{ "id": 1336046, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SARAH K. NESTROCK, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Nestrock", "decision_date": "1999-07-15", "docket_number": "No. 2-98-0341", "first_page": "216", "last_page": "225", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "306 Ill. App. 3d 216" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "152 Ill. 2d 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5603261 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "258" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/152/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 Ill. App. 3d 105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 872475 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/265/0105-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 Ill. App. 3d 393", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5284255 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "403" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/217/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 Ill. 2d 258", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3236913 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/142/0258-01" ] }, { "cite": "282 Ill. App. 3d 785", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 159473 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "789" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/282/0785-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 289", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2982988 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309-10" }, { "page": "310" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0289-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 Ill. App. 3d 223", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 351010 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/289/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 Ill. App. 3d 732", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 221518 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "736-37", "parenthetical": "holding that the amended statute \"prohibits the recording of any conversation without the consent of all parties regardless of any party's expectation of privacy\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/299/0732-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 Ill. App. 3d 7", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1260401 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/284/0007-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 U.S. 427", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11718713 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/373/0427-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 Ill. 2d 507", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477883 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/163/0507-01" ] }, { "cite": "115 Ill. 2d 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3179289 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54" }, { "page": "56" }, { "page": "56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/115/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821403 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "282" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "257 Ill. App. 3d 1018", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2891586 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1021-22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/257/1018-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 Ill. App. 3d 928", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2605250 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "935-36" }, { "page": "935-36" }, { "page": "935-36" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/213/0928-01" ] }, { "cite": "72 Ill. 2d 36", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5443247 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "44" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/72/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550081 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186-87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0176-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 903, "char_count": 20866, "ocr_confidence": 0.724, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.947487136851577e-08, "percentile": 0.3104111475225003 }, "sha256": "e0d56a287d799df2883e5455cf004af07047cd0c6ba086a38b2ed5bbcf02de58", "simhash": "1:ba7ebe7427019441", "word_count": 3395 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:16:55.452164+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "INGLIS and HUTCHINSON, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SARAH K. NESTROCK, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE BOWMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Sarah K. Nestrock, was convicted of reckless homicide (720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 3(a) (West 1996)) and subsequently sentenced to concurrent sentences of two years\u2019 imprisonment. Nestrock appeals her conviction, contending that she was denied a fair trial because (1) the State made several references to defendant\u2019s membership in a social group for gay students, intending to prejudice her in the eyes of the jury; (2) the trial court allowed the State\u2019s accident reconstruction expert to offer the opinion that defendant was conscious while driving her vehicle; (3) the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress a tape-recorded conversation between defendant and one of her friends without conducting an evidentiary hearing; (4) the trial court did not allow defendant to offer as substantive evidence a statement that she made to an investigating police officer shortly after the accident; and (5) defendant did not receive the effective assistance of counsel. We reverse and remand.