{ "id": 173607, "name": "DIMENSIONS MEDICAL CENTER, LTD., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ELMHURST OUTPATIENT SURGERY CENTER, L.L.C., et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Dimensions Medical Center, Ltd. v. Elmhurst Outpatient Surgery Center, L.L.C.", "decision_date": "1999-09-29", "docket_number": "No. 4-99-0030", "first_page": "781", "last_page": "800", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "307 Ill. App. 3d 781" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "524 N.E.2d 561", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "581" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5549613 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505-06" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "669 N.E.2d 668", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "673" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 Ill. App. 3d 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 182769 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "234" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/283/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "646 N.E.2d 1374", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1376" }, { "page": "1375-76" }, { "page": "1376" }, { "page": "1376" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "269 Ill. App. 3d 944", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3422006 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "349" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/57/0345-01" ] }, { "cite": "687 N.E.2d 1050", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1062" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "178 Ill. 2d 399", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 385568 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/178/0399-01" ] }, { "cite": "707 N.E.2d 150", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154-55" }, { "page": "154-55" }, { "page": "156" }, { "page": "154" }, { "page": "154" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 Ill. App. 3d 461", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1352937 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "467" }, { "page": "467" }, { "page": "469" }, { "page": "466" }, { "page": "466" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/302/0461-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 N.E.2d 1376", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1378-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 Ill. 2d 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5489662 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/77/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "603 N.E.2d 489", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 Ill. 2d 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3291849 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "405" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/151/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "673 N.E.2d 1176", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1179" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 Ill. App. 3d 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1295625 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/285/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "606 N.E.2d 1111", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1119" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 Ill. 2d 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4738801 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "92-93" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/153/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "655 N.E.2d 304", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "312" }, { "page": "308" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 Ill. App. 3d 84", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 906794 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97" }, { "page": "90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/275/0084-01" ] }, { "cite": "642 N.E.2d 475", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "481", "parenthetical": "concluding, on review of an administrative decision, that the appellant forfeited arguments by failing to object at the administrative hearing" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "267 Ill. App. 3d 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 333109 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166", "parenthetical": "concluding, on review of an administrative decision, that the appellant forfeited arguments by failing to object at the administrative hearing" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/267/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "472 N.E.2d 492", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 Ill. App. 3d 291", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3489598 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "293-94" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/129/0291-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 N.E.2d 217", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 