{ "id": 1336100, "name": "In re PETITION OF C.M.A., a/k/a C.M.W., et al., TO ADOPT K.D.W., a Minor (C.M.A., a/k/a C.M.W., et al., Petitioners-Appellants; K.D.W., a Minor, Respondent-Appellant).-In re PETITION OF M.M. et al., TO ADOPT E.L.S. et al., Minors (M.M. et al., Petitioners-Appellants; E.L.S. et al., Minors, Respondents-Appellants)", "name_abbreviation": "In re C.M.A.", "decision_date": "1999-07-19", "docket_number": "Nos. 1-99-0769, 1-99-0770 cons.", "first_page": "1061", "last_page": "1070", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "306 Ill. App. 3d 1061" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "518 N.E.2d 436", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "164 Ill. App. 3d 1036", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3583044 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1040" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/164/1036-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 N.E.2d 293", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 Ill. 2d 269", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2726387 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277" }, { "page": "277" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/10/0269-01" ] }, { "cite": "583 N.E.2d 555", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 Ill. 2d 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5595837 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "324" }, { "page": "323" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/145/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "631 N.E.2d 710", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 Ill. 2d 561", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "625 N.E.2d 376", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "253 Ill. App. 3d 337", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5424269 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/253/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "256 Ill. App. 3d 742", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5382923 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/256/0742-01" ] }, { "cite": "286 Ill. App. 3d 1046", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1544512 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1055" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/286/1046-01" ] }, { "cite": "274 Ill. App. 3d 189", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 291586 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "194" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/274/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "435 N.E.2d 506", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. App. 3d 44", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3035545 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "47" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/106/0044-01" ] }, { "cite": "658 N.E.2d 1372", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 Ill. App. 3d 939", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 927649 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "946-47" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/276/0939-01" ] }, { "cite": "661 N.E.2d 463", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 Ill. App. 3d 722", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1172349 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "727" }, { "page": "727" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/277/0722-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 959, "char_count": 24322, "ocr_confidence": 0.767, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.063884962999277e-08, "percentile": 0.42570145981483865 }, "sha256": "299fb81230bfbc276e77578f07d33591c48f30550f35c8a05794966431af6a61", "simhash": "1:98e6b96a1943267b", "word_count": 4030 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:16:55.452164+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "CAMPBELL, PJ., and QUINN, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "In re PETITION OF C.M.A., a/k/a C.M.W., et al., TO ADOPT K.D.W., a Minor (C.M.A., a/k/a C.M.W., et al., Petitioners-Appellants; K.D.W., a Minor, Respondent-Appellant).\u2014In re PETITION OF M.M. et al., TO ADOPT E.L.S. et al., Minors (M.M. et al., Petitioners-Appellants; E.L.S. et al., Minors, Respondents-Appellants)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE ZWICK\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThese consolidated appeals arise out of two separate adoption cases and are brought jointly by both sets of adoptive parents and their respective minor children. In these appeals, the parties challenge the propriety and jurisdictional basis of four interlocutory orders entered by Circuit Court Judge Susan McDunn after she had been removed from each case for cause. For the reasons that follow, we grant the relief requested by the appellants and declare null and void each of the orders entered by Judge McDunn after her removal from the instant cases.