{ "id": 564576, "name": "THE VILLAGE OF PLAINFIELD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DANIEL J. ANDERSON, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Village of Plainfield v. Anderson", "decision_date": "1999-04-16", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201498\u20140463", "first_page": "338", "last_page": "342", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "304 Ill. App. 3d 338" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "517 U.S. 806", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11746960 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "813-14" }, { "page": "98" }, { "page": "1774" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/517/0806-01" ] }, { "cite": "149 Ariz. 269", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ariz.", "case_ids": [ 1480115 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ariz/149/0269-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 F.3d 1275", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 571893 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1280" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/85/1275-01" ] }, { "cite": "680 N.E.2d 776", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "780" }, { "page": "780" }, { "page": "780" }, { "page": "780" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 Ill. App. 3d 487", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1596961 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491" }, { "page": "491" }, { "page": "491" }, { "page": "491" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/288/0487-01" ] }, { "cite": "591 N.E.2d 469", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "472", "parenthetical": "appellate court utilized the manifestly erroneous standard because the trial court had considered the credibility of the police officer and found him to be incredible" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "227 Ill. App. 3d 302", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5793632 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "306", "parenthetical": "appellate court utilized the manifestly erroneous standard because the trial court had considered the credibility of the police officer and found him to be incredible" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/227/0302-01" ] }, { "cite": "554 N.E.2d 192", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "197" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 Ill. 2d 66", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3255347 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "76" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/136/0066-01" ] }, { "cite": "697 N.E.2d 693", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "695" }, { "page": "695" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 16", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209984 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "21" }, { "page": "21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0016-01" ] }, { "cite": "564 N.E.2d 1155", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1161" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 Ill. 2d 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5574337 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "281" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/139/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 N.E.2d 696", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "702" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 Ill. 2d 443", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3160428 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/101/0443-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 512, "char_count": 8915, "ocr_confidence": 0.751, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.013208223198575e-08, "percentile": 0.4644900146688089 }, "sha256": "30d9f8d78ef0289a9c4f7b1fad551827b6f46f168e554820c334195e0d82676d", "simhash": "1:ab5e68263beb2be7", "word_count": 1420 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:20:24.702805+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE VILLAGE OF PLAINFIELD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DANIEL J. ANDERSON, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LYTTON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe trial court quashed defendant Daniel J. Anderson\u2019s arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). The Village of Plainfield (Village) contends that the court\u2019s ruling should be reversed because the arresting officer, Officer Sandmire, had reasonable grounds to investigate defendant for DUI and then arrest him on that charge. We reverse and remand.\nFACTS\nDefendant was arrested for DUI and issued citations for a cracked windshield and an unreasonably loud muffler. At a hearing on a motion to quash the arrest and the two additional citations, Sandmire testified through an offer of proof that he was on routine patrol at approximately 1:30 a.m. when he pulled next to defendant\u2019s vehicle at a red light. Sandmire noticed that defendant\u2019s windshield had a number of cracks and that the muffler was unreasonably loud.\nAs the light changed, defendant drove away. Sandmire followed him for approximately one-half mile before activating the emergency lights on his police car. Upon approaching, Sandmire smelled a strong odor of alcohol emanating from the car. Sandmire also noticed that defendant\u2019s eyes were bloodshot and glossy, and his speech was slurred. Defendant admitted to Sandmire that he had consumed three to four beers within the past hour. Sandmire then administered a variety of field sobriety tests.\nThe trial judge found that Sandmire was justified in stopping defendant for equipment violations, but believed that the circumstances as perceived by Sandmire did not warrant the administration of field sobriety tests. Specifically, the trial judge stated that the cracked windshield was \u201canother one of those things that the Courts have said it\u2019s a pretense for a stop, but it\u2019s permissive. However, that in itself doesn\u2019t justify going into a further search or a further investigation as to possible DUI.\u201d\nThus, the trial court ruled that all evidence related to defendant\u2019s alleged intoxication at the time of arrest was inadmissible and quashed the DUI arrest, but denied the motion to quash the two other citations.\nDISCUSSION\nThe Village argues that (1) evidence of defendant\u2019s condition prior to the field sobriety tests should have been admissible, as it was relevant to determine if the tests were properly administered, and (2) based on defendant\u2019s condition, Sandmire was justified in conducting field sobriety tests and then arresting him for DUI.\nA. Evidence of Intoxication\nCourts may exclude evidence on grounds of relevancy if that evidence \u201chas little probative value due to its remoteness, uncertainty or its possibly unfair prejudicial nature.