{ "id": 1336025, "name": "STEVE WELSH et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Welsh v. Commonwealth Edison Co.", "decision_date": "1999-06-17", "docket_number": "No. 1-98-2212", "first_page": "148", "last_page": "157", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "306 Ill. App. 3d 148" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "414 N.E.2d 1327", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 Ill. App. 3d 157", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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"/ill-2d/108/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "519 N.E.2d 909", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 Ill. 2d 526", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3192772 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "529" }, { "page": "530-31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/119/0526-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 N.E.2d 353", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ill. 2d 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2994390 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/74/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "421 N.E.2d 876", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 Ill. 2d 124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5469094 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128-30" }, { "page": "133" }, { "page": "130" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/85/0124-01" ] }, { "cite": "639 N.E.2d 1282", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 Ill. 2d 469", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 781334 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/159/0469-01" ] }, { "cite": "566 N.E.2d 1365", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 Ill. 2d 42", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3236685 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "47" }, { "page": "47" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/142/0042-01" ] }, { "cite": "688 N.E.2d 1172", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 338", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801348 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "344" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0338-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 N.E.2d 605", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 Ill. 2d 398", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5406059 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "406" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/57/0398-01" ] }, { "cite": "565 N.E.2d 654", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 Ill. 2d 501", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5573900 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/139/0501-01" ] }, { "cite": "557 N.E.2d 328", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, 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App. 3d 427", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2466122 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "432" }, { "page": "430, 433" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/199/0427-01" ] }, { "cite": "641 N.E.2d 498", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "557" }, { "page": "508" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "161 Ill. 2d 374", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 783173 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392" }, { "page": "396" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/161/0374-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 Ill. 2d 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5557690 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86" }, { "page": "86" }, { "page": "86" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/126/0078-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 995, "char_count": 21438, "ocr_confidence": 0.748, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.4027522062892e-07, "percentile": 0.7990873213071495 }, "sha256": "7be6c1ab051d4799fb3e02d423ccfc389e6f84d32eb63c1047effd19492f4f31", "simhash": "1:9ed0f4df0ff740a4", "word_count": 3371 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:16:55.452164+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WOLFSON, J., concurs." ], "parties": [ "STEVE WELSH et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HOFFMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe plaintiffs, Steve Welsh, Gerald Evans, Lee Danson, Michael Johnson, Mike Yusten, and Kelly Fondrliak, filed the instant action seeking recovery against their employer, Commonwealth Edison Company, on theories of \u201cRetaliatory Demotion,\u201d \u201cRetaliatory Constructive Discharge,\u201d and \u201cIntentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.\u201d Commonwealth Edison moved to dismiss the action pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615 (West 1996)), alleging that the plaintiffs\u2019 complaint failed to state causes of action upon which relief could be granted. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the action. The plaintiffs have appealed, and for the reasons that follow, we affirm.