{ "id": 1336053, "name": "SHERRY J. BROWN, Indiv. and as Adm'r of the Estates of Rachel Brown, et al., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Brown v. Ford Motor Co.", "decision_date": "1999-06-30", "docket_number": "No. 1-97-1804", "first_page": "314", "last_page": "318", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "306 Ill. App. 3d 314" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "650 N.E.2d 1108", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1113" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "272 Ill. App. 3d 451", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 253098 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "457" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/272/0451-01" ] }, { "cite": "541 N.E.2d 643", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5567243 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/129/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "558 N.E.2d 252", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "200 Ill. App. 3d 526", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2461681 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/200/0526-01" ] }, { "cite": "668 N.E.2d 8", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 Ill. App. 3d 199", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 159547 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "202" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/282/0199-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2983361 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "359" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "46 Ill. 2d 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2900056 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "471" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/46/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "658 N.E.2d 371", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "167 Ill. 2d 542", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 222740 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "546" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/167/0542-01" ] }, { "cite": "665 N.E.2d 1379", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1385" }, { "page": "1385" }, { "page": "1385" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "172 Ill. 2d 193", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 55984 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205" }, { "page": "206" }, { "page": "206" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/172/0193-01" ] }, { "cite": "615 N.E.2d 1294", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1296-97" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "246 Ill. App. 3d 323", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5388650 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "327" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/246/0323-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 622, "char_count": 11273, "ocr_confidence": 0.739, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.226624621469605e-08, "percentile": 0.26852820376786446 }, "sha256": "1e6a81ca81a4936f2a29bfdb9abd5b343383285960c8e09e735875d9f6bdbf71", "simhash": "1:1924e89ce9d695f0", "word_count": 1858 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:16:55.452164+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "O\u2019BRIEN, EJ., and O\u2019MARA FROSSARD, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "SHERRY J. BROWN, Indiv. and as Adm\u2019r of the Estates of Rachel Brown, et al., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE TULLY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiffs, Sherry Brown and Emma Mae Brown, brought a product liability action against defendant, Ford Motor Company. Sherry Brown sued individually and as the administrator of the estates of Rachel, Veronica, and Miriam Brown. Emma Mae Brown sued as the administrator of the estate of Brian Brown. Sherry Brown was the only survivor of an accident involving a van that defendant manufactured. A jury found for defendant and answered special interrogatories in defendant\u2019s favor. The trial court denied plaintiffs\u2019 posttrial motion, and plaintiffs appeal. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 301 (155 Ill. 2d R. 301).\nWe affirm for the following reasons.\nThe relevant facts are as follows. On December 22, 1990, Miriam Brown was driving his 1989 Ford Econoline van southbound on Route 1-57. Sherry Brown was a passenger in the van with Rachel, Veronica, and Brian Brown. It was a cold day with freezing rain and snow. The van passed a car driven by James Bell and then struck the rear of a van driven by Marc Drayton, which slid into the shoulder of the highway. Brown\u2019s van slid off the road, hit a concrete abutment in the median, and exploded. Sherry Brown was the only survivor of the accident.\nAt trial, James Bell testified that Brown\u2019s van passed him going 15 to 20 miles per hour faster than Bell\u2019s car. He saw Brown\u2019s van slide and hit the concrete abutment. He did not know how far behind Brown\u2019s van he was when he saw the van slide. Bell estimated the van\u2019s speed was 20 to 25 miles per hour before it hit the abutment, but he stated that it was very possible that the van was going faster than that.