{ "id": 173570, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL SAUNDERS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Saunders", "decision_date": "1999-08-23", "docket_number": "No. 1-98-0352", "first_page": "406", "last_page": "414", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "307 Ill. App. 3d 406" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "657 N.E.2d 57", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 Ill. App. 3d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 927645 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/276/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "668 N.E.2d 125", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 Ill. App. 3d 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 159530 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218" }, { "page": "217" }, { "page": "218" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/282/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "610 N.E.2d 16", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 Ill. 2d 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4820340 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "445" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/154/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "710 N.E.2d 140", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 Ill. App. 3d 719", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 564574 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "731" }, { "page": "733", "parenthetical": "holding that the juvenile's statements should have been suppressed" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/304/0719-01" ] }, { "cite": "613 N.E.2d 1139", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "244 Ill. App. 3d 55", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5098676 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/244/0055-01" ] }, { "cite": "661 N.E.2d 287", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 Ill. 2d 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 909161 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144" }, { "page": "144" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/169/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "675 N.E.2d 156", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 Ill. App. 3d 965", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1295554 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "974" }, { "page": "976" }, { "page": "976-78" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/285/0965-01" ] }, { "cite": "662 N.E.2d 1168", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "171 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 57341 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/171/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "662 N.E.2d 1328", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 Ill. 2d 409", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 909168 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/169/0409-01" ] }, { "cite": "639 N.E.2d 1296", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "266 Ill. App. 3d 671", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 887225 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "675" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/266/0671-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 781, "char_count": 18901, "ocr_confidence": 0.784, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.5828155114230504e-08, "percentile": 0.2867618922956512 }, "sha256": "01c79db64a5fce50107696a43f3d04b1c02644a3ef1b8016e7e4a07b4766d582", "simhash": "1:b34852cdc367c5f3", "word_count": 3106 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:00:41.446378+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL SAUNDERS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE TULLY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial, defendant Michael Saunders was convicted of first degree murder and aggravated criminal sexual assault and sentenced to consecutive prison terms of 34 years and 6 years, respectively. Defendant contends on appeal that collateral estoppel barred the trial court from reconsidering its ruling on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress his statement as involuntary and that the court erred in reversing its original finding.\nFor the reasons that follow, we affirm.\nDefendant\u2019s convictions arose from a November 6, 1994, incident at 5356 South Bishop in Chicago in which defendant and four codefendants (Jerry Fincher, Vincent Thames, Terrill Swift and Harold Richardson) were indicted because they had sexually assaulted and murdered the victim, Nina Glover. Several months later, Jerry Fincher voluntarily gave the police information regarding the murder, hoping to \u201cget some consideration\u201d for his friend who had been arrested on a drug charge. Eventually, codefendants Fincher, Thames and Swift all gave inculpatory statements that incriminated defendant as well. Defendant was arrested on March 11, 1995, and subsequently gave an inculpatory statement.\nHearings on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress his statement were held on September 17 and September 24, 1997. Detective Richard Paladino testified that he was notified at 4 p.m. of defendant\u2019s arrest. At 4:30 p.m. Paladino advised defendant of his Miranda rights and also told him, as a juvenile, that if he were charged, he would be tried as an adult. Detective Clancey was also present. Defendant stated he understood each of his rights. Paladino told him that everybody involved in the incident was in custody and the police knew what had happened. Paladino said he was not going to question defendant at that time but told him to think about the incident.\nAt 4:45 p.m., Paladino returned with youth officer Charles Bowen. Paladino again advised defendant as he had done earlier. The youth officer remained for the entire interview.