{ "id": 173546, "name": "In re DETENTION OF JACK GARDNER (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Jack Gardner, Respondent-Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Gardner", "decision_date": "1999-09-03", "docket_number": "No. 4-98-1029", "first_page": "85", "last_page": "91", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "307 Ill. App. 3d 85" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "265 N.E.2d 144", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "146", "parenthetical": "although not confined in prison, a parolee remains in custody until the expiration of his sentence" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 Ill. 2d 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2903930 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174", "parenthetical": "although not confined in prison, a parolee remains in custody until the expiration of his sentence" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/47/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "610 N.E.2d 1250", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1253" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 Ill. 2d 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4810424 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/155/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "667 N.E.2d 1305", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1307" }, { "page": "1307" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "172 Ill. 2d 452", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 55998 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "457" }, { "page": "457" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/172/0452-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 N.E.2d 493", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "495" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5426498 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998 Ill. Legis. Serv. 3397", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Legis. Serv.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 545, "char_count": 12846, "ocr_confidence": 0.838, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.7542835041679323e-07, "percentile": 0.70896913294945 }, "sha256": "ba04d9e272b30bd61af32b53c125561607897c9b1f2efcdfc61821986c3c89b3", "simhash": "1:c92cb6dc72eee9f2", "word_count": 2101 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:00:41.446378+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re DETENTION OF JACK GARDNER (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Jack Gardner, Respondent-Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn December 1998, respondent, Jack Gardner, moved to dismiss the State\u2019s petition seeking to have him committed as a sexually violent person, pursuant to the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (Act) (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 1998)). Later that same month, the trial court conducted a hearing and granted respondent\u2019s motion. The State appeals, and we reverse and remand.\nI. BACKGROUND\nOn November 24, 1998, the State filed a petition to commit respondent as a sexually violent person, alleging the following: (1) in February 1995, respondent was convicted of a sexually violent offense \u2014 namely, three counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12\u201416 (West 1994)) (Coles County case No. 94 \u2014 CF\u2014289); (2) respondent was within 90 days of entry into mandatory supervised release (MSR) from a five-year sentence imposed for those convictions; (3) respondent suffered from the mental disorders of pedophilia, alcohol abuse, and borderline intellectual functioning; and (4) respondent was dangerous to others because his mental disorders created a substantial probability that he would engage in acts of sexual violence. That same day, the trial court ordered respondent to be detained and scheduled a probable-cause hearing, pursuant to section 30 of the Act (725 ILCS 207/30 (West 1998)), for November 30, 1998.\nAt the November 30, 1998, hearing, the State moved to amend its petition to further allege that (1) respondent was then serving a sentence for a conviction for failing to report a change of address as a sex offender (730 ILCS 150/6 (West 1996)) (Coles County case No. 97\u2014CF\u201459), which was being served consecutively with or concurrently to his sentence for the aggravated criminal sexual abuse convictions; and (2) respondent \u201cwas to be released within 90 days of the filing of the original petition,\u201d on November 28, 1998. The State pointed out that the Act had recently been amended to allow the State to file a petition when the offender was serving a sentence that was running consecutively to or concurrently with a sentence for a sexually violent offense (Pub. Act 90\u2014793, \u00a7 20, eff. August 14, 1998 (1998 Ill. Legis. Serv. 3397, 3418-19 (West)); 725 ILCS 207/15 (West 1998)). At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court continued the proceedings to allow the parties an opportunity to research the applicability of the amendment to the present case.\nThe following day, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the State\u2019s petition, alleging that (1) the Act required a petition be filed when an offender was within 90 days of discharge from a sexually violent offense; and (2) respondent was not then, serving, a sentence for a sexually violent offense. On December 3, 1998, the State filed an amended petition, in which it included the additional allegations earlier discussed.