{ "id": 173575, "name": "THE ESTATE OF BENJAMIN DOWNS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WAYNE L. WEBSTER, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Estate of Downs v. Webster", "decision_date": "1999-09-03", "docket_number": "No. 3-98-0744", "first_page": "65", "last_page": "71", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "307 Ill. App. 3d 65" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "233 Ill. App. 428", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 3091954 ], "year": 1924, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/233/0428-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 Ill. App. 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 2571273 ], "year": 1903, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/107/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "676 N.E.2d 299", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307" }, { "page": "307" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 Ill. App. 3d 325", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1544430 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "337" }, { "page": "337-38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/286/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "510 N.E.2d 437", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "443" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 Ill. App. 3d 691", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3506671 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "700" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/156/0691-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 Ill. 2d 218", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477021 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/164/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 Ill. App. 415", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 3180144 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1929, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/254/0415-01" ] }, { "cite": "11 Ill. 527", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2573399 ], "year": 1850, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "528" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/11/0527-01" ] }, { "cite": "32 N.E.2d 463", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1935, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "5 Ohio Op. 387", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio Op.", "year": 1935, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 604, "char_count": 11555, "ocr_confidence": 0.838, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.680019714753517e-08, "percentile": 0.4525775440962002 }, "sha256": "61c0568837bcb983b0079201f9195628fa705c2fcaec735d6becfac881d1e6ed", "simhash": "1:5f1e13540ac55ab3", "word_count": 1923 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:00:41.446378+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE ESTATE OF BENJAMIN DOWNS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WAYNE L. WEBSTER, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LYTTON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe estate of Benjamin Downs (estate), through its executor, Caroline Downs, instituted an action in replevin against defendant Wayne L. Webster, d/b/a Galesburg Mini-Storage. Caroline sought recovery of property wrongfully placed in Webster\u2019s storage facility by the estate\u2019s original executor, Thomas Downs. The trial court found that, pursuant to section 3 of the Self-Service Storage Facility Act (Act) (770 ILCS 95/3 (West 1996)), and a lease agreement entered into between Webster and Thomas, Webster had an existing lien for past rent, attorney fees and costs on all property that Thomas placed in the facility. Caroline appeals, claiming that (1) Webster cannot have a lien on \u201cstolen\u201d property, and (2) attorney fees were improper. In addition, Webster contends that he is entitled to collect rent that has accrued during the pendency of this appeal. We affirm in part and reverse in part.\nI. FACTS\nBenjamin Downs died in January 1988. Thomas was appointed executor of Benjamin\u2019s estate; he was subsequently removed as executor in December 1989 amidst allegations of improper conduct. Caroline then became executor of the estate.\nOne month after his removal, Thomas entered into a lease with Webster, owner of Galesburg Mini-Storage, for rental of a storage unit. Under the terms of the lease, Thomas agreed to pay \u201call costs, including attorney fees, incurred in collecting any money due hereunder or enforcing the terms of this lease.\u201d\nUpon discovering that Thomas had stored property belonging to the estate in Webster\u2019s storage facility, Caroline, as executor, filed an action in replevin against Webster. After a bench trial, the court found Webster to have a lien on all property contained in the storage facility for past rent, attorney fees and court costs. The court ordered Webster, upon payment of the lien, to return any items belonging to the estate. Caroline appeals.