Ill. 2d 341", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3218403 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/124/0341-01" ] }, { "cite": "515 N.E.2d 750", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 Ill. App. 3d 907", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3467535 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/161/0907-01" ] }, { "cite": "697 N.E.2d 1231", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1235" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 Ill. App. 3d 93", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1073570 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98-99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/298/0093-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1527, "char_count": 46379, "ocr_confidence": 0.811, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.56573169783841e-07, "percentile": 0.6776812084411099 }, "sha256": "719312b5e09e15db2d07699030a177fdd7648e3d0b1b1d4c1c2c4d69cbb7cf4e", "simhash": "1:26ea66939d3d2576", "word_count": 7200 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:00:41.446378+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "DIMENSIONS MEDICAL CENTER, LTD., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ELMHURST OUTPATIENT SURGERY CENTER, L.L.C., et al., DefendantsAppellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn October 1997, defendant Illinois Health Facilities Planning Board (Board) issued a permit, known as a certificate of need (CON), to defendant Elmhurst Memorial Hospital (Memorial), a wholly owned subsidiary of defendant Elmhurst Memorial Health System, to build an outpatient facility to be called the Memorial Center for Health (Center for Health). The Board issued a second CON to Memorial jointly with defendant Elmhurst Outpatient Surgery Center, L.L.C. (Surgery Center), a limited liability company owned by Memorial and several of its physicians, to build an ambulatory surgical treatment center (ASTC), which would provide outpatient surgery services inside the Center for Health.\nLater that same month, plaintiffs, Dimensions Medical Center, Ltd. (Dimensions), Access Center for Health, Ltd., and Access Health Center, Ltd. (collectively Access), medical care providers operating existing ASTCs in the geographic area of Memorial\u2019s proposed facility, filed a complaint for administrative review in the circuit court, seeking reversal of the Board\u2019s decisions to issue the two CONs. In July 1998, intervenor, Northwest Community Health Center, Ltd. (Northwest), petitioned to intervene. (Northwest had previously applied unsuccessfully for a CON to operate an ASTC in the same geographic area as Memorial\u2019s proposed ASTC.)\nIn August 1998, the trial court conducted a hearing on Access and Dimensions\u2019 complaint and on Northwest\u2019s petition to intervene, granted Northwest\u2019s petition, and affirmed the Board\u2019s decision. Access, Dimensions, and Northwest appeal, arguing that (1) the administrative proceedings were unfair because (a) the hearing officer prohibited them from cross-examining witnesses, and (b) the Board allowed the applicants to provide additional materials in support of their CON applications after the close of the public hearing; and (2) the Board\u2019s decision was arbitrary, capricious, and against the manifest weight of the evidence. We affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nPursuant to section 3 \u2014 106 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 106 (West 1996)), the Board filed the record of administrative proceedings as its answer to Access and Dimensions\u2019 complaint. That record consists of 7 volumes and nearly 2,500 pages of documentation. The evidence was nearly identical regarding the CON applications for the Center for Health and the ASTC, and the only reason two different CON applications were involved is because two different corporate entities applied for the CONs. None of these nuances are relevant to our analysis. Accordingly, our references to the evidence will relate to both applications unless otherwise stated. In addition, we will avoid unnecessary confusion by referring to both Memorial and the Surgery Center as Memorial.\nIn June 1997, Memorial filed applications for the Board to issue CONs for the two projects at issue \u2014 namely, the Center for Health and the ASTC. According to the application materials, Memorial\u2019s existing hospital facilities were aging and overcrowded, and Memorial wanted to modernize some of its outpatient services. Because of physical limitations and zoning restrictions, Memorial could not accomplish these changes within the existing hospital structure, and adjacent land was not available.