\nIn the first of the two adoption cases, C.M.W and L.A.W filed their petition to adopt K.D.W on April 10, 1998. An interim order of adoption was entered that same date by Judge James F. Henry.\nC.M.W and L.A.W are a lesbian couple who jointly brought a petition to adopt K.D.W., the biological child of C.M.W Pursuant to the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/0.01 et seq. (West 1996)) and the procedures of the circuit court, Edward J. O\u2019Connell was appointed guardian ad litem (GAL) on behalf of the minor child. The Cook County department of supportive services (DSS) was ordered to conduct an investigation of the family.\nThe DSS investigative report was favorable and, in fact, all evidence favored the adoption. No negative matters were raised. After reviewing the file and DSS report and filing an answer, the GAL joined with the petitioners in requesting entry of judgment for adoption.\nAlthough the adoption was uncontested, Judge McDunn denied the petition for adoption on July 27, 1998, and instead entered an order \u201coff-call\u201d requiring that a best interests hearing be held.\nThe best interests hearing was held September 1, 1998. Three witnesses were called and examined by the GAL and counsel for petitioners. C.M.W and L.A.W. testified about their family and their care of K.D.W. The DSS investigator, who has done studies of this type for almost 20 years, testified about the home-study investigation and the contents of her report. She testified about evidence she received supporting her decision to highly recommend the adoption and her conclusion that the parties\u2019 sexual orientation was not a concern. She also testified that such investigations are generally not done when an adoption petitioner is related to the child, as is the situation in the instant case, but are currently done in all cases in which the petitioners are lesbian or gay.\nAccording to the DSS caseworker, C.M.W and L.A.W went through the required intake process and investigation regarding their relationship and financial matters as well as health, family, work, and educational histories. Letters from three people knowledgeable as to their parenting skills were obtained. The investigator spent several hours at the family home and determined that K.D.W is \u201ca beautiful baby with two people who adore him and love him and *** seems to be just thriving in their home.\u201d The caseworker described their home environment and found petitioners\u2019 relationship to be stable. She testified further that nothing in her investigation disclosed any problems stemming from the parents\u2019 sexual orientation or posed any question about their suitability to adopt.\nJudge McDunn asked no questions of any witness about K.D.W. or his care or welfare. Judge McDunn did, however, question each petitioner regarding her \u201ccoming out\u201d process as a lesbian, her early sexual experiences, and whether petitioners were currently in a lesbian sexual relationship. These questions were answered completely and truthfully, over objection. The court called no witnesses of its own.\nNo evidence presented at the hearing indicated any indiscreet or inappropriate conduct by petitioners or others, nor any circumstance harmful to the minor child. All evidence favored the adoption and none indicated that his best interests would' be served by denying the petition to adopt. At the conclusion of the hearing, the parties jointly requested entry of an adoption order. Judge McDunn took the case under advisement.\nOn October 6, 1998, more than a month after the hearing, the GAL moved for entry of judgment. In support of the motion, he stated that the case presented no unique or unusual factual or legal issues. Judge McDunn entered and generally continued this motion and refused to indicate when a ruling would be issued.\nOn November 17, 1998, Judge McDunn held a status hearing. Again counsel and the GAL inquired when a ruling might be expected. Judge McDunn informed the parties that she could not set such a date, but that she considered that the two lesbian adoption cases before her had \u201csimilar issues\u201d and \u201csimilar types of circumstances.\u201d She indicated that she would likely not be deciding the first case until after hearing evidence in the second case.\nOn December 11, 1998, the parties brought a motion, pursuant to section 2 \u2014 1001(a)(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2\u2014 1001(a)(3) (West 1996)), to remove Judge McDunn from the case based upon her decision to consider evidence in the second, wholly unrelated case before ruling in the instant case. This motion was heard and granted on December 11, 1998, by Judge Francis Barth, presiding judge of the county division. On December 15, 1998, Judge Barth entered a final judgment of adoption. No appeal was taken from the adoption judgment.