement from Jacobowski. Anderson again told them he knew nothing about the robbery, and he requested an attorney: \u201cI told them no, I didn\u2019t have nothing to say. I wanted to get a lawyer. I wanted to talk to a lawyer.\u201d\nRoberts and Denman questioned Anderson again around 1 or 2 p.m. and told him they found his fingerprints, as well as Jacobowski\u2019s fingerprints, on the car used in the robbery. Roberts and Denman also told Anderson Jacobowski had given a statement implicating him. Anderson said he knew nothing about the robbery and repeated his request for an attorney. The detectives told him he would have to wait: \u201cThey said the only way you get an attorney, you don\u2019t have a private one, you wait until you go to Markham ***\u201d to receive a public defender.\nWhen Anderson again denied any knowledge of the robbery, Den-man slapped him in the ear, knocking him to the floor, and then picked him up, squeezing his neck. Anderson said Denman later \u201cslung\u201d him against the wall.\nWhen assistant State\u2019s Attorneys arrived, Anderson refused to speak to them without an attorney present:\n\u201cBecause I told them I wasn\u2019t going to talk to anybody without an attorney present. I kept saying I want an attorney present.\nI said what they want to talk to me, they have to talk to me about after I go to Markham.\u201d\nAccording to Anderson, Roberts was present during the assistant State\u2019s Attorneys\u2019 interview.\nAnderson examined his written statement, acknowledged he had signed it, but denied he had read it. Roberts and Denman informed Anderson someone was coming for him from Markham, but they had some paperwork to finish before they could let him go. Roberts and Denman asked Anderson to initial the waiver of rights portion of the statement to acknowledge that they had given him his Miranda rights, and he did so. Roberts and Denman then asked him to sign the statement, telling him it was the statement by Jacobowski, which had been read to him previously by these officers, in order to acknowledge that he was aware Jacobowski had implicated him in the robbery. Anderson initialed and signed the statement without reading it because the detectives told him he would have to stay at the Homewood station another day if he delayed.\nAnderson said he was not given any food from the time he was arrested by the Robbins police department on March 15 until the time he left the Homewood police department on March 16. Although Anderson had a water fountain, which was attached to the commode in his cell, he declined to drink the \u201cnasty\u201d water. Anderson was not given anything else to drink. Anderson did not sleep during the time he was at the Homewood station because it was cold in his cell, and he had no blanket. He acknowledged that the officers did not prevent him from sleeping. Anderson did not tell the assistant State\u2019s Attorneys about the physical mistreatment he received, but he did tell the medical technician at the county jail that he had been mistreated and his elbow was swollen.\nOn rebuttal, the prosecution called Denman. Denman testified that while Anderson was at the Homewood station, he made three telephone calls: one on the evening of March 15 and two on March 16. Denman, however, was present only when the defendant made one of those calls. Denman further testified Anderson was given food three times on March 16, although Denman did not see Anderson eat. Den-man denied Anderson ever asked for an attorney.\nAlphonso Hill, a medical technician at Cermak Health Services of Cook County, testified he conducted Anderson\u2019s medical intake on March 17. Hill said he did not observe any signs of injury or trauma to Anderson. Hill also said if Anderson had reported injuries or mistreatment by the police, Hill would have noted that in his report even if he did not observe any signs of it.\nAnderson called Yvette Jones, a Cook County deputy sheriff employed by the Department of Corrections. Jones testified Anderson complained to her on one occasion of a sore arm. Jones noticed that one of Anderson\u2019s arms appeared to be swollen, and she took him to the dispensary, where he was given an ice pack.\nIn denying Anderson\u2019s motion to suppress, the trial court said:\n\u201c[I]n my opinion based on the evidence presented to me and after resolving the issue of credibility, I am finding that the Defendant was advised of his Miranda warnings!!.] That he did not ask for an attorney; that he initiated the interview after declining to speak to the assistant state\u2019s attorney.\u201d\nThe trial court found Anderson received food and water, was not denied sleep, and was not beaten by the detectives. The trial court concluded Anderson\u2019s statement was voluntary and denied his motion to suppress.