{ "id": 1336028, "name": "In re V.T. III, a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. V.T. III, Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. V.T.", "decision_date": "1999-08-03", "docket_number": "No. 2-98-0371", "first_page": "817", "last_page": "821", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "306 Ill. App. 3d 817" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "141 Ill. 2d 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3238211 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73" }, { "page": "73" }, { "page": "73" }, { "page": "73" }, { "page": "73", "parenthetical": "a report should be excluded when the author has a \"fairly positive counter motive to misrepresent\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/141/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 Ill. App. 3d 438", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1352853 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449-50" }, { "page": "450" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/302/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 309", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3126284 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0309-01" ] }, { "cite": "245 Ill. App. 3d 977", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5383744 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "980" }, { "page": "980" }, { "page": "980-81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/245/0977-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 Ill. App. 3d 794", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 847607 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "798" }, { "page": "799" }, { "page": "799" }, { "page": "798" }, { "page": "797" }, { "page": "799-80" }, { "page": "798" }, { "page": "800" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/293/0794-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 563, "char_count": 11413, "ocr_confidence": 0.774, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.745654131974477e-08, "percentile": 0.40881900836689705 }, "sha256": "c7e50d952bf7af33c78735a4eb2fff18b078c2120d9abc85e10d412d96d00df6", "simhash": "1:3bfab4bee226b57b", "word_count": 1850 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:16:55.452164+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "BOWMAN, P.J., and INGLIS, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "In re V.T. III, a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. V.T. III, Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HUTCHINSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe circuit court of Boone County placed the 14-year-old respondent, VT. Ill, on probation after a delinquency proceeding. The State filed a petition to revoke probation after respondent allegedly violated the terms of his probation by leaving a residential treatment facility, Aunt Martha\u2019s Youth Service Center (the facility), before he completed a drug and alcohol evaluation. After admitting an \u201cUnusual Incident Report\u201d (the report), which described respondent\u2019s flight from the facility, the trial court revoked respondent\u2019s probation.\nOn appeal, respondent contends that section 115 \u2014 5(c)(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (the Code) (725 ILCS 5/115\u2014 5(c)(2) (West 1998)) prohibited the trial court from admitting the report under the business record exception to the hearsay rule because the report was prepared in anticipation of litigation. We disagree, and we affirm the trial court\u2019s order revoking respondent\u2019s probation and committing him to the juvenile division of the Department of Corrections.\nA petition for adjudication of wardship filed on December 3, 1997, charged respondent with being a delinquent minor for possessing between 10 to 30 grams of cannabis with the intent to deliver (720 ILCS 550/5(c) (West 1996); 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 3(1) (West 1996)). On December 29, 1997, the trial court placed respondent on probation after he admitted the. allegations. As a requirement of probation, respondent was to undergo drug and alcohol counseling at the facility.\nThe State filed a petition to revoke probation, alleging that respondent failed to complete the counseling program after leaving the facility without permission. At the probation revocation hearing, a case manager from the facility, Nicole Rogers, testified that she admitted respondent to the facility on January 26, 1998. Respondent was required to remain at the facility and participate in the program for at least 45 days.\nWhile testifying, Rogers identified the report that was prepared after respondent fled the facility. She explained that such a report is prepared when a child assigned to the facility fails to take prescribed medication, runs away from the facility, or attacks someone in the facility. A staff member who witnesses the incident prepares the report and forwards it to Rogers and to the child\u2019s supervisor. Rogers further testified that such a report is prepared at the time of the incident and kept in the facility\u2019s regular course of business. Rogers admitted that she did not prepare the report and did not have personal knowledge of respondent\u2019s departure from the facility.\nOur review of the report also reveals that the facility prepares incident reports when a child is injured, suffers from an illness, or misses school. Although he did not testify, Joe Huey was the staff member who prepared the report in this case.\nThe trial court admitted the report pursuant to the business record exception to the hearsay rule (725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 5(a) (West 1998)). The report reveals that on January 28, 1998, respondent asked to go outside. Earlier that day, Huey saw respondent making a phone call and shortly thereafter saw a red car drive past the facility several times. Huey concluded that respondent called for a ride and left the facility without permission. Huey also recommended filing a missing person\u2019s report with the police as a follow-up measure. Respondent never returned to the facility.\nThe trial court revoked respondent\u2019s probation and denied his motion to reconsider, noting that the report, by itself, sufficiently proved that respondent willfully violated his probation. The trial court concluded that the report was not prepared for litigation but merely documented whether respondent was present at the facility. Respondent\u2019s timely appeal followed.\nOn appeal, respondent contends that the trial court\u2019s admission of the report warrants reversal. We disagree. The decision of whether to admit a business record is within the trial court\u2019s discretion, and we will not reverse such a determination absent an abuse of that discretion. In re N.W., 293 Ill. App. 3d 794, 798 (1997). At a probation revocation hearing, the State has the burden of proving a probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence. In re N.W., 293 Ill. App. 3d at 799. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the report, and we decline to reverse the trial court\u2019s order because it was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. See In re N.W., 293 Ill. App. 3d at 799.