\nIn the second of the two cases, J.S. and M.M. filed their petition to adopt E.L.S. and J.M.S. on April 8, 1998. An interim order of adoption was entered that same date by Judge Sidney R. Yates.\nJ.S. and M.M. are a lesbian couple and the adoption petition was brought to secure the parental rights of both women, who have jointly raised J.M.S. and E.L.S. since their respective births. E.L.S. is the biological child of M.M., and J.M.S. is the biological child of J.S. The adoption would enable the children to be legally recognized as brother and sister.\nEdward J. O\u2019Connell was again appointed GAL on behalf of the minor children and DSS was ordered to conduct an investigation of the family.\nThe DSS investigative report, submitted on July 9, 1998, was favorable. It described both mothers and their 10-year relationship, their parenting skills and respective backgrounds, and described the children and their interaction, health, and personalities. References characterized petitioners M.M. and J.S. as \u201cloving, caring, nurturing and affectionate parents.\u201d The investigator concluded that the petitioners had a \u201cstable relationship, lovely home and warm and caring interaction,\u201d and \u201chighly recommend[ed]\u201d the adoption. All evidence favored the adoption, and no negative matters were raised. On July 21, 1998, after reviewing the file and the DSS report and filing an answer, the GAL joined with the petitioners in requesting entry of judgment for adoption without hearing.\nRather than granting the petition, Judge McDunn entered an order \u201coff-call\u201d on July 27, 1998, requiring that a best interests hearing be held. The order reflected that it was nunc pro tunc July 21, 1998.\nA best interests hearing was originally scheduled for September 3, 1998, but was continued because the DSS investigator was unavailable on that date. No new hearing date was set.\nOn September 11, 1998, petitioners J.S. and M.M. presented a petition for substitution of judge as a matter of right pursuant to section 2 \u2014 1001(a)(2)(ii) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2\u2014 1001(a)(2)(ii) (West 1996)). The GAL, on behalf of the minor children, consented to the motion. Although no hearing had been held in the case, Judge McDunn denied the motion. She ruled that, while the motion would have been considered timely if brought by consent of adult parties, the GAL\u2019s consent on behalf of the minor children was not legally sufficient. Judge McDunn expressed her view that the minor children, less than one and three years old, respectively, were required to consent themselves, but had not.\nOn November 13, 1998, petitioners J.S. and M.M., with the consent of the GAL, filed a motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice pursuant to section 2 \u2014 1009 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1009 (West 1996)). Although no hearings had been held on the merits of the case, Judge McDunn denied the motion as untimely, stating that a \u201cwritten hearing\u201d had been held when she entered the order \u201coff-call,\u201d without the parties or counsel present, requiring a best interests hearing.\nOn February 2, 1999, sua sponte, Judge McDunn issued an order adding a new party to the case, the Family Research Council (FRC) of Washington, D.C., and ordering that \u201c[tjhrough and including March 4, 1999, Gary Bauer, President of the FRC, and any attorney who files an appearance on behalf of the FRC are permitted to examine the court file herein *** [and] these persons also have leave to make or receive copies of all papers and documents contained in such files,\u201d subject to maintaining identifying information as confidential. This order contained the true names of the adopting petitioners and their children. The order was sent by the court to FRC by Federal Express delivery and to the parties by regular delivery through the United States Postal Service.\nThis order further explained that FRC was added as a \u201cnecessary\u201d party and cited sections 2 \u2014 405, 2 \u2014 406, 2 \u2014 407, and 2 \u2014 408 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 405, 2 \u2014 406, 2 \u2014 407, 2 \u2014 408 (West 1996)). FRC was added in the capacity of \u201csecondary guardian\u201d to represent the interests of the minor children before the court and of children generally. Judge McDunn indicated that FRC was a necessary party because FRC \u201cis on public record for the position that adoptions by unmarried persons and persons living a homosexual lifestyle are not in the best interests of children\u201d and no party to the case had advocated this position.\nJudge McDunn stated further that it was necessary to add FRC because FRC has a general interest in the welfare of children and might have an interest in future cases involving similar circumstances. Judge McDunn expressed the view that no Illinois appellate decision had considered whether adoptions by lesbians and gay men were contrary to the best interests of children.