\nAt 7 p.m., Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Valentini questioned defendant after advising him again of his Miranda rights and juvenile warnings. Paladino and the youth officer were present. Paladino testified that neither he nor anyone in his presence slapped defendant, pulled on his earring or lied to him about telephoning his mother. Defendant did not ask for either his mother or an attorney and did not invoke his right to remain silent.\nOn cross-examination, Paladino testified that although he attempted to contact defendant\u2019s mother by telephone, he did not note the telephone call in his arrest report. Paladino sent Officers Coughlin and Golden to find defendant\u2019s mother at 4:05 p.m. When they were unable to locate her, Paladino contacted the youth officer, who was present during defendant\u2019s questioning. The plainclothes youth officer advised defendant of his Miranda rights and gave him the juvenile warnings before Paladino questioned him.\nYouth Officer Bowen testified that when he first saw defendant at 4:45 p.m., he introduced himself as a youth officer and told defendant he was there to protect defendant\u2019s rights as a juvenile. Bowen advised defendant of his rights and told him that he would be tried as an adult if the charges were approved. Defendant stated that he understood. Bowen corroborated that Paladino also advised defendant similarly and that defendant again indicated his understanding.\nAt 7 p.m., Bowen reintroduced himself and again advised defendant of all his rights. The assistant State\u2019s Attorney then advised defendant regarding his Miranda rights and juvenile warnings. Defendant stated that he understood. The interview lasted 45 minutes. At that time, the assistant State\u2019s Attorney explained the nature of both a court-reported and'handwritten statement to defendant. Defendant chose to give a handwritten statement. Bowen testified that neither he nor anyone in his presence slapped defendant or pulled his earring. Defendant did not ask for his mother or an attorney and did not ever say he did not underst\u00e1nd anything.\nDefendant\u2019s mother, Emma Saunders, testified that the last time she saw defendant before his arrest was about 5 p.m. the previous day. When he was not home the following morning, she began telephoning hospitals and police stations. She first telephoned the police station at 51st and Wentworth at 11 a.m. on March 11, 1995, and was told defendant was not there. When she telephoned again 15 minutes later, an officer told her that defendant was there. She arrived at the police station about 1 p.m. but was told she could not see defendant. An officer told her that defendant was at the juvenile facility at 11th Street and Hamilton. When she arrived at the juvenile facility, she was told defendant was not there, but she remained until late in the afternoon. She learned that defendant was at the juvenile facility the following day. She initially testified that she lived at 6707 South Aberdeen and subsequently that she lived at 6737 South Aberdeen. She stated she had no telephone but could be contacted at her mother-in-law\u2019s telephone number, which she specified.\nDefendant testified that he was 15 years old at the time of his arrest. Although he was registered at a high school, the last time he had regularly attended school was in eighth grade. After he was arrested, three police officers came into the room and slapped him on the neck. One officer snatched the earring out of his ear and threw it on the ground. Defendant denied that he was arrested at 4 p.m.; he claimed he was arrested at 10 a.m. He testified that no one advised him of his rights or told him he could be tried as an adult. Defendant said he asked the officers to telephone his mother and gave them his grandmother\u2019s telephone number, but the officers did not say they would try to locate his mother. Defendant testified that he asked to have an attorney present during his questioning, but the officers told him to \u201cshut up.\u201d He was not taken before a judge for a hearing, and he remained in the police station until 10 a.m. the next day. He claimed that the youth officer did not speak to him at all while he was in custody. He told his mother the following day about the earring being pulled from his ear and also told a man who worked in the lockup about the incident, but the man told him he could not do anything about it. Defendant denied making the telephone call noted on the arrest report to his grandmother\u2019s number at 10:30 p.m. while he was in the lockup. The number on the arrest report was the one given by defendant\u2019s mother as that of her mother-in-law. Defense counsel objected to the State\u2019s reference to an arrest report with writing on it. Defense counsel had two arrest reports, one of which had no writing on it. A discussion was held off the record.\nDefendant admitted on cross-examination that the signature on each page of his eight-page handwritten statement was his. He also testified that in March 1995 he understood each of the Miranda warnings and had heard those warnings many times. But he denied that he gave the statement to an assistant State\u2019s Attorney. He stated that he spoke only to three officers, none of whom was a youth officer. Defendant testified that he confessed because the officers threatened him and woke him about 3 a.m., telling him to sign his name to the statement.\nIn rebuttal, the parties stipulated that Detective William Foley would testify that he did not slap defendant or pull his earring.