{ "id": 564620, "name": "LEONARD SIDDENS, Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Moorhead Machinery/Westinghouse, Appellants and Cross-Appellees)", "name_abbreviation": "Siddens v. Industrial Commission", "decision_date": "1999-04-22", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201498\u20140117WC", "first_page": "506", "last_page": "514", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "304 Ill. App. 3d 506" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "184 N.E. 202", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "weight": 2, "year": 1932, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "203-04" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 Ill. 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5297462 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1932, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "131-32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/351/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 N.E.2d 94", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "96", "parenthetical": "circuit court had no jurisdiction to entertain claimant's petition for review of Commission's decision; circuit court's remand order, Commission's decision on remand, and circuit court's second order were therefore all nullities" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 Ill. 2d 452", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3093103 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455-56", "parenthetical": "circuit court had no jurisdiction to entertain claimant's petition for review of Commission's decision; circuit court's remand order, Commission's decision on remand, and circuit court's second order were therefore all nullities" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/91/0452-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 N.E.2d 609", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "611" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 Ill. 2d 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2828912 ], "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "185" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/30/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "662 N.E.2d 161", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 Ill. App. 3d 65", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1156775 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "78" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/278/0065-01" ] }, { "cite": "630 N.E.2d 801", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "806" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780265 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "678 N.E.2d 7", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "9" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 Ill. App. 3d 638", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1544522 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "640" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/286/0638-01" ] }, { "cite": "565 N.E.2d 724", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "727" }, { "page": "727", "parenthetical": "respondent collaterally attacked default judgment in workers' compensation case; respondent filed petition in circuit court alleging that the court which entered default judgment lacked jurisdiction to do so and that the judgment was therefore void" }, { "page": "727" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 Ill. App. 3d 297", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2554003 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "302" }, { "page": "300" }, { "page": "302" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/207/0297-01" ] }, { "cite": "555 N.E.2d 693", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "716" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 Ill. 2d 192", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3255316 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/136/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "681 N.E.2d 1100", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1103" }, { "page": "1101" }, { "page": "1101" }, { "page": "1102" }, { "page": "1103" }, { "page": "1103" }, { "page": "1102" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 Ill. App. 3d 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 351052 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "450-51" }, { "page": "448" }, { "page": "448" }, { "page": "449" }, { "page": "450" }, { "page": "450" }, { "page": "449" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/289/0447-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 748, "char_count": 20257, "ocr_confidence": 0.781, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.473347522702668e-07, "percentile": 0.8067619000181092 }, "sha256": "54db9f5b8e1f42f909398c6b077470fe80b11a155bea0f9e1fca83aff7b52f39", "simhash": "1:c3b78f85eadbecd4", "word_count": 3222 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:20:24.702805+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "LEONARD SIDDENS, Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Moorhead Machinery/Westinghouse, Appellants and Cross-Appellees)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE COLWELL\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nRespondent, Moorhead Machinery/Westinghouse (Moorhead), and the Industrial Commission (Commission) appeal from an August 1997 order in which the circuit court of Macon County granted a motion for declaratory judgment in favor of claimant, Leonard Siddens (Siddens). Siddens cross-appeals, contending that the circuit court failed to grant him the proper relief in its order. We hold that the Commission in March 1993 exceeded its powers under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 1992)) by entering an order on a petition for penalties and attorney fees filed by Siddens. As a result, the Commission\u2019s March 1993 decision and all subsequent orders and decisions of the Commission and circuit court are void, and we therefore vacate the circuit court\u2019s August 1997 order.