{
  "id": 1208020,
  "name": "In re MARRIAGE OF ROGER E. BARTLETT, Petitioner, and DOROTHY J. BARTLETT, Respondent (Michael D. Canulli, Contemnor-Appellant v. The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee)",
  "name_abbreviation": "Canulli v. People",
  "decision_date": "1999-05-21",
  "docket_number": "Nos. 2\u201498\u20140277, 2\u201498\u20140278 cons.",
  "first_page": "28",
  "last_page": "32",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "305 Ill. App. 3d 28"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "46 Ill. App. 3d 420",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        2976103
      ],
      "year": 1977,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "423",
          "parenthetical": "reversing judgment of contempt, stating that even assuming that the contemnor's legal position was incorrect an attorney should be able to act in good faith in a proper and respectful manner to represent a client's interests without being held in contempt"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/46/0420-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "37 Ill. App. 3d 98",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        2714244
      ],
      "year": 1976,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "99",
          "parenthetical": "reversing judgment of contempt where there was no indication that the contemnor's words were made in a loud or boisterous manner"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/37/0098-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "228 Ill. App. 3d 1014",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        5221724
      ],
      "weight": 3,
      "year": 1992,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "1020"
        },
        {
          "page": "1020"
        },
        {
          "page": "1020-21"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/228/1014-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "94 Ill. 2d 167",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        3106072
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1983,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "171"
        },
        {
          "page": "171"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-2d/94/0167-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "276 Ill. App. 3d 939",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        927649
      ],
      "weight": 4,
      "year": 1995,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "944"
        },
        {
          "page": "944-45"
        },
        {
          "page": "945"
        },
        {
          "page": "945",
          "parenthetical": "reviewing court may consider provocation by the trial court and erroneous trial court rulings"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/276/0939-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "208 Ill. App. 3d 971",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        2549530
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1991,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "977"
        },
        {
          "page": "977"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/208/0971-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 467,
    "char_count": 8350,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.781,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 7.929698923179137e-08,
      "percentile": 0.46186051773674835
    },
    "sha256": "4cf2dc2152efd64dc31ca99184b13a981a580ab56b72e58e046491bdf1057900",
    "simhash": "1:82d708c63d045d25",
    "word_count": 1411
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:21:49.676413+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "In re MARRIAGE OF ROGER E. BARTLETT, Petitioner, and DOROTHY J. BARTLETT, Respondent (Michael D. Canulli, Contemnor-Appellant v. The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee)."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE COLWELL\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nContemnor, Michael D. Canulli, a licensed attorney representing respondent Dorothy J. Bartlett, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Du Page County summarily finding him in direct criminal contempt of court and imposing a $500 fine. We reverse.\nOn January 22, 1998, contemnor filed a motion to continue the February 13, 1998, trial date in this matter. On February 3, 1998, contemnor filed a supplement to his January 22, 1998, motion. The supplement concerned contemnor\u2019s theory on petitioner\u2019s alleged dissipation of assets and requested that the court order petitioner to produce certain documents and to instruct that the report of his individual retirement account (IRA) be updated. The supplement also requested that depositions be set after the production was completed.\nThe trial court held a contested hearing on February 3, 1998. During that hearing, contemnor began to discuss the supplement to his motion when opposing counsel objected because he had received a copy of the supplement just the previous day. The trial court then addressed contemnor\u2019s dissipation theory in the supplement and made findings and rulings regarding that theory. After a short exchange with contemnor, the court then commented that the supplement was not properly filed.\nContemnor then began to speak and was interrupted by opposing counsel, who again objected, stating that contemnor was arguing his motion. The following exchange then occurred:\n\u201cMR. CANULLI (the contemnor): Let me just\u2014let me just finish.\nTHE COURT: I have already made my ruling on that issue.\nMR. CANULLI: I understand.\nTHE COURT: That\u2019s all. That [sic] all. You can\u2019t keep arguing after a Court has made a ruling. Proper procedure is somebody to argue, hear responses. I disagree with you. We\u2019re done with the issue. You can preserve it at the time of trial, if you wish. I don\u2019t think that it\u2019s an issue at the trial. I\u2019m holding it\u2019s not an issue. That\u2019s my ruling. It will be binding on the trial. I don\u2019t think there is a legal basis, I\u2019ve said that enough now.\nSo, thank you, you gentlemen are done. You\u2019re done. Step away. When the court makes a ruling, you are required to step away.\nMR. CANULLI: I\u2019m not arguing with your ruling, Judge.\nTHE COURT: No, you can file any written papers that you wish, that I will consider, but we\u2019re done now.\nMR. CANULLI: There\u2019s a second part of the motion.\nTHE COURT: Counsel. Counsel, I\u2019ve denied it.\nThank you.\nDEPUTY DE TRAY: You need to step away.