\nFollowing a car accident that caused the deaths of Stephen Cornelius and his eight-year-old son, Zachery, defendant was charged with reckless homicide and aggravated driving while under the influence of drugs (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(d)(1)(C) (West 1996)). Before trial, the State nol-prossed the charges that were based on driving under the influence of drugs.\nThe evidence at trial revealed that the accident in question took place on September 25, 1996, at the intersection of 79th Street and Clarendon Hills Road in Willowbrook. Defendant, who was driving a 1995 Ford Escort station wagon, was traveling south on Clarendon Hills Road when her car left the road and entered the ditch on the west side of the road. Defendant\u2019s car traveled through the ditch for approximately 300 feet, exited the ditch, traveled another 70 feet, and then ran into the driver\u2019s side of the Cornelius vehicle, a 1992 Pontiac Bonneville, which was stopped on 79th Street at a stop sign. Stephen Cornelius was driving the Bonneville, and his son, Zachery, was seated directly behind him. Barbara Hall, Stephen\u2019s wife and Zachery\u2019s mother, was also in the car at the time of the collision, as was the couple\u2019s 10-year-old daughter, Jane, who was seriously injured. The State\u2019s accident reconstruction expert opined that defendant\u2019s car was traveling 42 miles per hour at the time of impact. Defendant\u2019s accident reconstruction expert opined that her speed at impact was 31 miles per hour.\nAt trial, the State presented the theory that defendant purposely drove her car into and through the ditch in an attempt to either kill herself or feign suicide to attract the attention of her family and friends. Defendant testified that she was not trying to commit suicide. She stated that she remembered turning on her right turn signal and the next thing she remembered was being stopped next to a telephone pole.\nIn addition to other evidence that defendant was contemplating suicide, the State presented a tape-recorded conversation between defendant and Nagayo \u201cNick\u201d Heath, a close friend of defendant\u2019s at the time of the accident. The recorded conversation took place on the evening of September 26, 1996, the day after the accident.\nHeath testified that on the morning of September 26, 1996, he received a phone call from defendant, who said that she had hit a tree and was in the hospital. Later that day, defendant called Heath and another friend, Jason Taylor, at the home of Beth Johnson. Heath talked to defendant, who told him that she had killed two people. Heath testified that defendant said that \u201c[s]ubliminally [she] pulled a Justin.\u201d This was a reference to another friend of defendant\u2019s, Justin Krause. Heath testified that on September 23, 1996, defendant told him that Krause had tried to kill himself by driving his car into a tree.\nFrom Beth Johnson\u2019s house, Heath then went to work, where he received a message from the Willowbrook police department. Heath spoke with Officer Andy Pellicioni and arranged to meet him the following day or the day after. From work, Heath went to Jason Taylor\u2019s house. Defendant called Taylor\u2019s house that night at 8 or 9 p.m. Heath spoke with defendant and asked her if she meant to commit suicide. Defendant did not respond. Taylor and Heath decided to tape-record their next conversation with defendant because they had been contacted by the police and wanted to protect themselves.\nDefendant paged Jason Taylor at about 10 p.m., and Taylor called her back. While Heath was talking to defendant, Taylor, who was listening on another extension, recorded the conversation. Defendant did not know that Taylor was recording the conversation. The record submitted to this court does not include the tape recording or a transcript of the tape recording. Certain portions of the tape, however, are quoted in the report of proceedings. These portions indicate that, during their conversation, Heath asked defendant, \u201cDid you or did you not wish to end your life?\u201d Defendant replied \u201cyes.\u201d Heath then said, \u201cOkay. That\u2019s a starting stone, it\u2019s somewhere for me to go from here. Now, we established why because of your family life, you know, and your new found friend, illness, what have you.\u201d Defendant again responded \u201cyes.\u201d\nBefore trial, defendant brought a motion to suppress her recorded conversation with Heath. She argued that the language of the Illinois eavesdropping statute (720 ILCS 5/14 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 1996)) barred the admission of the tape and that the investigating police officers had arranged and directed the tape recording without giving her any warning. The trial court ruled that Heath did not violate the statute by recording his own conversation with defendant and that this would be true even if the police department had instigated the recording.