\nThe \u201cunderlying litigation\u201d in this case began when Siddens filed an application for adjustment of claim. On January 31, 1988, an arbitrator awarded Siddens wage-differential benefits pursuant to section 8(d)(1) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/8(d)(1) (West 1992)), and Moor-head appealed. The Commission affirmed, and the circuit court of Macon County confirmed. Moorhead again appealed, and the Industrial Commission Division of the appellate court affirmed Siddens\u2019 award in a Rule 23 order entered on July 8, 1992 (July 1992 Order). Siddens v. Moorhead MachinerylWestinghouse, No. 4\u201491\u20140629WC (July 8, 1992) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).\nOn August 4, 1992, Siddens filed a petition (August 1992 petition) with the Commission seeking attorney fees and penalties pursuant to sections 16 and 19(k) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/16, 19(k) (West 1992)). Section 19(k) provides in pertinent part:\n\u201cIn case [sz\u2019c] where there has been any unreasonable or vexatious delay of payment or intentional underpayment of compensation, or proceedings have been instituted or carried on by the one liable to pay the compensation, which do not present a real controversy, but are merely frivolous or for delay, then the Commission may award compensation additional to that otherwise payable under this Act equal to 50% of the amount payable at the time of such award.\u201d 820 ILCS 305/19(k) (West 1992).\nSection 16 provides in pertinent part:\n\u201cWhenever the Commission shall find that the employer, his or her agent, service company or insurance carrier *** has been guilty of unreasonable or vexatious delay, intentional underpayment of compensation benefits, or has engaged in frivolous defenses which do not present a real controversy, within the purview of the provisions of paragraph (k) of Section 19 of this Act, the Commission may assess all or any part of the attorney\u2019s fees and costs against such employer and his or her insurance carrier.\u201d 820 ILCS 305/16 (West 1992).\nSiddens alleged that Moorhead\u2019s appeals in the underlying litigation \u201cdid not present a real controversy but [were] merely frivolous within the meaning of section 19(k).\u201d Siddens did not allege that Moorhead unreasonably delayed or intentionally underpaid compensation; in fact, Siddens admitted in his petition that Moorhead had paid his due compensation.\nOn March 8, 1993, the Commission, with one commissioner dissenting, denied Siddens\u2019 request for penalties and attorney fees (March 1993 decision). The majority, one of whom was commissioner Richard Gilgis, found that Moorhead\u2019s appeals in the underlying litigation were not frivolous. The dissenting commissioner disagreed, citing the appellate court\u2019s July 1992 Order in which the court stated that one of Moorhead\u2019s three arguments on appeal had \u201cno merit\u201d and that another was \u201cmeritless.\u201d Siddens appealed to the circuit court of Macon County, which reversed the Commission in an order dated January 10, 1995 (January 1995 order). The circuit court found that Moorhead\u2019s appeals in the underlying litigation were frivolous and that the Commission\u2019s March 1993 decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The circuit court accordingly remanded the cause to the Commission for a determination of attorney fees, penalties, and costs.\nThe Commission rendered its decision on remand on December 11, 1995 (December 1995 decision). The Commission awarded Siddens penalties and attorney fees in the amount of $38,798.28 and $7,759.66,. respectively. Commissioner Gilgis dissented, stating that the circuit court impermissibly substituted its judgment for that of the Commission. Moorhead appealed.\nOn October 23, 1996, the circuit court again reversed (October 1996 order), finding the Commission\u2019s decision on remand against the manifest weight of the evidence. The circuit court ordered the Commission to enter an order awarding Siddens $67,918.03 in section 19(k) penalties, $33,972.84 in section 16 attorney fees and $962.25 in costs. Neither party appealed the circuit court\u2019s October 1996 order.