{ "id": 564551, "name": "MARTHA ANN MAY, on Behalf of Herself and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SMITHKLINE BEECHAM CLINICAL LABORATORIES, INC., Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "May v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical Laboratories, Inc.", "decision_date": "1999-04-14", "docket_number": "No. 5\u201498\u20140428", "first_page": "242", "last_page": "250", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "304 Ill. App. 3d 242" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "516 N.E.2d 527", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "163 Ill. App. 3d 136", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3546293 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/163/0136-01" ] }, { "cite": "434 N.E.2d 31", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Ill. App. 3d 195", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5472653 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/105/0195-01" ] }, { "cite": "616 N.E.2d 686", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "690" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "246 Ill. App. 3d 557", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5388207 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "563" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/246/0557-01" ] }, { "cite": "653 N.E.2d 825", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "274 Ill. App. 3d 314", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 291671 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "318" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/274/0314-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 L. Ed. 2d 153", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1936, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "158" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 U.S. 248", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5722825 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1936, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254-55" }, { "page": "166" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/299/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "572 N.E.2d 1119", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1123" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "213 Ill. App. 3d 591", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2606819 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "594-95" }, { "page": "595" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/213/0591-01" ] }, { "cite": "635 N.E.2d 468", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "471" }, { "page": "471" }, { "page": "472" }, { "page": "472" }, { "page": "472" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "263 Ill. App. 3d 611", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5366528 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "615" }, { "page": "615" }, { "page": "617" }, { "page": "616" }, { "page": "617" }, { "page": "617" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/263/0611-01" ] }, { "cite": "419 N.E.2d 23", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "26" }, { "page": "27" }, { "page": "27" }, { "page": "27" }, { "page": "27" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 Ill. 2d 245", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3046125 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "252-53" }, { "page": "253" }, { "page": "252" }, { "page": "252" }, { "page": "254" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/84/0245-01" ] }, { "cite": "493 N.E.2d 1045", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1053" }, { "page": "1053" }, { "page": "1053" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 Ill. 2d 428", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5537948 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447" }, { "page": "446" }, { "page": "447" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/112/0428-01" ] }, { "cite": "Fla. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 501.201", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Fla. Stat. Ann.", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "et seq." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 U.S.C. \u00a7 1001", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "et seq." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1961", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "et seq." } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 826, "char_count": 17452, "ocr_confidence": 0.79, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.524410523763123e-07, "percentile": 0.6698722589618159 }, "sha256": "4cf3a7c8fcd36b5556acfb2612b0af131dc8091156885a59612ecdb9d0022a1b", "simhash": "1:a334dcd56f4de95d", "word_count": 2831 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:20:24.702805+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "MARTHA ANN MAY, on Behalf of Herself and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SMITHKLINE BEECHAM CLINICAL LABORATORIES, INC., Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CHAPMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Martha Ann May, filed a putative class action lawsuit against defendant, SmithKline Beecham Clinical Laboratories, Inc. (SBCL), based upon SBCL\u2019s alleged improper billing for medical laboratory tests. SBCL sought to have plaintiffs case stayed pursuant to section 2\u2014619(a)(3) of the Civil Practice Law (735 ILCS 5/2\u2014619(a)(3) (West 1996)) because eight other putative class actions are pending against SBCL across the country. The trial court denied SBCL\u2019s motion to stay, and SBCL filed this interlocutory appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1) (166 Ill. 2d R. 307(a)(1)). We affirm for the reasons set forth below.