\nAssistant State\u2019s Attorney Fabio Valentini testified that at 7 p.m. on March 11, 1995, he advised defendant of his Miranda rights, and defendant stated he understood each of them. Valentini also explained that even though defendant was a juvenile, because of the charges, he would be tried and sentenced as if he were an adult. Defendant stated that he understood and agreed to answer questions. After a 30-minute conversation, Valentini explained the ways in which defendant\u2019s statement could be memorialized. Defendant said he wanted a handwritten statement. Before writing the statement, Valentini and the youth officer were alone with defendant, and Valentini asked him how he had been treated by the police. Defendant responded, \u201cvery good.\u201d Defendant did not state that the police slapped him or pulled his earring, and Valentini did not notice any injuries. Valentini began writing defendant\u2019s statement at 8:20 p.m. After he completed defendant\u2019s statement, he asked defendant to read aloud the preprinted portion regarding his rights and the additional juvenile warnings that Valentini had written out. Defendant read and stated he understood his rights and then signed immediately below. With defendant sitting beside him, Valentini read the remaining statement aloud. Defendant made several corrections, initialed them, and signed each page after verifying its correctness.\nValentini testified on cross-examination that he did not try to contact defendant\u2019s mother or ask if defendant wanted to have her present. Valentini did not ask defendant to repeat his rights in his own words because defendant spoke intelligently and seemed to understand what Valentini said.\nFollowing argument, the trial court sustained defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the statement. The court criticized the youth officer for failure to go out and look for defendant\u2019s mother and found that a question existed about what the police officers did or did not do to contact her. The court acknowledged, however, that there was a possible discrepancy with the telephone number and address.\nThe court stated:\n\u201c[It is] abhorrent [that] the police simply look at a defendant as a defendant, period. And they ignore the fact that \u2014 because the law doesn\u2019t say you have to do this, then they ignore it. Or they give it short shrift. Well, that might work out in the district, but it\u2019s not working here.\u201d\nThe State asked the court for the basis of its ruling, stating that the law did not impose a duty upon youth officers to do what the court stated it believed they should do.\nThe court specifically found it did not believe defendant was slapped, but it stated it had not been \u201cconvinced\u201d a telephone call had been made or that the police had made a good-faith effort to contact defendant\u2019s mother. The court also expressed concern over the discrepancy between the differing copies of the arrest report, one of which noted that defendant was allowed a telephone call. The court asked, \u201cdid he get a phone call, and he\u2019s lying, or did somebody just write this stuff in here?\u201d\nThe State asked if that information would make a difference in the court\u2019s ruling. The court answered, \u201cI don\u2019t know.\u201d The court granted the State\u2019s request for \u201cleave to reopen\u201d its rebuttal.\nAt a hearing one week later, which the court stated was a \u201ccontinuation\u201d of the motion, Officer Richard Coughlin testified that he arrested defendant at 4 p.m. Defendant told Coughlin his telephone number was 651-6292. Detective Paladino called that number, but no one answered. Then, Coughlin went to the address provided by defendant, 6707 South Aberdeen, to find defendant\u2019s mother. He found a house and several vacant lots. When no one answered his knock, he returned to the police station and asked defendant his address again. Defendant repeated that it was 6707 South Aberdeen. Coughlin verified with defendant that the address was \u201cthe first house.\u201d\nCoughlin also testified that one copy of the arrest report was the original. The other was a photocopy of the original that is taken into the lockup for the watch commander to sign. Then, the remaining boxes on the form are filled out there. Copies are generally made before the entire form is completed. The youth officer adds details to his copy.\nLloyd Huddleston testified that he was a civilian employee in the lockup. He screened prisoners and arranged for prisoner telephone calls. He also completed a screening record on the back of the arrest report. When Huddleston interviewed defendant at 11:58 p.m. on March 11, defendant answered that he had no pain or injury and Huddleston noticed no injury. Defendant did not state that he had been slapped or that his earring had been pulled from his ear. Defendant refused to give Huddleston the name of a person to notify in case of emergency. Defendant made a telephone call to 651-6292, and Huddleston noted the telephone number on the arrest report.\nOfficer Francis Zeller testified that he searched defendant at 10:30 p.m. on March 11 in the lockup. Defendant did not complain that he had been slapped or that his earring had been pulled.\nThe trial court found that the State had presented convincing evidence regarding issues about which the court had previously had \u201cserious question.\u201d The court stated it now believed that the police went out and tried to locate defendant\u2019s mother but were unable to do so. The court commented that \u201c[e]ven she was hesitant about the address\u201d when she testified. Stating that it was convinced that defendant was afforded the requisite statutory juvenile rights, the court denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nDefendant contends that collateral estoppel barred the trial court from reconsidering its ruling. A ruling on a motion to suppress \u201cmay be changed or reversed at any time before final judgment.