\nThe parties immediately sought an emergency stay of the order entered on February 2, 1999, allowing them the opportunity to present a written and verified motion for substitution of judge for cause pursuant to section 2 \u2014 1001(a)(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1001(a)(3) (West 1996)). That motion was presented to Judge Francis Barth, who stated that he was prepared to entertain the substitution motion immediately, allowing the transcript of the hearing to serve as the petition and be verified by affidavit.\nAfter hearing arguments for substitution, Judge Barth granted the motion and removed Judge McDunn for cause. Judge McDunn\u2019s order of February 2, 1999, was vacated, and the case was reassigned to Judge Barth.\nOn February 4, 1999, Judge Barth entered a final judgment of adoption. No appeal was taken from the adoption judgment.\nOn February 16, 1999, the appellants received orders entered in each case by Judge McDunn and dated Saturday, February 13, 1999. Those orders declared that the petitions for substitution for cause had been improperly brought, that Judge Barth did not have jurisdiction to hear or to grant them, and that the substitution orders were void. In addition, the February 13 orders declared that any adoption judgments entered by Judge Barth were also void because he lacked jurisdiction to act in the cases. Judge McDunn\u2019s orders further indicated that the evidence before her was insufficient to grant or deny the adoptions and that it was necessary to hold further hearings for additional proof.\nThese orders again named FRC as a \u201cnecessary\u201d party and \u201csecondary guardian\u201d in both of the adoption cases, and Gary Bauer was allowed immediate access to the confidential adoption files. These orders were sent to FRC by Federal Express delivery and to the parties by regular delivery through the United States Postal Service.\nOn February 17, 1999, the parties again appeared before Judge Barth and presented an emergency motion to clarify the status and jurisdiction in each of the adoption cases. After hearing, Judge Barth entered orders reaffirming his prior orders removing Judge McDunn for cause and restricting access to the existing confidential adoption files. On February 19, 1999, Judge Barth granted the appellants\u2019 joint motion in each case for a stay, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 305 (155 Ill. 2d R. 305), pending completion of all appeals.\nOn March 4, 1999, Judge McDunn issued an order in each case stating that Judge Barth\u2019s stay orders were of no legal effect because he lacked jurisdiction and that her orders of February 13, 1999, remained in full force and effect. Impending dates by which Judge McDunn had previously allowed FRC to file an appearance were extended and status hearings were scheduled. These orders were sent to FRC by Federal Express delivery and to the parties by regular delivery through the United States Postal Service.\nOn March 11, 1999, this court granted appellants\u2019 petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(5) (155 Ill. 2d R. 306 (a)(5)) and set an expedited briefing schedule because the cases involved the care and custody of unemancipated minors.\nWe initially address appellants\u2019 argument that Judge McDunn had no jurisdiction to enter the orders of February 13 and March 4 after she had been removed for cause.\nIllinois law firmly establishes that once a motion for substitution of judge for cause is brought, that judge loses all power and authority over the case and any orders entered after a judge\u2019s removal or after an improper denial of such motion are of no force or effect. See Jiffy Lube International, Inc. v. Agarwal, 277 Ill. App. 3d 722, 727, 661 N.E.2d 463 (1996); People v. Bell, 276 Ill. App. 3d 939, 946-47, 658 N.E.2d 1372 (1995); In re Marriage of Cummins, 106 Ill. App. 3d 44, 47, 435 N.E.2d 506 (1982). Thus, a judge who has been removed from a case for cause has no jurisdiction to enter enforceable orders in that case. Any attempt by the removed judge to rule in such a matter is futile, rendering void all orders entered by that judge after substitution for cause.\nIn the case at bar, Judge Barth held a hearing on the appellants\u2019 motion for substitution of judge for cause and properly granted that motion in light of Judge McDunn\u2019s extreme and patent bias against the adoptive parents based upon their sexual orientation. This bias was manifest in numerous ways, including her insensitive probing and wrongful interrogation of the adoptive parents\u2019 early sexual history. We can conceive of no legitimate motive or worthwhile purpose for questioning the petitioners on such clearly irrelevant matters. In addition, Judge McDunn joined together two totally separate adoptions, whose only common thread was the sexual orientation of the adoptive parents. As a result, she not only injected inadmissible facts into each of the cases, but also inflicted anguish on the petitioners and needlessly prolonged what should have been a simple and straightforward process. In In re Petition of K.M., 274 Ill. App. 3d 189, 194 (1995), this court pointed out that nothing in the Adoption Act suggests that sexual orientation is a relevant consideration in adoption cases. Therefore, \u201c[sjexual orientation is simply not an issue in these cases, which turn exclusively upon this court\u2019s construction of the language of the Act.