\nBACKGROUND\nIn 1997, a settlement agreement between SBCL and the United States government was made public. The settlement agreement resulted from qui tarn (\u201cwhistleblower\u201d) lawsuits filed on behalf of the government against SBCL. The agreement required SBCL to pay $325 million in restitution for improper medical claims submitted and paid under government health plans. The settlement agreement did not provide for restitution to be made to the following: members (i.e., patients) of the government health plans for co-payments made, private third-party payers or their members, or patients who directly paid for the medical services provided by SBCL. As a result of the settlement agreement, this case and eight other putative class action lawsuits, which claimed damages from improper billing practices, were filed on behalf of patients who paid SBCL either directly or under a co-payment agreement with their insurance. Additionally, two smaller putative class actions have been filed (one on behalf of certain employee benefit plans and the other on behalf of certain New York patients). Finally, in September 1997, a nonclass action case, with 37 insurance companies as named plaintiffs, was filed against SBCL in a federal district court in Connecticut.\nThis case was the sixth putative class action case to be filed. Out of the nine lawsuits filed, all but this case have been either filed in or transferred by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, where the cases have been consolidated and pretrial proceedings are being conducted under the designation of \u201cMDL-1210,\u201d entitled \u201cIn re SmithKline Beecham Clinical Laboratories, Inc. Laboratory Test Billing Practices Litigation.'\u201d\nIn each of the nine class action suits filed, the putative plaintiffs\u2019 lawsuits were based on SBCL\u2019s settlement agreement with the United States government, and most of the putative class actions filed recite the same \u201coverall scheme\u201d used by SBCL to implement the improper billing practices. SBCL\u2019s \u201cscheme\u201d allegedly involves the following improper billing practices: (1) add-ons, i.e., billing for tests not ordered by physicians, (2) unbundling, i.e., billing separately for tests that should have been billed at a single composite rate, (3) double billing, i.e., billing twice for the same test, (4) up-coding, i.e., performing and billing for more expensive tests' than ordered, and (5) code-jamming, i.e., inserting fabricated diagnosis codes to obtain reimbursement from third-party payers.\nThe bases of the various causes of action stated in the complaints are as follows: violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1961 et seq. (1994)), violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (29 U.S.C. \u00a7 1001 et seq. (1994)), federal and state common law claims for unjust enrichment and restitution, negligence, breach of contract, violation of Pennsylvania\u2019s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, \u00a7 201\u20141 et seq. (West 1993)), conversion, fraud, violation of Illinois\u2019s Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 1996)), and violation of Florida\u2019s Deceptive and Unfair Practices Act (Fla. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 501.201 et seq. (West 1997)). The putative class actions filed primarily seek money damages for payments made by plaintiffs, although certain cases also seek injunctive relief. Plaintiff in this case claims that no federal question is raised on her pleadings. However, the same claim was made by plaintiffs in two of the other pending cases, one of which was filed in Cook County, Illinois. These other two cases have been transferred to the federal district court in Connecticut.\nFACTS\nPlaintiff filed this putative class action on December 27, 1997. Plaintiff asserted the following causes of action against SBCL: (1) violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, (2) unjust enrichment or restitution, (3) fraud, and (4) breach of contract.\nAfter plaintiff successfully defeated SBCL\u2019s attempt to remove this case to federal court, SBCL filed a motion to dismiss for the failure to state a cause of action, pursuant to section 2\u2014615 of the Civil Practice Law (735 ILCS 5/2\u2014615 (West 1996)), and a motion to dismiss or stay pursuant to section 2\u2014619(a)(3) of the Civil Practice Law (735 ILCS 5/2\u2014619(a)(3) (West 1996)). In support of SBCL\u2019s motion to dismiss or stay the proceedings, SBCL filed an affidavit and attached as exhibits the other pending complaints filed against it. Both parties filed two memoranda in support of their positions on these motions. On July 2, 1998, the trial court denied SBCL\u2019s motions. This interlocutory appeal followed.\nANALYSIS\nSBCL contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied SBCL\u2019S motion to stay proceedings pursuant to section 2\u2014619(a)(3). SBCL argues that it proved that duplicative actions were pending between the same parties for the same cause and that it proved that the other four factors to be considered when determining whether to grant a motion for a stay weighed heavily in its favor. These factors are comity; the prevention of multiplicity, vexation, and harassment; the likelihood of obtaining complete relief in the foreign jurisdiction; and the res judicata effect of a foreign judgment in the local forum.\nPlaintiff argues that the court\u2019s ruling was proper because defendant has not overcome the substantial presumption of propriety afforded the trial court\u2019s discretion in ruling on the motion, because the record does not show that the court failed to consider the four factors which are to be weighed in determining defendant\u2019s motion to stay; that the four factors are not necessarily dispositive of the motion; and that plaintiff will be significantly harmed if defendant\u2019s motion is granted.\nSection 2\u2014619(a)(3) provides that a defendant may move for dismissal \u201cor other appropriate relief\u2019 if another pending action involving the same parties for the same cause exists. 