{ "id": 564560, "name": "AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALLSTEEL, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Allsteel, Inc.", "decision_date": "1999-03-26", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201497\u20144095", "first_page": "34", "last_page": "44", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "304 Ill. App. 3d 34" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "704 N.E.2d 721", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "725" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 Ill. App. 3d 930", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 257127 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "935-36" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/301/0930-01" ] }, { "cite": "747 F. Supp. 477", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7383240 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/747/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "24 F.3d 1363", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 10515543 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1367-68", "parenthetical": "finding insufficient notice during policy period because no specific notice of wrongful acts tendered as required by terms of claims made policy" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/24/1363-01" ] }, { "cite": "31 F.3d 285", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 10523399 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288" }, { "page": "290-91" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/31/0285-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 Ill. App. 3d 1011", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 222570 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1013-14" }, { "page": "1016" }, { "page": "1015" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/296/1011-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 Ill. App. 3d 574", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 182710 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/283/0574-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 Ill. App. 3d 1036", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1725135 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1047" }, { "page": "1048" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/292/1036-01" ] }, { "cite": "267 Ill. App. 3d 1043", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 333147 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1049" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/267/1043-01" ] }, { "cite": "272 Ill. App. 3d 510", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 251706 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "514" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/272/0510-01" ] }, { "cite": "273 Ill. App. 3d 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 258506 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/273/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777543 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 Ill. 2d 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 317117 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479" }, { "page": "479" }, { "page": "479" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/177/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 436", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821405 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441" }, { "page": "441" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "272 Ill. App. 3d 86", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 251929 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/272/0086-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 Ill. 2d 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 317112 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/177/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 U.S.C. \u00a7 185", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 C 4976", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cow.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 C 4975", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cow.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 F.3d 1033", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 7649680 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1035" }, { "page": "1037" }, { "page": "1037" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/96/1033-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 C 0214", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cow.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "11 F.3d 1354", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11329127 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding in part that the district court erred in defining \"retire,\" but there was no impermissible reduction of an accrued benefit under ERISA" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/11/1354-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 U.S.C. \u00a7 141", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "et seq." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 U.S.C. \u00a7 1024", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 U.S.C. \u00a7 1054", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(g)" }, { "page": "(g)" }, { "page": "(g)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 C 1856", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cow.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 862, "char_count": 23077, "ocr_confidence": 0.779, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4950629557803082e-07, "percentile": 0.6637450677626379 }, "sha256": "ae820483a07e6c767da97857a6a9aa353c08bd6f7102081f234825d042cecbe7", "simhash": "1:0a45d70b0b215463", "word_count": 3742 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:20:24.702805+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALLSTEEL, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BUCKLEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe Aetna Casualty and Surety Company (Aetna) brought a declaratory judgment action to resolve a coverage dispute with Federal Insurance Company (Federal) concerning defense costs and settlements paid on behalf of Allsteel, Incorporated (Allsteel). On cross-motions for summary judgment, the Cook County circuit court denied Federal\u2019s motion, granted Aetna\u2019s motion, and entered judgment in favor of Aetna in the amount of $960,000.