\u201d\nIn In re Marriage of R.S., 286 Ill. App. 3d 1046, 1055 (1996), a case involving a modification of a custody determination, the court noted that Illinois\u2019 approach to child custody determinations is sexual-orientation neutral.\nIn In re Marriage of Pleasant, 256 Ill. App. 3d 742 (1993), this court strongly criticized a trial judge for focusing on a parent\u2019s sexual orientation in a hearing to modify the visitation provisions in a judgment of dissolution of marriage. We found that the judge\u2019s personal beliefs improperly clouded his judgment. Similarly, here, the record is clear that Judge McDunn\u2019s actions were the result of her personal beliefs regarding homosexuality. It is undisputed from this record that no one opposed these adoptions, except the judge, who obviously had a predetermined bias against lesbians. No judge has the right or authority to ignore the rules governing our administration of justice or to place her interests above those of the litigants.\nPetitioners in both of these cases came to our state court system in order to be allowed to adopt children, children with whom they had already formed a loving relationship over a period of time. A higher purpose cannot be imagined. To have the petitioners treated in the manner that they were is nothing less than appalling.\nThe record indicates that Judge McDunn sought to justify her actions by asserting that the motion for substitution necessarily should have been presented to her in the first instance. Judge McDunn asserted that if the motion had been presented before her, she \u201cwould only have a duty to transfer the motion to another judge for a cause hearing if the movants established a threshold basis for the substitution motion ***. The allegations of the instant substitution motion do not establish a threshold basis.\u201d\nThe December 9, 1998, petition for substitution of judge consisted of a verified motion for substitution for cause, petitioners\u2019 counsel\u2019s affidavit, a copy of the D.S.S. report, the court\u2019s order requiring a best interest hearing, a transcript of the best interest hearing, a transcript of the proceeding in which the G.A.L. moved for entry of judgment of adoption, a transcript of the November 17, 1998, status hearing in the K.D.W. adoption case during which Judge McDunn said she would probably conduct a best interest hearing on the E.L.S. and J.M.S. adoption case before deciding the K.D.W adoption case, a transcript of the proceeding in the E.L.S. and J.M.S. case during which Judge McDunn denied the parties\u2019 joint petition for substitution of judge based on the age of the children, and a transcript of the proceeding in which Judge McDunn refused the parties in the E.L.S. and J.M.S. adoption case\u2019s joint petition for voluntary dismissal. The trial court\u2019s position that this motion and attachments did not establish a threshold basis which required a judge other then Judge McDunn to hear the motion is patently without merit.\nThe statutory language governing motions for substitution of judge for cause requires that upon the filing of such a motion, the trial court must transfer the motion to a judge other than the judge named in the petition for a hearing to determine whether the cause exists. See 735 ILCS 5/2\u20141001(a)(3)(iii) (West 1996); Jiffy Lube International, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 727.\nIt would be the better practice to file the petition in the trial court first; however, the exigencies of this case precluded that. In the instant case, Judge Barth addressed this concern and only allowed the petition to file the motion in his court after concluding that based on the fact that all parties to the case joined in the petition, it was an uncontested adoption, and any further delay was unwarranted. Our review of the record in this case reveals facts that we believe are unique and we find that any further delay in this case would have been unconscionable. For all of these reasons, we affirm Judge Barth\u2019s December 11, 1998, ruling granting the parties\u2019 motion for substitution of judge for cause in the K.D.W adoption case.