\nBefore trial, Anderson also filed a motion in limine to bar the prosecution from using his prior convictions as evidence. The trial court reserved its ruling on this motion until Anderson decided whether he would testify.\nAfter the State rested, Anderson indicated he would testify, and the trial court ruled that the State would be allowed to use the defendant\u2019s prior convictions for impeachment. The jury found Anderson guilty of aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced Anderson to 12 years\u2019 imprisonment. This appeal followed.\nDECISION\nAnderson contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the written confession he signed at about 8:15 p.m. on March 16, 1995. Anderson asserts the trial court\u2019s finding that he had not invoked his right to counsel was in error. Because issues of credibility and fact are raised in this case, we must review the trial court\u2019s denial of the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress on the manifest weight of the evidence standard. People v. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 309, 692 N.E.2d 1109 (1998). The State had the burden to demonstrate the defendant\u2019s Miranda waiver was voluntary, \u201c \u2018including the necessary fact that the accused, not the police, reopened the dialog with the authorities.\u2019 \u201d People v. Baker, 253 Ill. App. 3d 15, 33, 625 N.E.2d 719 (1993), quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 486 n.9, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378, 387 n.9, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 1885 n.9 (1981).\nPrior to custodial interrogation, a criminal suspect must be informed he has the right to remain silent and the right to have an attorney present during questioning. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 706-07, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1612 (1966). \u201c[A]n accused, *** having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communications, exchanges, or conversations with the police.\u201d Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 386, 101 S. Ct. at 1884-85; People v. Ravellette, 263 Ill. App. 3d 906, 912, 636 N.E.2d 105 (1994). To help determine whether the suspect has waived his right to counsel, the supreme court in Edwards established a bright-line, two-part inquiry. The State must show:\n\u201c(1) the suspect initiated further communication with the police that demonstrates a desire to discuss the criminal investigation, and (2) as a separate matter and under the particular facts and circumstances of the case, that his purported waiver was knowing and intelligent.\u201d People v. St. Pierre, 122 Ill. 2d 95, 112, 522 N.E.2d 61 (1988).\nAccord Baker, 253 Ill. App. 3d at 33.\nAfter the suspect invokes his right to counsel, any statement he makes as a result of police-initiated interrogation without counsel is inadmissible, even if the suspect waived his right to counsel during the police-initiated interrogation. People v. Winsett, 153 Ill. 2d 335, 349-50, 606 N.E.2d 1186 (1992).\nAnderson contends the trial court\u2019s finding that he did not request an attorney was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Anderson\u2019s testimony on this issue is controverted by the detective\u2019s testimony. But Anderson also testified he requested an attorney during his brief interrogation by the assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, before he signed his written inculpatory statement. Anderson contends because the assistant State\u2019s Attorneys did not testify, the trial court was not entitled to reject his testimony that he asked for an attorney during his meeting with them. In short, Anderson argues that the evidence compels a finding that he did, in fact, invoke his right to counsel and that his subsequent written confession is inadmissible.\nWe agree with Anderson. The prosecution\u2019s evidence concerning Anderson\u2019s statements after he refused to talk to two assistant State\u2019s Attorneys is not believable.\nThe record discloses: Anderson arrived at the Homewood police department on the evening of March 15, 1995. The next day, March 16, around 6 p.m., Anderson told two assistant State\u2019s Attorneys he did not want to talk to them. His testimony about that stands uncontroverted:\n\u201cBecause I told them I wasn\u2019t going to talk to anybody without an attorney present. I kept saying I want an attorney present.\nI said what they want to talk to me, they have to talk to me about after I go to Markham.