\nFederal filed this timely appeal and contends that the circuit court erred in granting Aetna\u2019s motion for summary judgment because All-steel\u2019s tender of a complaint to Aetna during Aetna\u2019s policy period constituted written notice of a \u201cwrongful act,\u201d thereby obligating Aetna to provide coverage for Allsteel in three lawsuits filed after expiration of the Aetna policy. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.\nI. BACKGROUND\nIn 1991, Aetna issued a \u201cclaims made\u201d pension and welfare fund fiduciary responsibility insurance policy to the Allsteel retirement income plan for the period December 31, 1991, to December 31, 1992. Under the policy, only claims made during the policy period were covered. The Aetna policy contained a claims made extension clause which stated:\n\u201cIf, during the policy period hereof, the Insured shall first become aware of any Wrongful Act which may subsequently give rise to a claim against any Insured and shall during the policy period hereof give written notice to the Company of such Wrongful Act, then any such claim which is subsequently made against the Insured arising out of such Wrongful Act shall for the purposes of this policy be deemed to have been first made against the Insured during the policy period.\u201d\nAt the expiration of the policy period, Allsteel did not renew the Aetna policy.\nFederal\u2019s fiduciary liability policy was in effect from June 30, 1994, to June 30, 1996. As part of its underwriting process, Federal asked Allsteel to complete an application before it would offer coverage. On the application, Allsteel stated that there were no \u201cfacts or circumstances which [it had] reason to suppose might afford valid grounds for any future claims that would fall within the scope of the proposed coverage.\u201d Allsteel also chose not to respond to a question concerning whether it had \u201cgiven written notice under the provisions of any prior or current fiduciary liability insurance of specific facts or circumstances which might give rise to a claim being made against any insured.\u201d Federal offered coverage to Allsteel, and its policy included the following exclusion:\n\u201c5. The Company shall not be liable for Loss on account of any Claim made against the Insured:\n(a) based upon, arising from, or in consequence of any circumstance if written notice of such circumstance has been given under any policy or coverage section of which this coverage is a renewal or replacement and if such prior policy or coverage section affords coverage *** for such Loss in whole or in part, as a result of such notice ***.\u201d\nIn 1974, Allsteel adopted a pension plan that provided retirement benefits for its employees. Under the terms of the plan, retirees received benefits as of their retirement date. In 1988 and 1991, All-steel and its employees negotiated new collective bargaining agreements. The new agreements offered incentives for employees to take early retirement by March 31, 1991. Some Allsteel employees believed they had taken early retirement during early 1991 but learned that Allsteel had determined them ineligible for early retirement benefits.\nIn March of 1992, Meredith v. Allsteel, Inc., No. 92 C 1856 (N.D. Ill.), was filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs were retired Allsteel employees who claimed they had been wrongly denied retirement benefits. The plaintiffs alleged that Allsteel had violated section 204(g) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) (29 U.S.C. \u00a7 1054(g) (1994)) by unlawfully amending the pension plan, wrongfully refusing to pay supplemental retirement benefits, breaching its fiduciary duty under section 104(b) of ERISA (29 U.S.C. \u00a7 1024(b) (1994)) and also violating the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) (29 U.S.C. \u00a7 141 et seq. (1994)). The district court granted Allsteel\u2019s motion for summary judgment and, in particular, held that the 1991 collective bargaining agreement did not violate federal law by reducing an accrued benefit. Meredith v. Allsteel, Inc., 814 E Supp. 657 (N.D. Ill. 1992). The plaintiffs appealed and the United States Court of Appeals for the seventh circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. Meredith v. Allsteel, Inc., 11 F.3d 1354 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding in part that the district court erred in defining \u201cretire,\u201d but there was no impermissible reduction of an accrued benefit under ERISA).\nOn remand, plaintiffs sought leave to file an amended complaint so 13 new plaintiffs could join the case. The district court denied this request since the potential plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies. The action proceeded to trial, where Aetna provided the defense for Allsteel under the terms of its policy.\nOn January 12, 1995, former Allsteel employees filed Ahng v. Allsteel, Inc., No. 95 C 0214 (N.D. Ill.). The Ahng plaintiffs alleged that even though they satisfied the pre-1991 eligibility requirements for higher pension benefits, Allsteel had refused to pay them these supplemental benefits in violation of section 204(g) of ERISA. 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 1054(g) (1994). These plaintiffs had not retired in 1992 when the Meredith complaint was filed.