\nII. LIEN CLAIM\nCiting general common law principles, Caroline claims that \u201cone cannot derive an interest in property, be it title to property or a lien over a property[,] from a thief.\u201d Accordingly, Webster cannot have any interest in the estate property because Thomas had no ownership rights over the property when he placed it in storage. Webster responds that a lien on the property is appropriate under section 3 of the Act.\n1\nLiens originate from a variety of sources, including the common law, statute and equity. D. Overton, The Law of Liens \u00a7 38, at 40 (Banks & Bros. ed. 1883). The common law right to impose a lien or seize property for the compulsion of rental payments dates back to feudal times. L. Jones, The Law of Liens \u00a7 561, at 347 (2d ed. 1894). At common law, innkeepers could maintain a lien over property that guests brought to the inn. There were two opposing theories, however, regarding whether an innkeeper could secure a hen on stolen property. D. Overton, The Law of Liens \u00a7 122, at 149 (Banks & Bros. ed. 1883). Ohio\u2019s common law, for example, would not allow an innkeeper\u2019s lien under such circumstances. See M&M Hotel Co. v. Nichols, 5 Ohio Op. 387, 32 N.E.2d 463 (1935). In contrast, Overton, in his treatise on lien law, explained:\n\u201cIf property *** [is] brought by a guest to an inn, at which he obtains accommodations, and leaves the property in custody of the innkeeper, it seems the lien will attach thereto, whether it belong to a guest or *** even if it had been stolen by the guest. For the innkeeper is bound to receive and entertain the guest, and when unaccompanied by any suspicious circumstances, would not be justified in inquiring into the title to the property delivered by the guest to his possession.\u201d D. Overton, The Law of Liens \u00a7 123, at 150 (Banks & Bros. ed. 1883), citing Yorke v. Greenaugh, 2 Ld. Raym. 866 (1702).\nInnkeepers\u2019 rights are no longer within the province of the common law, having been replaced by statute, \u201cwith some modifications and extensions,\u201d in all states. J. Sherry, Law of Innkeepers \u00a7 20:20, at 605 (rev. ed. 1981).\nLandlord-tenant rights also evolved from the common law. While the common law did not allow a landlord, in the absence of a statute or agreement, to acquire a lien over a tenant\u2019s property when the tenant defaulted on rental payments (24 Ill. L. & Prac. Landlord & Tenant \u00a7 461, at 558 (1980)), the common law did provide that \u201call chattels found upon the demised premises were prima facie distrainable, whether they belonged to the tenant or not.\u201d L. Jones, The Law of Liens \u00a7 561, at 347 (2d ed. 1894); see also Gray v. Rawson, 11 Ill. 527, 528 (1850).\nLike innkeepers\u2019 rights, landlords\u2019 rights have been codified. However, a \u201clandlord\u2019s statutory lien for rent does not generally attach to goods of other persons which happen to be upon the demised premises.\u201d L. Jones, The Law of Liens \u00a7 566, at 350 (2d ed. 1894).\n2\nAlthough the common law, in many instances, has been supplanted by statute, its history is reflected throughout Illinois statutory law and remains informative. In the Act, the Labor and Storage Lien Act (770 ILCS 45/1 (West 1996)), and the Labor and Storage Lien (Small Amount) Act (770 ILCS 50/1 (West 1996)), the Illinois legislature, like the common law, has followed two distinct approaches to liens on stored property and the rights of third parties.\nA\nSection 3 of the Act provides:\n\u201cThe owner of a self-service storage facility and his heirs, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns have a lien upon all personal property located at a self-service storage facility for rent, labor, or other charges, present or future ***.\u201d 770 ILCS 95/3 (West 1996).\nIn drafting the Act, no exception was made for property wrongfully placed in a storage facility. Instead, the legislature stated that an owner of a self-service storage facility has a lien \u201cupon all personal property located\u201d within.\nThe broad language of section 3 establishes that an owner of a self-service storage facility may have a lien on all property stored within the facility even property stored there by a person having no possessory or ownership rights over the property. This interpretation is supported by National Malted Food Corp. v. Crawford, 254 Ill. App. 415 (1929), a case that addressed the scope of \u201cAn Act for the protection of Innkeepers\u201d (Innkeepers\u2019 Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1927, ch. 71, par. 2). The Innkeepers\u2019 Act provided that \u201c[ejvery hotel proprietor shall have a lien upon all baggage and effects brought into said hotel by his guests for any and all proper charges due him from such guests for hotel accommodations.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1927, ch. 71, par. 2. The court construed this provision to mean that an innkeeper can have \u201ca lien on all the property brought by the guests into the hotel, even though the innkeeper has notice that such property belongs to another.