{ "id": 564598, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. QUENTIN HOLLOMAN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Holloman", "decision_date": "1999-04-15", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201498\u20140500", "first_page": "177", "last_page": "188", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "304 Ill. App. 3d 177" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "590 N.E.2d 502", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "511" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "226 Ill. App. 3d 923", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5239575 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "936" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/226/0923-01" ] }, { "cite": "653 N.E.2d 977", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "984", "parenthetical": "noting that the record on direct appeal of a criminal case rarely contains any explanation of the tactics of trial counsel, and holding that if those tactics are to be the subject of scrutiny, a record should be developed in which they can effectively be reviewed" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "274 Ill. App. 3d 46", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 291584 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "56", "parenthetical": "noting that the record on direct appeal of a criminal case rarely contains any explanation of the tactics of trial counsel, and holding that if those tactics are to be the subject of scrutiny, a record should be developed in which they can effectively be reviewed" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/274/0046-01" ] }, { "cite": "607 N.E.2d 1375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1380", "parenthetical": "held, \"[t]he appellate court is not the appropriate forum to decide contested questions of fact,\" and defendant could pursue his claim pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, under which the court could hear evidence and make appropriate findings" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "240 Ill. App. 3d 1078", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5136843 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1087", "parenthetical": "held, \"[t]he appellate court is not the appropriate forum to decide contested questions of fact,\" and defendant could pursue his claim pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, under which the court could hear evidence and make appropriate findings" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/240/1078-01" ] }, { "cite": "596 N.E.2d 1204", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1213-14" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 Ill. App. 3d 813", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5204352 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "827-28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/231/0813-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 15, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "688" }, { "page": "693" }, { "page": "2064" }, { "page": "694" }, { "page": "698" }, { "page": "2068" }, { "page": "697" }, { "page": "699" }, { "page": "2069" }, { "page": "694" }, { "page": "698" }, { "page": "2068" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "610 N.E.2d 16", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "36" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 Ill. 2d 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4820340 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "458" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/154/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "689 N.E.2d 1181", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1186" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 Ill. App. 3d 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 35351 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/294/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 N.E.2d 272", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278", "parenthetical": "Ryan, J., specially concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ill. 2d 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2994926 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456", "parenthetical": "Ryan, J., specially concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/74/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "660 N.E.2d 901", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "910" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 909174 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/169/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "622 N.E.2d 774", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "786" }, { "page": "786" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777562 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "507" }, { "page": "507" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0483-01" ] }, { "cite": "684 N.E.2d 128", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134", "parenthetical": "court may reject evidence due to its possibly unfair prejudicial nature" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 Ill. App. 3d 55", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 456182 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "65", "parenthetical": "court may reject evidence due to its possibly unfair prejudicial nature" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/291/0055-01" ] }, { "cite": "651 N.E.2d 72", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83", "parenthetical": "\"even when evidence is relevant, it may, in the trial court's discretion, be excluded if its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "165 Ill. 2d 305", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 483560 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "329", "parenthetical": "\"even when evidence is relevant, it may, in the trial court's