\nAccordingly, Memorial sought to build the Center for Health approximately four miles from the hospital. Memorial planned the Center for Health to be a four-story facility housing the following: (1) an outpatient care center, to include (a) diagnostic radiology, (b) magnetic resonance imaging, (c) non-invasive diagnostic cardiology and cardiac rehabilitation, (d) physical and occupational therapy, (e) preadmission and preprocedure testing, and (f) specimen collection; (2) a regional blood bank; (3) leased space for private physicians\u2019 offices; and (4) the ASTC, which would offer a variety of outpatient surgical procedures, not to include pregn\u00e1ncy terminations. The Center for Health was projected to cost approximately $48 million, and the ASTC was projected to cost approximately $4 million.\nThe applicants provided the Board with a large amount of documentation in support of their claims that the new facility was necessary because (1) Memorial was currently serving more patients than its existing building could comfortably accommodate; (2) the design of Memorial\u2019s existing building was inadequate to provide outpatient care; and (3) Memorial\u2019s patients were currently receiving outpatient surgery in the hospital\u2019s traditional operating rooms, an inconvenient arrangement due to the layout of the hospital and the need to reschedule surgeries whenever an emergency need for an operating room arose.\nMemorial also provided referral letters and statistics regarding the utilization of the hospital\u2019s existing facilities to demonstrate that Memorial\u2019s existing patients and doctors would use the new facility sufficiently for it to be economically feasible. In making these utilization estimates, Memorial did not propose to draw patients from other area facilities. In particular, Memorial based its ASTC utilization estimates on the number of outpatient surgeries it was currently performing in the hospital\u2019s operating rooms.\nDimensions and Access objected to Memorial\u2019s applications and demanded a public hearing. Pursuant to section 8 of the Illinois Health Facilities Planning Act (Planning Act) (20 ILCS 3960/8 (West 1996)), a hearing officer for the Illinois Department of Public Health (Department) conducted two hearings in July 1997 on the same day, one on each of the CON applications. After convening the first hearing, the hearing officer stated the following:\n\u201cKeep in mind, this is not a debate. If you feel that something is raised today that you take real issue with and you are lucky enough to follow the person that made that comment, obviously, [you can] indicate[ ] your disagreement.\nBut the best way to respond is to send me [comments] via [facsimile], because I will keep this record open until the close of business this Friday ***.\u201d\nMemorial\u2019s president, Leo Fronza, was the first person to testify. Fronza introduced himself and then gave testimony substantially similar to the assertions in the application materials. When Fronza finished, no one asked to cross-examine him.\nThe city manager of Elmhurst, Tom Bochard, testified next and confirmed that \u201c[i]t is doubtful that further development of the current hospital site will be allowed, and the [hospital\u2019s] current condition[al-]use permit prohibits any physician offices on the existing campus.\u201d Bochard indicated that the proposed location would avoid zoning problems, then concluded his testimony by saying, \u201cI am pleased as a resident and pleased as a [c]ity manager, the community and hospital have been able to come together on a solution that fills the needs of everyone. I would encourage your approval of this project.\u201d No one asked to cross-examine Bochard. The next eight witnesses all spoke enthusiastically in favor of the proposed facility, and no one asked to cross-examine any of them.\nThe next witness was Allyson Bouldon, an attorney representing Dimensions, who read a prepared statement opposing Memorial\u2019s application. After Bouldon finished, the following exchange occurred between Memorial\u2019s attorney, Dan Lawler, and the hearing officer:\n\u201cMR. LAWLER: The rules under which this hearing may be conducted provide that any person shall have the right to be represented by counsel and may conduct reasonable questioning of persons who make relevant factual allegations.\nHEARING OFFICER[ ]: As I indicated earlier, counselor, *** the format that I adhere to is nondebate, nonquestioning. I know what the rules indicate, but I have never offered an opportunity for cross[-]examin[ation] or re-examination at any of my hearings.\nWhat I would recommend that you do is take advantage of the extension that\u2019s granted to file any factual information, to respond, to come back with a cross. But I will not allow a debate or a question-and-answer[,] period.\nMR. LAWLER: The rules that the [Board] sent us with the notice of procedure\u2014\nHEARING OFFICER[ ]: I understand that. And my interpretation allows me to make that decision.\n* * *\nMR. LAWLER: But I will not have the opportunity to reasonably question this person.\nHEARING OFFICERf ]: You are absolutely correct.\n*** I think you\u2019re underestimating the intuitive process of the Planning Board. ***\nMR. LAWLER: *** [I]t\u2019s not the intuitive process of the [Board] that concerns me. It\u2019s that the only material[s] that go up to the [c]ircuit [c]ourt *** is what our court reporter here is transcribing. And if I am not allowed to be heard\u2014\nHEARING OFFICERf ]: What time limit are you talking? How detailed is your request for counsel going to be here?