{ "id": 173488, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NICHOLAS L. DOGUET, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Doguet", "decision_date": "1999-08-25", "docket_number": "No. 2-97-0830", "first_page": "1", "last_page": "7", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "307 Ill. App. 3d 1" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 409", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821408 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413", "parenthetical": "a challenge to the trial court's statutory authority to impose a particular sentence is not waived when the defendant fails to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0409-01" ] }, { "cite": "288 Ill. App. 3d 308", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1596926 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "315" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/288/0308-01" ] }, { "cite": "285 Ill. App. 3d 36", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1295537 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/285/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "1 Ill. App. 3d 212", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5315842 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218", "parenthetical": "Evans governed plea agreement in which the State agreed not to seek extended or consecutive prison terms" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/1/0212-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 Ill. 2d 260", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 926981 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/184/0260-01" ] }, { "cite": "286 Ill. App. 3d 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1544464 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/286/0597-01" ] }, { "cite": "304 Ill. App. 3d 472", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 564548 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "473, 475" }, { "page": "475", "parenthetical": "where trial court advised defendant that he could file either a motion to withdraw his guilty plea or a motion to reconsider sentence, fundamental fairness required a remand for Rule 604(d) admonishments" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/304/0472-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 Ill. App. 3d 291", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1208029 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/305/0291-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 Ill. App. 3d 727", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1208129 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "731" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/305/0727-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 Ill. 2d 67", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 243897 ], "weight": 13, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "74" }, { "page": "74" }, { "page": "77-80", "parenthetical": "Freeman, C.J., specially concurring" }, { "page": "77-80", "parenthetical": "Freeman, C.J., specially concurring" }, { "page": "78", "parenthetical": "Freeman, C.J., specially concurring" }, { "page": "79", "parenthetical": "Freeman, C.J., specially concurring" }, { "page": "77, 80", "parenthetical": "Freeman, C.J., specially concurring" }, { "page": "77", "parenthetical": "Freeman, C.J., specially concurring" }, { "page": "79", "parenthetical": "Freeman, C.J., specially concurring" }, { "page": "74" }, { "page": "74" }, { "page": "74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/186/0067-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 Ill. 2d 320", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 223611 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332" }, { "page": "327-28, 332" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/174/0320-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 640, "char_count": 14943, "ocr_confidence": 0.831, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5613265258925818e-07, "percentile": 0.6769885039629724 }, "sha256": "17e9c60a245a7ca43034dea9e33a34de7b4b3ebc368c577983ec02732a490b6f", "simhash": "1:7a3b576f77c4b4f7", "word_count": 2445 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:00:41.446378+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NICHOLAS L. DOGUET, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE COLWELL\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Nicholas L. Doguet, pleaded guilty to second-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 2(a)(1) (West 1994)) in exchange for the State\u2019s agreement not to seek an extended-term sentence. After the circuit court of Winnebago County sentenced him to an 11-year prison term, defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which was denied. Defendant appeals the denial of that motion, maintaining (a) that his sentence was excessive and (b) that the trial court erred in relying on uncorroborated hearsay testimony in determining his sentence. We dismiss defendant\u2019s appeal and remand the matter to the trial court.