\nTHE COURT: I\u2019ve denied it, counsel.\nYou need to step away.\nMR. CANULLI: I\u2019m not arguing.\nTHE COURT: I\u2019m ordering you. I\u2019m ordering you to step away now. I\u2019ve asked you three times.\nDEPUTY DE TRAY: The judge asked you to step away, so please step away.\nTHE COURT: If you do not want to step away now, then I\u2019m going to hold you in contempt of court because you are still standing here.\nTurn and walk away by my order.\nDEPUTY DE TRAY: Okay, I\u2019m calling\u2014\nTHE COURT: Counsel, I\u2019m finding you in direct criminal contempt of court.\nMR. CANULLI: I\u2019m getting my things.\nTHE COURT: I\u2019m fining you $500 to be paid within seven days.\nMR. CANULLI: I\u2019m getting my things, your Honor, to walk away from the bench.\nTHE COURT: Seven days. Seven days. Seven days. Seven days to pay. I\u2019m finding you in direct criminal contempt of court.\nMR. CANULLI: Judge, may I make a record?\nTHE COURT: No, you can\u2019t. You\u2019re done. If you don\u2019t want to step away again, then I\u2019m going to find [sic] you on a second contempt of court and consider further sanctions.\u201d\nA February 3, 1998, order granted the motion for a new trial and the request to continue the deposition dates but did not address contemnor\u2019s other requests for relief. On February 24, 1998, the trial court granted contemnor\u2019s other requested relief after he presented another motion. The trial court also denied contemnor\u2019s motion to reconsider the contempt finding, and contemnor appeals.\nCriminal contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court. In re Marriage of Ruchala, 208 Ill. App. 3d 971, 977 (1991). The contempt is committed in the physical presence of the judge or within an integral part of the court while the court is performing its judicial functions. People v. Bell, 276 Ill. App. 3d 939, 944 (1995). Direct contempt arises from conduct that occurs in the presence of the judge. Ruchala, 208 Ill. App. 3d at 977.\nTo sustain a finding of direct criminal contempt of court, it must be shown that the particular conduct was calculated to embarrass, hinder, or obstruct a court in its administration of justice, to derogate from its authority or dignity, or bring the administration of law into disrepute. People v. Siegel, 94 Ill. 2d 167, 171 (1983). In determining whether direct criminal contempt has occurred, the reviewing court may consider provocation by the trial court and erroneous trial court rulings that may have triggered the contemnor\u2019s comments. Bell, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 944-45. Although provocation is not a defense, the circumstances of the underlying proceedings may be weighed to determine whether the offense was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Bell, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 945.\nBoth elements of criminal contempt, an intent and an act, must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Coulter, 228 Ill. App. 3d 1014, 1020 (1992). Intent in criminal contempt cases has been defined as a voluntary act by one who knows or who should reasonably know that the act is wrongful. Coulter, 228 Ill. App. 3d at 1020. The intent to commit contempt of court may be inferred from the contemnor\u2019s actions, although a finding of contempt will not stand where it is shown that the attorney acted in good faith to serve his or her client and the court. Siegel, 94 Ill. 2d at 171. If the contemnor can show that his or her conduct was a good-faith attempt to represent his or her client without hindering the court\u2019s functions or dignity, a finding of direct criminal contempt should be reversed upon review. Coulter, 228 Ill. App. 3d at 1020-21.\nAfter reviewing the record in this case in light of these principles, we conclude that the record does not support the trial court\u2019s finding of direct criminal contempt. We do not believe that contemnor intended to embarrass the court or interfere with the court\u2019s proceedings. Indeed, during its ruling on the motion for reconsideration, the trial court expressly acknowledged that contemnor\u2019s tone of voice was not disrespectful. See People v. Hanna, 37 Ill. App. 3d 98, 99 (1976) (reversing judgment of contempt where there was no indication that the contemnor\u2019s words were made in a loud or boisterous manner). On the contrary, we believe that contemnor was acting in good faith in an attempt to act as an advocate for his client. See People v. Kuelper, 46 Ill. App. 3d 420, 423 (1977) (reversing judgment of contempt, stating that even assuming that the contemnor\u2019s legal position was incorrect an attorney should be able to act in good faith in a proper and respectful manner to represent a client\u2019s interests without being held in contempt). Contemnor was properly attempting to obtain a ruling on the remaining requests for relief in his motion, but the trial court would not allow him to explain his intentions. See Bell, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 945 (reviewing court may consider provocation by the trial court and erroneous trial court rulings). In fact, the trial court later granted the requested relief when it was presented again. Furthermore, the trial court immediately found contemnor in contempt after giving him his first and only warning without providing time for contemnor to comply.\nBased on the foregoing, we reverse the order of the circuit court of Du Page County finding contemnor in direct criminal contempt of court.\nReversed.\nGEIGER and THOMAS, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE COLWELL"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Michael D. Canulli, of Oak Brook, for appellant.",
      "Joseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Martin P. Moltz, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), and Robert E. Davison, of DePaepe & Davison, of Springfield, for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "In re MARRIAGE OF ROGER E. BARTLETT, Petitioner, and DOROTHY J. BARTLETT, Respondent (Michael D. Canulli, Contemnor-Appellant v. The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee).\nSecond District\nNos. 2\u201498\u20140277, 2\u201498\u20140278 cons.\nOpinion filed May 21, 1999.\nMichael D. Canulli, of Oak Brook, for appellant.\nJoseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Martin P. Moltz, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), and Robert E. Davison, of DePaepe & Davison, of Springfield, for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0028-01",
  "first_page_order": 46,
  "last_page_order": 50
}