\nIn April of 1995, Allsteel filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted in June of 1995. The plaintiffs appealed, and the seventh circuit reversed and remanded. Ahng v. Allsteel, Inc., 96 F.3d 1033 (7th Cir. 1996). Even though the Ahng plaintiffs raised an issue similar to that in Meredith, the court of appeals made clear that \u201cnone of the [Ahng] employees retired before March 31, 1991,\u201d and \u201cthey therefore stand in a different position *** from the Meredith plaintiffs.\u201d Ahng, 96 F.3d at 1035. To be sure, the court of appeals stated that an \u201cidentity of interest\u201d with Meredith was lacking because \u201c[t]he Meredith plaintiffs had no need to press the point that the 1991 change in the plan harmed people who retired after March 31, 1991, for the simple reason that none of them fell within that group.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Ahng, 96 F.3d at 1037.\nIn 1997, Ahng was settled. The case had been tendered to Federal, which defended the case, and even though Aetna denied coverage on the basis of policy language, it advanced money toward settlement while reserving its rights to recover from Federal.\nSnitchler v. Allsteel, Inc., No. 95 C 4975 (N.D. Ill.), and Johnson v. Allsteel, Inc., No. 95 C 4976 (N.D. Ill.), were also filed in federal court in September of 1995. The Johnson plaintiffs sought relief under both the 1988 and 1991 collective bargaining agreements, section 204(g) of ERISA (29 U.S.C. \u00a7 1054(g) (1994)) and section 301 of the LMRA (29 U.S.C. \u00a7 185 (1994)). According to the plaintiffs, they intended to retire in 1991 but chose not to because they thought it was too late. Johnson settled in May 1997 and, as in Ahng, Federal provided the defense for Allsteel and Aetna declined on the basis that the claim was filed after the expiration of its coverage.\nThe Snitchler complaint alleged that Allsteel breached its fiduciary duty to the retirement plan and requested injunctive relief. However, the complaint did not request payment of retirement benefits because the plaintiff had not yet retired. On December 27, 1995, the trial court refused Allsteel\u2019s request to consolidate Johnson with Snitchler because the cases were not sufficiently related. Again, the case was tendered to Federal, which defended the case, and Aetna declined coverage.\nAetna originally filed this action against Allsteel seeking a declaration of its rights and obligations with respect to the Ahng, Johnson and Snitchler claims. To partially fund the settlements in these three cases and to settle its coverage dispute with Allsteel, Aetna paid $960,000 to the retirement plan for the benefit of the underlying plaintiffs. Federal also paid $960,000 to the Allsteel plan. Aetna and Federal agreed to litigate the issue of the insurance policies.\nThe circuit court denied Federal\u2019s motion for summary judgment, granted Aetna\u2019s motion for summary judgment and entered a judgment in favor of Aetna. In so ruling, the court stated:\n\u201cThe clause in the Aetna policy that is in issue here is a policy that was in effect from December 31, 1991, to December 31, 1992.\nThe clause in question is entitled Claims Made Extension Clause\nMy holding is that the filing of the Meredith complaint does not constitute the written notice that is required under the claims made extension clause. Therefore, with respect to the claims of Ahng filed on January 12th, 1995, the suit filed by Johnson on September 1, 1995, and the Snitchler suit filed on September 1, 1995, do not come within the claims made coverage under the Aetna policy. There will be summary judgment in favor of Aetna and against Federal.\u201d\nFederal filed this appeal and requests reversal of the circuit court\u2019s ruling.\nII. ANALYSIS\nAs a preliminary matter, since this appeal arises from an order granting summary judgment on an issue of law, we review the case de novo. Murneigh v. Gainer, 177 Ill. 2d 287, 298 (1997). Under the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (the Code), summary judgment is properly entered when the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits, viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmovant, fail to establish a genuine issue of material fact and the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2\u20141005(c) (West 1994); Walker v. Rogers, 272 Ill. App. 3d 86, 89 (1995).\nA. Notice Under the Aetna Policy\nFederal first argues that it would be incongruous for us to find that even though Aetna accepted coverage of the Meredith claim during the Aetna policy period, Aetna can now assert that written notice of the \u201cwrongful acts\u201d contained in the Meredith complaint was not properly provided during the policy period. Specifically, Federal insists that Allsteel satisfied the following condition precedent to coverage under the Aetna policy:\n\u201c(a) In the event the Insured shall first become aware of any claim or allegation of a Wrongful Act or any occurrence which might reasonably give rise to such claim or allegation of a Wrongful Act, written notice containing particulars sufficient to identify the insured and any claimant and also reasonably obtainable information with respect to the time, place and circumstances thereof, and the names and addresses of the injured parties and of available witnesses, shall be given by or for the Insured to the Company or any of its authorized agents as soon as practicable;\n(b) If claim is made or suit is brought against an Insured, the Insured or Insurance Representative shall immediately forward to the company every demand, notice, summons or other process received ***.\u201d\nWe disagree with Federal\u2019s argument.\nThe construction of an insurance policy is also a question of law subject to de novo review. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Villicana, 181 Ill. 2d 436, 441 (1998). In construing the language of an insurance policy, a court must ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parties as expressed in their agreement. American States Insurance Co. v. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d 473, 479 (1997). The terms used in an insurance policy are accorded their plain and ordinary meaning. Villicana, 181 Ill. 2d at 441. However, a reviewing court must read the policy as a whole and consider the type of insurance purchased, the nature of the risks involved, and the overall purpose of the contract. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 479. Provisions that limit or exclude coverage are to be construed liberally in favor of the insured. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 479.\nFederal does not cite any cases in support of its argument that tender of a complaint constitutes written notice for the purposes of a claims made insurance policy. Instead, Federal contends that the plain language of the policy should be construed in its favor because \u201c[t]he court must not search for ambiguity where there is none.\u201d See Crum & Forster Managers Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 156 Ill. 2d 384, 391 (1993).\nAccording to general principles of contract law, an ambiguity exists when a contract contains language that is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. Ford v. Dovenmuehle Mortgage, Inc., 273 Ill. App. 3d 240, 244 (1995). The policy at issue in the instant case was a claims made policy, as opposed to an occurrence policy. A claims made policy provides that the risk insured is the claim brought by a third party against the insured, not the occurrence itself. General Insurance Co. of America v. Robert B. McManus, Inc., 272 Ill. App. 3d 510, 514 (1995). The purpose of a claims made policy is to allow the insurance company to easily identify risks, allowing it to know in advance the extent of its claims exposure and compute its premiums with greater certainty. Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. American Empire Surplus Lines Insurance Co., 267 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 1049 (1994).\nA notice requirement in an insurance policy enables an insurer to make a timely and thorough investigation of a claim. Employers Insur- anee of Wausau v. Ehlco Liquidating Trust, 292 Ill. App. 3d 1036, 1047 (1997). Notice provisions in insurance policies are considered valid conditions precedent to coverage and not mere technical requirements. See Kerr v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 283 Ill. App. 3d 574 (1996). Although the issue of whether notice was reasonable or sufficient is usually a question of fact, it may be a question of law when, as in the case at bar, the facts are not in dispute. Employers Insurance of Wausau, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 1048.\nAccording to the plain language of Aetna\u2019s policy, written notice of any wrongful acts or circumstances that could lead to a claim by the insured had to specify the nature of the conduct at issue and supply names and addresses of the potential claimants, along with a complete description of the alleged wrongful conduct. In Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Baur\u2019s Opera House, Inc., 296 Ill. App. 3d 1011, 1013-14 (1998), an employee filed a race discrimination claim against his employer in federal court and then, after dismissal of his federal suit, he filed a similar claim in state court. The employer\u2019s insurer defended the lawsuit in federal court but never received notice of the state claim from the employer-insured. The plaintiff then contested the insurer\u2019s denial of coverage on the basis that the insurer\u2019s defense of the suit in federal court provided sufficient notice of the state court lawsuit. Cincinnati Insurance, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 1016. The court rejected this argument and determined that \u201c[t]he mere possibility [plaintiff] would file suit in state court is insufficient to constitute \u2018actual notice\u2019 of the lawsuit.\u201d Cincinnati Insurance, 296 III. App. 3d at 1016. Even though there is only one insurer in Cincinnati Insurance and the notice question hinged on separate claims filed in separate court systems, the court\u2019s reasoning that a complaint tendered in one lawsuit does not constitute sufficient notice under the terms of an insurance policy because of the \u201cmere possibility\u201d of a subsequent lawsuit is instructive.\nThe United States Court of Appeals has also addressed the issue of notice in claims made insurance policies. For example, in Resolution Trust Corp. v. Ayo, 31 F.3d 285 (5th Cir. 1994), consolidated cases were brought by the Resolution Trust Corporation against former officers and directors of banks who carried claims made fiduciary liability insurance policies with extension clauses. In both cases, the district court granted summary judgment because none of the evidence demonstrated compliance with policy notice requirements. In fact, in one case, the evidence showed that the insured\u2019s directors denied knowledge of any conduct that might lead to potential claims when they filled out policy renewal application forms. Ayo, 31 F.3d at 288. The court of appeals affirmed the district courts\u2019 rulings on the grounds that forwarding regulatory reports, management reports, financial statements, complaints, and other materials associated with two lawsuits filed against the bank and its director did not constitute objective compliance with insurance policy notice provisions. Ayo, 31 F.3d at 290-91; see also Resolution Trust Corp. v. Artley, 24 F.3d 1363, 1367-68 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding insufficient notice during policy period because no specific notice of wrongful acts tendered as required by terms of claims made policy).\nIn the case at bar, Aetna received notice of the Meredith claim during the policy period and defended the suit as required by the policy. But, it is unclear how the Meredith complaint could furnish notice for lawsuits filed almost three years later and deemed unrelated by both the United States District Court and the United States Court of Appeals. The language in Aetna\u2019s policy specifically required written notice of a wrongful act that might lead to a claim \u201ccontaining particulars sufficient to identify the insured and any claimant and also reasonably obtainable information with respect to the time, place and circumstances thereof, and the names and addresses of the injured parties.