{ "id": 1208118, "name": "DARREL W. HILST et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Hilst v. General Motors Corp.", "decision_date": "1999-05-26", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201498\u20140087", "first_page": "792", "last_page": "798", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "305 Ill. App. 3d 792" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "390 N.E.2d 859", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "864" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 154", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2983143 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0154-01" ] }, { "cite": "558 N.E.2d 252", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "259" }, { "page": "259" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "200 Ill. App. 3d 526", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2461681 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "535" }, { "page": "535" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/200/0526-01" ] }, { "cite": "537 N.E.2d 938", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "940" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "181 Ill. App. 3d 1023", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499592 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1025" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/181/1023-01" ] }, { "cite": "865 F.2d 395", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10527113 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "415-16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/865/0395-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1397", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(k)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "902 F.2d 1116", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10538703 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1121" }, { "page": "1121" }, { "page": "1122" }, { "page": "1122" }, { "page": "1122" }, { "page": "1123" }, { "page": "1123" }, { "page": "1125" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/902/1116-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 F.3d 1236", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 3667600, 1397108 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1237" }, { "page": "1237" }, { "page": "1242" }, { "page": "1242" }, { "page": "1242" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us-app-dc/334/0273-01", "/f3d/166/1236-01" ] }, { "cite": "505 U.S. 504", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1481129 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "516" }, { "page": "423" }, { "page": "2617" }, { "page": "516" }, { "page": "423" }, { "page": "2617" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/505/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "662 N.E.2d 397", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "402" }, { "page": "402" }, { "page": "403" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 Ill. 2d 325", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 909164 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "333" }, { "page": "333" }, { "page": "335" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/169/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1392", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(d)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 C.F.R. \u00a7 571.208", "category": "laws:admin_compilation", "reporter": "C.F.R.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 U.S.C. \u00a7 30102", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "et seq." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1381", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "et seq." } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 723, "char_count": 13916, "ocr_confidence": 0.786, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.726121167848969e-08, "percentile": 0.3590657215922627 }, "sha256": "3d34799a2453dae1fbad2e300c5591e634ab0121640941f0e4d4ffe3334cfba8", "simhash": "1:ba665f48bd5de674", "word_count": 2246 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:21:49.676413+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "DARREL W. HILST et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KOEHLER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn this appeal, we are principally called upon to decide whether the Peoria County circuit court erred when it concluded that the plaintiffs\u2019 \u201cno airbag\u201d claim was preempted by federal law. Additionally, we are called upon to review several rulings made by the circuit court during the course of and after trial. Because we conclude that the circuit court did not err, we affirm.\nI. FACTS\nPlaintiffs Darrel and Judith Hilst were involved in an automobile collision with defendant Philip Bradford on February 28, 1994, when Bradford\u2019s vehicle crossed the road\u2019s center line and hit the plaintiffs\u2019 Pontiac Grand Am. At the time of the accident, all three persons were wearing their seatbelts. Darrel Hilst, the only person seriously injured, suffered a torn mesenteric artery that resulted in the removal of a large section of his colon. The plaintiffs\u2019 1989 Grand Am was equipped with a passive restraint system that was designed to automatically operate.\nDarrel Hilst filed suit against defendants Bradford and General Motors Corporation (GM) for his injuries alleging that Bradford negligently caused the collision and that GM manufactured a defective Grand Am that enhanced Darrel\u2019s injuries. Judith Hilst filed suit against Bradford for her injuries and against Bradford and GM for loss of consortium. Prior to trial, Judith Hilst settled her claim against Bradford. The plaintiffs alleged that GM: (1) failed to equip the Grand Am with a driver\u2019s side airbag; (2) equipped the Grand Am with a restraint system that did not properly operate to restrain Darrel Hilst; and (3) failed to equip the Grand Am with a steering wheel that adequately absorbed energy when struck by a driver during a frontal collision.\nFederal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 (Standard 208) is promulgated under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (Safety Act) (15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1381 et seq. (1988), recodified as 49 U.S.C. \u00a7 30102 et seq. (1994)). It provides automobile manufacturers with \u201cthe option [to] *** equip[] cars with either automatic seatbelts or airbags.