\nOn July 30, 1997, before the Commission took any action on remand, Siddens filed a two-count \u201cAction for Declaratory Judgment\u201d with the circuit court (July 1997 motion). In count I, Siddens sought an order declaring the circuit court\u2019s October 1996 order final but no longer appealable. In count II, Siddens alleged that the Commission\u2019s March 1993 and December 1995 decisions were made fraudulently. He claimed that Commissioner Gilgis was not in possession of the necessary transcripts and motions to render those decisions or to conduct a hearing on Siddens\u2019 August 1992 petition for penalties and attorney fees. Siddens further alleged that the other commissioners were unaware of the contents of his petition. According to Siddens, the Commission lacked jurisdiction to rule on his petition, since the decisions were allegedly not made by a three-member panel as required by section 19(e) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/19(e) (West 1992)). Siddens asked the circuit court to hold an evidentiary hearing so that the commissioners could be called before the circuit court, and the circuit court could decide whether the Commission\u2019s March 1993 and December 1995 decisions were made by a three-judge panel.\nThe circuit court ruled on Siddens\u2019 July 1997 motion on August 20, 1997 (August 1997 order). The court granted the relief Siddens sought in count I, finding that the circuit court\u2019s October 1996 order was final and appealable. However, because no party appealed within 30 days of the entry of the order, the order was no longer reviewable. See 820 ILCS 305/19(f)(2) (West 1996); 155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a). Regarding count II, the circuit court ordered the commissioners to convene amongst themselves and \u201center an order declaring whether the order of March 8, 1993[,] and order on remand [of] December 11, 1995[, were] in fact the decision[s] of a 3[-]member panel of the Industrial Commission pursuant to Sec. 19(e) of the Worker\u2019s [sic] Compensation Act.\u201d Siddens filed a motion to reconsider count II, asserting that it was for the circuit court, not the commissioners, to decide whether the Commission\u2019s March 1993 and December 1995 decisions were frauds. The circuit court denied Siddens\u2019 motion to reconsider.\nMoorhead, Siddens, and the Commission appeal the August 1997 order of the circuit court. Moorhead and the Commission advance several arguments why we should vacate the circuit court\u2019s August 1997 order. They contend the following: that the circuit court lost jurisdiction to entertain Siddens\u2019 July 1997 motion after remanding the cause to the Commission in October 1996; that Siddens\u2019 motion for declaratory judgment did not present a justiciable controversy, and thus the circuit court\u2019s resulting order was an advisory opinion; and that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to enter the August 1997 order because its October 1996 order was interlocutory and not final. Moorhead also argues that the Commission lacked the statutory jurisdiction to consider Siddens\u2019 August 1992 petition in the first place. Siddens, on the other hand, cross-appeals and asks this court to order the circuit court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the Commission\u2019s March 1993 and December 1995 decisions were those of a three-member panel. Siddens reiterates his arguments that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to render its March 1993 and December 1995 decisions, and he asks us to declare those decisions void.\nWhile the instant appeal was pending, Siddens filed a motion with this court. In that motion, he asks us to dismiss all appeals until an evidentiary hearing can be held before the circuit court. Siddens also seeks to amend his prayer for relief in count II of his July 1997 motion. His proposed amendment prays for the circuit court to declare all Commission and circuit court orders on and subsequent to March 8, 1993, null and void, and he further requests a stay of the proceedings in the Commission on remand. Moorhead and the Commission oppose Siddens\u2019 motion, contending that the circuit court already ruled on Siddens\u2019 July 1997 motion and that the parties fully briefed the instant appeal based on that ruling. The Commission also points out that Sid-dens provided no factual or legal reasons why we should grant his motion. We agree with Moorhead and the Commission and accordingly deny Siddens\u2019 motion.\nWe first address whether the Commission possessed the statutory authority to rule on Siddens\u2019 August 1992 petition for penalties and attorney fees. The Commission is an administrative agency and possesses only those powers granted to it by the legislature. Krantz v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 289 Ill. App. 3d 447, 450-51, 681 N.E.2d 1100, 1103 (1997). To the extent an agency acts outside its statutory authority, it acts without jurisdiction. The term \u201cjurisdiction,\u201d while not strictly applicable to an administrative agency, may be employed to designate the authority of the agency to act. In administrative law, the term \u201cjurisdiction\u201d has three aspects: (1) personal jurisdiction, (2) subject-matter jurisdiction, and (3) the agency\u2019s scope of statutory authority. Business & Professional People for the Public Interest v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n, 136 Ill. 2d 192, 243, 555 N.E.2d 693, 716 (1989). A judgment or order is void where it is entered by a court or agency which lacks personal jurisdiction, subject-matter jurisdiction, or the inherent power to enter the particular judgment or order, or where the order is procured by fraud. Evans v. Corporate Services, 207 Ill. App. 3d 297, 302, 565 N.E.2d 724, 727 (1990). A void order is a complete nullity from its inception and has no legal effect. National Bank v. Multi National Industries, Inc., 286 Ill. App. 3d 638, 640, 678 N.E.2d 7, 9 (1997). A void order may be attacked, either directly or collaterally, at any time or in any court. In re Estate of Steinfeld, 158 Ill. 2d 1, 12, 630 N.E.2d 801, 806 (1994). Courts have a duty to vacate and expunge void orders from court records and thus may sua sponte declare an order void. People v. Childs, 278 Ill. App. 3d 65, 78, 662 N.E.2d 161, 169 (1996).