\nOn October 14, 1995, defendant\u2019s wife, Cindy Doguet, was shot and killed in a Holiday Inn in Rockford. That same day, defendant gave a statement to police and admitted shooting Cindy. Defendant told police that he shot her in the chest following her persistent verbal and physical attacks on him. A grand jury returned an indictment against defendant on October 25, 1995, charging him with alternative counts of first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 1994)). Defendant and the State subsequently entered into a plea agreement under which defendant agreed to plead guilty to second-degree murder. On March 25, 1997, the State filed an information charging defendant with second-degree murder under the theory that he shot Cindy while acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation. It appears from the record that the State dismissed the first-degree murder charges against defendant.\nAlso on March 25, 1997, defendant, defendant\u2019s attorney, and an assistant State\u2019s Attorney attended a hearing during which the attorneys informed the trial court of the plea agreement. Defense counsel stated that, under the agreement, the State would not seek an extended-term sentence. The assistant State\u2019s Attorney referred to the deal as \u201ca partially negotiated plea agreement,\u201d and defense counsel called it an \u201copen plea.\u201d The trial court admonished defendant pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 402 (134 Ill. 2d R. 402), accepted defendant\u2019s guilty plea, and continued the cause for sentencing.\nThe sentencing hearing began on May 20, 1997. Among the individuals who testified for defendant were four of his coworkers and his father. Defendant\u2019s coworkers testified that defendant was a dependable employee and a peaceful, nonviolent, and honest man. They also related stories depicting Cindy as a physically abusive wife and defendant as an extremely passive husband who refused to retaliate. For example, one witness observed an event in which Cindy beat defendant with closed fists but defendant merely covered up his head. In response to this testimony, the State introduced an undated letter purportedly authored by Cindy. Apparently recovered from defendant\u2019s truck, the letter referenced defendant\u2019s tendency to beat up his wife. It was signed \u201cLove from your wife, Cindy Doguet.\u201d The State did not introduce another handwriting sample written by Cindy. Over defense counsel\u2019s objection, the trial court admitted the letter and found it reliable.\nDespite the State\u2019s recommendation of a 20-year term of imprisonment, the trial court sentenced defendant to an 11-year term. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)), the trial court advised defendant of his right to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea or a motion to reconsider sentence. The trial court informed defendant that if he wanted to appeal his sentence, he would first have to file a motion to reconsider sentence. On June 19, 1997, defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence in which he argued that his sentence was excessive and that the trial court erred in finding the letter reliable. The trial court denied that motion. Defendant never filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea.\nDefendant\u2019s first contention on appeal is that his sentence was excessive. According to the State, however, defendant waived this argument by not moving to withdraw his guilty plea. The State relies on People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320 (1996), in support of its position.\nIn Evans, a case involving consolidated appeals, our supreme court decided how Rule 604(d) applies to negotiated, as opposed to open, plea agreements. Rule 604(d) provides in pertinent part:\n\u201cNo appeal from a judgment entered upon a plea of guilty shall be taken unless the defendant, within 30 days of the date on which sentence is imposed, files in the trial court a motion to reconsider the sentence, if only the sentence is being challenged, or, if the plea is being challenged, a motion to withdraw his plea of guilty and vacate the judgment.\u201d 145 Ill. 2d R. 604(d).\nIn Evans, the defendants and the State entered into negotiated plea agreements in which the defendants pleaded guilty to certain charges. In return, the State agreed to dismiss other charges and to recommend specific terms of imprisonment. After being sentenced to the recommended terms, both defendants appealed their sentences. Deciding the case under contract law principles, the court held that a defendant seeking to challenge the excessiveness of his sentence under these circumstances must first move to withdraw the guilty plea and vacate the judgment against him. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 332. The court reasoned that to allow a defendant to seek a modification of the agreed-upon sentence while binding the State to its part of the negotiated plea agreement would invalidate the plea agreement. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 327-28, 332.