\u201d People v. Ward, 101 Ill. 2d 443, 455, 463 N.E.2d 696, 702 (1984). A ruling on the admissibility of evidence should not be reversed unless it was an abuse of discretion. People v. Enis, 139 Ill. 2d 264, 281, 564 N.E.2d 1155, 1161 (1990).\nHere, defendant objected to all evidence of intoxication, claiming that it was irrelevant. The court sustained defendant\u2019s objection. In an offer of proof, Sandmire testified that upon asking for defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license and insurance card, Sandmire smelled a strong odor of alcohol emanating from the car, defendant\u2019s eyes were bloodshot and glossy, and his speech was slurred. Defendant also admitted that he had consumed three to four beers within the past hour.\nThe above testimony is directly relevant to the Village\u2019s contention that Sandmire was justified in conducting a DUI investigation after making the initial traffic stop. Without this testimony, there was no evidence to support the administration of field sobriety tests after an unrelated traffic stop. Consideration of Sandmire\u2019s observations at the time of the traffic stop was necessary to put the DUI investigation into a proper context. Thus, excluding evidence of this nature was an abuse of discretion.\nB. Administration of Field Sobriety Tests\nThe Village further argues that field sobriety tests were warranted after stopping defendant for a routine traffic violation. Defendant claims that the trial court\u2019s ruling was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\n1. Standard of Review\nA trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion to quash usually involves assessing the credibility of witnesses and making a determination of the facts. People v. Wright, 183 Ill. 2d 16, 21, 697 N.E.2d 693, 695 (1998). A ruling in these circumstances should not be disturbed unless it was manifestly erroneous. Wright, 183 Ill. 2d at 21, 697 N.E.2d at 695. However, a ruling should be reviewed de novo \u201c[w]hen neither the facts nor the credibility of the witnesses is questioned.\u201d People v. Foskey, 136 Ill. 2d 66, 76, 554 N.E.2d 192, 197 (1990).\nIn this case, defendant claims our review should be under the manifestly erroneous standard because the trial court called into question the credibility of the police officers. See People v. O\u2019Brien, 227 Ill. App. 3d 302, 306, 591 N.E.2d 469, 472 (1992) (appellate court utilized the manifestly erroneous standard because the trial court had considered the credibility of the police officer and found him to be incredible).\nHere, the trial judge stated that he was not \u201cattacking directly the credibility of the officers in this case, but *** their interpretation of the incident doesn\u2019t justify the result of a DUI charge.\u201d In making this statement, the judge indicated that he was taking the officer\u2019s testimony as truthful and that his finding of whether the facts justified a DUI investigation was made as a matter of law. Thus, we review his ruling de novo.\n2. Defendant\u2019s Detention\nWhen a police officer stops a vehicle for a minor traffic violation, the officer may briefly detain the driver to request a driver\u2019s license and make some initial inquiries. People v. Easley, 288 Ill. App. 3d 487, 491, 680 N.E.2d 776, 780 (1997). If no further suspicion is aroused in the officer following these initial inquiries, the traffic stop may go no further, and the individuals involved should no longer be detained. Easley, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 491, 680 N.E.2d at 780. Where an officer\u2019s suspicions are aroused during the initial inquiries, however, further detention may be warranted. United States v. Finke, 85 F.3d 1275, 1280 (7th Cir. 1996).\nIn a DUI case, if an officer has a reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts that a driver is under the influence of alcohol, field sobriety tests which \u201cdo not involve long delay or unreasonable intrusion, although searches under the Fourth Amendment, may be justified.\u201d State v. Superior Court, 149 Ariz. 269, 274, 718 E2d 171, 176 (1986); see generally Easley, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 491, 680 N.E.2d at 780. In deciding whether reasonable suspicion exists to justify the continued detention, we must consider the totality of the circumstances. Easley, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 491, 680 N.E.2d at 780.\nAlthough the trial court ruled that all alcohol-related evidence was inadmissible, a meaningful review is possible due to the Village\u2019s preservation of the record through an offer of proof. The evidence contained in the offer of proof consisted of Sandmire\u2019s testimony regarding defendant\u2019s impaired condition prior to the field sobriety tests. Sandmire stated that only after observing defendant\u2019s impaired state did he prolong defendant\u2019s detention for the purpose of conducting those tests.\nBased on Sandmire\u2019s testimony, a limited detention to ascertain whether defendant was under the influence of alcohol was reasonable. Indeed, an officer faced with these facts would be derelict in his duties if he chose not to conduct a further investigation.\nWe understand the trial court\u2019s apprehension about permitting an officer to detain a driver for minor traffic violations and then administer field sobriety tests. Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has held that the \u201csubjective intent\u201d or actual motivation of the police officers involved should play no role in determining the reasonableness of an investigation pursuant to the fourth amendment. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813-14, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89, 98, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 (1996). Accordingly, we must reverse the trial court\u2019s ruling.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Will County is reversed and remanded for further proceedings on defendant\u2019s motion to quash. On remand, the sole question for the trial court is whether defendant\u2019s conduct prior to the field sobriety tests combined with defendant\u2019s performance of those tests created probable cause to arrest defendant for DUI.\nReversed and remanded.\nHOLDRIDGE, EJ., and SLATER, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LYTTON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael R. Lucas (argued), of McKeown Law Office, of Joliet, for appellant.", "Frank S. Cservenyak, Jr., and Tim Rathbun (argued), both of Rathbun, Cservenyak & Kozol, LLC, of Joliet, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE VILLAGE OF PLAINFIELD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DANIEL J. ANDERSON, Defendant-Appellee.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201498\u20140463\nOpinion filed April 16, 1999.\nMichael R. Lucas (argued), of McKeown Law Office, of Joliet, for appellant.\nFrank S. Cservenyak, Jr., and Tim Rathbun (argued), both of Rathbun, Cservenyak & Kozol, LLC, of Joliet, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0338-01", "first_page_order": 356, "last_page_order": 360 }