\nAt a December 1998 hearing on respondent\u2019s motion to dismiss, the trial court first granted the State\u2019s motion to amend its petition, and respondent told the court that his motion to dismiss adequately set forth his challenge to the amended petition. Randy Stevenson, the supervisor of the Robinson Correctional Center\u2019s records office, then testified as follows.\nOn February 22, 1995, respondent began serving his five-year sentence for the aggravated criminal sexual abuse convictions at the Department of Corrections (DOC). On December 23, 1996, respondent was released from Robinson Correctional Center and placed on two years\u2019 MSR. On April 7, 1997, respondent was sentenced to a 26-month prison term for failing to report a change of address as a sex offender (730 ILCS 150/6 (West 1996)), to be served concurrently with respondent\u2019s sentence imposed for his aggravated criminal sexual abuse convictions. As a result of that 1997 conviction, the Prisoner Review Board declared respondent to be an MSR violator, and respondent\u2019s discharge for his sexually violent offense convictions\u2014 that is, his aggravated criminal sexual abuse convictions \u2014 was recalculated to be February 21, 1998. Thus, on that date, respondent\u2019s sentence for the sexually violent offense convictions terminated, and he was released from physical custody. (Due to good-time credit, respondent\u2019s physical release date for the failure to report a change of address conviction was January 24, 1998.) However, upon his release from prison, respondent was still serving one year of MSR for failing to report a change of address.\nOn October 2, 1998, respondent was again incarcerated for violating a term of his MSR by removing an electronic monitoring device from his ankle. As a result of that MSR violation, respondent\u2019s discharge for the failure to report a change of address conviction was recalculated to be November 28, 1998. According to Stevenson, even though respondent was not in physical custody from February 21, 1998, until October 2, 1998, he was still in DOC\u2019s constructive custody because he was serving his one-year term of MSR for failing to report a change of address. Stevenson also testified that an offender is \u201cdischarged\u201d from his sentence only after he fully completes the sentence.\nAfter considering counsel\u2019s arguments, the trial court granted respondent\u2019s motion to dismiss, finding that the amendment to the Act did not apply to a situation \u2014 like the present case \u2014 in which an offender had been placed on MSR, returned to prison after violating his MSR, and subsequently discharged from his sentence directly from prison. In particular, the court found that the word \u201cdischarge\u201d does not have the same meaning as that used by DOC, and the State should have filed its petition within 30 days of respondent\u2019s entry into MSR for failing to report a change of address as a sex offender.\nII. THE TRIAL COURT\u2019S GRANTING OF RESPONDENT\u2019S MOTION TO DISMISS\nThe State argues that the trial court erred by granting respondent\u2019s motion to dismiss. Specifically, the State contends that the court erroneously determined that the amendatory language of section 15 of the Act did not apply to the present case. We agree.\nInitially, we note that respondent did not file a brief in support of the trial court\u2019s order. In First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133, 345 N.E.2d 493, 495 (1976), the supreme court held that when the record is simple and the claimed errors are such that a reviewing court can easily decide them without the aid of the appellee\u2019s brief, the reviewing court should decide the merits of the appeal. Because we conclude that this is such a case, we address the merits of the State\u2019s appeal despite defendant\u2019s failure to file a brief.\nThis issue requires this court to interpret section 15 of the Act, as it reads following the amendment by Public Act 90\u2014793. Section 15 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:\n\u201c(a) A petition alleging that a person is a sexually violent person may be filed by:\n(1) The Attorney General ***. If the Attorney General *** decides to file a petition under this [s]ection, he or she shall file the petition before the date of the release or discharge of the person or within 30 days of placement onto parole or mandatory supervised release for [a sexually violent] offense enumerated in paragraph (e) of [sjection 5 of this Act.\n(2) If the Attorney General does not file a petition under this [s]ection, the State\u2019s Attorney of the county in which the person was convicted of a sexually violent offense *** may file a petition.\n(b) A petition filed under this [s]ection shall allege that all of the following apply to the person alleged to be a sexually violent person: $ % $\u2022:\n(2) The person is within 90 days of discharge or entry into mandatory supervised release from a Department of Corrections correctional facility for a sentence that was imposed upon a conviction for a sexually violent offense or for a sentence that is being served concurrently or consecutively with a sexually violent offense or is within the initial 30 days of the person\u2019s entry date into parole or mandatory supervised release.\u201d (Emphasis denotes language added by Public Act 90\u2014793.) 725 ILCS 207/15 (West 1998).