{ "id": 564590, "name": "In re MARRIAGE OF BARBARA GRUNSTEN, Petitioner-Appellant, and RICHARD GRUNSTEN, Respondent-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "In re Marriage of Grunsten", "decision_date": "1999-02-11", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201495\u20143583", "first_page": "12", "last_page": "22", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "304 Ill. App. 3d 12" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "543 N.E.2d 201", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "187 Ill. App. 3d 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2665143 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/187/0334-01" ] }, { "cite": "568 N.E.2d 1345", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "210 Ill. App. 3d 521", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2535026 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "535" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/210/0521-01" ] }, { "cite": "603 N.E.2d 720", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "236 Ill. App. 3d 337", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5781845 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/236/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "605 N.E.2d 670", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "238 Ill. App. 3d 965", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5155919 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "972" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/238/0965-01" ] }, { "cite": "571 N.E.2d 1135", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "213 Ill. App. 3d 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2605310 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/213/0371-01" ] }, { "cite": "551 N.E.2d 737", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "194 Ill. App. 3d 839", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499363 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "851" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/194/0839-01" ] }, { "cite": "569 N.E.2d 1097", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "210 Ill. App. 3d 1043", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2533599 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1048" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/210/1043-01" ] }, { "cite": "575 N.E.2d 938", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "216 Ill. App. 3d 672", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5286905 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/216/0672-01" ] }, { "cite": "598 N.E.2d 1013", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 Ill. App. 3d 165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5195577 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "183" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/233/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "461 N.E.2d 447", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. App. 3d 338", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3523414 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "349" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/122/0338-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 N.E.2d 490", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. App. 3d 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3563335 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/127/0102-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1117, "char_count": 25266, "ocr_confidence": 0.731, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.581666928529404e-07, "percentile": 0.6805168950004421 }, "sha256": "ce47ba9fff925c630ec26e2222c4816ed61105eb5addceebb58752af794471c1", "simhash": "1:8fdb914076929f30", "word_count": 4124 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:20:24.702805+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re MARRIAGE OF BARBARA GRUNSTEN, Petitioner-Appellant, and RICHARD GRUNSTEN, Respondent-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE ZWICK\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe petitioner, Barbara Grunsten, appeals from the judgment of dissolution of her marriage to the respondent, Richard Grunsten, challenging the trial court\u2019s distribution of marital assets, its award of maintenance and its findings regarding the payment of attorney fees.\nA substantial amount of evidence and testimony was presented in the trial court over 11 days between August 11, 1994, and October 24, 1994. However, only those facts necessary to an understanding of this court\u2019s decision will be set forth. The relevant facts will be discussed in the analysis of the issues to which they are pertinent.\nI. Valuation of GSP Marketing Services, Inc.\nRichard is the sole shareholder of an Illinois corporation, GSP Marketing Services, Inc. (GSP). GSP designs and produces mail order catalogs and performs other marketing services. The business was founded in 1979, and it is conceded to be marital property. The parties stipulated that GSP should be valued as of December 31, 1993. Each party retained accountants as expert witnesses for this purpose.