\nWe note that, although we .could have addressed the instant issue sua sponte, Siddens himself challenged the validity of the Commission\u2019s March 1993 decision in his July 1997 circuit court motion. He asserted that the Commission\u2019s March 1993 decision was procured by fraud and that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to rule on his August 1992 petition. Siddens made these allegations nine months after the circuit court remanded the cause to the Commission and before the Commission acted upon the circuit court\u2019s October 1996 order. We find that these allegations amount to a collateral attack on the Commission\u2019s jurisdiction. See Evans, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 300, 565 N.E.2d at 727 (respondent collaterally attacked default judgment in workers\u2019 compensation case; respondent filed petition in circuit court alleging that the court which entered default judgment lacked jurisdiction to do so and that the judgment was therefore void).\nWe now turn to Moorhead\u2019s contention that the Commission lacked the statutory power to consider Siddens\u2019 August 1992 petition for section 19(k) penalties and section 16 attorney fees. Moorhead compares the instant case with Krantz, 289 Ill. App. 3d 447, 681 N.E.2d 1100, and contends that Krantz is controlling authority. In Krantz, the claimant was awarded workers\u2019 compensation benefits for injuries he suffered while working for the respondent. The respondent eventually appealed to the circuit court of Saline County, which confirmed the claimant\u2019s award. Neither party appealed the circuit court\u2019s decision. Approximately one month later, the claimant filed a petition with the Commission seeking section 16 attorney fees and penalties under sections 19(k) and 19(1) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/16, 19(k), 19(1) (West 1994)). Krantz, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 448, 681 N.E.2d at 1101. The claimant in his petition alleged only \u201cthat [the respondent\u2019s] appeal to the circuit court did not present a real controversy but was merely frivolous and made for the purpose of delay.\u201d Krantz, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 448, 681 N.E.2d at 1101. The Commission ruled that the claimant was not entitled to section 16 attorney fees or to section 19(k) penalties. Krantz, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 449, 681 N.E.2d at 1102. The circuit court agreed with the Commission, and the claimant appealed to this court. We affirmed, holding that, where a circuit court enters a final judgment, the Commission lacks the statutory power to review the merits of the appeal in the underlying case to determine if that appeal was frivolous or made for the purpose of delay. We could not find \u201cthat the Commission\u2019s power extends to consideration of pleadings and matters that take place in the circuit court.\u201d Krantz, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 450, 681 N.E.2d at 1103.\nIn the instant case, the appellate court rendered a final judgment with its July 1992 Order, affirming Siddens\u2019 compensation award. Neither party appealed. Approximately one month later, Sid-dens filed his August 1992 petition with the Commission, seeking section 19(k) penalties and section 16 attorney fees. Siddens alleged that Moorhead\u2019s \u201cappeal[s] to the circuit court and [to] the Industrial Commission of the Appellate Court did not present a real controversy but [were] merely frivolous within the meaning of \u00a7 19(k).\u201d Siddens did not provide any other basis on which to support his claim for penalties and attorney fees. These facts are strikingly similar to the facts in Krantz. The only difference between this case and Krantz is that, here, the underlying appeal went to the appellate court, whereas in Krantz the underlying appeal stopped at the circuit court. We find this difference immaterial, however, since the roles of circuit and appellate courts in workers\u2019 compensation cases are the same \u2014 appellate only. Gunnels v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 30 Ill. 2d 181, 185, 195 N.E.2d 609, 611 (1964); 820 ILCS 305/19(1) (West 1992).\nWe therefore find the rule of law from Krantz applicable. Accordingly, we hold that the Commission lacked the statutory power to determine whether Moorhead\u2019s appeals in the underlying litigation were frivolous. See Krantz, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 450, 681 N.E.2d at 1103.\nSiddens argues that Krantz should not apply to this case, since, in Siddens\u2019 words, \u201c[t]he [appellate] court [in its July 1992 Order] found Moorhead\u2019s challenges to its liability \u2018meritless.\u2019 \u201d We disagree with Siddens\u2019 characterization of the appellate court\u2019s July 1992 Order. In appealing the underlying litigation to the appellate court, Moorhead made three arguments: (1) that no causal relation existed between Siddens\u2019 work-related injury and condition of ill-being; (2) that Sid-dens\u2019 compensation award was against the manifest weight of the evidence; and (3) that the Commission\u2019s decision was unreliable because the Commission failed to comment on videotape evidence presented by Moorhead. The appellate court stated that Moorhead\u2019s first argument had \u201cno merit\u201d and that its third argument was \u201cmeritless.