735 ILCS 5/2\u2014619(a)(3) (West 1996). A motion under section 2\u2014619(a)(3) is a matter that a court, in a sound exercise of its discretion, must decide, and in exercising its discretion, a court must weigh the prejudice resulting to the nonmovant against the public policy of avoiding duplicative litigation. Kellerman v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 112 Ill. 2d 428, 447, 493 N.E.2d 1045, 1053 (1986); A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co. v. Swift & Co., 84 Ill. 2d 245, 252-53, 419 N.E.2d 23, 26 (1980).\nAbsent an abuse of discretion, a trial court\u2019s decision to grant or deny a motion to stay will not be overturned on appeal. A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co., 84 Ill. 2d at 253, 419 N.E.2d at 27. An abuse of discretion occurs not when a reviewing court disagrees with a court\u2019s decision but, rather, when a reviewing court finds that a trial court \u201c \u2018acted arbitrarily without the employment of conscientious judgment or, in view of all the circumstances, exceeded the bounds of reason and ignored recognized principles of law so that substantial prejudice resulted.\u2019 \u201d Kaden v. Pucinski, 263 Ill. App. 3d 611, 615, 635 N.E.2d 468, 471 (1994), quoting Zurich Insurance Co. v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 213 Ill. App. 3d 591, 594-95, 572 N.E.2d 1119 (1991).\nThe party seeking a stay bears the burden of proving adequate justification for it. Kaden v. Pucinski, 263 Ill. App. 3d 611, 615, 635 N.E.2d 468, 471 (1994).\n\u201c[A] party seeking a stay must justify it by clear and convincing circumstances outweighing potential harm to the party against whom it is operative. (Williford [v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc.], 715 F.2d [124,] 127 [(4th Cir. 1983)].) Thus, [the party seeking a stay] must \u2018make out a clear case of hardship or inequity in being required to go forward, if there is even a fair possibility that the stay for which he prays will work damage to someone else.\u2019 \u201d Zurich Insurance Co. v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 213 Ill. App. 3d 591, 595, 572 N.E.2d 1119, 1123 (1991), quoting Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55, 81 L. Ed. 2d 153, 158, 57 S. Ct. 163, 166 (1936).\nA motion to stay need not be automatically granted simply because the same cause involving the same parties is pending in another jurisdiction. Kellerman, 112 Ill. 2d at 446, 493 N.E.2d at 1053. The legislature did not intend that a section 2\u2014619(a)(3) motion would always prevent two separate actions concerning the same subject matter from proceeding simultaneously. A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co., 84 Ill. 2d at 252, 419 N.E.2d at 27.\nThe initial issue for a determination on a motion to stay is whether the other pending action involves the \u201csame parties\u201d and the \u201csame cause.\u201d \u201cSame parties\u201d does not mean that the parties to both litigations have to be identical, for even if the litigants differ in name or number, the \u201csame parties\u201d requirement is met if the litigants\u2019 interests are sufficiently similar. Schnitzer v. O\u2019Connor, 274 Ill. App. 3d 314, 653 N.E.2d 825 (1995). The \u201csame cause\u201d requirement does not mean the \u201csame cause of action\u201d or the same legal theories, but it means that the relief sought is requested on the same set of facts. Schnitzer, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 318; Quantum Chemical Corp. v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Insurance Co., 246 Ill. App. 3d 557, 616 N.E.2d 686 (1993); Catalano v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 105 Ill. App. 3d 195, 434 N.E.2d 31 (1982).\nThe named plaintiffs here and the named plaintiffs in the pending federal class actions are not identical, but all of the plaintiffs have a substantially similar interest in the litigation. All of the plaintiffs paid money to SBCL for medical testing, either as co-payers under an insurance plan or as direct payers to SBCL. All of the plaintiffs seek money damages for SBCL\u2019s alleged improper billing procedures under SBCL\u2019s \u201coverall scheme.\u201d\nEven with those similarities, plaintiff argues that the \u201csame cause\u201d requirement has not been met. She asserts that because none of the federal cases allege all her causes of action, the \u201csame cause\u201d requirement is not met. None of the counts in the federal action allege claims based on the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. Although the failure to allege each and every one of the \u201csame causes of action\u201d may not per se defeat the \u201csame cause\u201d requirement, the fact that the federal cases do not incorporate each of her counts is one factor to consider in deciding whether to stay the action. See Kaden, 263 Ill. App. 3d at 617, 635 N.E.2d at 472. SBCL\u2019s \u201coverall scheme\u201d of improper billing practices is the basis for plaintiffs putative class action, just as it is the basis for the other pending putative class actions. However, multiple actions in different jurisdictions, arising out of the same operative facts, may be maintained where the circuit court, in a sound exercise of discretion, determines that more than one action should proceed. Kellerman, 112 Ill. 2d at 447, 493 N.E.2d at 1053.\nAssuming that the threshold inquiry of \u201csame parties\u201d and \u201csame cause\u201d is resolved in defendant\u2019s favor, the following four factors, should be considered by a trial court in its decision on a motion to stay: comity; the prevention of multiplicity, vexation, or harassment; the likelihood of obtaining complete relief in the foreign jurisdiction; and the res judicata effect of a foreign judgment in the local forum. Kaden, 263 Ill. App. 3d at 616, 635 N.E.2d at 472. These four factors are not all-inclusive, and a court may consider additional factors that bear on its discretion. Kaden, 263 Ill. App. 3d at 617; Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 163 Ill. App. 3d 136, 516 N.E.2d 527 (1987).