\nThe trial court noted that similar approaches were taken by each accountant in valuing GSP Both witnesses based their valuations on capitalizing the average earnings over a four- or five-year period weighted in favor of more recent years and discounted due to the lack of marketability of closely held corporations. However, each used a different valuation method in reaching his final conclusion. Barbara\u2019s accountant valued GSP\u2019s shares using various economic assumptions and concluded the shares had a fair market value of $1,043,771. Richard\u2019s accountant valued Richard\u2019s shares as being worth $418,954.\nAs explained in the trial court\u2019s memorandum opinion and order, Barbara\u2019s accountant used an \u201cexcess earnings\u201d or \u201cformula\u201d method. This method assumes that the principal officers of closely held corporations take advantage of their ability to set their own compensation to minimize taxes by drawing out unneeded corporate profits in the form of salary and bonuses \u2014 rather than as dividends \u2014 in order to avoid the double taxation that occurs when corporations make a profit. Such compensation necessarily exceeds a lower level of compensation that could be paid to a nonowner hired to perform the same job. To compensate for this tax-avoidance practice, the excess payments are adjusted back into the corporation\u2019s history in estimating what its future profits are likely to be.\nBarbara\u2019s accountant determined Richard\u2019s \u201cnormal\u201d compensation by referencing a salary survey of chief executive officers of small businesses conducted by the Research Institute of America. For example, he found that Richard\u2019s 1993 salary was $282,463, of which $182,500 was \u201cnormal\u201d and $99,963 was \u201cexcess.\u201d A weighted average of this adjusted annual compensation was then capitalized to determine the corporation\u2019s \u201cgoodwill.\u201d\nThe value of GSP according to Barbara\u2019s expert\u2019s method is expressed by the following formula: Value = current (1993) net tangible assets + goodwill \u2014 discount for lack of marketability. The final estimate of $1,043,771 was derived by averaging various rates of return on net tangible assets and capitalization rates.\nIn addition to the above analysis, Barbara\u2019s expert noted that GSP had originally been started with a shareholder named Bob Simonek. Simonek owned 50% of GSP\u2019s outstanding shares when he died in 1987 or 1988. On April 8, 1989, Richard entered into a written agreement with Simonek\u2019s widow in which he bought Simonek\u2019s shares for a cash payment of $245,246. In addition, Simonek\u2019s widow served as a consultant to GSP for a period of three years following Simonek\u2019s death at an annual salary of $45,833.34 per year. However, she was not at work very often in those three years and Richard could only recall her working on 1 of 40 GSP accounts. The buyout also included furnishing $25,000 over 10 years to establish an insured college scholarship for Mr. Simonek\u2019s daughter.\nIn the fiscal year of Simonek\u2019s death, gross sales of GSP had been $6,204,909. By 1992, they had risen to $9,006,809. Given the increasing strength of GSP\u2019s financial position since the time of the Simonek sale, Barbara\u2019s expert stated that whatever value was placed on GSR the terms of the Simonek stock purchase set a baseline for what 50% of the company was currently worth.\nThe report of Richard\u2019s accountant, who had a preexisting relationship with both Richard and GSR was based upon the \u201ccapitalization of earnings\u201d method. This method assumes that various types of business investments entail different levels of risk. The risk is expressed in terms of a risk factor multiple ranging from one to four with no risk being given a value of one and the highest risk receiving a value of four. The benchmark for measuring risk is the interest rate on 30-year government bonds, being 6.35% at the time of valuation. The capitalization rate is determined by multiplying the risk factor by the benchmark rate. Thus, the capitalization rate for a high risk business on December 31, 1993, is 4 x 6.35 = 25.4. The value of a high risk business on December 31, 1993, can then be expressed as follows: Value = 100 divided by 25.4 = 3.93 x weighted average of net annual corporate earnings \u2014 discount for lack of marketability.\nRichard\u2019s accountant opined that GSP was a high risk business, principally because its value was closely tied to Richard\u2019s personal expertise and his relationships with clients. He also noted that GSP had a small customer base and that 60% of its sales were accounted for by only five clients. He computed GSP\u2019s weighted average annual net income to be $152,021, and he employed a 30% discount for lack of marketability. His computation of GSP\u2019s value was then expressed as follows: Value = 3.93 x $152,021 = $598,506 x .70 = $418,954.