\u201d This provision, in its most plain meaning, requires specific information regarding the insured\u2019s conduct and who was injured by wrongful acts. A complaint in an unrelated lawsuit does not satisfy the language of the policy.\nThe plaintiffs in Ahng, Snitchler and Johnson alleged different violations in their complaints, none had retired during March of 1991, and, in the case of Snitchler, one plaintiff had not retired at the time of filing his complaint in 1995, much less during 1991. On appeal, in Ahng, the court of appeals made clear that a group of plaintiffs who retired after March 31, 1991, alleged a very different claim from the plaintiffs in Meredith. Ahng, 96 F.3d at 1037. Moreover, Allsteel\u2019s application to Federal for coverage did not respond to whether Allsteel had ever given written notice of a potential claim under a prior fiduciary liability policy. As a result, if Allsteel had actually known of other specific claims, the company would have put Federal on notice during the underwriting process. Accordingly, we hold that transmission of the Meredith complaint to Aetna did not satisfy the notice requirement in the Aetna policy and we find the circuit court\u2019s grant of Aetna\u2019s motion for summary judgment to be correct as a matter of law.\nB. Claims Made Extension Clause\nFederal next argues that the claims made extension clause in Aet-na\u2019s policy forces Aetna to provide coverage for any future claims of which it had notice during the effective policy period. Federal contends that the wrongful acts alleged in the Meredith complaint were essentially the same acts alleged in the subsequently filed Ahng, Johnson and Snitchler cases. This argument rests on an assumption that the Meredith complaint met the Aetna policy\u2019s notice requirement.\nUnder the terms of its extension clause, Aetna covered claims made after the expiration of its policy if the insured gave the requisite written notice of potential claims during the actual policy period. The extension clause provided:\n\u201cIf, during the policy period hereof, the Insured shall first become aware of any Wrongful Act which may subsequently give rise to a claim against any Insured and shall during the policy period hereof give written notice to the Company of such Wrongful Act, then any such claim which is subsequently made against the Insured arising out of such Wrongful Act shall for the purposes of this policy be deemed to have been first made against the Insured during the policy period.\u201d\nAs noted above, a claims made insurance policy requires specific notice so that the insurer can identify the extent of its claims exposure in advance. General Insurance, 272 Ill. App. 3d at 514. In this case, Aetna did not have notice that other, unidentified groups of plaintiffs might file lawsuits regarding amendment of the 1991 plan. Therefore, since we find tender of the Meredith complaint did not constitute notice under the Aetna policy, the Meredith complaint did not place future claims within the coverage of the \u201cClaims Made Extension Clause\u201d in Aetna\u2019s policy.\nC. Federal\u2019s Policy\nFinally, Federal argues that the language in its policy precludes coverage of the Ahng, Johnson and Snitchler lawsuits. The language in paragraph 5(a) of Federal\u2019s policy stated in relevant part:\n\u201cThe Company [Federal] shall not be liable for Loss on account of any Claim made against any Insured:\nbased upon, arising from, or in consequence of any circumstance if written notice of such circumstance has been given under any policy or coverage section of which this coverage section is a renewal or replacement and if such prior policy or coverage section affords coverage for such Loss, in whole or in part, as a result of such notice ***.\u201d\nFederal asserts that public policy forbids an insured from obtaining insurance for a loss the insured knows is already present, and therefore paragraph 5(a) of the Federal policy precludes coverage of the Ahng, Johnson and Snitchler claims. See International Insurance Co. v. Peabody International Corp., 747 F. Supp. 477, 484 (N.D. Ill. 1990). Even though this is a plausible reading of the Federal policy\u2019s language, it does not explain how the Meredith complaint satisfied the written notice requirement in Aetna\u2019s policy, how the extension clause was invoked by tender of the Meredith complaint, or . how Federal avoids its obligation to provide coverage for claims made within its policy period. Accordingly, we agree with Aetna\u2019s position and find that the language of the Federal policy does not preclude coverage for the Ahng, Johnson and Snitchler claims.\nFor the abovementioned reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nZWICK and QUINN, JJ, concur.\nThe employer\u2019s insurance policy contained a notice provision similar to the one at issue in the instant case. Cincinnati Insurance, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 1015.\nIllinois courts often rely on decisions from other jurisdictions when confronted with a case of first impression. See, e.g., Jaime v. Director, 301 Ill. App. 3d 930, 935-36, 704 N.E.2d 721, 725 (1998).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BUCKLEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, of Chicago, for appellant Federal Insurance Company.", "Baker & McKenzie, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALLSTEEL, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201497\u20144095\nOpinion filed March 26, 1999.\nWilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, of Chicago, for appellant Federal Insurance Company.\nBaker & McKenzie, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0034-01", "first_page_order": 52, "last_page_order": 62 }