\nIn her posttrial motion, defendant asserted that it was error for the trial court to deny her motion to suppress without conducting an evidentiary hearing to establish whether the investigating police officers were involved in the recording. Defendant did not request an evidentiary hearing during trial. During the hearing on the posttrial motion, the trial court asked counsel for the defendant if he had any evidence that the Willowbrook police department instigated or arranged the tape recording. Defense counsel admitted that he had no such evidence. In ruling on the posttrial motion, the trial court noted that the evidence indicated that Heath recorded his conversation with defendant entirely of his own volition. The trial court further stated that suppression was not available to defendant under such a circumstance.\nWe first consider defendant\u2019s argument that the trial court erred by denying the motion to suppress without holding an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the Willowbrook police department instigated or arranged the recorded conversation. We note initially that, because defendant did not request an evidentiary hearing before or during trial, this issue is waived for the purposes of our review. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186-87 (1988). This issue does not merit consideration under the plain error doctrine because there was no error and defendant has not shown that the failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing contributed to her conviction (see People v. Sullivan, 72 Ill. 2d 36, 44 (1978)).\nAt trial, Nick Heath, Jason Taylor, and Officer Pellicioni all testified that the police did not suggest, request, or otherwise arrange the recording. During the hearing on the posttrial motion, defendant conceded that she had no evidence to support her theory that the investigating officers were involved with the recording. We find this case analogous to People v. Govin, 213 Ill. App. 3d 928, 935-36 (1991). In Govin, the court considered whether it was error for the trial court to deny the defendant an evidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress tapes of a wiretap. Govin, 213 Ill. App. 3d at 935-36. The court held that the trial court correctly denied the request for an evidentiary hearing because the defendant did not specify which portions of the affidavit supporting the wiretap request were false and did not offer any evidence to support his claim that the affidavit contained false statements. Govin, 213 Ill. App. 3d at 935-36. In the present case, defendant presented no evidence to support her theory of police involvement; thus, there was no reason for an evidentiary hearing and no harm to defendant.\nWe must disagree, however, with the trial court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. We find that the plain language of the Illinois eavesdropping statute bars the admission of the recording and that it was reversible error for the trial court to admit the recording into evidence. Although defendant failed to raise this issue in her appeal, we consider it because it involves, in our view, a grave error of law. As we stated in People v. Olsewski, 257 Ill. App. 3d 1018 (1994), \u201c[w]hile the general rule is that a reviewing court should not normally search the record for unargued and unbriefed reasons to reverse the trial court judgment, a reviewing court need not ignore grave errors of law which the parties on appeal either overlook or decline to address.\u201d Olsewski, 257 Ill. App. 3d at 1021-22; see also People v. Cortes, 181 Ill. 2d 249, 282 (1998).\nThe eavesdropping statute provides that a person commits eavesdropping when he:\n\u201c[u]ses an eavesdropping device to hear or record all or any part of any conversation unless he does so (1) with the consent of all of the parties to such conversation!.]\u201d 720 ILCS 5/14 \u2014 2(a) (West 1996).\nEffective December 15, 1994, section 14 \u2014 1(d) of the eavesdropping statute defined \u201cconversation\u201d as \u201cany oral communication between 2 or more persons regardless of whether one or more of the parties intended their communication to be of a private nature under circumstances justifying that expectation.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/14 \u2014 1(d) (West 1996). Section 14 \u2014 5 provides that any evidence obtained in violation of the statute is inadmissible in any civil or criminal trial, with the sole exception of trials for a person charged with violating the eavesdropping statute. 720 ILCS 5/14 \u2014 5 (West 1996).\nIn denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, the trial court relied on our supreme court\u2019s interpretation of the eavesdropping statute in People v. Beardsley, 115 Ill. 2d 47 (1986), and People v. Herrington, 163 Ill. 2d 507 (1994). In Beardsley, the supreme court held that the primary factor in determining whether eavesdropping has occurred is whether the nonconsenting participants \u201cintended their conversation to be of a private nature under circumstances justifying such expectation.