\nThe trial court found that both accountants had been \u201cflawed\u201d in their analyses. The court stated that the assumptions of Barbara\u2019s accountant regarding \u201cnormal\u201d and \u201cexcess\u201d officer compensation to have been \u201cwholly arbitrary.\u201d The court was also critical of Barbara\u2019s accountant\u2019s methodology in that he only \u201clooked up numbers in a study whose parameters were not described, and the numbers were not specific either for the industry or geographic location.\u201d Indeed, the court specifically found that Richard\u2019s salary had not been inflated to avoid federal taxes. It noted that Richard was actively involved with all 40 of GSP\u2019s active clients and that he personally managed the five largest client accounts. The court also observed that GSP\u2019s chief salesman, Michael Zaremba, was paid over $400,000 in 1993, while Richard received only $282,463 that year. The court found Richard\u2019s expert to have used a proper methodology in calculating GSP\u2019s value, but determined that Richard\u2019s expert had overstated the riskiness of GSP\u2019s business. Rather than being a high risk business, the trial court stated that GSP should be considered as \u201cmoderately risky.\u201d In applying the correct risk factor to Richard\u2019s expert\u2019s formula, the trial court determined that GSP had a fair market value on December 31, 1993 of $558,677.\nSection 503(c) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/503(c) (West 1996)) requires that the court shall divide marital property in \u201cjust proportions.\u201d To apportion\nmarital assets under section 503(c), the value of such assets must first be established. In re Marriage of Melnick, 127 Ill. App. 3d 102, 468 N.E.2d 490 (1984). Testimony concerning the valuation of assets in an action for dissolution of marriage is a matter to be resolved by the trier of fact, and as long as the court\u2019s valuation is within the range testified to by the expert witnesses, it ordinarily will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Marriage of Wilder, 122 Ill. App. 3d 338, 349, 461 N.E.2d 447 (1983). As the trial court noted, determining market value for a closely held business is not unlike the evaluation process that must be applied in valuing professional corporations. The process is inherently subjective:\n\u201cPlacing a fair market value on the professional corporation is an art, not a science, and the court must rely on expert witnesses to assist it in this difficult task. There is no exact formula that can be applied, so the trial court must rely on experts who may differ significantly in both methodology and valuation. The trial court must consider the relevant evidence before it; determine the credibility of the experts, the reasonableness of their testimony, the weight given to each of them, and their expertise in the particular area of valuation; and then determine fair market value.\u201d In re Marriage of Gunn, 233 Ill. App. 3d 165, 183, 598 N.E.2d 1013 (1992).\nOn appeal Barbara argues, inter alia, that the trial court\u2019s valuation of GSP is against the manifest weight of the evidence because it is below the valuation Richard paid to Simonek\u2019s widow four years earlier, and because the evidence establishes that GSP\u2019s financial health had greatly improved since the earlier transaction. Barbara argues, as her expert did below, that the Simonek transaction should necessarily set the \u201cfloor value\u201d for GSP We agree.\nAlthough valuation of a closely held corporation is subjective in nature, the process is obviously much less so when done with the benefit of viewing a similar transaction, particularly when the comparison transaction involves the same property. This is because fair value is best measured by what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller in a voluntary transaction. See In re Parker, 216 Ill. App. 3d 672, 575 N.E.2d 938 (1991). Here, on reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court failed to give the Simonek sale sufficient consideration in assessing the value of GSP Had the court done so, it would have been evident that Richard\u2019s expert\u2019s valuation was grossly inaccurate.\nIn our view, GSP cannot be reasonably valued at less than twice the value Richard gave Mrs. Simonek. Yet the trial court\u2019s valuation of $558,677 is clearly far below this threshold amount. The present value of the Simonek transaction can be logically calculated by adding the cash payment made to Mrs. Simonek ($245,246), the cash value of the $25,000 tuition payments, and any unearned salary Mrs. Simonek received in the transaction, and then adjusting this sum to account for the growth of GSP since the sale. In light of Mrs. Simonek\u2019s apparent lack of any articulable consulting skills and Richard\u2019s own concession that she was not at GSP very often during the three years she was paid as a consultant, it is clear that the salary payments made to Mrs. Simonek must be treated in large measure as consideration for the sale.