\u201d People v. Zinnamon, 266 Ill. App. 3d 671, 675, 639 N.E.2d 1296 (1993). Thus, we find no merit to defendant\u2019s contention that collateral estoppel barred the trial court from doing so.\nDefendant also contends that the additional evidence presented did not refute the basis of the court\u2019s original ruling that the State had not proved defendant\u2019s statement was voluntarily given.\nOn review of a trial court\u2019s voluntariness determination that involved resolving questions of credibility, we will not disturb the decision unless it was against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Oaks, 169 Ill. 2d 409, 447, 662 N.E.2d 1328 (1996). The State must establish that a defendant\u2019s confession was voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence. People v. Bounds, 171 Ill. 2d 1, 32, 662 N.E.2d 1168 (1995); In re J.E., 285 Ill. App. 3d 965, 974, 675 N.E.2d 156 (1996). Among the factors a court should consider are the age, education and intelligence of the accused, the duration of his detention and questioning, whether he was advised of his constitutional rights and whether he was subjected to any physical coercion, threats or promises. People v. Brown, 169 Ill. 2d 132, 144, 661 N.E.2d 287 (1996); In re D.C., 244 Ill. App. 3d 55, 61, 613 N.E.2d 1139 (1992). Regarding a juvenile\u2019s statement, a court considers additional factors, including the time of day, the presence of a parent or adult interested in the juvenile\u2019s welfare, and the juvenile\u2019s previous experience with the court system. In re G.O., 304 Ill. App. 3d 719, 731, 710 N.E.2d 140 (1999). The overall consideration in determining voluntariness is whether the accused\u2019s statement was made freely and without compulsion or inducement or whether his will was overborne at the time of his confession. Brown, 169 Ill. 2d at 144; People v. Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d 414, 445, 610 N.E.2d 16 (1992).\nDefendant argues that the court changed its ruling based on tenuous and faulty reasoning and that defendant\u2019s mother presented uncontradicted testimony that her request to see defendant at the police station was denied. However, whether a juvenile\u2019s parent was allowed to see him before he confessed is but one factor in the \u201ctotality of the circumstances\u201d test that a court employs to determine if the confession was voluntary. People v. Gardner, 282 Ill. App. 3d 209, 218, 668 N.E.2d 125 (1996); see also In re J.E., 285 Ill. App. 3d at 976. In this case, Emma Saunders testified that a police officer told her shortly after 11 a.m. on March 11 that defendant was at the police station. However, the State\u2019s witnesses testified that defendant was arrested at 4 p.m. that day, which is also the time of arrest noted on the arrest report. The trial court properly determined the issue of credibility on the issue in favor of the State. The record supports the court\u2019s factual determination that the officers attempted to contact defendant\u2019s mother both by telephone and in person but were unable to do so. In addition, there was a youth officer present when defendant was questioned. See Gardner, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 217; People v. Anderson, 276 Ill. App. 3d 1, 7, 657 N.E.2d 57 (1995). The youth officer told defendant he was a youth officer who was there to protect defendant\u2019s rights. He also advised defendant of his rights and gave him the additional juvenile warnings. Defendant was arrested at 4 p.m. and, before being questioned, was advised of his rights several times by police officers and the assistant State\u2019s Attorney. He gave his statement at 8:20 p.m., stating that he had been treated very well by the officers. The record also establishes that this was not defendant\u2019s first encounter with the judicial system; he had been found delinquent on three prior occasions. Thus, this case is significantly distinguishable from the facts presented in In re G.O. In that case, there was no evidence the youth officer ever said anything to the 13-year-old defendant, the police conduct was \u201cdesigned to frustrate the presence of a parent,\u201d the defendant\u2019s statements were never reduced to writing and he was never asked to sign a waiver of his rights, and he had never before been arrested. In re G.O., 304 Ill. App. 3d at 733 (holding that the juvenile\u2019s statements should have been suppressed). Here, after the additional witnesses for the State testified, the court was convinced that defendant\u2019s rights had been protected and the police had acted appropriately. The trial court was not required to make its decision on the evidence presented at the reopened hearing alone. Rather, it could reconsider its initial ruling in light of all of the evidence. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the trial court\u2019s decision that defendant\u2019s statement was voluntarily made after being properly advised of his rights was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. See In re J.E., 285 Ill. App. 3d at 976-78; Gardner, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 218. The cases upon which defendant relies are factually distinguishable.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nO\u2019BRIEN, P.J., and O\u2019HARA FROSSARD, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE TULLY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Frederick Weil, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Janet Mahoney, and Eve Reilly, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL SAUNDERS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1\u201498\u20140352\nOpinion filed August 23, 1999.\nRita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Frederick Weil, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Janet Mahoney, and Eve Reilly, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0406-01", "first_page_order": 424, "last_page_order": 432 }