\nMR. LAWLER: I would have approximately five minutes of questioning.\n^ \u00cd\nHEARING OFFICER[ ]: You may\u2014\nMS. BOULDON [(the witness)]: If I could just interject, I believe I could possibly save everyone a lot of time. I prepared and submitted a written statement, and *** we are prepared and willing to respond to any inquiries in writing. That\u2019s for two reasons. To make sure we understand the inquiries, but also I am here in lieu of the attorney who usually represents the clients ***.\nHEARING OFFICER[ ]: Any concern about that, counselor?\nMR. LAWLER: Well, that\u2019s not what the rules allow.\nHEARING OFFICER[ ]: I know that\u2019s not what the rules allow. I interpret the rules. I\u2019m well aware of the interpretation I\u2019ve made. *** You have an opportunity to question and to prepare written documentation.\nMR. LAWLER: But I don\u2019t have a reasonable opportunity to question this person who\u2019s making irrelevant and factual allegations.\nHEARING OFFICER[ ]: This person is also indicating that [she\u2019s] not the proper counsel to ask those questions.\nMR. LAWLER: Well, then she shouldn\u2019t have been testifying.\nHEARING OFFICER[ ]: She didn\u2019t testify. She offered information on the project.\n\u00bffi >;<\nMS. BOULDON: I read from a prepared statement verbatim. The statement has been submitted to the record.\nMR. LAWLER: Well,\u2014\nHEARING OFFICER[ ]: Counselor, as far as I\u2019m concerned, you\u2019re starting to try my patience. If you have a problem with my ruling, you may certainly appeal it. Okay?\u201d\nAt that point, Lawler requested and received permission to enter a statement into the record in response to Bouldon\u2019s testimony. When he finished, no one asked to cross-examine him.\nHeather Lesson, an attorney representing Access, testified next in opposition to Memorial\u2019s application. When she had finished, the following exchange occurred between Lawler and the hearing officer:\n\u201cMR. LAWLER: *** I just want to preserve the record on the objection for the record. I didn\u2019t stand up to question the witness, but if I would have had the opportunity, I would have. I just want to make that clear. I\u2019m assuming you would not have let me.\nHEARING OFFICER[ ]: You\u2019re absolutely correct.\nMR. LAWLER: Nor any other opponents?\nHEARING OFFICER STEVENS: Nor any other individuals. There\u2019s no cross[-]examination, no rebuttal.\u201d\nAfter that exchange, the final witness at the first hearing spoke in favor of the project. No one asked to cross-examine her.\nAt the second hearing, conducted later the same day, only two witnesses spoke in favor of the application, and no one asked to cross-examine either of them. Attorneys for Access and Dimensions gave statements in opposition to the project, and George Olson, the administrator for Oakbrook Medical and Surgical Center, also testified in opposition to the project. Olson was the final witness.\nNo party ever contested the core assertions of Memorial\u2019s application \u2014 namely, that the facility was needed because Memorial\u2019s patient base had outgrown the existing facility, which could not be renovated to adequately provide outpatient services. However, Dimensions and others claimed that the proposed ASTC would have an adverse effect on their medical practices because several of these parties offered the same services in the same geographic area in facilities that were underutilized. Access\u2019 existing ASTC, in contrast, provided only pregnancy-termination services. However, Access had also applied for a CON to open a multispecialty ASTC, and the Board had previously denied Access\u2019 application on the ground that facilities in the area were underutilized. The Board had also denied Dimensions a CON to relocate its existing facility on the ground that facilities in the area were underutilized.\nDimensions provided a list of five other medical-care providers to whom the Board had denied CONs to construct ASTCs in the same geographic area as Memorial\u2019s proposed project on the ground that existing facilities in the region were underutilized. Beyond making that point, Dimensions\u2019 objections were general and conclusory, consisting of assertions such as, \u201cthere are inaccuracies in outpatient information contained in [Memorial\u2019s] application,\u201d without stating what was purportedly inaccurate about the application materials. Northwest did not participate in the administrative proceedings on Memorial\u2019s CON applications.