\nIf extremely conservative estimates are applied to the unearned salary and scholarship payments and they are valued at 50% of their nominal cost to Richard, the total amount of consideration received by Mrs. Simonek for her shares is $245,246 (cash) + $68,750 (f/z of the \u201csalary payments\u201d) + $12,500 (Vs of the scholarship payments) = $326,496. This means the corporation had an estimated worth, in 1989, of twice this amount, or $652,992. Although profitability figures were in dispute at trial, it was conceded that GSP\u2019s gross revenues grew between 1989 and 1993 by more than 50%. If the corporation\u2019s fair market value is then calculated assuming its gross revenues roughly corresponded with its profitability to account for its financial growth, once again conservatively discounting the suggested nominal value by half, it is evident that GSP cannot be reasonably valued at less than $652,992 x 1.25 or $816,240.\nWe have carefully reviewed the record with regard to the court\u2019s valuation of GSP. Following pur review, we conclude that a most conservative valuation of GSP suggested by the record, taking into account the experts\u2019 valuations, the Simonek transaction and the company\u2019s sustained growth since 1989, cannot be reasonably set below $816,240. This figure is not only supported by the financial evidence but also within the range of values suggested by the experts. Accordingly, we set GSP\u2019s value at this amount. We make this specific finding rather than remand the case for further proceedings in light of the voluminous record before us, which shows that the parties have litigated their dispute to the point where further proceedings could never be construed as serving the ends of justice. See generally 155 Ill. 2d R. 366(a).\nII. Barbara\u2019s Permanent Maintenance\nBarbara is a 52-year-old woman with a college degree in fine arts. At the time of the dissolution, she had been married to Richard for more than 21 years. From the time of her graduation in 1964 until July of 1990, she was employed in the photography and modeling fields. She has worked as a photography stylist and as a booking sub-agent for models. Her salary when she left her last employment in 1990 was $22,000. Richard, in extreme contrast, earned an annual salary at the time of the dissolution of over $275,000 per year. As the trial court recognized in its order and memorandum, his income had provided them both with a \u201cluxurious\u201d lifestyle.\nBarbara offered an affidavit showing her monthly expenses to be $11,664. The trial court rejected the affidavit, calling it \u201cthe Paul Bunyan of all income and expense affidavits.\u201d The affidavit does not appear to have been included in the record on appeal. However, the trial court noted that it simultaneously listed a $2,000 mortgage payment on an unbought home and $1,000 for unmade repairs to Barbara\u2019s present home. It also requested $450 for a professional dog walker to escort her pet to dog shows. The court found that the affidavit \u201crepresented the lifestyle of the divorce, not the marriage.\u201d Accordingly, the court disregarded the affidavit and looked instead to an affidavit Barbara had filed five months after the dissolution proceedings had been instituted, finding it to be a better indication of Barbara\u2019s \u201creasonable needs.\u201d The affidavit sought temporary support of $4,800 per month.\nSection 504(a) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/504(a) (West 1996)) provides a court may grant permanent or temporary maintenance upon consideration of \u201call relevant factors,\u201d including:\n\u201c(1) the income and property of each party, including marital property apportioned and non-marital property assigned to the party seeking maintenance;\n(2) the needs of each party;\n(3) the present and future earning capacity of each party;\n(4) any impairment of the present and future earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance due to that party devoting time to domestic duties or having foregone or delayed education, training, employment, or career opportunities due to the marriage;\n(5) the time necessary to enable the party seeking maintenance to acquire appropriate education, training, and employment, and whether that party is able to support himself or herself through appropriate employment or is the custodian of a child making it appropriate that the custodian not seek employment;\n(6) the standard of living established during the marriage;\n(7) the duration of the marriage;\n(8) the age and the physical and emotional condition of both parties;\n(9) the tax consequences of the property division upon the respective economic circumstances of the parties;\n(10) contributions and services by the party seeking maintenance to the education, training, career or career potential, or license of the other spouse;\n(11) any valid agreement of the parties; and\n(12) any other factor that the court expressly finds to be just and equitable.