{ "id": 1336114, "name": "In re MICHAEL D., Found to be a Person Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Michael D., Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Michael D.", "decision_date": "1999-06-21", "docket_number": "No. 1-98-1730", "first_page": "25", "last_page": "29", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "306 Ill. App. 3d 25" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "606 N.E.2d 1259", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "237 Ill. App. 3d 105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5163414 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/237/0105-01" ] }, { "cite": "702 N.E.2d 555", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209988 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "124 F.3d 899", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11907299 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unjust .restriction on impeachment of the State's expert psychiatrist warrants reversal" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/124/0899-01" ] }, { "cite": "631 N.E.2d 1371", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "court's decisions on cross-examination warrant reversal where there has been an abuse of that discretion resulting in manifest prejudice" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "260 Ill. App. 3d 895", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2863848 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "904", "parenthetical": "court's decisions on cross-examination warrant reversal where there has been an abuse of that discretion resulting in manifest prejudice" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/260/0895-01" ] }, { "cite": "510 N.E.2d 1066", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "expert may be cross-examined regarding the basis of his or her opinion which may include reports or medical tests performed by others" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "157 Ill. App. 3d 649", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3543765 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "671", "parenthetical": "expert may be cross-examined regarding the basis of his or her opinion which may include reports or medical tests performed by others" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/157/0649-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 N.E.2d 1322", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "adopting Federal Rules of Evidence 703 and 705" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 Ill. 2d 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3045513 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "adopting Federal Rules of Evidence 703 and 705" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/84/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 N.E.2d 74", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 Ill. 2d 185", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2800172 ], "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/24/0185-01" ] }, { "cite": "707 N.E.2d 125", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 Ill. App. 3d 807", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1352847 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/302/0807-01" ] }, { "cite": "703 N.E.2d 100", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "106-07", "parenthetical": "legislature presumed to know judicial construction of statute" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "184 Ill. 2d 185", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 926987 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "197-98", "parenthetical": "legislature presumed to know judicial construction of statute" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/184/0185-01" ] }, { "cite": "593 N.E.2d 1137", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "229 Ill. App. 3d 737", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5215452 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/229/0737-01" ] }, { "cite": "607 N.E.2d 681", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "239 Ill. App. 3d 880", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5147709 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/239/0880-01" ] }, { "cite": "686 N.E.2d 641", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "petition error" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 Ill. App. 3d 1069", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1725054 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "petition error" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/292/1069-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 N.E.2d 791", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "guardian of minor delinquent subject to exclusion though considered a party to the adjudicatory hearing under the Juvenile Court Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 37, par. 702 - 2)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "35 Ill. App. 3d 829", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5305238 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "guardian of minor delinquent subject to exclusion though considered a party to the adjudicatory hearing under the Juvenile Court Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 37, par. 702 - 2)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/35/0829-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 