\nFurthermore, the qualitative difference between a criminal prosecution and a revocation of probation allowed the trial court greater discretion in determining whether to admit the report in this case. See People v. Kruszyna, 245 Ill. App. 3d 977, 980 (1993). Although respondent was entitled to due process of law, it is well established that only \u201cminimum requirements\u201d of due process need to be followed at a probation revocation hearing. See Kruszyna, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 980. A probation revocation hearing is not a proceeding in which guilt or innocence is determined; rather, \u201c \u2018 [i]t takes place only after the defendant has already been convicted, sentenced to probation, and then has violated the conditions of the probation.\u2019 \u201d Kruszyna, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 980-81, quoting People v. Allegri, 109 Ill. 2d 309, 313 (1985). We conclude that the trial court\u2019s admission of the report at the probation revocation hearing did not deprive respondent of the minimum due process protection to which he was entitled.\nIn In re N.W., 293 Ill. App. 3d 794 (1997), the reviewing court set forth the foundational requirements for the admission of a document pursuant to the business records exception. The writing must be made as a memorandum or record of the event, and the writing must be made in the regular course of business at the time of the event or within a reasonable time thereafter. In re N.W., 293 Ill. App. 3d at 798.\nThe probation officer in that case admitted that he did not have personal knowledge of (1) the source of the reports, (2) the events described in the reports, or (3) how the youth residential facility kept its records. In re N.W., 293 Ill. App. 3d at 797. The reviewing court concluded that the reports were inadmissible, in part, because the State failed to lay a proper foundation. In re N.W., 293 Ill. App. 3d at 799-80.\nTo establish a proper foundation for the admission of a business record, the author of the record need not testify or be shown to be unavailable. People v. Virgin, 302 Ill. App. 3d 438, 449-50 (1998). Anyone familiar with the business and its procedures may testify about how the business record was prepared. Virgin, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 450.\nIn the present case, the State established a proper foundation. Although Rogers had no personal knowledge of respondent\u2019s escape, she testified that an unusual incident report is prepared when, among other events, one of the children assigned to the facility fails to take medication, runs away, or attacks others. A staff member who witnesses the event prepares the report and delivers it to the child\u2019s supervisor. Rogers explained that she also receives copies of these reports and that the facility prepares them in the regular course of business.\nRespondent argues that, even if the report qualifies as a business record and a proper foundation is established, it is nevertheless inadmissible because its purpose was improper. In a criminal proceeding, a business record is inadmissible if it was \u201c \u2018made by anyone during an investigation of an alleged offense or during any investigation relating to pending or anticipated litigation of any kind.\u2019 \u201d In re N.W., 293 Ill. App. 3d at 798, quoting 725 ILCS 5/115\u20145(c)(2) (West 1994). The N.W. court emphasized that the record it reviewed failed to establish the \u201ctrustworthiness and reliability necessary to satisfy the underlying purpose of the business records exception\u201d (In re N.W., 293 Ill. App. 3d at 800), and seemed concerned that the reports were part of an ongoing investigation concerning the minor in that case.\nOur supreme court has concluded that \u201cprison incident reports\u201d are prepared for litigation and are inadmissible. People v. Smith, 141 Ill. 2d 40, 73 (1990). Because they are designed to record disciplinary infractions, the prison reports \u201clack the necessary earmarks of trustworthiness and reliability generally attendant to regularly kept business records.\u201d Smith, 141 Ill. 2d at 73. The Smith court noted that prison incident reports, like police reports, are \u201cmade with an eye toward some form of subsequent discipline.\u201d Smith, 141 Ill. 2d at 73.\nThe report and its use in this case can be distinguished from the series of reports in the N.W. case and prison incident reports in general. Initially, a review of the record clearly indicates that the report was not prepared in anticipation of future discipline. After respondent left, the facility granted him a 14-day extension to return and complete the program. The facility formally discharged respondent only after he failed to return during that period.\nThe report in this case is also more reliable than the prison incident reports excluded in Smith. This report was prepared by a facility staff member and not by a law enforcement officer. The report was prepared shortly after respondent left the facility. Based on his observations, Huey reasonably concluded that respondent left without permission. The information contained in the report does not call into question the motivation, recall, or the soundness of the conclusions of the report\u2019s author. Cf. Smith, 141 Ill. 2d at 73.\nIn Smith, the court noted that prison incident reports are unreliable because confrontations between prison employees and inmates often give rise to civil rights litigation against the employees, and it can be assumed that the employees prepare their reports with this in mind. Smith, 141 Ill. 2d at 73 (a report should be excluded when the author has a \u201cfairly positive counter motive to misrepresent\u201d). Nothing suggests that the employees of a youth residential treatment facility contemplate similar retaliatory litigation, especially when this type of report is a standardized form used to document the health and safety of a minor.\nTherefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the report in this case because it was not prepared in anticipation of future discipline or litigation which would remove it from the business record exception to the hearsay rule. The report merely described how respondent left the facility, and it recommended that a missing persons report be filed. The facility also allowed respondent an opportunity to return and complete the counseling program.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the order of the circuit court of Boone County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nBOWMAN, P.J., and INGLIS, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HUTCHINSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller and Paul J. Glaser, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Roger T. Russell, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belvidere (Martin E Moltz and Peggy EJ. Bradford, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re V.T. III, a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. V.T. III, Respondent-Appellant).\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201498\u20140371\nOpinion filed August 3, 1999.\nG. Joseph Weller and Paul J. Glaser, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nRoger T. Russell, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belvidere (Martin E Moltz and Peggy EJ. Bradford, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0817-01", "first_page_order": 835, "last_page_order": 839 }