\u201d\nAn award of maintenance is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal unless it constitutes an abuse of discretion or is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Marriage of Hensley, 210 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 1048, 569 N.E.2d 1097 (1991); In re Marriage of Hart, 194 Ill. App. 3d 839, 851, 551 N.E.2d 737 (1990). An abuse of discretion occurs where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. In re Marriage of Cheger, 213 Ill. App. 3d 371, 378, 571 N.E.2d 1135 (1991).\nHere, the trial court, in dividing the parties\u2019 assets, awarded Barbara very little income-producing property, yet awarded her only $1,538 in monthly permanent maintenance to sustain a lifestyle which the court\u2019s own assessment would cost her approximately $4,800 per month. Although an award of marital property is correctly considered by the trial court in setting maintenance under section 504(a), the law is clear that a spouse is not required to sell assets for self-support where the other spouse has the financial ability to pay sufficient maintenance while meeting his own needs. See In re Marriage of Tietz, 238 Ill. App. 3d 965, 972, 605 N.E.2d 670 (1992); In re Marriage of Pearson, 236 Ill. App. 3d 337, 350, 603 N.E.2d 720 (1992). The paucity of the court\u2019s maintenance award in this case is evident when it is recognized that Barbara\u2019s monthly maintenance was set at less than half the amount Richard claimed at one point he needed for clothing and entertainment. Moreover, the court, by basing its determination of Barbara\u2019s reasonable needs on her initial affidavit, necessarily failed to take into consideration several of Barbara\u2019s long-term expenses, such as real estate taxes, health insurance and home repairs. Insomuch as these were all part of the standard of living of the marriage, the record establishes that the court underestimated Barbara\u2019s reasonable needs.\nThe record also demonstrates that the court unreasonably discounted Barbara\u2019s likely long-term health care expenses and overestimated her ability to earn salary income. The court stated that it believed Barbara\u2019s physician to be \u201cthe most pathetic witness\u201d it had ever seen, yet Richard never disputed that Barbara had been treated for depression during the course of their marriage and that, at one point prior to the start of the dissolution proceedings, Barbara was incurring as much as $800 per month in psychiatric costs. Apparently based upon its negative view of Barbara\u2019s expert witness, the court concluded that Barbara was \u201cin good health\u201d and that her reasonable medical expenses should be no more than $300 per month. However, the evidence presented by Barbara as to the reasonable cost of her psychiatric care was not disputed by expert testimony from Richard. Although a trial judge may be free to disregard psychiatric testimony, he may not do so based upon his own prejudices where the testimony offered of psychiatric illness has substantial foundation. In re Violetta B., 210 Ill. App. 3d 521, 535, 568 N.E.2d 1345 (1991).\nThe factual foundation presented in this case is that Barbara had been treated by her physician for 12 years during the course of the marriage and that she was being treated for depression at the time of the proceedings. She testified that she suffers frequent crying spells, sleep loss, memory loss, continual feelings of anxiety and an inability to cope with stress. In addition to her depression, her treating physician testified that if she returned to her previous line of work, it could be \u201cvery damaging\u201d to her self-esteem. Despite this testimony, and despite the court\u2019s finding that Barbara was entitled to continue to live the \u201cluxurious\u201d lifestyle of the marriage, the trial court stated that it did not \u201csee why she couldn\u2019t go back to [the modeling industry] at $22,000 per year.\u201d\nUnder these facts, the trial court\u2019s finding that Barbara was \u201chealthy\u201d and had a future as an employee in the modeling industry was against the manifest weight of the evidence. In addition, the court\u2019s finding that Barbara was likely to incur monthly medical expenses of only $300 per month was against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nIn light of the factors set out in section 504(a) and the court\u2019s finding that Barbara\u2019s reasonable needs shortly after the dissolution were $4,800 per month, we set her permanent maintenance at this level. We do so recognizing that certain long-term costs may have been omitted from her initial affidavit on which the court based the $4,800 amount, but conclude that $4,800 is the only value supported by the record before us and that any additional costs that have been omitted are not likely to be so onerous to Barbara as to require further adjustment. Moreover, we note that the trial court made the amount of Barbara\u2019s permanent maintenance subject to periodic future review.