discretion, be excluded if its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/165/0305-01" ] }, { "cite": "679 N.E.2d 1266", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1268-69" }, { "page": "1269" }, { "page": "1269" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 Ill. App. 3d 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1597006 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "105-07" }, { "page": "106-07" }, { "page": "107" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/288/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "550 N.E.2d 284", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "299", "parenthetical": "Steigmann, J., specially concurring" }, { "page": "299", "parenthetical": "Steigmann, J., specially concurring" }, { "page": "296" }, { "page": "296" }, { "page": "296" }, { "page": "296", "parenthetical": "\"[w]here *** consideration of matters outside of the record is required in order to adjudicate the issues presented for review, the defendant's contentions are more appropriately addressed in proceedings on a petition for post-conviction relief'" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "193 Ill. App. 3d 708", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2496987 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "731", "parenthetical": "Steigmann, J., specially concurring" }, { "page": "731" }, { "page": "726" }, { "page": "725" }, { "page": "726" }, { "page": "725-26" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/193/0708-01" ] }, { "cite": "670 N.E.2d 638", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "655", "parenthetical": "asserting continued adherence to the Montgomery standard" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "173 Ill. 2d 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 147596 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83", "parenthetical": "asserting continued adherence to the Montgomery standard" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/173/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "449 N.E.2d 821", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "826" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3115107 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187-88" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/96/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 N.E.2d 695", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "698" }, { "page": "698" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 Ill. 2d 510", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2903225 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "516" }, { "page": "516" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/47/0510-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1106, "char_count": 25489, "ocr_confidence": 0.78, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1672148990766955e-07, "percentile": 0.5854271812758196 }, "sha256": "ddc46123bd47028f001c130df2e837ad768e9e004cb475ee2c3255e521b37a86", "simhash": "1:ba6ab4ca3b63bdc5", "word_count": 4158 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:20:24.702805+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. QUENTIN HOLLOMAN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn February 1998, a jury convicted defendant, Quentin Holloman, of possession of more than 30 grams but not more than 500 grams of cannabis with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 550/5(d) (West 1996)). The trial court later sentenced him to 10 years in prison and imposed a fine. Defendant appeals, claiming that (1) the court abused its discretion by admitting his prior felony conviction for impeachment purposes; (2) the court committed reversible error when it admitted expert testimony consisting of \u201cdrug dealer profiles\u201d; (3) the court relied on erroneous information at sentencing; and (4) he received ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. We affirm defendant\u2019s conviction but remand for a new sentencing hearing.\nI. BACKGROUND\nAround 4 p.m. on August 23, 1997, Decatur police officer Frank Hubbard and two other officers went to 721 E. Johns Street in Decatur, Illinois, to conduct a follow-up investigation of a shooting incident. Hubbard and Officer Platzbecker went to the front door of the residence while Officer Michael Gannon went to the rear. When Hubbard knocked on the front door, it opened approximately 12 inches, and a young man, Antonio Harris, came to the door. According to Hubbard\u2019s testimony, when he began the interview, Harris acted \u201cnervous\u201d and repeatedly looked over his shoulder toward the inside of the house. After a few moments, Hubbard heard a commotion inside the house, and Gannon reported over his radio that persons were attempting to exit the residence through a rear window. At that point, Harris attempted to close the front door on Hubbard and Platzbecker. Hubbard, believing a felony was in progress, pulled Harris onto the front porch and entered the residence.\nInside, Hubbard found defendant lying on the floor in the back bedroom. Jimmy Brown was halfway out the window of the same room. Hubbard also found a large quantity of cannabis on and around a card table in the dining area. Following a standard procedure, Hubbard contacted Task Force X (the Decatur police drug task force) upon discovery of the drugs. He then took the occupants of the residence into custody and secured the residence. Task Force X obtained a warrant, searched the premises, and collected the evidence. Task Force officer Edward Root testified that the total amount of cannabis recovered at the house was 406.1 grams. Root also recovered a box of plastic bags and a pair of scissors. Sixty dollars in cash was found on the card table, and defendant was holding $347 in cash at the time of his arrest. Jimmy Brown was holding $350. Defendant\u2019s fingerprints were found on one of the plastic bags containing cannabis.