\nSoon after the State filed its brief in the instant case, our supreme court decided People v. Linder, 186 Ill. 2d 67 (1999), another consolidated appeal. Linder addressed the situation where a defendant pleads guilty to a charge in exchange for the State\u2019s dismissing charges and recommending a sentence \u201ccap.\u201d In both cases in Linder, the recommended sentence caps were less than the maximum nonextended sentences allowable under the Unified Code of Corrections (Code of Corrections) (730 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 1\u20141 et seq. (West-1994)). Further, the actual sentences imposed in both cases were less than the recommended sentence caps. The Linder court followed Evans, holding that a defendant who pleads guilty in exchange for a recommended sentencing cap \u201cis, in effect, agreeing not to challenge any sentence imposed below that cap on the grounds that it is excessive.\u201d Linder, 186 Ill. 2d at 74. Since neither defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate the judgment against him, the supreme court held that the appellate court should have dismissed both appeals. Linder, 186 Ill. 2d at 74.\nThe Illinois Appellate Court, Second District, has decided three related cases since Linder was filed \u2014 People v. Mast, 305 Ill. App. 3d 727 (1999), People v. Wyatt, 305 Ill. App. 3d 291 (1999), and People v. Knowles, 304 Ill. App. 3d 472 (1999). All of these cases involved situations where the defendants pleaded guilty to certain charges and the State agreed only to dismiss other charges. In none of the plea agreements did the State agree to recommend a sentence, a sentencing cap, or a sentencing range. The panel in Knowles held that such negotiated plea agreements require defendants to move to withdraw their guilty pleas in order to challenge their sentences as excessive. Knowles, 304 Ill. App. 3d at 473, 475. The Mast and Wyatt panels, on the other hand, reached the exact opposite conclusion, holding that such plea arrangements do not require the filing of such a motion. Mast, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 731; Wyatt, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 294.\nWhile we recognize this split in the second district, we find that these cases, along with People v. Johnson, 286 Ill. App. 3d 597 (1997), overruled on other grounds by People v. Latona, 184 Ill. 2d 260 (1998), are factually distinguishable from the instant case. In those cases, the parties made no agreement whatsoever as to a sentence recommendation, whereas the State in this case agreed not to pursue an extended-term sentence.\nPrior to determining whether Evans and Linder control, we find it necessary to discuss Justice Freeman\u2019s special concurrence in Linder. There, Justice Freeman reviewed the differences between the three types of \u201cnegotiated\u201d pleas. Two of these pleas \u2014 the \u201cnegotiated as to charge and/or sentence\u201d plea and the \u201cfully\u201d negotiated plea\u2014 require a defendant to move to withdraw his guilty plea before challenging the excessiveness of his sentence. Linder, 186 Ill. 2d at 77-80 (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring). The remaining type of negotiated plea, the \u201cnegotiated as to charge\u201d plea, requires only that a defendant file a motion to reconsider sentence to preserve his right to make such a challenge. Linder, 186 Ill. 2d at 77-80 (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring). According to Justice Freeman, whether a given plea agreement can be categorized as a \u201cnegotiated as to charge and/or sentence\u201d plea or as a \u201cnegotiated as to charge\u201d plea depends upon the sentencing concession made by the State. A plea agreement falls into the former category if the defendant pleads guilty \u201cin exchange for a sentence recommendation or range.\u201d Linder, 186 Ill. 2d at 78 (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring). Under this scenario, due to its bargain with the defendant, the State \u201climit[s] its ability to argue at sentencing for a sentence from the full panoply of penalties contained in the Code of Corrections.\u201d Linder, 186 Ill. 2d at 79 (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring). The \u201cnegotiated as to charge\u201d category, on the other hand, applies to situations where the defendant pleads guilty to a charge but where the State makes no promises with respect to sentencing. Linder, 186 Ill. 2d at 77, 80 (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring). Under this scenario, the State retains its ability to seek \u201cthe full range of penalties provided for in the Code of Corrections including maximum sentences and extended terms.\u201d Linder, 186 Ill. 2d at 77 (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring).\nIn this case, defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree murder in exchange for (a) the dismissal of the first-degree murder counts and (b) the State\u2019s agreement not to seek an extended-term sentence. The applicable sentencing range for second-degree murder was 4 to 20 years (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(1.5) (West 1994)), and the maximum extended-term sentence was 30 years (720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 2(d) (West 1994); 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20142(a)(3) (West 1994)). The State, in fact, sought a 20-year sentence.