\nIII. Attorney Fees\nThe record shows that Barbara filed a petition for fees and costs on April 23, 1995, seeking imposition of those expenses against Richard. Richard responded by filing a motion for summary judgment, stating that Barbara had sufficient assets to pay her own fees and that her statement at trial that her fees had been $40,000 was res judicata precluding her claim of legal fees totalling $134,000.\nBarbara responded by filing her own motion for summary judgment, stating that her monthly payments under the judgment were her only income as compared to Richard\u2019s $275,000 salary, that he had a far superior asset position and that res judicata on the extent of her legal fees was inapplicable because the fees discussed at trial had been those that had been paid as of that time, not those that had been earned.\nRespective counsel appeared before the court on August 28, 1997. The court stated that it did not believe the fee issue was amenable to summary judgment since Barbara\u2019s property distribution did not contemplate her paying her own fees. At that time the fee petition was for a total of $137,534.75, of which $63,652.87 had been paid. The court also stated, however, that it simply did not believe Barbara had an inability to pay, partly evidenced by what she had already paid, and supported by its view that she could be working and using her salary income to pay legal fees. The court also stated that Barbara could get a home equity loan on her residence. The court then denied Barbara\u2019s request for a hearing on the parties\u2019 financial circumstances and entered an order denying assessment of any of Barbara\u2019s fees against Richard.\nOn appeal Barbara argues that it was error to enter an order disposing of the fee issue without holding a hearing. We agree. In In re Marriage of Cierny, 187 Ill. App. 3d 334, 543 N.E.2d 201 (1989), the court held that the right to a hearing on the financial ability to pay attorney fees exists, if requested, and is only waived if no such request is made. Here, Barbara repeatedly requested a hearing once the trial court stated its view that the fee issue was not amenable to summary judgment. This is despite the fact that Barbara\u2019s maintenance had been set by the court at 32% of what the court determined were her reasonable needs.\nIn sum, after finding the trial court\u2019s valuation of GSP and monthly maintenance to B\u00e1rbara to be so low as to be against the manifest weight of the evidence, we find the record supports a fair market valuation of GSP at $816,240. In addition, we find the record requires a permanent monthly maintenance award to Barbara of at least $4,800. On remand, we direct the court to enter an order adjusting its memorandum and order as to make it consistent with these findings, as well as to hold a hearing on the attorney fees issue.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nBUCKLEY and QUINN, JJ., concur.\nDouble taxation occurs because the corporation must pay corporate income tax on its profits, and because shareholders must subsequently pay personal income tax on any dividends declared by the corporation. If corporate earnings that would otherwise represent profit to the corporation are diverted instead to an executive officer/shareholder in the form of salary, no corporate taxes are assessed with regard to the diverted payments, and so only personal income tax is collected. See generally D. Ackerman & T. Kinasz, Tax Considerations in Organizing Closely Held Corporations, in Closely Held Corporations \u00a7 2.5 (Ill. Inst, for Cont. Legal Educ. 1996).\nBarbara argues on appeal that, in addition, Mrs. Simonek had an $80,000 debt to the corporation forgiven as part of the compensation she received for her shares. However, a close reading of the record shows that Richard disputed this, testifying that the cash payment of $245,246 was calculated after taking the debt into account.\nIn fact, 3.93 x $152,021 = $597,443. When this correct figure is multiplied by .70, a final valuation for GSP is calculated to be $418,210, not $418,954. The error appears in the trial court\u2019s memorandum and opinion but, as explained immediately below, did not affect the court\u2019s final valuation of GSP", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE ZWICK" } ], "attorneys": [ "Joel Ostrow, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Sloan & Associates, of Chicago (Mel Sloan and Bradley J. Plaschke, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re MARRIAGE OF BARBARA GRUNSTEN, Petitioner-Appellant, and RICHARD GRUNSTEN, Respondent-Appellee.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201495\u20143583\nOpinion filed February 11, 1999.\nModified on denial of rehearing April 30, 1999.\nJoel Ostrow, of Chicago, for appellant.\nSloan & Associates, of Chicago (Mel Sloan and Bradley J. Plaschke, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0012-01", "first_page_order": 30, "last_page_order": 40 }