\nThe plaintiffs filed an 18-count complaint against Commonwealth Edison alleging that they were demoted after having made complaints concerning safety issues and statutory violations at Commonwealth Edison\u2019s nuclear power station in Zion, Illinois. In their complaint, the plaintiffs allege that they each complained to Commonwealth Edison\u2019s management and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission concerning conditions at the Zion facility and that five of them testified before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in support of their complaints. According to the complaint, each of the plaintiffs was thereafter transferred to another facility and demoted, and each suffered a loss of pay and \u201ca significant deterioration in the terms, conditions, privileges and environment of\u201d his or her employment. Specifically, the complaint alleges that three of the plaintiffs were demoted from the position of nuclear station operator to underground helper, one was demoted from equipment operator to coal handler, another was demoted from equipment attendant to underground helper, and the sixth was demoted from nuclear fuel handler to coal handler. Those demoted to underground handler were assigned \u201cdemeaning\u201d and \u201chumiliating\u201d tasks such as manually cleaning manholes \u201cinfested with bacteria, human waste, and other disgusting matter\u201d and denied permission to use equipment specifically designed for such purposes. Those assigned to duties as a coal handler allege that they were assigned unspecified \u201cdemeaning\u201d and \u201chumiliating\u201d tasks. The plaintiffs charge that they were reassigned and demoted in retaliation for having complained about conditions and procedures at the Zion facility. The complaint filed in this case sets forth three counts in favor of each plaintiff; one for \u201cRetaliatory Demotion,\u201d one for \u201cRetaliatory Constructive Discharge,\u201d and one for \u201cIntentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.\u201d\nCommonwealth Edison filed a section 2 \u2014 615 motion to dismiss all counts of the plaintiffs\u2019 complaint. In its motion, Commonwealth Edison argued, inter alia, that Illinois does not recognize causes of action for retaliatory demotion or constructive retaliatory discharge. It further argued that, as to the claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiffs had failed to plead any facts in support of the conclusion that its actions were \u201cextreme and outrageous\u201d or that its alleged conduct caused them to suffer \u201csevere emotional distress.\u201d The trial court granted the motion, thereby dismissing all of the plaintiffs\u2019 claims, and this appeal followed.\nAs the complaint in issue was dismissed in response to a section 2 \u2014 615 motion, the only question before this court is whether the dismissed counts state causes of action. Burdinie v. Village of Glendale Heights, 139 Ill. 2d 501, 505, 565 N.E.2d 654 (1990); Janes v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass\u2019n, 57 Ill. 2d 398, 406, 312 N.E.2d 605 (1974). The issue is one of law, and our review is de novo. Vernon v. Schuster, 179 Ill. 2d 338, 344, 688 N.E.2d 1172 (1997).\nIn reviewing a dismissal under section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code, we must take all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences from those facts that are favorable to the pleader. Ziemba v. Mierzwa, 142 Ill. 2d 42, 47, 566 N.E.2d 1365 (1991). However, we will not take conclusions of law or fact contained within the challenged pleading as true unless they are supported by specific factual allegations. Ziemba, 142 Ill. 2d at 47. A cause of action should not be dismissed on the pleadings unless it is apparent that no set of facts can be proven which would entitle the plaintiff to recover. Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469, 488, 639 N.E.2d 1282 (1994).\nAs a general rule, Illinois follows, the common law doctrine that at-will employment is terminable at any time for any or no cause. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 128-30, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981). In 1978, our supreme court recognized a cause of action for retaliatory discharge and thereby created a limited exception to an employer\u2019s ability to freely discharge an at-will employee. See Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978). In order to state a valid claim for retaliatory discharge, a plaintiff must allege that he or she was discharged from employment in retaliation for his or her activities and that the discharge violates a clear mandate of public policy. Hinthorn v. Roland\u2019s of Bloomington, Inc., 119 Ill. 2d 526, 529, 519 N.E.2d 909 (1988).\nAs the plaintiffs correctly argue, the protection of public policy is the foundation of a retaliatory discharge claim. Palmateer, 85 Ill. 2d at 133. Although not subject to precise definition, \u201cpublic policy concerns what is right and just and what affects the citizens of the State collectively.\u201d Palmateer, 85 Ill. 2d at 130. Our supreme court has already held that the \u201cprotection of the lives and property of citizens from the hazards of radioactive material is as important and fundamental as protecting them from crimes of violence, and *** Congress has effectively declared a clearly mandated public policy to that effect.\u201d Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 108 Ill. 2d 502, 511, 485 N.E.2d 372 (1985).