\nThe hearing officer allowed each person attending the hearings to give testimony and also kept the administrative record open for several additional days, until July 11, 1997, so that anyone could submit additional written materials. Once the record was closed, the Department, acting pursuant to sections 8 and 12.2 of the Planning Act (20 ILCS 3960/8, 12.2 (West 1996 & Supp. 1997)), submitted two reports to the Board, one for each of the CON applications. Each of these reports discussed over 20 different review criteria that applicable regulations required to be considered in issuing a CON (77 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 1110.210 et seq. (1996)) and concluded that the Center for Health satisfied all but two review criteria and the ASTC satisfied all but one of the criteria. (The criteria that the Department found the project did not satisfy involved financial issues unrelated to this appeal (77 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7\u00a7 1120.310(e), (f) (1996)).)\nAt some point not reflected in the record, Michael Copeland, who worked for the Department, requested Memorial to provide some additional materials to the Board, and Memorial did so in a letter dated in September 1997. In October 1997, the Board conducted an agenda meeting, and Memorial\u2019s representatives gave oral testimony in support of the CON applications. Afterwards, the Board voted unanimously to issue Memorial both CONs. On the same day, the Board denied Northwest a CON application to operate an ASTC.\nLater in October 1997, Access and Dimensions filed their complaint for administrative review in the circuit court. Northwest filed a separate complaint for administrative review of the Board\u2019s decision to grant Memorial\u2019s applications. (The record does not reflect whether Northwest appealed from the denial of its own permit application.) In July 1998, the court dismissed Northwest\u2019s separate case for lack of standing but, in August 1998, allowed Northwest to intervene in this case.\nAlso in August 1998, the circuit court conducted a hearing on Access and Dimensions\u2019 complaint and affirmed the Board\u2019s decision. This appeal followed.\nII. PLAINTIFFS\u2019 STANDING\nInitially, Memorial argues, as it did in the circuit court, that Dimensions and Access lack standing to appeal the Board\u2019s decision. In Dimensions Medical Center, Ltd. v. Suburban Endoscopy Center, 298 Ill. App. 3d 93, 98-99, 697 N.E.2d 1231, 1235 (1998), the first district addressed the standing of these same plaintiffs to appeal from a decision of the Board granting a CON to a different defendant and wrote the following:\n\u201c[O]nly those persons \u2018adversely affected by a final decision of the *** Board may have such a decision judicially reviewed.\u2019 20 ILCS 3960/11 (West 1996). In Condell Hospital v. Illinois Health Facilities Planning Board, 161 Ill. App. 3d 907, [933,] 515 N.E.2d 750[, 767-68] (1987), affd, 124 Ill. 2d 341, 530 N.E.2d 217 (1988), this court held that a \u2018competing health[-]care facility\u2019 was an \u2018adversely affected\u2019 person, and thus had standing to challenge a final decision of the [Board] granting a permit for construction of a new hospital. [Citation]; see also Manor Healthcare Corp. v. Northwest Community Hospital, 129 Ill. App. 3d 291, 293-94, 472 N.E.2d 492[, 494] (1984). Accordingly, plaintiffs may be said to have standing to challenge the [Board\u2019s] approval if, within the administrative record, they are shown to be \u2018competing health[-]care facilities.\u2019\nNo serious contention may be maintained that either Access Center for Health, Ltd., or Access Health Center, Ltd., is a \u2018competing health[-]care facility.\u2019 Indeed, as the administrative record makes clear, neither has ever performed any [procedures to be performed in the proposed facility]. Nor could they, for they jointly operate a single-specialty ambulatory surgical treatment center limited to pregnancy terminations. Access Center for Health, Ltd., and Access Health Center, Ltd., therefore, lacked standing to challenge the [Board\u2019s] approval.\nThe same, however, cannot be said of Dimensions. Here, the administrative record makes clear that Dimensions, unlike [Access], is a multispecialty ambulatory surgical treatment center. In addition, the Department\u2019s report lists Dimensions as a provider of [procedures to be performed in the proposed facility]. Moreover, plaintiffs\u2019 representative testified during the public hearing that Dimensions \u2018provides a full range of outpatient surgical procedures ***.\u2019 Dimensions is, therefore, a \u2018competing health[-]care facility\u2019 and, thus, duly entitled to challenge the [Board\u2019s] approval.\u201d\nWith respect to plaintiffs\u2019 standing, this case is indistinguishable from Dimensions. Access performs only pregnancy terminations, and the proposed facility will not offer such procedures. Dimensions provides a full range of ambulatory surgical services, including the same services to be performed at Memorial\u2019s proposed facility. Thus, Dimensions has standing and Access does not. Memorial has not challenged Northwest\u2019s standing.\nWe will therefore address the appellant\u2019s arguments only as they apply to Dimensions and Northwest.