\u201d 49 C.F.R. \u00a7 571.208, S4.1.3.3, S4.1.1.1 through 4.1.1.2. Based upon Standard 208, GM elected the seatbelt option for the 1989 Grand Am that was later purchased by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs claimed that although Standard 208 did not require airbags to be placed in the 1989 Grand Am, GM nevertheless should be liable under state law for the Grand Am\u2019s failure to be crashworthy without a driver\u2019s side airbag.\nThe Peoria County circuit court granted GM a partial summary judgment on the plaintiffs\u2019 \u201cno airbag\u201d claim concluding that it was preempted by Standard 208 and the following provision of the Safety Act:\n\u201cWhenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under this subchapter is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard.\u201d 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1392(d) (1988).\nThe circuit court also granted GM\u2019s motion to prevent the plaintiffs from introducing evidence of airbags as a feasible alternative design to the passive seatbelts that were installed in the plaintiffs\u2019 Grand Am.\nThe jury awarded a verdict in favor of Darrel Hilst in the amount of $226,000 against Bradford; however, the jury returned a verdict against the plaintiffs in favor of GM. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a posttrial motion as to Bradford and GM seeking a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial on all issues as to GM and a new trial on the issue of damages as to Bradford. The circuit court denied the plaintiffs\u2019 motion. The plaintiffs\u2019 claim against Bradford was subsequently settled and is not at issue before this court. The plaintiffs appeal the various rulings as they relate to GM.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Preemption\nAt the outset, we note that review of a summary judgment is de novo. Busch v. Graphic Color Corp., 169 Ill. 2d 325, 333, 662 N.E.2d 397, 402 (1996). When the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and exhibits on file viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party reveal that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment is appropriate. Busch, 169 Ill. 2d at 333, 662 N.E.2d at 402.\nIn this case, we must decide whether common law claims alleging that automobiles are defective because they are not equipped with airbags are preempted by the federal Safety Act and Standard 208. Preemption will occur if: (1) state law conflicts with federal law; or (2) the legislative field is occupied by federal law. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516, 120 L. Ed. 2d 407, 423, 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2617 (1992). When Congress enacts a provision that defines the federal law\u2019s preemptive reach, any matter beyond that reach is not preempted. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 423, 112 S. Ct. at 2617. There are two presumptions that courts must consider when invoking the doctrine of preemption. First, in areas where states have exercised their historic police powers, such as the health and safety of their citizens, courts must start with a presumption against preemption, absent a clear and manifest purpose of Congress. Second, in every preemption case, the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone. Geier v/American Honda Motor Co., 166 F.3d 1236, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1999).\nFederal court decisions interpreting a federal act are binding upon our Illinois courts. Busch, 169 Ill. 2d at 335, 662 N.E.2d at 403. We therefore look to Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir. 1990), and Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 166 F.3d 1236, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1999), for guidance in deciding the preemption issue presented here on appeal.\nIn Pokorny, the third circuit analyzed the Safety Act\u2019s preemption provision, savings clause, and Standard 208. In so doing, the court initially held that the common law action was not expressly preempted. Pokorny, 902 F.2d at 1121. Instead, after considering both the preemption provision and the savings clause, the court held \u201cthat Congress did not intend all common law actions for design defects *** to be expressly preempted by federal regulations like Standard 208.\u201d Pokorny, 902 F.2d at 1121. The third circuit went on to explain, however, that a \u201cfederal law may impliedly pre-empt state law to the extent that the state law conflicts with a federal regulatory scheme.\u201d Pokorny, 902 F.2d at 1122. The court limited implied preemption to those laws that create an actual conflict with a federal regulatory scheme. Pokorny, 902 F.2d at 1122.\nIn reviewing the legislative history of the Safety Act, the third circuit concluded that Congress\u2019 goal was to reduce traffic accidents and the fatalities that arise from such accidents. Pokorny, 902 F.2d at 1122. To achieve this goal, the federal government provided automobile manufacturers with the flexibility to choose among several options for passenger restraint systems according to Standard 208. Pokorny, 902 F.2d at 1123. Consequently, the court concluded that a common law claim asserting that an automobile is defectively designed when it lacks airbags presents an actual conflict with the Safety Act and Standard 208 because it frustrates Congress\u2019 method for implementing its goal. Pokorny, 902 F.2d at 1123. In following the third circuit, we also conclude that the plaintiffs\u2019 \u201cno airbag\u201d claim is impliedly preempted by the federal Safety Act and Standard 208 because it undermines Congress\u2019 intent.\nLikewise, in Geier, after she was involved in a car accident, the plaintiff filed suit against the manufacturer of her 1987 Honda Accord, alleging defective design for failing to install an airbag. The D.C. circuit, after declining to rule whether the claim was expressly preempted, held that it was impliedly preempted \u201cbecause we conclude that a verdict in her favor would stand as an obstacle to the federal government\u2019s chosen method of achieving the Act\u2019s safety objectives.\u201d Geier, 166 F.3d at 1242.\nThe plaintiffs further assert that the existence of the Safety Act\u2019s savings clause precludes a finding of preemption. The savings clause states that \u201cCompliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any person from liability under the common law.