\nOfficer Carl Carpenter testified that he interviewed defendant at the Macon County jail following his arrest. Defendant told Carpenter that he came to Decatur from Chicago with his cousin, Jimmy Brown, to sell drugs out of the Johns Street house. This arrangement was made at the request of a Chicago man known as \u201cTray,\u201d who transported defendant and Brown to Decatur and dropped them off at the Johns Street house. An individual unknown to defendant dropped off the drugs (about one-half pound of cannabis) and other supplies later that night. At trial, defendant denied having told Carpenter this version of events.\nDefendant testified that he came to Decatur from Chicago with Brown for a vacation. He initially stayed at a motel, but checked out after an altercation with the management over a $10 raise in the rates. At some point prior to the events surrounding his arrest at the Johns Street house, defendant bought some \u201cweed\u201d at the house and subsequently was picked up by the police. After posting bond he returned to the house and asked if he could sleep there for a couple of hours because he had nowhere else to go. The young man at the house agreed. Defendant smoked a little, moved some things out of the way, and went to sleep on the floor in the back bedroom. According to defendant, he slept until he was awakened by Hubbard.\nGannon testified that he saw defendant by the window as Brown was attempting to climb out. By the time Gannon reached the window (where he handcuffed Brown), defendant had retreated back into the house and out of Gannon\u2019s sight.\nWhen the State in rebuttal sought to impeach defendant\u2019s testimony with a 1996 felony conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, the trial court conducted a side-bar conference out of the jury\u2019s presence. (The record contains no transcript or bystander\u2019s report of the side-bar.) After the side-bar, the court addressed the jury as follows:\n\u201cLadies and gentlemen, the only evidence in, uh, rebuttal by the State is a certified copy of conviction, uh, of a case in Macon County. It is entitled The People of the State of Illinois vs. Quentin Holloman, [No.] 96\u2014CF\u2014681, and the record indicates that on August the 16th of 1996, Quentin Holloman was convicted of a felony in Macon County.\nYou can use that evidence in determining his credibility only. It is not to be used for any other purpose.\u201d\nLater, also out of the jury\u2019s presence, the trial court gave defendant an opportunity to state on the record his objection to the conviction\u2019s admission. Defendant asserted that its prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value. The court stated in response that it had overruled the objection and had weighed the prejudicial effect against the probative value when the court made its determination and that, because the prior conviction was for the same offense as currently charged, the \u201cmere fact\u201d approach was used. The court later clarified its ruling for fear that it originally misstated the standard. The court stated as follows:\n\u201c[J]ust to make sure that so there is no problem in the record, uh, that the probative value of the impeachment evidence was \u2014 I made that determination that it was not outweighed by the undue prejudice that could be caused to the defendant. I think I might have said it backwards.\u201d\nThe jury then convicted defendant and the trial court subsequently sentenced him as previously stated. This appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Impeachment Evidence\nDefendant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted his prior felony conviction for impeachment purposes. Specifically, he alleges that the court supplanted the balancing test required under People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510, 268 N.E.2d 695 (1971), with the \u201cmere fact\u201d method of impeachment, thereby depriving him of the benefit of a meaningful Montgomery analysis.\nA trial court\u2019s decision to allow impeachment by a prior conviction should not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. People v. McKibbins, 96 Ill. 2d 176, 187-88, 449 N.E.2d 821, 826 (1983). Under Montgomery, a prior conviction is admissible to impeach a testifying defendant if (1) the conviction was for a crime punishable by death or imprisonment for more than one year (a felony); or (2) the conviction was for a crime involving dishonesty or false statement. In either case, the prior conviction is not admissible if (a) it is more than 10 years old, or (b) the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d at 516, 268 N.E.2d at 698; see also People v. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48, 83, 670 N.E.2d 638, 655 (1996) (asserting continued adherence to the Montgomery standard).\nThe \u201cmere fact\u201d method of impeachment was first suggested in People v. Kunze, 193 Ill. App. 3d 708, 731, 550 N.E.2d 284, 299 (1990) (Steigmann, J., specially concurring). Under this method, only the existence of the prior conviction is revealed to the jury, not its underlying nature. Use of the \u201cmere fact\u201d method reduces the risk of prejudice to the defendant, especially when the prior conviction was for the same or a similar offense as the current charge.\nIn People v. Atkinson, 288 Ill. App. 3d 102, 105-07, 679 N.E.2d 1266, 1268-69 (1997), this court clarified the way in which trial courts should conduct the Montgomery analysis in conjunction with the option of using the \u201cmere fact\u201d method. A trial court should first determine if the prior conviction falls within the two categories of permissible convictions and meets the timeliness requirement. If these two \u201cmechanical prongs\u201d of the Montgomery test are satisfied, the court should then conduct the balancing test. Atkinson, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 106-07, 679 N.E.2d at 1269. \u201cIn determining whether the probative value of the evidence sought to be admitted is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, the court should consider evidentiary alternatives,\u201d one of which is the \u201cmere fact\u201d method of impeachment. Atkinson, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 107, 679 N.E.2d at 1269.