\u201d Nonetheless, the court addressed those two arguments. Regarding Moor-head\u2019s second argument, the court never commented on its merits; in fact, the court engaged in a thorough discussion of the facts supporting the Commission\u2019s decision. The appellate court never indicated that Moorhead\u2019s appeal itself was frivolous, brought for the purpose of delay or presented no real controversy; even if it did, we doubt that such a statement could provide the basis for an award of penalties and attorney fees under the circumstances. Thus, the language of the July 1992 Order did not authorize the Commission to determine whether Moorhead\u2019s appeals were frivolous.\nAs stated earlier, an order is void where it is entered by a tribunal that lacks the inherent power to enter the order. Evans, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 302, 565 N.E.2d at 727. We previously concluded that the Commission lacked the statutory power to enter its order on Siddens\u2019 August 1992 petition for penalties and attorney fees. We therefore find the Commission\u2019s March 1993 decision void and also declare null and void the subsequent orders and decisions of the circuit court and Commission. See Simpson v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 91 Ill. 2d 452, 455-56, 440 N.E.2d 94, 96 (1982) (circuit court had no jurisdiction to entertain claimant\u2019s petition for review of Commission\u2019s decision; circuit court\u2019s remand order, Commission\u2019s decision on remand, and circuit court\u2019s second order were therefore all nullities).\nSiddens next asserts that he \u201cmay amend his [August 1992] petition before the Industrial Commission to allege \u2018unreasonable delay\u2019 as a basis for section 19(k) penalties, in accordance with [Board of Education v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 351 Ill. 128, 184 N.E. 202 (1932)].\u201d In Board of Education, our supreme court held that, after a final judgment has been entered in a workers\u2019 compensation proceeding, a claimant may subsequently file with the Commission a petition seeking section 19(k) penalties based on the employer\u2019s unreasonable or vexatious delay of payment. Board of Education, 351 Ill. at 131-32, 184 N.E. at 203-04. Board of Education remains good law. See Krantz, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 449, 681 N.E.2d at 1102. Pursuant to Board of Education, we find no reason that would preclude Siddens from filing a new petition with the Commission and alleging an \u201cunreasonable or vexatious delay of payment or intentional underpayment of compensation\u201d (820 ILCS 305/19(k) (West 1996)) on the part of Moorhead.\nWe pause, however, to highlight two applicable statements from the record. First, in his August 1992 petition, Siddens acknowledged that Moorhead had made all of its then-due payments to Siddens. Second, at a January 9,1998, hearing on Siddens\u2019 motion to reconsider, Moorhead\u2019s attorney stated:\n\u201c[Siddens] is paid permanent and total disability benefits and it\u2019s my understanding that he has been paid these benefits and the benefits are ongoing in nature. [Siddens] is not an individual who is not receiving sums of money ***. He has been paid, is being paid, and pursuant to the law in this state, he will be paid.\u201d\nThis statement went unchallenged. We stress that any allegation of an unreasonable delay must be made in good faith.\nDue to the nature of our decision, we need not address the other arguments advanced by the parties.\nBased on the foregoing, the following are declared null and void: the Commission\u2019s March 1993 and December 1995 decisions, and the circuit court\u2019s January 1995, October 1996 and August 1997 orders.\nThe August 20, 1997, order of the circuit court is hereby vacated.\nOrder vacated.\nMcCULLOUGH, p.j., and RAKOWSKI, HOLDRIDGE and RARICK, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE COLWELL" } ], "attorneys": [ "Theodore J. Powers and Gregory G. Vacala, both of Rusin, Patton, Ma-ciorowski & Friedman, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant Moorhead Machinery/ Westinghouse.", "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Barbara A. Preiner, Solicitor General, and Jan E. Hughes, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellant Industrial Commission.", "Diane E. Greanias, of Peoria Heights, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LEONARD SIDDENS, Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Moorhead Machinery/Westinghouse, Appellants and Cross-Appellees).\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201498\u20140117WC\nOpinion filed April 22, 1999.\nRehearing denied June 3, 1999.\nTheodore J. Powers and Gregory G. Vacala, both of Rusin, Patton, Ma-ciorowski & Friedman, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant Moorhead Machinery/ Westinghouse.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Barbara A. Preiner, Solicitor General, and Jan E. Hughes, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellant Industrial Commission.\nDiane E. Greanias, of Peoria Heights, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0506-01", "first_page_order": 524, "last_page_order": 532 }