\nTurning to the four factors the courts generally consider in determining whether to enter a stay, considerations of comity do not favor staying this case. SBCL argues that the principle of comity requires that the substantial coordination efforts already undertaken by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation by Judge Covello of the Connecticut District Court not be ignored or complicated by this Illinois action.\nComity means giving respect to the laws and judicial decisions of other jurisdictions out of deference. Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 267 (6th ed. 1990). SBCL would have this court defer to the Connecticut District Court simply because it has acquired jurisdiction over other similar class actions and has devoted judicial resources to the management of those cases. It has already been determined that the time of filing actions is not determinative as to a motion to stay. A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co., 84 Ill. 2d at 252, 419 N.E.2d at 27; Kaden, 263 Ill. App. 3d at 617, 635 N.E.2d at 472. The other class actions are, according to the record, in their infant pretrial stage. We cannot find, therefore, that comity dictates that a stay be granted here.\nAs for multiplicity, this Illinois action is the only pending state action against SBCL regarding SBCL\u2019s alleged wrongdoing. All of the other actions have been consolidated in the federal courts. Because discovery in the consolidated class actions will most probably mirror that of this cause, the duplication effort should not be significant. SBCL has not made out a clear case- of hardship or inequity in being required to proceed with the Illinois litigation. Moreover, there is nothing in the record to substantiate that plaintiffs complaint of defendant\u2019s fraud is founded in harassment or vexatiousness.\nPlaintiff claims that complete relief is not available for her in the federal court. She claims that there is a \u201csignificant possibility\u201d that the federal court will not certify the class action because it is easier to have a class certified under Illinois rules than under the federal rules. Defendant contends that plaintiff is speculating as to whether class certification will occur at the federal level and that she does not assert any facts to substantiate her contention. Although speculation about a federal court\u2019s decision is not a sufficient basis alone for denying SBCL\u2019s motion, it is one factor to consider. See Quantum Chemical Corp., 246 Ill. App. 3d at 563, 616 N.E.2d at 690.\nWith regard to res judicata, plaintiff states that the proceedings in the federal class actions \u201cwill presumably\u201d have a res judicata effect on her case. Therefore, the factor of res judicata weighs in favor of \u00a1 granting defendant\u2019s motion to stay.\nThe trial court\u2019s order on SBCL\u2019s motion to stay the proceedings stated:\n\u201cPending before the court is the defendant\u2019s Motion to Dismiss or Stay. After considering at length the arguments and multiple briefs of the parties, the court enters the following order.\nIn the exercise of its discretion, utilizing in large part the rationale found in the plaintiffs briefs, the court denies the motion to dismiss or stay regarding the issue of the alleged duplicative nature of the action at bar.\u201d\nThe trial court considered the arguments and briefs of the parties, which exhaustively addressed the issue of a stay, and found that this action has a legitimate and substantial relation to Illinois. Moreover, the considerations of comity, multiplicity, harassment, and the likelihood of obtaining complete relief all weigh in plaintiffs favor.\nIn reviewing this case, we are mindful of the supreme court\u2019s statement in A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co.: .\n\u201cWe do not believe that a resident corporation\u2019s right to its day in court should await resolution of sister-State litigation where, as here, plaintiffs filing of its complaint does not evidence an intent to harass or gain undue influence over defendant and where, as here, the possibility of completely resolving this controversy in Illinois is greater.\u201d A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co., 84 Ill. 2d at 254, 419 N.E.2d at 27.\nBased on the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying SBCL\u2019s motion for stay.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Madison County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nKUEHN and HOPKINS, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CHAPMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Baker & McKenzie, of Chicago, and Dechert, Price & Rhoads, of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Sandberg, Phoenix & von Gontard, PC., of St. Louis, Missouri, for appellant.", "Judy L. Cates, Steven A. Katz, and Douglas R. Sprang, all of Carr, Korein, Tillery, Kunin, Montroy, Cates & Glass, of Belleville, and John J. Carey, Joseph E Danis, and T. Evan Schaeffer, all of Carey & Danis, L.L.C., of St. Louis, Missouri, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MARTHA ANN MAY, on Behalf of Herself and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SMITHKLINE BEECHAM CLINICAL LABORATORIES, INC., Defendant-Appellant.\nFifth District\nNo. 5\u201498\u20140428\nOpinion filed April 14, 1999.\nBaker & McKenzie, of Chicago, and Dechert, Price & Rhoads, of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Sandberg, Phoenix & von Gontard, PC., of St. Louis, Missouri, for appellant.\nJudy L. Cates, Steven A. Katz, and Douglas R. Sprang, all of Carr, Korein, Tillery, Kunin, Montroy, Cates & Glass, of Belleville, and John J. Carey, Joseph E Danis, and T. Evan Schaeffer, all of Carey & Danis, L.L.C., of St. Louis, Missouri, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0242-01", "first_page_order": 260, "last_page_order": 268 }