\nPlaintiffs alleged that faulty nylon fuel lines in Brown\u2019s Ford Econoline van melted, leaked gasoline, and therefore caused the explosion. The evidence showed that Ford installed nylon fuel lines in its Econoline vans in 1985 or 1986 and, at that time, Ford was the only vehicle manufacturer using such fuel lines. However, some European car companies used nylon tubing in their engines, and, subsequently, General Motors and Chrysler used nylon fuel lines. In addition, Ford knew when it installed them that the nylon fuel lines had temperature limitations and that it should not install such lines where that limit would be exceeded. Cost was one of the factors Ford considered in its decision to use nylon fuel lines. The trial court refused to allow plaintiffs to introduce evidence that Ford changed from nylon fuel lines to stainless steel fuel lines in 1989, which was after Brown\u2019s van was made but before the accident. The new fuel lines were made of Teflon surrounded by stainless steel wire braiding. Such lines were feasible when Brown\u2019s van was manufactured. Plaintiffs sought to introduce the evidence to rebut any implication that the nylon lines were proper because other companies had used them.\nThe evidence also showed that the engine area contained several potentially combustible fluids. There were about 12 gallons of such fluids, which included radiator, transmission, brake, power steering, and windshield washer fluids, Freon gas, and oil.\nPlaintiffs presented expert witness testimony that the source of the fire was a severed nylon fuel line that leaked gasoline. According to the expert, the stainless steel braided fuel lines would not have allowed gasoline to leak out. In the expert\u2019s opinion, the van was therefore unreasonably dangerous.\nDefendant\u2019s reconstruction expert witness, Geoffrey Germane, testified that he reviewed various depositions, examined the accident scene, and performed test crashes. Germane also reviewed 28 crash tests of the Econoline van that defendant was required to complete for federal certification. The vans did not catch fire in those tests, but they did not have gas in them during the tests. For the reconstruction crash tests, Germane calculated how much energy Brown\u2019s van absorbed by examining the vehicle and by looking at reconstruction crash tests that Ford had conducted. He compared Brown\u2019s van to an undamaged van to determine how much crush damage occurred. Ford performed the reconstruction crash tests using a similar concrete abutment and vans similar to Brown\u2019s van. The first test\u2019s speed was 36.7 miles per hour, and the second test\u2019s speed was 47.5 miles per hour. Defendant showed the jury the first crash test at normal speed and in slow motion. The damage to the vehicle in that test was similar to but not as great as the damage to Brown\u2019s van. The jury also saw the second crash test at normal speed and in slow motion. Using the tests, Germane computed the crash energies and estimated that the impact speed of Brown\u2019s van was 44 to 46 miles per hour. In Germane\u2019s opinion, Bell\u2019s estimate that Brown\u2019s van was traveling 20 to 25 miles per hour before it hit the abutment was incorrect. According to Germane, the energy for that speed is much lower than that for the first crash test\u2019s speed of 36.7 miles per hour.\nDefendant\u2019s fire expert witness, Walter Newell, testified that there wer\u00e9 two fires at the accident, one in the cargo area and one in the engine compartment. In his opinion, gasoline did not play a role in the cause or origin of the fires.\nLarry Ragan, defendant\u2019s automotive consulting engineer, also testified. He reviewed the evidence and tests. In his opinion, the fuel line system in Brown\u2019s van was safe.\nThe jury found in defendant\u2019s favor. In addition, it stated in its answer to special interrogatories that defendant\u2019s fuel system was not dangerous and did not cause a fire.\nOn appeal, plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in: (1) admitting into evidence videos of defendant\u2019s crash reconstruction, even though an eyewitness had already testified as to the speed of the van before the accident; (2) allowing the jury to view the reconstruction videos in slow motion; and (3) barring evidence that defendant changed its fuel lines from plastic to metal, after it manufactured the van, but before the accident.\nPlaintiffs first argue that the trial court erred in admitting the crash reconstruction evidence because Bell had already provided eyewitness testimony about the speed of Brown\u2019s van. \u201cWhether reconstruction evidence should be admitted at trial is a matter within the trial court\u2019s discretion.\u201d Palmer v. Craig, 246 Ill. App. 3d 323, 327, 615 N.E.2d 1294, 1296-97 (1993). \u201c \u2018[Ejxpert reconstruction testimony is proper, even where there is an eyewitness, if what the expert offers is \u201cknowledge and application of principles of science beyond the ken of the average juror.