\u201d National Malted Food, 254 Ill. App. at 418. The statutory language at issue in National Malted Food is similar to the language of section 3 of the Act. We find no reason to interpret section 3 any narrower than the Innkeeper\u2019s Act.\nB\nHad the legislature intended a less expansive application, it could have drafted the Act with qualifying language similar to that of the Labor and Storage Lien Act or the Labor and Storage Lien (Small Amount) Act. Both the Labor and Storage Lien Act and the Labor and Storage Lien (Small Amount) Act require a person storing personal property to have legal authority over the property as a condition precedent to imposition of a lien.\nSection 1 of the Labor and Storage Lien Act provides:\n\u201cEvery person, firm or corporation who has *** furnished storage for said chattel, at the request of its owner *** or authorized agent of the owner, or possessor thereof, shall have a lien upon such chattel beginning on the date of the commencement of *** such storage ***.\u201d 770 ILCS 45/1 (West 1996).\nSection 1 of the Labor and Storage Lien (Small Amount) Act provides:\n\u201cEvery person *** furnishing storage for any chattel at the request of or with the consent of its owner, authorized agent of the owner, or lawful possessor thereof, in the amount of $2,000 or less, shall have a lien upon such chattel beginning upon the date of commencement of *** furnishing of storage ***.\u201d 770 ILCS 50/1 (West 1996).\nRather than utilizing restrictive language similar to that of the Labor and Storage Lien Act and the Labor and Storage Lien (Small Amount) Act, the legislature, in this instance, resolved to use more expansive language. That language must be given effect. See People v. Hicks, 164 Ill. 2d 218, 222 (1995). Any interpretation inconsistent with the legislature\u2019s express intent shall be avoided. The trial court\u2019s finding of a lien on all property which Thomas has stored in Webster\u2019s facility, even property wrongfully placed there, was appropriate.\nIII. ATTORNEY FEES\nCaroline next contends that Webster is not entitled to attorney fees. Webster responds that attorney fees are recoverable under section 3 of the Act.\nA court may only award attorney fees if they are expressly authorized by statute or by agreement of the parties. In re Marriage of Magnuson, 156 Ill. App. 3d 691, 700, 510 N.E.2d 437, 443 (1987). Statutes that allow for recovery of attorney fees must do so by specific language. ESG Watts, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 286 Ill. App. 3d 325, 337, 676 N.E.2d 299, 307 (1997). When the language does not specifically state that \u201cattorney fees\u201d are recoverable, courts will not give the language an expanded meaning. ESG Watts, Inc., 286 Ill. App. 3d at 337-38, 676 N.E.2d at 307.\nHere, attorney fees were improper. First, they are not authorized by statute. Section 3 of the Act does not contain an attorney fee provision. Rather, it allows recovery for \u201crent, labor, or other charges, present or future, in relation to the personal property, and for expenses necessary for its preservation, or expenses reasonably incurred in its sale or other disposition pursuant to this Act.\u201d 770 ILCS 95/3 (West 1996). This language is insufficient to support an attorney fee award.\nSecond, the parties did not contract for attorney fees. Although the lease agreement between Thomas and Webster contains an attorney fee provision, Thomas entered that agreement individually, not as executor. Neither Caroline nor any other person representing the estate was a party to the agreement. Accordingly, the attorney fee award is reversed.\nIV ADDITIONAL RENT\nWebster claims that he is entitled to recover additional rent and fees that have accumulated through the course of plaintiffs appeal. Webster asks that we remand for a hearing to determine the amount that he is entitled to collect.\nWebster may be entitled to additional rent that has accrued during the course of this appeal. However, we decline Webster\u2019s request that we remand this cause to the trial court. If the parties are unable to resolve this issue without court action, Webster may institute a separate proceeding.\nV CONCLUSION\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Knox County is affirmed in part and reversed in part.\nAffirmed in part and reversed in part.\nHOLDRIDGE, P.J., and BRESLIN, J., concur.\nSee, for example, Bauman Loan Co. v. Hatowsky, 107 Ill. App. 181 (1903), and People ex rel. Russell v. Michigan Avenue Trust Co., 233 Ill. App. 428 (1924).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LYTTON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Walwyn M. Trezise (argued), of Fairbury, for appellant.", "Christopher W Kanthak (argued), of Galesburg, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE ESTATE OF BENJAMIN DOWNS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WAYNE L. WEBSTER, Defendant-Appellee.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201498\u20140744\nOpinion filed September 3, 1999.\nWalwyn M. Trezise (argued), of Fairbury, for appellant.\nChristopher W Kanthak (argued), of Galesburg, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0065-01", "first_page_order": 83, "last_page_order": 89 }