\u201d Beardsley, 115 Ill. 2d at 54. Relying on Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 10 L. Ed. 2d 462, 83 S. Ct. 1381 (1963), the court further held that the eavesdropping statute should not prohibit a party to a conversation from recording that conversation. Beardsley, 115 Ill. 2d at 56. Likewise, in Herrington, the supreme court held that \u201cthere can be no expectation of privacy by the declarant where the individual recording the conversation is a party to that conversation.\u201d Herrington, 163 Ill. 2d at 510, citing Beardsley, 115 Ill. 2d at 56.\nHowever, by adding the definition of \u201cconversation\u201d to the statute in 1994, the Illinois legislature \u201cextended the coverage of the eavesdropping statute to all conversations, regardless of whether they were intended to be private\u201d (People v. Siwek, 284 Ill. App. 3d 7, 14 (1996)). See also In re Marriage of Almquist, 299 Ill. App. 3d 732, 736-37 (1998) (holding that the amended statute \u201cprohibits the recording of any conversation without the consent of all parties regardless of any party\u2019s expectation of privacy\u201d). The State cites People v. Rodriguez, 289 Ill. App. 3d 223 (1997), as authority for the proposition that the recording of a conversation by one of the parties to the conversation is not prohibited. Rodriguez is distinguishable from the present case because the conversation in question in Rodriguez was recorded in July 1994, prior to the effective date of the amendment that defined \u201cconversation.\u201d\nThe amended statute was in effect at all times relevant to the present case. Based on the plain language of the statute and the fact that the conversation was recorded without defendant\u2019s consent, we cannot ignore the trial court\u2019s grave error of law in admitting the tape recording.\nFrom those portions of the tape quoted in the report of proceedings, we conclude that the admission of the tape prejudiced defendant and was not harmless error. The jury could have regarded defendant\u2019s admission that she meant to end her life as the equivalent of a confession that she acted in conscious disregard of a substantial and justifiable risk to the safety of others, which was the most strongly contested issue in the case. Although the State presented other evidence suggesting that defendant was contemplating suicide, we cannot say that the jury would have convicted defendant if the tape had not been admitted. We further find, after reviewing the record, that there was. sufficient evidence for the jury to determine that defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the State may proceed with a new trial against defendant without subjecting her to double jeopardy. See People v. Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d 289, 309-10 (1979). In so holding, we in no way imply that we have made a finding as to defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence that is binding on retrial. See People v. Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d at 310.\nWe next consider defendant\u2019s arguments that the trial court erred by (1) allowing the State to make references to defendant\u2019s membership in Cornerstones, an organization for gay students; (2) allowing the State\u2019s reconstruction expert to offer the opinion that defendant consciously drove through the ditch; and (3) barring defendant from offering as substantive evidence a statement she made to Officer Handzik following the accident. Preliminarily, we note that defendant did not object at trial to the State\u2019s references to Cornerstones or to the allegedly improper expert testimony. Nonetheless, we will consider these issues, along with the hearsay issue, in the interest of judicial economy, because they will likely arise during the new trial.\nDefendant claims that she was prejudiced by the State\u2019s references, both in opening argument and examination of several witnesses, to her membership in Cornerstones, an organization for gay students at the College of Du Page. Improper remarks by a prosecutor do not warrant reversal unless they were so prejudicial that they were a material factor in convicting the defendant. People v. Falconer, 282 Ill. App. 3d 785, 789 (1996). The standard of review in making this determination is similar to the plain error analysis. People v. Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d 258, 323 (1990).\nIn the present case, we find that the prosecutor\u2019s remarks were not improper and, consequently, they were not prejudicial. Two of the State\u2019s own witnesses belonged to Cornerstones, and the evidence indicated that defendant met these witnesses through Cornerstones. Defendant also testified that she was on her way home from a Cornerstones meeting when the accident happened. Clearly, there were reasons for the State to mention Cornerstones. The trial court, which was in the best position to determine whether the remarks were improper and prejudicial, found that the tone of the trial was not inflammatory and not prejudicial to defendant. Based on our review of the record, we agree with the trial court and conclude that the State\u2019s references to defendant\u2019s membership in Cornerstones did not deny her a fair trial.\nDefendant next asserts that the trial court improperly allowed the State\u2019s accident reconstruction expert, Jimmy Lee, to offer the opinion that defendant consciously drove through the ditch. Defendant claims that Lee\u2019s opinion was speculative. The admission of expert testimony is within the trial court\u2019s discretion, which we will not disturb absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Miles, 217 Ill. App. 3d 393, 403 (1991).