\nThe plaintiffs\u2019 complaint alleges that they were transferred and demoted in retaliation for having registered complaints concerning issues of safety at the Zion facility and Commonwealth Edison\u2019s possible violations of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2011 et seq. (1994)) and regulations issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Consequently, we have little difficulty in finding that, if these allegations are true, Commonwealth Edison\u2019s retaliation against the plaintiffs evinces behavior which is inconsistent with the state\u2019s public policy. Nevertheless, the question remains as to whether, in the absence of an actual discharge, the plaintiffs have stated cognizable causes of action.\nThe plaintiffs candidly concede that our supreme court refused to recognize the tort of retaliatory demotion in Zimmerman v. Buckheit of Sparta, Inc., 164 Ill. 2d 29, 645 N.E.2d 877 (1994), but argue that Zimmerman, a plurality opinion, is readily distinguishable from the facts present in this case. They also point out that four of the justices participating in the Zimmerman decision found the recognition of a cause of action for retaliatory demotion to be the logical extension of the tort of retaliatory discharge. Zimmerman, 164 Ill. 2d at 46 (Bilandic, C.J., concurring, joined by Heiple, J.); 164 Ill. 2d at. 52 (Harrison, J., dissenting, joined by Nickels, J.).\nIn Zimmerman, the plurality noted that \u201cthe element of discharge in violation of a clear public policy is essential to the tort created *** in Kelsay\u201d and declined the \u201cplaintiffs request to extrapolate from the rationale of Kelsay a cause of action predicated on retaliatory demotion.\u201d Zimmerman, 164 Ill. 2d at 38, 39. In a separate concurring opinion, two additional justices also declined to recognize a cause of action for retaliatory demotion, not because they believed that such an action would be inconsistent with the rationale adopted in Kelsay, but because they were of a belief that the recognition of a cause of action for retaliatory discharge was in itself an \u201cunwarranted intrusion into the legislative arena\u201d. Zimmerman, 164 Ill. 2d at 46 (Bilandic, C.J., concurring, joined by Heiple, J.).\nThe logic of the proposition that the recognition of a cause of action for retaliatory demotion is the necessary extension of the tort of retaliatory discharge is difficult to deny. As the concurrence in Zimmerman observes:\n\u201c[I]f we do not have a cause of action for retaliatory demotion, we, in effect, will not have a cause of action for retaliatory discharge. We have invited those who wish to discharge in retaliation to simply demote in retaliation, and thereby escape the effect of the law.\u201d Zimmerman, 164 Ill. 2d at 46 (Bilandic, C.J., concurring, joined by Heiple, J.).\nThe fact remains, however, that five justices of our supreme court in Zimmerman refused to recognize a cause of action for retaliatory demotion. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs urge us to reverse the dismissal of their retaliatory demotion claims, asserting that \u201cZimmerman was wrongly decided.\u201d As we lack the authority to overrule or modify the supreme court\u2019s decisions (Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority, 98 Ill. 2d 546, 551, 457 N.E.2d 1 (1983)), we must decline. The trial court\u2019s dismissal of the plaintiffs\u2019 retaliatory demotion claims is, therefore, affirmed.\nNext, we address the dismissal of the plaintiffs\u2019 claims for \u201cRetaliatory Constructive Discharge.\u201d We begin with the observation that the complaint in this case fails to allege that Commonwealth Edison terminated the employment of any of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs seem to premise these counts on the theory that their demotion and placement in new jobs at different locations with different duties, obligations, and benefits constitutes a discharge. We disagree.\nDischarge in an employment context is commonly understood to mean the release, dismissal, or termination of an employee. Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 644 (1993); Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 463 (6th ed. 1990). The plaintiffs\u2019 constructive retaliatory discharge claims are nothing more than an attempt to recast their demotion and reassignment as a discharge. Simply put, the plaintiffs have not alleged that their employment with Commonwealth Edison was terminated and, as such, they have failed to allege that they were discharged, either actually or constructively.\nAside from our semantic analysis, there is ample decisional authority supporting the dismissal of the plaintiffs\u2019 constructive retaliatory discharge claims. To date, our supreme court has not expanded the tort of retaliatory discharge to encompass any behavior other than actual termination of employment. See Hartlein v. Illinois Power Co., 151 Ill. 2d 142, 163, 601 N.E.2d 720 (1992); Hinthorn, 119 Ill. 2d at 530-31. This court has rejected claims based on an employer\u2019s retaliatory actions short of actual discharge. Melton v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 220 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1056-57, 581 N.E.2d 423 (1991). Specifically, we have found that constructive discharge is not an actionable concept. Grey v. First National Bank, 169 Ill. App. 3d 936, 940-43, 523 N.E.2d 1138 (1988), cited approvingly in Hartlein, 151 Ill. 2d at 163; Scheller v. Health Care Service Corp., 138 Ill. App. 3d 219, 223-25, 485 N.E.2d 26 (1985). In light of our supreme court\u2019s admonition that it \u201cdoes not \u2018strongly support\u2019 the expansion of the tort [of retaliatory discharge]\u201d (Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co., 106 Ill. 2d 520, 525, 478 N.E.2d 1354 (1985)), we find no compelling reason to deviate from our holdings in Grey and Scheller. Consequently, we affirm the dismissal of the plaintiffs\u2019 constructive retaliatory discharge claims.