{
  "id": 173557,
  "name": "MARUSA POOLE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TRIOLA L. MOSLEY, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "Poole v. Mosley",
  "decision_date": "1999-09-03",
  "docket_number": "No. 1-98-4768",
  "first_page": "625",
  "last_page": "628",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:00:41.446378+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "MARUSA POOLE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TRIOLA L. MOSLEY, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE BUCKLEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn this case, which involves personal injuries resulting from a vehicular collision, plaintiff obtained an arbitration award of $7,000 against defendant. Judgment was entered on the award, and defendant\u2019s attempt to set aside that award was rejected by the trial court.\nOn appeal, defendant contends that the judgment was improperly entered because the parties had previously settled the matter.\nOn August 26, 1998, the arbitration award was entered for $7,000. The parties are in agreement that on September 9, 1998, the parties\u2019 attorneys agreed to settle the case for $7,000. However, on October 9, 1998, the trial court entered judgment for $7,000, plus costs ($330.80) and interest commencing thereon. One month later, defendant filed a motion to satisfy the judgment and to vacate the judgment entered on October 9, 1998.\nThe trial court rejected defendant\u2019s effort after respective counsel filed conflicting affidavits. Defendant\u2019s counsel averred that the parties\u2019 agreement required that defendant would provide a draft for $7,000 within seven days of defendant\u2019s receipt of an executed release by plaintiff and entry of a dismissal order by the circuit court. Defense counsel received the executed release on September 18, 1998, with a request for the draft. While defense counsel admitted that thereafter he received messages that plaintiff\u2019s counsel had telephoned him, defense counsel claimed he was not informed what plaintiffs Counsel wanted until he called plaintiffs counsel on October 8, 1998. Defense counsel then told plaintiffs counsel that a draft would be tendered one week after the release was executed and the dismissal order entered. Plaintiffs counsel replied that he would appear in court the next day and request entry of judgment on the arbitration award since defendant had not filed a rejection of the award. Defense counsel claimed that he told plaintiffs counsel that a rejection had not been filed because of reliance on the agreement. Defense counsel was not able to contact another attorney at his firm who would be in court the next day, and as a result that attorney sought entry of a dismissal order because he thought the case had been settled.\nPlaintiffs counsel filed an affidavit recounting a differing version. Plaintiffs counsel claimed that the settlement involved giving defense counsel an executed release in return within one week for a $7,000 draft; costs were to be waived. There was no discussion that payment would be conditioned on 'he entry of a dismissal order. The executed release was given to defense counsel on September 18, 1998, but when the latter did not respond, plaintiffs counsel called defense counsel on September 30, 1998, and succeeding days. Plaintiffs counsel could not reach defendant\u2019s counsel and left messages to return the calls. At 4:45 p.m. on October 8, 1998, defense counsel finally did so. During the ensuing conversation, defense counsel first mentioned the need for a dismissal order, and plaintiffs counsel replied that he would seek entry of judgment the following day.\nThe trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to vacate the judgment, noting it had been \u201cfully advised.\u201d No report of proceedings for the hearing leading to that denial has been presented by defendant, as appellant.\nOn appeal, defendant argues that she was not required to reject the arbitration award because the parties had settled the case. She also contends that public policy favors settlements. Finally, she contends that plaintiff\u2019s remedy was to commence a proceeding to enforce the settlement agreement. Conversely, plaintiff argues that, based on the record before it, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to vacate the judgment entered on the arbitration award.\nWe must reject plaintiff\u2019s position that a settlement agreement was reached. Here plaintiffs counsel believed that he was to receive a $7,000 draft no later than September 25, 1998 (seven days after defendant received an executed release), and defendant\u2019s counsel believed that payment was not required until after a dismissal order had been entered. There was clearly a disagreement as to a material factor. See Academy Chicago Publishers v. Cheever, 144 Ill. 2d 24, 29 (1991).\nPlaintiffs counsel tried to contact defense counsel on several occasions during the days leading up to entry of judgment on the arbitration award. Defense counsel, however, chose to ignore those calls until late in the business day preceding the entry of judgment. Clearly, defense counsel\u2019s inaction forced plaintiff\u2019s counsel to protect his client\u2019s interest by seeking entry of judgment.\nWe are further concerned that this entire matter apparently is being contested to the appellate level over the issue of court costs because defendant was willing to pay the damage amount of $7,000 awarded in the arbitration proceedings. Such conduct clearly acts to clog the judicial system with issues of questionable import.\nAfter review of the record, we find that the trial court did not err in rejecting defendant\u2019s efforts to set aside the judgment entered on the arbitration award. See Moon v. Jones, 282 Ill. App. 3d 335, 338 (1996).\nAffirmed.\nCAMPBELL, P.J., and ZWICK, J., concur.\nThe order bears the date stamp of October 8, 1998, but the parties agree and a subsequent order of court confirms that the date the judgment on the award was entered was October 9, 1998.\nIn defendant\u2019s motion to satisfy the judgment, defendant\u2019s counsel stated that respective counsel had failed \u201cto reach a meeting of the minds on the settlement terms.\u201d",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE BUCKLEY"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Keely Truax and Rachel Foster, both of Parrillo, Weiss & O\u2019Halloran, of Chicago, for appellant.",
      "Claudis B. Kahn, of Kipnis, Kahn & Bruggeman, of Chicago, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "MARUSA POOLE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TRIOLA L. MOSLEY, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201498\u20144768\nOpinion filed September 3, 1999.\nKeely Truax and Rachel Foster, both of Parrillo, Weiss & O\u2019Halloran, of Chicago, for appellant.\nClaudis B. Kahn, of Kipnis, Kahn & Bruggeman, of Chicago, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0625-01",
  "first_page_order": 643,
  "last_page_order": 646
}