\nIII. ANALYSIS\nDimensions and Northwest argue that (1) the administrative proceedings were unfair because (a) the hearing officer prohibited them from cross-examining witnesses, and (b) the Board allowed the applicants to provide additional materials in support of their CON applications after the close of the public hearing; and (2) the Board\u2019s decision was arbitrary, capricious, and against the manifest weight of the evidence. We address these arguments in turn.\nA. The Fairness of the Public Hearing\nWhen a health-care provider applies for a CON, the Department must review the application and submit its findings to the Board. In addition, the Department must afford an opportunity for a public hearing, and it must provide \u201c[a]ll interested persons attending such hearing *** reasonable opportunity to present their views or arguments in writing or orally.\u201d 20 ILCS 3960/8 (West 1996). Those comments become part of the record that the Department submits to the Board. 20 ILCS 3960/8 (West 1996). The Board is authorized to establish rules and regulations prescribing the procedures to be followed at the public hearing. 20 ILCS 3960/12 (West 1996).\nDimensions and Northwest raise questions regarding the procedures used by the Department and the Board prior to the Board\u2019s issuing the CONs. Because Northwest did not participate in any of those procedures, we address those claims only as they relate to Dimensions.\n1. The Hearing Officer\u2019s Refusal To Allow Cross-Examination Dimensions argues that the hearing officer violated section 1200.50(a)(4) of the Board\u2019s regulations (77 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 1200.50(a)(4) (1996)) by not allowing cross-examination of witnesses who testified in favor of Memorial\u2019s CON applications. We conclude that Dimensions has forfeited this claim of error by failing to object or request to cross-examine witnesses at the hearing.\nSection 1200.50(a)(4) of the Board\u2019s regulations provides, in pertinent part, that \u201cany person *** may conduct reasonable questioning of persons who make relevant, factual allegations.\u201d 77 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 1200.50(a)(4) (1996). By its plain language, this regulation requires a hearing officer to allow some questioning of witnesses by a party requesting cross-examination. However, Dimensions never made such a request. By failing to do so, Dimensions forfeited this claim of error. See Miller v. Pollution Control Board, 267 Ill. App. 3d 160, 166, 642 N.E.2d 475, 481 (1994) (concluding, on review of an administrative decision, that the appellant forfeited arguments by failing to object at the administrative hearing).\nDimensions nevertheless claims that the record indicates that it was the hearing officer\u2019s decision not to allow cross-examination. In particular, Dimensions points to the following: (1) before the first hearing began, the hearing officer said, \u201cthis is not a debate\u201d; and (2) the hearing officer did not allow Memorial\u2019s attorney to cross-examine witnesses. However, the hearing officer\u2019s statement at the beginning of the first hearing that \u201cthis is not a debate\u201d hardly constitutes a clear prohibition on all cross-examination. Even so, Dimensions\u2019 counsel made no request to question witnesses even as witness after witness gave testimony in favor of Memorial\u2019s application.\nThe first time anyone attempted to cross-examine a witness was when Bouldon testified in opposition to the project and Lawler, Memorial\u2019s counsel, attempted to cross-examine her. An extensive colloquy between the hearing officer and Lawler ensued, during which Lawler explained in detail the reasons why he believed he should be allowed to cross-examine Bouldon. Eventually, the hearing officer appeared willing to allow a brief cross-examination, \"as the transcript reveals:\n\u201cHEARING OFFICER! ]: What time limit are you talking? How detailed is your request for counsel going to be here?\nMR. LAWLER: I would have approximately five minutes of questioning.\n* ?}{ *\nHEARING OFFICER! ]: You may \u2014 .\u201d\nOnly then, Bouldon intervened and convinced the hearing officer that cross-examination would be inappropriate. Thus, the transcript from the hearing indicates that Bouldon actually supported the hearing officer\u2019s preclusion of cross-examination of witnesses who opposed Memorial\u2019s certificate applications, the converse of the error of which her client now complains. Dimensions therefore cannot now seek reversal on this basis.\n2. The Board\u2019s Allowing Memorial and the Surgical Center To Submit Additional Materials After the Public Hearing\nDimensions also contends that we should reverse the Board\u2019s decision because the Board allowed Memorial to submit additional written materials after the public hearing had ended. Specifically, Dimensions claims that by allowing Memorial to submit the September 1997 letter in support of the CON applications, the Board violated (a) section 1200.50 of its own regulations (77 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 1200.50(c) (1996)), which prohibits ex parte contact between an applicant and Department officers; (b) section 10 \u2014 40 of the Administrative Procedure Act (Procedure Act) (5 ILCS 100/10 \u2014 40 (West 1996)), which requires parties be given notice and an opportunity to respond to any material submitted to an administrative agency in contested cases; and (c) fundamental fairness and due process.