\nThe third category of claims asserted by the plaintiffs and dismissed by the trial court were those for intentional infliction of emotional distress. To state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the defendant\u2019s conduct was extreme and outrageous; (2) the defendant either intended to inflict severe emotional distress or knew that there was a high probability that its conduct would do so; and (3) the defendant\u2019s conduct actually caused severe emotional distress. McGrath v. Fahey, 126 Ill. 2d 78, 86, 533 N.E.2d. 806 (1988). In its motion to dismiss, Commonwealth Edison asserted that the facts alleged in the plaintiffs\u2019 complaint are insufficient to satisfy the first and third elements of the tort.\n\u201cWhether conduct is extreme and outrageous is judged on an objective standard.\u201d Doe v. Calumet City, 161 Ill. 2d 374, 392, 641 N.E.2d 498 (1994). Liability does not, however, extend to \u201cmere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions or trivialities.\u201d Public Finance Corp. v. Davis, 66 Ill. 2d 85, 89-90, 360 N.E.2d 765 (1976). Liability only attaches in circumstances where the defendant\u2019s conduct is \u201c \u2018so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency ***.\u2019 \u201d Public Finance Corp., 66 Ill. 2d at 90, quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, \u00a7 46, Comment d (1965). In circumstances involving the abuse of a position of power, the extreme and outrageous nature of conduct may arise not so much from what is done as from the defendant\u2019s actual or apparent ability to damage the plaintiffs interests by his exercise of power or authority. Doe, 161 Ill. 2d at 392-95; Milton v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 101 Ill. App. 3d 75, 79, 427 N.E.2d 829 (1981).\nAccording to the plaintiffs\u2019 complaint, they were demoted, transferred, forced to perform \u201cdemeaning\u201d and \u201chumiliating\u201d tasks, harassed, intimidated, and threatened with termination, all in retaliation for having voiced safety concerns or in an effort to deter them from making complaints to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. If the plaintiffs\u2019 allegations are true, Commonwealth Edison\u2019s retaliatory conduct may well have been in violation of federal statute (see 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 5851 (1994)) and could easily be found to be an abuse of power. However, in the absence of conduct calculated to coerce an employee to do something illegal, courts have generally declined to find an employer\u2019s retaliatory conduct sufficiently extreme and outrageous as to give rise to an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. This reluctance seems to be grounded in a fear that, if the anxiety and stress resulting from discipline, job transfers, or even terminations could form the basis of an action for emotional distress, virtually every employee would have a cause of action. See Miller v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 181 Ill. App. 3d 954, 957-58, 537 N.E.2d 887 (1989); Harris v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass\u2019n, 129 Ill. App. 3d 978, 981, 473 N.E.2d 457, 459 (1984).\nAlthough the retaliation and indignities to which the plaintiffs allege they were subjected are wholly lacking in social utility, we are unable to conclude that Commonwealth Edison\u2019s alleged conduct was of such an outrageous character that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. Even assuming for the sake of further analysis that Commonwealth Edison\u2019s conduct could be termed outrageous, we would still affirm the dismissal of the plaintiffs\u2019 claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress.\nInfliction of emotional distress alone is not sufficient to give rise to a cause of action. As our supreme court held in Public Finance Corp., 66 Ill. 2d at 90:\n\u201cThe emotional distress must be severe. Although fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, worry, etc. may fall within the ambit of the term \u2018emotional distress,\u2019 these mental conditions alone are not actionable. \u2018The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it. The intensity and the duration of the distress are factors to be considered in determining its severity.\u2019 Comment j. See also Prosser, Law of Torts sec. 12, at 54 (4th ed. 1971).\u201d (Emphasis in original.)\nIt is the degree of emotional distress actually suffered by a plaintiff which separates the actionable from the nonactionable.\nIllinois is a fact-pleading jurisdiction. Although \u201c[n]o pleading is bad in substance which contains such information as reasonably informs the opposite party of the nature of the claim *** which he or she is called upon to meet\u201d (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 612(b) (West 1996)), a plaintiff must still allege facts essential to the cause of action under which recovery is sought. A pleading that merely paraphrases the elements of a cause of action in conclusory terms is not sufficient. Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 88 Ill. 2d 407, 423-27, 430 N.E.2d 976 (1981).\nIn this case, the plaintiffs generally allege that they suffered \u201canxiety, humiliation,\u201d and \u201cextreme and severe emotional distress,\u201d but the complaint contains no factual allegations from which the level of severity of the emotional distress could be inferred. They do not allege that they were hospitalized or were required to seek medical care (see Milton, 101 Ill. App. 3d at 78), nor do they allege that any of them was afflicted with a physical or mental condition rendering him or her particularly vulnerable to emotional distress (see Kolegas v. Heftel Broadcasting Corp., 154 Ill. 2d 1, 21-23, 607 N.E.2d 201 (1992); McGrath, 126 Ill. 2d at 89-93).\nTo state an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the complaint must be \u201cspecific, and detailed beyond what is normally considered permissible in pleading a tort action.\u201d McCaskill v. Barr, 92 Ill. App. 3d 157, 158, 414 N.E.2d 1327 (1980). A plaintiff must allege some facts which, if true, would support the conclusion that the emotional distress actually suffered as a proximate result of the defendant\u2019s conduct was severe. Merely characterizing emotional distress as severe is not sufficient.\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the dismissal of the plaintiffs\u2019 complaint.\nAffirmed.\nWOLFSON, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HOFFMAN" }, { "text": "JUSTICE HALL,\nspecially concurring:\nI agree with the majority that the dismissal of the plaintiffs\u2019 complaint must be affirmed for the reasons stated except on the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.\nCommonwealth Edison\u2019s alleged conduct if taken as true was sufficiently extreme and outrageous to meet the first element of an intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action. McGrath v. Fahey, 126 Ill. 2d at 86. The complaint alleges four plaintiffs were demoted from the positions of nuclear station operators and equipment attendant to the positions of underground helpers and relegated to cleaning manholes containing human waste and bacteria and \u201cother disgusting matter\u201d without the proper equipment. Two other plaintiffs were allegedly demoted from equipment operator and nuclear fuel handler to coal handlers, allegedly doing \u201chumiliating\u201d and \u201cdemeaning\u201d tasks. The facts allege that the demotions were in retaliation for the plaintiffs\u2019 complaints to management and their complaints and testimony before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Plaintiffs also allege they lost pay and were transferred to other facilities.\nConduct is considered outrageous and extreme in nature if a \u201crecitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, \u2018Outrageous!\u2019 \u201d Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 46, Comment d, at 73 (1965). It is cognizable that if an average member of plaintiffs\u2019 and defendant\u2019s community were told that an employee had been reduced from a position of nuclear operator to shoveling human feces in retaliation for taking steps to defend the public safety as plaintiffs allege, a reasonable response could well be the word \u201cOutrageous!\u201d Doe v. Calumet City, 161 Ill. 2d at 392, 641 N.E.2d at 557, citing Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 46, Comment d, at 73 (1965).\nEven if the defendant\u2019s alleged conduct had not been extreme and outrageous per se, this court has held the fact that a defendant\u2019s conduct was retaliatory and punitive in nature makes that defendant\u2019s conduct extreme and outrageous and satisfies the first element of the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Johnson v. Federal Reserve Bank, 199 Ill. App. 3d 427, 432, 557 N.E.2d 328 (1990).\nThe second element required to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is that the defendant either intended to inflict severe emotional distress or knew that there was a high probability that its conduct would do so. The facts as alleged by plaintiff were sufficient to satisfy this element. McGrath, 126 Ill. 2d at 86.\nHowever, the plaintiffs fail to meet the third element of this tort, having failed to specifically and factually allege that the defendant\u2019s conduct actually caused severe emotional distress. For these reasons, I specially concur with the majority. See McGrath, 126 Ill. 2d at 86; Doe, 161 Ill. 2d at 396, 641 N.E.2d at 508; Johnson, 199 Ill. App. 3d at 430, 433.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "JUSTICE HALL," } ], "attorneys": [ "Hunt & Associates, of Chicago (Keith L. Hunt and Katherine A. Rodosky, of counsel), for appellants.", "Sidley & Austin (Brian J. Gold, Scott E. Gross, and Melissa E. Lamfalusi, of counsel), and Glenn D. Newman, of Commonwealth Edison Company, both of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STEVE WELSH et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1\u201498\u20142212\nOpinion filed June 17, 1999.\nHunt & Associates, of Chicago (Keith L. Hunt and Katherine A. Rodosky, of counsel), for appellants.\nSidley & Austin (Brian J. Gold, Scott E. Gross, and Melissa E. Lamfalusi, of counsel), and Glenn D. Newman, of Commonwealth Edison Company, both of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0148-01", "first_page_order": 166, "last_page_order": 175 }