\u201d\nNo assistant State\u2019s Attorney was called as a witness in this case. Anderson\u2019s testimony in this matter is reasonable. We, therefore, take the defendant\u2019s testimony as true. See People v. Peck, 18 Ill. App. 3d 112, 116, 309 N.E.2d 346 (1974) (\u201cIt was improper for the trial court to disregard defendant\u2019s uncontroverted testimony\u201d); accord People v. Holick, 337 Ill. 333, 338, 169 N.E. 169 (1929); People v. Jones, 184 Ill. App. 3d 412, 428, 541 N.E.2d 132 (1989); People v. Lopez, 114 Ill. App. 3d 1018, 1024, 449 N.E.2d 927 (1983); People v. Rhoads, 73 Ill. App. 3d 288, 308-09, 391 N.E.2d 512 (1979); People v. Mrozek, 52 Ill. App. 3d 500, 508, 367 N.E.2d 783 (1977); People v. McClure, 43 Ill. App. 3d 1059, 1061-62, 358 N.E.2d 23 (1976). See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 10 L. Ed. 2d 513, 83 S. Ct. 1336 (1963).\nThe detectives testified one of the assistant State\u2019s Attorneys told them to take Anderson back to his cell. According to Denman, as he and Anderson walked to the lockup, Anderson said, without prompting, he would be willing to talk to police officers, just not State\u2019s Attorneys. After this surprising disclosure around 6 p.m., the detectives returned Anderson to his cell and left him there for more than two hours, giving him time to mull over his decision to answer questions.\nAccording to both Roberts and Denman, the police resumed their interrogation around 8:15 p.m., at which time they secured Anderson\u2019s signature on a written inculpatory statement. The detectives denied they knew Anderson told the assistant State\u2019s Attorneys he wanted counsel. That testimony makes no sense if we accept Anderson\u2019s uncontradicted statement he told the assistant State\u2019s Attorneys he wanted a lawyer before he would say anything. An assistant State\u2019s Attorney who did not relay to the police a defendant\u2019s assertion of his right to counsel would commit serious misconduct.\nWe find the detectives reinitiated their interrogation around 8:15 p.m., about two hours after Anderson said he would not make a statement unless he had a lawyer. Under Edwards, Anderson\u2019s written statement must be suppressed. Because this statement was a large part of the prosecution\u2019s case at trial, we remand for a new trial.\nOur decision today is not a deprecation of the salutary manifest weight of the evidence standard. We do not second-guess the trial court when it determines factual matters. On the other hand, the manifest weight standard is not a rubber stamp. It does not require mindless acceptance in the reviewing court. It is not our desire to usurp the role of the trial judge as fact finder. It is our desire to provide a reminder that credulity has its limits. We need not abdicate our responsibility to examine factual findings with a view toward determining whether \u201cthe opposite conclusion is clearly evident.\u201d Launius v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 151 Ill. 2d 419, 427, 603 N.E.2d 477 (1992). In this case, we find the opposite conclusion is clearly evident.\nWhile Anderson does not ask us to suppress his 9:30 a.m. oral statement, we note an apparent conflict between Roberts and Denman concerning that statement. In discussing Anderson\u2019s first interrogation, Roberts testified, \u201c[Anderson] gave us his account of implicating himself in the armed robbery.\u201d However, in discussing this same interrogation, Denman testified: \u201cAt first, yes, [Anderson] denied, not acknowledging that he was the offender, yes.\u201d Neither at the suppression hearing nor at trial did Denman testify about the contents of Anderson\u2019s purportedly incriminating statement at the first interrogation, which formed the basis for the written statement Roberts said he drafted from his notes.\nAnderson also contends the trial court erred in concluding his confession was voluntary. Here, we disagree.\nWhen determining whether a defendant\u2019s confession was voluntarily made, the court must look to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession and consider factors such as the defendant\u2019s age, education level, and intelligence; the length of the detention and duration of questioning; whether he was advised of his constitutional rights; and whether he was physically mistreated. People v. Brown, 169 Ill. 2d 132, 144, 661 N.E.2d 287 (1996). We will not disturb the trial court\u2019s determination regarding the voluntariness of a statement unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d 41, 58, 604 N.E.2d 275 (1992).