\nIn this case, the trial court properly followed Atkinson. Defendant\u2019s prior conviction satisfied the mechanical prongs of Montgomery\u2014that is, it was a felony conviction from 1996. The record shows that the court weighed the probative value of admitting the prior conviction against the possibility of unfair prejudice, and in doing so properly exercised its discretion. The court stated that it performed the balancing test and that because the prior conviction was for the same offense as currently charged, the court opted to allow only the \u201cmere fact\u201d method of impeachment.\nIn so concluding, we emphasize that a trial court\u2019s use of the \u201cmere fact\u201d method of impeachment by prior conviction does not mean that the court may refrain from engaging in the balancing test Montgomery requires. Even though use of the \u201cmere fact\u201d method will (in most cases) substantially reduce the prejudicial effect a defendant might suffer by being impeached with a prior conviction \u2014 that is, as compared to the prejudice he might suffer by having the nature of the felony conviction revealed to the jury \u2014 use of the \u201cmere fact\u201d method does not eliminate that prejudicial effect.\nFor example, consider a case in which a defendant on trial for armed robbery presents an alibi that he was at his aunt\u2019s birthday party at the time of the armed robbery. Defendant testifies to his presence at the birthday party, as do three other witnesses who claim to have been at the party with defendant. In rebuttal, if the State seeks to impeach the defendant by bringing forth his two prior burglary convictions, it would be entirely appropriate for the trial court to conclude that \u2014 even though it would use the \u201cmere fact\u201d method if it were to grant the State\u2019s request \u2014 on balance, the probative value of the defendant\u2019s prior convictions is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice he would suffer. That is, because the defendant is but one of four alibi witnesses presented by the defense, the State does not really need to impeach his testimony by throwing doubt upon his credibility by means of his prior felony convictions. Thus, in this example, even though the use of the \u201cmere fact\u201d method would reduce the extent of the prejudice the defendant might suffer, the trial court may nonetheless determine that because the probative value of the impeaching evidence is so slight, the minimal probative value is substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect. In other words, casting doubt upon the defendant\u2019s credibility does little to defeat the alibi defense because the defendant\u2019s testimony is corroborated by three other witnesses, none of whom are impeached by the defendant\u2019s prior conviction.\nIn this case, defendant essentially contends that a trial court presented with the State\u2019s request to impeach a defendant with his prior conviction must utilize the Montgomery balancing test and decide to allow the impeachment by prior conviction before the court determines whether it will allow only the \u201cmere fact\u201d method of impeachment. In support of this contention, defendant cites a portion of the specially concurring opinion in Kunze, which states that use of the \u201cmere fact\u201d method is appropriate only after \u201cthe trial court has determined that such evidence is admissible for that purpose under the Montgomery standards.\u201d Kunze, 193 Ill. App. 3d at 731, 550 N.E.2d at 299 (Steigmann, J., specially concurring). However, defendant has misconstrued that specially concurring opinion, and his argument is groundless.\nWhen a trial court assesses the admissibility of a defendant\u2019s prior conviction for impeachment purposes, Montgomery requires it to determine whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d at 516, 268 N.E.2d at 698. To properly apply this standard, the court must consider the evidence that the jury will actually receive. The court\u2019s determination is not some academic exercise but instead a real-world balancing of probative value versus unfair prejudice. Trial courts routinely engage in such balancings in a multitude of contexts (see People v. Lewis, 165 Ill. 2d 305, 329, 651 N.E.2d 72, 83, (1995) (\u201ceven when evidence is relevant, it may, in the trial court\u2019s discretion, be excluded if its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value\u201d); People v. Rodriguez, 291 Ill. App. 3d 55, 65, 684 N.E.2d 128, 134 (1997) (court may reject evidence due to its possibly unfair prejudicial nature)), and their doing so makes sense only when balancing the actual evidence at issue.\nStripped of its rhetoric, defendant\u2019s proposed approach would require trial courts in cases such as this one to determine whether the probative value of a defendant\u2019s prior conviction for the same drug offense is substantially outweighed by the danger of the unfair prejudice he would suffer, even though the trial court has no intention of ever letting the jury learn that defendant\u2019s prior conviction was for the same offense. However, including in this evidentiary balancing process a fact which will never be admitted makes no sense. Thus, we reject defendant\u2019s argument.\nIn performing the balancing test, the trial court must consider the evidence that will actually be presented to, and considered by, the jury. Therefore, if \u201cmere fact\u201d impeachment will be used, that is what the court must consider. That is what the court did here and, in so doing, it properly exercised its discretion.