\nWe hold that Evans and Linder govern the plea agreement in this case, since the agreement falls squarely within Justice Freeman\u2019s \u201cnegotiated as to charge and/or sentence\u201d category. Since the full sentencing range for the crime was 30 years, the State made a sentencing concession in this case by agreeing not to seek a sentence in excess of 20 years. Defendant received this benefit in exchange for his agreement to plead guilty to second-degree murder. By agreeing not to recommend an extended-term sentence, the State thus restricted itself from pursuing the \u201cfull panoply of penalties contained in the Code of Corrections.\u201d Linder, 186 Ill. 2d at 79 (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring). Despite the fact that the 20-year prison term recommended by the State was in fact the maximum nonextended term, we view the instant plea agreement as establishing a sentencing cap of 20 years. See People v. Economy, 29.1 Ill. App. 3d 212, 218 (1997) (Evans governed plea agreement in which the State agreed not to seek extended or consecutive prison terms).\nThe trial court sentenced defendant to an 11-year prison term. Yet by entering into the negotiated plea agreement with the State, defendant impliedly agreed that a sentence of 20 years or less would not be excessive. See Linder, 186 Ill. 2d at 74; People v, Catron, 285 Ill. App. 3d 36, 37 (1996). Therefore, the proper method for preserving his right to challenge his sentence on the ground that it was excessive was to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate the judgment. Linder, 186 Ill. 2d at 74. In failing to file such a motion, defendant has waived the argument that his sentence was excessive.\nHowever, since the trial court advised defendant that he could preserve his right to challenge the excessiveness of his sentence simply by filing a motion to reconsider sentence, we remand this cause so that the trial court can admonish defendant pursuant to Rule 604(d). See Knowles, 304 Ill. App. 3d at 475 (where trial court advised defendant that he could file either a motion to withdraw his guilty plea or a motion to reconsider sentence, fundamental fairness required a remand for Rule 604(d) admonishments). On remand, defendant is to be advised of his right to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and the consequences thereof.\nParenthetically, we must note our belief that People v. Smith, 288 Ill. App. 3d 308 (1997), is no longer good law. The Smith court held that Evans does not apply to a plea agreement in which the State agrees to recommend a sentencing cap. Smith, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 315. However, in holding just the opposite, Linder impliedly overruled Smith. See Linder, 186 Ill. 2d at 74.\nDefendant\u2019s second argument is that the trial court improperly relied on Cindy\u2019s letter in determining his sentence. Here, defendant is not merely complaining that his sentence is excessive; rather, he is essentially arguing that he did not receive a fair sentencing hearing. Such an argument compels judicial review. See People v. Wilson, 181 Ill. 2d 409, 413 (1998) (a challenge to the trial court\u2019s statutory authority to impose a particular sentence is not waived when the defendant fails to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea); Economy, 291 Ill. App. 3d at 219 (motion to reconsider sentence is proper vehicle in which to argue that the trial court misapplied the law by considering improper sentencing factors). Nonetheless, we choose not to address defendant\u2019s second argument at this time, since, if the trial court were to grant a motion to withdraw defendant\u2019s guilty plea, such a decision would render defendant\u2019s second argument moot.\nFor the reasons stated, we dismiss the instant appeal and remand the cause for the trial court to admonish defendant of his right to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and the consequences thereof.\nAppeal dismissed; cause remanded with directions.\nTHOMAS and RAPE JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE COLWELL" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, and Lawrence D. Wechter, of Law Office of Larry Wechter, of Batavia, for appellant.", "Paul A. Logli, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (Martin E Moltz and Joan M. Kripke, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NICHOLAS L. DOGUET, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201497\u20140830\nOpinion filed August 25, 1999.\nRehearing denied September 24, 1999.\nG. Joseph Weller, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, and Lawrence D. Wechter, of Law Office of Larry Wechter, of Batavia, for appellant.\nPaul A. Logli, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (Martin E Moltz and Joan M. Kripke, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0001-01", "first_page_order": 19, "last_page_order": 25 }