\nWe begin by noting that we find no testimony in the record from Lee that defendant was a \u201cconscious\u201d driver at the time of the collision. Lee did offer the following testimony:\n\u201cQ. Sir, in addition to that, did you analyze or determine what, if any, sort of steering input was used on the Ford Escort prior to it hitting the Pontiac Bonneville?\nA. Yes.\nQ. And what are we talking about when we talk about steering input?\nA. An input is the driver\u2019s action; turns left, turns right or maintains.\nQ. This is an action that a conscious driver would do?\nA. Yes.\nQ. Were you able to determine if there were any steering input prior to the Escort hitting the Bonneville?\nA. Yes.\nQ. How many steering inputs were you able to find or determine?\nA. There\u2019s at least three significant inputs. The act of driving is not one input here, one input there, it\u2019s maintaining. So in my opinion the steering was maintained throughout the course of this path.\u201d\nIt appears to us that, when answering whether a steering input is something that a \u201cconscious\u201d driver would do, Lee was explaining the term \u201csteering input,\u201d not giving an opinion about defendant\u2019s mental state at the time of the accident. Furthermore, we agree with the trial court that Lee\u2019s opinion that defendant made at least three steering inputs while driving through the ditch was based on his review of the physical evidence and reconstruction of the events leading up to the collision. It was not error to allow this testimony.\nLast, we address defendant\u2019s argument that the trial court erroneously barred her from offering her statement to Officer Handzik as substantive evidence. According to the record, Officer Handzik was the first police officer who arrived at the scene of the collision and was the first person defendant spoke to after the accident. Officer Handzik testified that his conversation with defendant took place approximately 10 to 15 minutes after he arrived on the scene. Officer Handzik further testified that defendant told him that she intended to turn right from Clarendon Hills Road onto 79th Street and that she remembered activating her turn signal but was not aware of what happened until her car came to rest. Before Officer Handzik gave this testimony, the trial court instructed the jury that his testimony about defendant\u2019s statement was being elicited only to demonstrate that the statement was made and not for the truth of the statement.\nDefendant argues that the statement was an excited utterance and therefore should have been admitted as substantive evidence. We will apply an abuse of discretion standard to this issue, not a de novo standard as defendant urges. A reviewing court may review de novo a trial court\u2019s decision that a statement is hearsay when the determination does not involve fact-finding or weighing the credibility of the witnesses. People v. Aguilar, 265 Ill. App. 3d 105, 109 (1994). In the present case, however, the trial court\u2019s determination of whether defendant\u2019s statement fell under the excited utterance exception involved fact-finding and assessing the credibility of the witnesses. To qualify as an excited utterance, the proponent of the evidence must demonstrate \u201c(1) the occurrence of an event or condition sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous and unreflecting statement; (2) absence of time to fabricate; and (3) a statement relating to the circumstances of the occurrence.\u201d People v. Smith, 152 Ill. 2d 229, 258 (1992). In the case before us, the trial court ruled that defendant did not establish that her statement was an excited utterance because she did not show a lack of opportunity to reflect and fabricate. Under the facts presented, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Any future ruling on this issue will likewise depend on the facts presented on retrial.\nDefendant also argues that she was denied a fair trial due to ineffective assistance of counsel. In light of our determination to reverse defendant\u2019s conviction and remand this cause, we need not consider this argument.\nFor the reasons stated, we reverse defendant\u2019s conviction and remand this cause to the circuit court of Du Page County for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nINGLIS and HUTCHINSON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE BOWMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "John E Donahue, of Law Offices of Donahue, Sowa & Bugos, of Lisle, for appellant.", "Joseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Martin E Moltz and Mary Beth Burns, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SARAH K. NESTROCK, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201498\u20140341\nOpinion filed July 15, 1999.\nRehearing denied August 13, 1999.\nJohn E Donahue, of Law Offices of Donahue, Sowa & Bugos, of Lisle, for appellant.\nJoseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Martin E Moltz and Mary Beth Burns, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0216-01", "first_page_order": 234, "last_page_order": 243 }