544, "char_count": 9507, "ocr_confidence": 0.755, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.566940261245358e-08, "percentile": 0.48839700692974763 }, "sha256": "2fe03b89407583b06f998032bce8ca62e60f82c6c96c2cd5e98d8b779e45c794", "simhash": "1:7842ac7335726d36", "word_count": 1469 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:16:55.452164+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "GALLAGHER and O\u2019MARA FROSSARD, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "In re MICHAEL D., Found to be a Person Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Michael D., Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE O\u2019BRIEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial on a petition for the involuntary commitment of respondent, Michael D., for mental health treatment, the circuit court ordered respondent committed and hospitalized at Chicago-Read Mental Health Center (Chicago-Read) for up to 180 days. Respondent appeals. We reverse.\nRespondent is a 74-year-old widower suffering from bipolar disorder whose relationship with his neighbors, Mr. and Mrs. Strom, had resulted in repeated police intervention. Respondent allegedly threatened the Stroms and swung an axe at Mrs. Strom. As a result, Officer Poland of the Chicago police department took respondent to a hospital for psychiatric evaluation. Respondent admitted himself to Chicago-Read for treatment, but requested discharge the following day. The Chicago-Read staff refused to discharge respondent and filed a petition for involuntary admission under the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Mental Health Code) (405 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 100 et seq. (West 1996)).\nAt the hearing on the petition but before testimony began, respondent\u2019s counsel requested that the hearing be closed to the public pursuant to section 3 \u2014 800 of the Mental Health Code. The court granted the motion but allowed Mrs. Strom and Officer Poland to remain in the courtroom. Respondent then requested that the court exclude witnesses from the courtroom. The court responded, \u201cI think we could proceed as we are. No more exclusions.\u201d\nAgain, after Mrs. Strom and Officer Poland had testified, respondent\u2019s counsel requested that witnesses be excluded from the remainder of the hearing because it had been closed and the testimony of respondent\u2019s psychiatrist would be confidential. The court denied the request and permitted Mrs. Strom and Officer Poland to remain in the courtroom while respondent\u2019s psychiatrist testified as to respondent\u2019s mental condition. At the close of the hearing, the court ordered respondent hospitalized at Chicago-Read. Respondent appeals.\nOn appeal, respondent first argues the commitment order must be reversed because the court violated his statutory right to a closed hearing. We agree.\nSection 3 \u2014 800(c) of the Mental Health Code requires that the court close a commitment hearing to the press and public upon request of the respondent unless someone objects. 405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 800(c) (West Supp. 1997). Counsel for respondent requested the courtroom be closed pursuant to section 3 \u2014 800(c) and no one objected. For purposes of this statute, Mrs. Strom and Officer Poland were members of the public and should have been excluded. In re Yates, 35 Ill. App. 3d 829, 342 N.E.2d 791 (1976) (guardian of minor delinquent subject to exclusion though considered a party to the adjudicatory hearing under the Juvenile Court Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 37, par. 702 \u2014 2)). Accordingly, the court erred in allowing Mrs. Strom and Officer Poland to remain in the courtroom once the motion had been granted.\nThe State responds that even if the court violated section 3 \u2014 800, the error was harmless and outright reversal of the commitment order is unwarranted. The State points out that section 3 \u2014 800 does not expressly provide for automatic reversal and urges this court to employ a \u201ctotality of the circumstances\u201d analysis to determine whether the commitment order should stand. Under that analysis, the State contends reversal of the commitment order is unwarranted because there was overwhelming evidence that respondent was subject to involuntary admission and the presence of witnesses in the courtroom during testimony about respondent\u2019s medical history did not affect the outcome. We disagree.\nBecause the procedural rules of the Mental Health Code are primarily intended to protect a respondent\u2019s fundamental liberty interest, we have repeatedly held that failure to comply with those rules requires reversal of an involuntary commitment order. In re Moore, 292 Ill. App. 3d 1069, 686 N.E.2d 641 (1997) (petition error); In re Adams, 239 Ill. App. 3d 880, 607 N.E.2d 681 (1993) (same); In re Wiessing, 229 Ill. App. 3d 737, 593 N.E.2d 1137 (1992) (same). Admittedly, the procedural rule at issue here is intended to protect the respondent\u2019s privacy interest in his or her medical records more than his or her liberty interest. Nevertheless, since the legislature is presumed to know that the remedy for violating the procedural rules of the Mental Health Code is reversal of an involuntary commitment order (Cripe v. Leiter, 184 Ill. 2d 185, 197-98, 703 N.E.2d 100, 106-07 (1998) (legislature presumed to know judicial construction of statute); In re Marriage of Burgess, 302 Ill. App. 3d 807, 707 N.E.2d 125 (1998) (same)), if it had desired a different remedy for the particular procedural rule at issue here, it could have provided for it in the statute. It did not. Accordingly, the error of the court was not harmless and reversal is warranted.