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Watkins v. Schmitt, 172 Ill. 2d 193, 205, 665 N.E.2d 1379, 1385 (1996), quoting Zavala v. Powermatic, Inc., 167 Ill. 2d 542, 546, 658 N.E.2d 371, 373 (1995), quoting Plank v. Holman, 46 Ill. 2d 465, 471 (1970). Therefore, the existence of an eyewitness is not the conclusive factor in deciding whether to admit such expert testimony. Watkins, 172 Ill. 2d at 206, 665 N.E.2d at 1385. The supreme court held in Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 76 Ill. 2d 353, 359, 392 N.E.2d 1 (1979), that \u201cautomobile speed [was] not a matter beyond the ken of the average juror.\u201d Moreover, \u201cany lay person with a reasonable opportunity to observe and ordinary experience with moving vehicles can estimate the speed of a car.\u201d Watkins, 172 Ill. 2d at 206, 665 N.E.2d at 1385.\nIn this case, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the reconstruction evidence. The trial court heard Bell\u2019s testimony about the speed of Brown\u2019s van and was able to determine whether he had a reasonable opportunity to observe the van. The court found Bell\u2019s testimony to be \u201cequivocal\u201d and exercised its discretion in allowing the reconstruction videos. On cross-examination, Bell testified that he could have been a half-mile away from Brown\u2019s van when it started to slide, but he couldn\u2019t \u201ctell how far back it [was].\u201d Bell then stated that Brown\u2019s van was \u201csome distance north\u201d when it slid. In addition, although Bell testified that the van\u2019s speed was 20 to 25 miles per hour, when asked whether it was possible that it was faster, he replied, \u201cIt\u2019s very possible, because that\u2019s the reason I hesitated before when the question was asked how fast he was going.\u201d We therefore do not find that the trial court erred in allowing the reconstruction evidence.\nPlaintiffs next contend that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to view the reconstruction and federal certification videos in slow motion because plaintiffs were prejudiced. \u201cA videotape is admissible for that purpose if it fairly and accurately shows whatever it intends to show and if it is not unduly prejudicial.\u201d Barry v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 282 Ill. App. 3d 199, 202, 668 N.E.2d 8, 10 (1996). Whether experimental evidence meets the criteria for admission is left to the trial court\u2019s sound discretion. Rios v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., 200 Ill. App. 3d 526, 558 N.E.2d 252 (1990). In this case, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in allowing the jury to view the federal certification and reconstruction videos in slow motion. First, it was explained at trial that the federal certification videos were made to satisfy federal testing requirements. Second, plaintiffs argue that the slow motion made the video crashes even more real and therefore made them prejudicial. We disagree and do not find an abuse of the trial court\u2019s discretion.\nFinally, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in barring evidence that defendant changed the fuel lines from plastic to metal after it manufactured Brown\u2019s van but before the accident. The trial court barred the evidence because of public policy reasons, such as the possible chilling effect on safety improvements. Evidence of a subsequent design change is not admissible to show either negligence or wilful and wanton conduct in a product liability action. Schaffner v. Chicago & North Western Transportation Co., 129 Ill. 2d 1, 541 N.E.2d 643 (1989). In Smith v. Black & Decker (US.), Inc., 272 Ill. App. 3d 451, 650 N.E.2d 1108 (1995), the appellate court affirmed the trial court\u2019s rejection of evidence of post-manufacture but pre-injury modifications to a power tool. The appellate court stated that it found \u201cthe same policy consideration, i.e., the potential chilling effect on safety improvements, present in product liability actions as in negligence actions regardless of whether the modifications were preinjury or post-injury.\u201d Smith, 272 Ill. App. 3d at 457, 650 N.E.2d at 1113. In this case, we follow Smith and find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in barring the evidence of changed fuel line materials.\nIn light of the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.\nAffirmed.\nO\u2019BRIEN, EJ., and O\u2019MARA FROSSARD, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE TULLY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Arthur S. Gold, Gary R. Williams, and Michael W Rath, of Chicago, for appellants.", "Donohue Brown Mathewson & Smyth, of Chicago (John T. Coleman, Richard B. Foster, and Karen Kies DeGrand, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SHERRY J. BROWN, Indiv. and as Adm\u2019r of the Estates of Rachel Brown, et al., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1\u201497\u20141804\nOpinion filed June 30, 1999.\nArthur S. Gold, Gary R. Williams, and Michael W Rath, of Chicago, for appellants.\nDonohue Brown Mathewson & Smyth, of Chicago (John T. Coleman, Richard B. Foster, and Karen Kies DeGrand, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0314-01", "first_page_order": 332, "last_page_order": 336 }