\nB. Expert Testimony\nDefendant next argues that the trial court committed reversible error when it admitted expert testimony about \u201cdrug dealer profiles.\u201d Specifically, defendant claims that the testimony of Officer Root on how cannabis is transported into Macon County, what form it comes in, and the typical characteristics of a \u201cdrug house\u201d had slight bearing, if any, on his guilt or innocence on a charge of possession with intent to deliver.\nDefendant failed to properly preserve this issue for review by failing to raise it in his posttrial motion. People v. Cloutier, 156 Ill. 2d 483, 507, 622 N.E.2d 774, 786 (1993). Thus, defendant has forfeited this issue on appeal unless the plain error rule applies, which occurs when the evidence is closely balanced or the error is of such magnitude the defendant has been denied a fair trial. Cloutier, 156 Ill. 2d at 507, 622 N.E.2d at 786. We conclude that the error alleged here does not rise to the level of plain error, which requires that the asserted error affect \u201csomething \u2018fundamental to the integrity of the judicial process.\u2019 \u201d People v. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d 1, 17, 660 N.E.2d 901, 910 (1995), quoting People v. Green, 74 Ill. 2d 444, 456, 386 N.E.2d 272, 278 (1979) (Ryan, J., specially concurring).\nRoot\u2019s testimony was elicited to prove that defendant had intent to deliver, an element of the charged offense. While some of Root\u2019s testimony may have been irrelevant, none of it was so prejudicial that its admission amounts to plain error. The evidence in this case was not closely balanced, and the admission of the evidence in question did not deny defendant fundamental fairness.\nAlthough we have concluded that defendant has forfeited on appeal the issue of expert testimony regarding \u201cdrug-dealer profiles,\u201d we nonetheless caution trial courts that such evidence must be seriously scrutinized and handled with care. In a proper case, expert testimony by a police officer about how controlled substances are manufactured or packaged might be \u201chighly relevant,\u201d particularly if an issue in the case is whether the defendant possessed the controlled substances in question merely for his personal use, as opposed to his possession with an intent to deliver. See People v. Moore, 294 Ill. App. 3d 410, 418, 689 N.E.2d 1181, 1186 (1998). However, in its.potentially prejudicial effect, this evidence is similar to expert testimony by a police officer about how street gangs operate. As the supreme court has noted, because a \u201cstrong prejudice\u201d may exist against street gangs, evidence indicating that a defendant was a gang member or involved in gang-related activity may be admissible only \u201cwhere there is sufficient proof that membership or [gang] activity is related to the crime charged.\u201d People v. Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d 414, 458, 610 N.E.2d 16, 36 (1992).\nC. Sentencing\nDefendant next argues that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing because the trial court considered erroneous information contained in the presentence report. The presentence report listed defendant\u2019s 1996 conviction for possession with intent to deliver as \u201ccont. sub. trafficking.\u201d However, defendant has never been convicted of controlled substance trafficking. Nonetheless, in apparent reliance upon the presentence report, the court referred to this conviction at defendant\u2019s sentencing hearing when it stated the following:\n\u201c[T]here are three prior felony convictions, two of them are drug charges. The last was a controlled substance trafficking charge [for] which he received three years [in prison], and I assume that he just got off parole when this was committed because it shows that he was not on parole at the time.\nI happen to agree with [the prosecutor] that if we are ever going to rid drugs out of this community or any other community we are going to take the dealers off the street for as long as I possibly can to keep the individual himself from dealing and to hopefully send a message that drug dealers are going to go away for as long as they can go away in this community. Quite frankly, [defendant], if you want to sell drugs, do it up in Cook County but don\u2019t do it here.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThe State argues that the misrepresentation in the presentence report was immaterial because the trial judge\u2019s primary point was that defendant was a dealer, and not just a user, of illegal drugs and that had his prior conviction been accurately listed, the court would have reached the same conclusion. Although the State would have us speculate that this is so, we know the court noted defendant\u2019s three prior convictions and specifically referred to the erroneous \u201ctrafficking\u201d conviction. In light of this record, we cannot conclude that the trial court\u2019s consideration of the trafficking conviction was insignificant. Because we agree with defendant that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing with an accurate record, we vacate his sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing.\nD. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel\nLast, defendant argues that ineffective assistance of counsel deprived him of a fair trial. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are reviewed under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). Reversal under Strickland requires defendant to prove that (1) the conduct of trial counsel fell below an objective standard of reasonableness (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064); and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant such that a \u201creasonable probability\u201d exists that the result would have been different but for the deficient performance (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068). If it is easier to dispose of a claim for lack of sufficient prejudice accruing to defendant, that course should be taken. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 699, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.\nDefendant\u2019s primary contention is that his attorney was ineffective because he failed to move to suppress the evidence arising from defendant\u2019s arrest. Defendant maintains that such a motion was his best \u201cand possibly only\u201d defense, and that such a motion would have been \u201cpatently meritorious\u201d because his fourth amendment rights were violated by the warrantless search and arrest. The State contends that defendant lacks standing under the fourth amendment and disputes whether defendant\u2019s fourth amendment claim is truly \u201cmeritorious,\u201d noting that because defendant\u2019s arrest was not challenged at trial, the State had no need or opportunity to present evidence on the propriety of the police officers\u2019 conduct.\nIn Kunze, 193 Ill. App. 3d at 726, 550 N.E.2d at 296, this court held that adjudication of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is often better made in proceedings on a petition for postconviction relief, where a complete record can be made. In Kunze, the ineffective assistance of counsel claim turned on whether the defendant would have testified had he known in advance that the State would use his prior convictions to impeach him. Kunze, 193 Ill. App. 3d at 725, 550 N.E.2d at 296. Because nothing in the record permitted such a determination to be made, this court declined to adjudicate defendant\u2019s claim. Kunze, 193 Ill. App. 3d at 726, 550 N.E.2d at 296.\nLikewise, in this case, whether defendant suffered prejudice for counsel\u2019s failure to make the suggested motions depends on the likelihood of their success. As the State points out, the record is devoid of factual findings on the issues pertinent to defendant\u2019s claim! The record contains nothing to review with respect to either the appropriateness of the officer\u2019s actions or defendant\u2019s standing to raise fourth amendment issues. We therefore decline the opportunity to consider these questions. Rather, defendant may pursue his claim under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122\u20141 et seq. (West 1996)). People v. Flores, 231 Ill. App. 3d 813, 827-28, 596 N.E.2d 1204, 1213-14 (1992) (held, without an explanation from trial counsel, reviewing court cannot determine whether trial counsel\u2019s omissions involved the exercise of judgment, discretion, or trial tactics, which are not reviewable matters; recommended postconviction petition as a better forum for adjudication of ineffective assistance claim); People v. Palacio, 240 Ill. App. 3d 1078, 1087, 607 N.E.2d 1375, 1380 (1993) (held, \u201c[t]he appellate court is not the appropriate forum to decide contested questions of fact,\u201d and defendant could pursue his claim pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, under which the court could hear evidence and make appropriate findings); In re Carmody, 274 Ill. App. 3d 46, 56, 653 N.E.2d 977, 984 (1995) (noting that the record on direct appeal of a criminal case rarely contains any explanation of the tactics of trial counsel, and holding that if those tactics are to be the subject of scrutiny, a record should be developed in which they can effectively be reviewed); Kunze, 193 Ill. App. 3d at 725-26, 550 N.E.2d at 296 (\u201c[w]here *** consideration of matters outside of the record is required in order to adjudicate the issues presented for review, the defendant\u2019s contentions are more appropriately addressed in proceedings on a petition for post-conviction relief\u2019).\nDefendant also claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to dismiss count II, possession with a prior possession conviction. 720 ILCS 550/4(d) (West 1996). Because count II was vacated at sentencing, defendant cannot make the necessary showing of prejudice under Strickland, i.e., that he was so prejudiced by counsel\u2019s omission that a different result was \u201creasonably probable.\u201d See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. Defendant could not have obtained a more favorable result.\nIn light of our decision to grant defendant a new sentencing hearing, we need not address defendant\u2019s argument regarding his counsel\u2019s failure to correct the error on the presentence report. We similarly need not address his argument that he is entitled to a credit of $10 against the imposed fines, representing $5 for each day he was incarcerated before being released on bond (725 ILCS 5/110\u201414 (West 1996)), even though the State concedes that defendant is entitled to a credit of $10 against either the street-value fine or the drug-treatment assessment, but not both under People v. Sinnott, 226 Ill. App. 3d 923, 936, 590 N.E.2d 502, 511 (1992).\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm defendant\u2019s conviction and remand for resentencing.\nAffirmed in part and vacated in part; cause remanded.\nCARMAN and MYERSCOUGH, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and Timothy E. Hoerman (argued), both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Lawrence R. Fichter, State\u2019s Attorney, of Decatur (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Denise M. Ambrose (argued), all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. QUENTIN HOLLOMAN, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201498\u20140500\nArgued March 17, 1999.\nOpinion filed April 15, 1999.\nRehearing denied May 7, 1999.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Timothy E. Hoerman (argued), both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nLawrence R. Fichter, State\u2019s Attorney, of Decatur (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Denise M. Ambrose (argued), all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0177-01", "first_page_order": 195, "last_page_order": 206 }