\nThe trial court must resolve conflicts between the defendant\u2019s testimony and that of the other witnesses. Brown, 169 Ill. 2d at 150. Having heard the testimony and observed the demeanor of the witnesses, the trial court here determined Anderson was not physically mistreated or denied food, drink, sleep, or telephone calls and he did not sign the statement without having read it. We cannot say that these factual findings, or the trial court\u2019s conclusion that the defendant\u2019s confession was voluntary, were against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nFinally, we do not determine whether the trial court erred in admitting Anderson\u2019s two prior convictions as impeachment evidence. On remand, the trial court presumably will have another chance to decide this question.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court\u2019s order denying suppression of Anderson\u2019s written statement. Because there would be sufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict without the statement, we reverse Anderson\u2019s conviction and remand the cause for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nHALL, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WOLFSON" }, { "text": "JUSTICE HOFFMAN,\ndissenting:\nIn reaching its conclusion, the majority professes: \u201cWe do not second-guess the trial court when it determines factual matters.\u201d 303 Ill. App. 3d at 1057. Unfortunately, that is exactly what the majority has done in this case. Consequently, I dissent.\nThe defendant testified that he told the assistant State\u2019s Attorneys that he \u201cwasn\u2019t going to talk to anyone without an attorney present.\u201d Accepting that testimony as true for the sake of analysis only, I still find no basis to suppress the defendant\u2019s written statement.\nAccording to Detective Denman, after the defendant refused to talk to the assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, the defendant initiated further discussion. Denman testified that the defendant stated \u201che was still interested in talking to me and my partner.\u201d .The defendant\u2019s testimony disputed Denman\u2019s account. The trial judge believed Den-man.\nThe majority asserts that \u201c[t]he prosecution\u2019s evidence concerning Anderson\u2019s statements after he refused to talk to two assistant State\u2019s Attorneys is not believable.\u201d 303 Ill. App. 3d at 1056. Specifically, the majority finds that Denman\u2019s testimony \u201cmakes no sense if we accept Anderson\u2019s uncontradicted statement that he told the assistant State\u2019s Attorneys he wanted a lawyer before he would say anything.\u201d 303 111. App. 3d at 1057. I, however, am at a loss to understand why Detective Denman\u2019s testimony is so patently unbelievable as to warrant invading the province of the trial court in resolving conflicts in testimony.\nDenman testified that the defendant told him that \u201che didn\u2019t want to talk to the state because they put cases on him that he didn\u2019t do.\u201d Thus, Denman\u2019s testimony supplied the defendant\u2019s motive in refusing to talk to the assistant State\u2019s Attorneys but agreeing to talk to the police.\nThe exclusionary rule bars the use of a defendant\u2019s statement obtained after the defendant invokes his right to counsel, \u201cunless the State can establish (1) the accused initiated further discussions with the police; and (2) that he knowingly and intelligently waived the right he had invoked.\u201d (Emphasis omitted.) People v. Winsett, 153 Ill. 2d 335, 350, 606 N.E.2d 1186 (1992); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378, 386, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 1884-85 (1981). After resolving the issue of credibility, the trial court in this case found that the defendant \u201cinitiated the interview after declining to speak to the assistant State\u2019s Attorney.\u201d To my mind, that puts the issue to rest.\nCredibility is a determination reserved to the trial court. Unlike the majority, I am unwilling to usurp its function in that regard. Consequently, I find no basis for the suppression of the defendant\u2019s written statement.\nI would affirm the defendant\u2019s conviction and sentence as I find each of his assignments of error lacking in merit.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE HOFFMAN," } ], "attorneys": [ "Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Julie A. Hull, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, William Toffenetti, and John M. Sheldon, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DARWIN ANDERSON, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1\u201497\u20140014\nOpinion filed March 25, 1999.\nHOFFMAN, J., dissenting.\nRita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Julie A. Hull, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, William Toffenetti, and John M. Sheldon, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1050-01", "first_page_order": 1068, "last_page_order": 1078 }