\u201d 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1397(k) (1988). However, this argument was rejected in Geier.\n\u201cThe tension between \u00a7\u00a7 1392(d) and 1397(k) prevents the identification of any \u2018express definition\u2019 of the reach of preemption in the Safety Act. ***\n*** [T]he instant case involves a federal safety standard that governs the use of airbags in 1987 model-year cars. Although the standard does not mandate or forbid the use of airbags, it presents them as one of several options from which manufacturers may choose. *** [The plaintiffs\u2019 savings clause] argument fails to surmount the obstacle that a favorable verdict would present to achieving congressional objectives in the chosen manner.\u201d Geier, 166 F.3d at 1242.\nThe court went on to note the inherent inconsistency in allowing a \u201cno airbag\u201d claim to go forward. Such a claim would mean that an automobile without an airbag was necessarily defectively designed. However, the Secretary of Transportation (through the power granted to him from Congress) rejected mandatory airbags in all cars in 1987, opting instead for a more flexible approach. Geier, 166 F.3d at 1242.\n\u201c[I]t is well-established that a savings clause like \u00a7 1397(k) does not \u2018save\u2019 common law actions that would subvert a federal statutory or regulatory scheme.\u201d Pokorny, 902 F.2d at 1125. See also Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 415-16 (1st Cir. 1988). Following our conclusion that the plaintiffs\u2019 cause of action would indeed subvert the statutory and regulatory scheme presently in place, and following the federal courts of appeals\u2019 decisions, the savings clause is of no avail. We therefore affirm the circuit court\u2019s decision granting summary judgment based upon preemption.\nB. Jury Instruction on Alternative Design\nWe must decide on review whether the circuit court abused its discretion in instructing the jury. Bargman v. Economics Laboratory, Inc., 181 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1025, 537 N.E.2d 938, 940 (1989). In the case at bar, the circuit court instructed the jury on alternative design, as follows:\n\u201cDefendant General Motors did not have a duty to manufacture the car with a different design if there were no feasible alternative designs, that is, designs that were economical, effective, practical, and possible given the state of the art at the time the car was manufactured. \u2019 \u2019\nThe plaintiffs argue that because this non-Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction (IPI) improperly suggested that the plaintiffs had the burden to prove a feasible alternative design, such suggestion is reversible error. The use of a non-IPI instruction is improper where the IPI instruction accurately states the law. Rios v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., 200 Ill. App. 3d 526, 535, 558 N.E.2d 252, 259 (1990). However, each party has the right to have the jury instructed on his theory of the case and the circuit court, in exercising its discretion, must instruct the jury on all issues which it finds have been raised by the evidence presented. Rios, 200 Ill. App. 3d at 535, 558 N.E.2d at 259.\nIn Kerns v. Engelke, 76 Ill. 2d 154, 390 N.E.2d 859 (1979), our supreme court was presented with a non-IPI jury instruction similar to the challenged instruction in this case. There, the circuit court instructed the jury as follows:\n\u201c \u2018There is no duty upon the manufacturer of the forage blower to manufacture the product with a different design, if the different design is not feasible. Feasibility includes not only elements of economy, effectiveness and practicality, but also technological possibilities under the state of the manufacturing art at the time the product was produced.\u2019 \u201d Kerns, 76 Ill. 2d at 164, 390 N.E.2d at 864.\nThe supreme court held that this instruction correctly stated the law. The Kerns jury instruction is nearly identical to the jury instruction at issue. We therefore conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it tendered this instruction.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nIn sum, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in granting the defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment when it concluded that the plaintiffs\u2019 \u201cno airbag\u201d claim was preempted by federal law: (1) a common law claim asserting that an automobile is defectively designed when it lacks airbags presents an actual conflict with the federal Safety Act and Standard 208 because it frustrates Congress\u2019 method for implementing its goal to reduce traffic accidents and fatalities; and (2) such a common law claim is impliedly preempted by the federal Safety Act and Standard 208 because it undermines Congress\u2019 intent.\nAffirmed.\nHOLDRIDGE, P.J., and SLATER, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KOEHLER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Gary L. Cline and Thomas Londrigan (argued), both of Londrigan, Potter & Randle, P.C., of Springfield, for appellants.", "R. Michael Henderson, of Quinn, Johnston, Henderson & Pretorius, Chartered, of Peoria, and Elaine S. Wright (argued) and Frank Nizio, both of Bowman & Brooke, LLP, of Detroit, Michigan, and Leslie Landau (argued), of McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Endorsen, of San Francisco, California, for appellee General Motors Corporation.", "Joseph G. Feehan and Brad A. Elward, both of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, of Peoria, for appellee Philip M. Bradford." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DARREL W. HILST et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201498\u20140087\nOpinion filed May 26, 1999.\nRehearing denied July 19, 1999.\nGary L. Cline and Thomas Londrigan (argued), both of Londrigan, Potter & Randle, P.C., of Springfield, for appellants.\nR. Michael Henderson, of Quinn, Johnston, Henderson & Pretorius, Chartered, of Peoria, and Elaine S. Wright (argued) and Frank Nizio, both of Bowman & Brooke, LLP, of Detroit, Michigan, and Leslie Landau (argued), of McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Endorsen, of San Francisco, California, for appellee General Motors Corporation.\nJoseph G. Feehan and Brad A. Elward, both of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, of Peoria, for appellee Philip M. Bradford." }, "file_name": "0792-01", "first_page_order": 810, "last_page_order": 816 }