\nNext, respondent urges reversal because the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to exclude witnesses. We agree. Ordinarily, the exclusion of witnesses is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed unless clear abuse or prejudice to the respondent is demonstrated. People v. Chennault, 24 Ill. 2d 185, 181 N.E.2d 74 (1962). Here, however, the language of section 3 \u2014 800(c) is mandatory and removes the discretion of the trial court in excluding witnesses.\nThe State counters that no prejudice resulted because the purpose of exclusion \u2014 to prevent one witness from affecting the testimony of another witness and depriving respondent of an opportunity to expose false testimony \u2014 did not apply. The court believed no prejudice would result from the presence of witnesses in the courtroom because they \u201chad a great deal of exposure to [Michael D.] already\u201d and \u201c[knew] the state of his mentality to some degree.\u201d A discussion of resultant prejudice is appropriate in an abuse of discretion analysis. Here, section 3 \u2014 800(c) of the Mental Health Code is mandatory and dispositive with no requirement of resultant prejudice.\nNext, respondent contends the commitment order must be reversed because the trial court prohibited him from cross-examining the State\u2019s expert with respondent\u2019s daily patient care assessments from his Chicago-Read chart. We agree.\nThe State called respondent\u2019s psychiatrist, Dr. Palacio, as an expert witness as to respondent\u2019s mental health. Dr. Palacio testified that she had relied on respondent\u2019s current Chicago-Read chart in forming her opinion. Documents relied upon by a witness in preparing his or her testimony are appropriate materials for cross-examination. Wilson v. Clark, 84 Ill. 2d 186, 417 N.E.2d 1322 (1981) (adopting Federal Rules of Evidence 703 and 705); Piano v. Davison, 157 Ill. App. 3d 649, 671, 510 N.E.2d 1066 (1987) (expert may be cross-examined regarding the basis of his or her opinion which may include reports or medical tests performed by others).\nHere, the court\u2019s refusal to permit respondent\u2019s counsel to use the Chicago-Read chart for cross-examination deprived respondent of the opportunity to discredit Dr. Palacio\u2019s opinion as being without adequate basis. This deprivation resulted in manifest prejudice to respondent\u2019s case. Accordingly, we reverse the court\u2019s commitment order. People v. Jefferson, 260 Ill. App. 3d 895, 904, 631 N.E.2d 1371 (1994) (court\u2019s decisions on cross-examination warrant reversal where there has been an abuse of that discretion resulting in manifest prejudice); Lindh v. Murphy, 124 F.3d 899 (7th Cir. 1997) (unjust .restriction on impeachment of the State\u2019s expert psychiatrist warrants reversal). If the State believes commitment is still necessary, it must initiate new proceedings. In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 702 N.E.2d 555 (1998).\nFinally, respondent contends the court committed reversible error in refusing his questions of a social worker about less restrictive alternative settings and in refusing him his constitutional and statutory right to treatment in the least restrictive alternative setting. Because this issue may arise in a new proceeding, we address it.\nThe Mental Health Code requires trial courts to consider alternative and less restrictive mental health facilities as alternatives to inpatient psychiatric hospitalization, 405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 811 (West 1996). Here, the court prevented respondent\u2019s counsel from introducing evidence regarding less restrictive alternative settings and denied respondent\u2019s counsel the opportunity to make an offer of proof. This evidence was relevant, probative and should have been allowed. Without it, the trial court was unable to fulfill its statutory responsibility (405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 811 (West 1996); In re Long, 237 Ill. App. 3d 105, 606 N.E.2d 1259 (1992)) of determining whether respondent was denied his constitutional and statutory right to treatment in the least restrictive alternative setting.\nReversed.\nGALLAGHER and O\u2019MARA FROSSARD, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE O\u2019BRIEN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Laurel Whitehouse Spahn, of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Janet Powers Doyle, and Kimberly J. Anderson, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re MICHAEL D., Found to be a Person Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Michael D., Respondent-Appellant).\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1\u201498\u20141730\nOpinion filed June 21, 1999.\nLaurel Whitehouse Spahn, of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Janet Powers Doyle, and Kimberly J. Anderson, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0025-01", "first_page_order": 43, "last_page_order": 47 }