\nIn construing this section, we must ascertain and give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent. The language of the statute generally provides the best evidence of the legislature\u2019s intent. Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, a court must give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words without resorting to extrinsic aids for construction. People v. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d 452, 457, 667 N.E.2d 1305, 1307 (1996). Moreover, a statute must be read as a whole, and no word or paragraph should be interpreted so as to be rendered meaningless. Collins v. Board of Trustees of the Firemen\u2019s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 155 Ill. 2d 103, 111, 610 N.E.2d 1250, 1253 (1993). Because the construction of a statute is a question of law, our review is de novo. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d at 457, 667 N.E.2d at 1307.\nThe Act does not define the word \u201cdischarge.\u201d However, that word has a well-known legal meaning within the context of criminal procedure and corrections. Section 3\u20141\u20142(g) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) defines \u201cdischarge\u201d as \u201cthe final termination of a commitment to the Department of Corrections.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 1\u20142(g) (West 1998); see also 730 ILCS Ann. 5/3 \u2014 1\u20142, Council Commentary \u2014 1973, at 11 (Smith-Hurd 1997) (\u201c \u2018Discharge\u2019 does not include release on *** mandatory release or parole release\u201d). \u201cCommitment\u201d is defined as \u201ca judicially determined placement in the custody of the Department of Corrections on the basis of *** [a] conviction.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 1\u20142(b) (West 1998). When an offender is released from a DOC correctional facility and placed on MSR, DOC retains \u201ccustody\u201d of that offender until \u201cdischarge.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/3\u2014 14 \u2014 2(a) (West 1998); see People ex rel. Johnson v. Pate, 47 Ill. 2d 172, 174, 265 N.E.2d 144, 146 (1970) (although not confined in prison, a parolee remains in custody until the expiration of his sentence). Thus, an offender is discharged from his sentence only when DOC no longer has actual or constructive custody of him. Accordingly, under the Act, \u201cdischarge\u201d and \u201centry into MSR\u201d have separate and distinct meanings.\nConstruing the Act in accordance with the aforementioned principles, we conclude that under section 15, the Attorney General or State\u2019s Attorney may file a petition to have an offender committed as a sexually violent person if the offender is (1) within 90 days of discharge from a DOC correctional facility for a sentence that was imposed upon a conviction for a sexually violent offense (as enumerated in section 5(e) of the Act (725 ILCS 207/5(e) (West 1998))), (2) within 90 days of entry into MSR from a DOC correctional facility for a sentence that was imposed upon a conviction for a sexually violent offense, (3) within 30 days of placement onto parole or MSR for a sexually violent offense, (4) within 90 days of discharge from a DOC correctional facility for a sentence that is being served concurrently with or consecutively to a sexually violent offense, or (5) within 90 days of entry into MSR from a DOC correctional facility for a sentence that is being served concurrently with or consecutively to a sexually violent offense.\nAs earlier stated, respondent\u2019s 26-month sentence for failing to report an address change as a sex offender was to be served concuirently with the sentence imposed for his aggravated criminal sexual abuse convictions, and his discharge for failing to report an address change was November 28, 1998. (Respondent\u2019s discharge was recalculated as a result of his having violated the terms of his MSR by removing from his ankle an electronic monitoring device.) Thus, the State properly filed its November 24, 1998, petition, which it later amended, within 90 days of respondent\u2019s discharge from a DOC correctional facility for a sentence that was being served concurrently with a sexually violent offense, pursuant to section 15 of the Act. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred by granting respondent\u2019s motion to dismiss the State\u2019s petition to have him committed as a sexually violent person.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court\u2019s judgment granting respondent\u2019s motion to dismiss, and we remand for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nCOOK and MYERSCOUGH, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" } ], "attorneys": [ "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Joel O. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, and William L. Browers and Jay Paul Hoffmann, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for the People.", "No brief filed for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re DETENTION OF JACK GARDNER (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Jack Gardner, Respondent-Appellee).\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201498\u20141029\nOpinion filed September 3, 1999.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Joel O. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, and William L. Browers and Jay Paul Hoffmann, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for the People.\nNo brief filed for appellee." }, "file_name": "0085-01", "first_page_order": 103, "last_page_order": 109 }