\nOn September 11, 1998, the parties in the E.L.S. and J.M.S. adoption case filed a joint petition for substitution of judge as of right pursuant to section 2 \u2014 1001(a)(2). Judge McDunn found that the petition had been timely filed but denied it, finding that the one-year-old and three-year-old children who are the subjects of the petition seeking adoption did not consent to the motion for substitution. It has long been the law in Illinois that if a petition for substitution for judge is timely made and is in the proper form, the trial court has no discretion to deny it, and any other order entered after its presentation is a nullity. Nunes v. Northwest Hospital, 253 Ill. App. 3d 337, 625 N.E.2d 376 (1993), appeal denied, 154 Ill. 2d 561, 631 N.E.2d 710 (1994), citing In re Dominique F., 145 Ill. 2d 311, 324, 583 N.E.2d 555 (1991). Guardians ad litem may file motions for substitution of judge on behalf of the juveniles they represent. In re Dominique F., 145 Ill. 2d at 323. Therefore, all orders entered by Judge McDunn after September 11, 1998, in the E.L.S. and J.M.S adoption case are void and of no legal effect.\nWe next consider appellants\u2019 claim that Judge McDunn erred in appointing FRC as a \u201csecondary guardian.\u201d As appellants have argued, there is no provision in Illinois statutory or case law authorizing the addition of FRC as a party to the adoption proceedings below.\nParties to adoption cases are strictly limited to those with legal rights at stake. Cooper v. Hinrichs, 10 Ill. 2d 269, 277, 140 N.E.2d 293 (1957). Where an entity has neither custody nor any other legal right with reference to the children sought to be adopted, that entity is entitled to no greater rights than those enjoyed by members of the general public. Cooper, 10 Ill. 2d at 277. Intervention will be allowed only where the party has an enforceable or recognizable right, not simply a general interest, in the subject matter of the proceeding. In re Adoption of Ruiz, 164 Ill. App. 3d 1036, 1040, 518 N.E.2d 436 (1987).\nHere, FRC has no rights at stake in the two adoption cases below. It had no relationship or cognizable interest in the minor children sought to be adopted and had no legally enforceable right or claim which could properly be asserted or defended in those cases. Moreover, FRC, an organization based in Washington, D.C., was not subject to the jurisdiction of the circuit court of Cook County and was not qualified under the statute to act as a guardian ad litem We find Judge McDunn\u2019s actions in appointing FRC as a \u201csecondary guardian\u201d to be legally and logically indefensible. In addition, we note that there is no indication in the record that the GAL previously appointed to represent the interests of the minor children had failed in his duty. On the contrary, the GAL appointed in the instant cases has a well-known reputation as a skilled practitioner and, based upon the evidence in the record, diligently performed his legal and ethical obligations as representative for the minor children. The appointment of FRC as a \u201csecondary guardian,\u201d without removal of the GAL, or grounds therefore, was unwarranted. Finally, we observe that in making this appointment and permitting FRC access to the court\u2019s files, Judge McDunn improperly disseminated sensitive and confidential information to nonparties, in violation of section 18 of the Adoption Act. 750 ILCS 50/18 et seq. (West 1996). .\nFor the foregoing reasons, the orders entered by Judge McDunn on February 13, 1999, and on March 4, 1999, are hereby vacated and held null and void.\nVacated.\nCAMPBELL, PJ., and QUINN, J., concur.\nIn the circuit court of Cook County, the county division hears all adoption matters. In addition, the case was reassigned to Judge Barth.\nSection 13(B)(a) of the Adoption Act requires that, in all cases, the court shall appoint some licensed attorney other than the State\u2019s Attorney acting in his or her official capacity as guardian ad litem to represent a child sought to be adopted. 750 ILCS 50/13(B)(a) (West 1996).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE ZWICK" } ], "attorneys": [ "Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. (Patricia M. Logue, of counsel), and Mulryan & York (Rosemary S. Mulryan, of counsel), both of Chicago, for appellants.", "Edward J. O\u2019Connell, of Chicago, guardian ad litem,." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re PETITION OF C.M.A., a/k/a C.M.W., et al., TO ADOPT K.D.W., a Minor (C.M.A., a/k/a C.M.W., et al., Petitioners-Appellants; K.D.W., a Minor, Respondent-Appellant).\u2014In re PETITION OF M.M. et al., TO ADOPT E.L.S. et al., Minors (M.M. et al., Petitioners-Appellants; E.L.S. et al., Minors, Respondents-Appellants).\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNos. 1\u201499\u20140769, 1\u201499\u20140770 cons.\nOpinion filed July 19, 1999.\nLambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. (Patricia M. Logue, of counsel), and Mulryan & York (Rosemary S. Mulryan, of counsel), both of Chicago, for appellants.\nEdward J. O\u2019Connell, of Chicago, guardian ad litem,." }, "file_name": "1061-01", "first_page_order": 1079, "last_page_order": 1088 }