\na. The Board\u2019s Regulations\nDimensions claims that the Board violated section 1200.50(c) of its own regulations by allowing Memorial to have ex parte contact when it submitted its letter to the Board in September 1997 without notifying Dimensions or giving it an opportunity to respond (77 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 1200.50(c) (1996)). We disagree.\nSection 1200.50(c) prohibits ex parte contacts between an applicant and Department officers. 77 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 1200.50(c) (1996). However, section 1200.50(e) specific\u00e1lly provides that \u201c[a]ny communications made after the commencement of the public hearing that are placed in the record or documented in the project file[ ] are not considered \u2018exparte\u2019 and are not prohibited.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 77 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 1200.50(e) (1996). Further, section 1130.640(a) (77 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 1130.640(a) (1996)), which governs an applicant\u2019s ability to submit supplemental information to the Board after the public hearing but before the Board\u2019s final decision, provides, in pertinent part, that \u201c[pjrior to initial [Board] action, the applicant may provide supplemental information or data in support of the project.\u201d\nHere, Dimensions does not contend that any of Memorial\u2019s submissions were ever kept out of the public record or the project file. On the contrary, the Board included the materials of which Dimensions now complains as part of the administrative record in its answer to Dimensions\u2019 complaint for administrative review in the circuit court. Thus, the materials did not constitute ex parte contact; the Board complied with all applicable regulations.\nb. The Procedure Act\nDimensions next argues that section 10 \u2014 40 of the Procedure Act (5 ILCS 100/10 \u2014 40 (West 1996)) required the Board to provide it notice and an opportunity to respond to any materials Memorial submitted in response to questions from the Department or Board. Specifically, Dimensions points out that section 10 \u2014 40(c) of the Procedure Act requires \u201cparties\u201d to be provided notice and an opportunity to respond to any materials of which an administrative agency takes notice in a contested case. 5 ILCS 100/10 \u2014 40(c) (West 1996). Thus, Dimensions claims that it should have been notified of and provided an opportunity to respond to any additional material submitted in support of the application. We disagree.\nThe problem with Dimensions\u2019 position is twofold. First, section 10 \u2014 40 of the Procedure Act protects only \u201cparties,\u201d a term of art defined elsewhere in the Procedure Act as a \u201cperson or agency named or admitted as a party or properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a party.\u201d 5 ILCS 100/1 \u2014 55 (West 1996). Dimensions was not named as a party on Memorial\u2019s application, nor did it at any time seek to become a party to the hearing. It simply attended the public hearing and provided a point of view, just as any other member of the public was able to do.\nSecond, section 18 of the Planning Act provides that the Procedure Act shall apply to the Board and the Department \u201cexcept that in case of a conflict between the [Procedure Act] and [the Planning Act] the provisions of [the Planning Act] shall control.\u201d 20 ILCS 3960/18 (West 1996). Section 13 of the'Planning Act authorizes the Department or the Board to conduct investigations regarding any application for a permit, and allows them to subpoena records and administer oaths to witnesses as part of those investigations. 20 ILCS 3960/13 (West 1996). That investigatory authority would be impossible to implement if section 10 \u2014 40 of the Procedure Act were to require the Board to allow all objectors, such as Dimensions, to shadow every inquiry the Board made of an applicant. Thus, even if we were to conclude that Dimensions was a \u201cparty\u201d within the meaning of the Procedure Act, we would also conclude that the Planning Act\u2019s provisions conflict with section 10 \u2014 40 of the Procedure Act and render them inapplicable to this situation.\nAccordingly, we conclude that section 10 \u2014 40 of the Procedure Act does not apply to the posthearing submission of materials in support of a CON application.\nc. Fundamental Fairness\nCiting Southwest Energy Corp. v. Pollution Control Board, 275 Ill. App. 3d 84, 97, 655 N.E.2d 304, 312 (1995), Dimensions argues that we should reverse because the Board\u2019s consideration of Memorial\u2019s additional submissions was fundamentally unfair. In a closely related argument, Dimensions claims that it was fundamentally unfair for the Board to allow Memorial\u2019s representatives to provide testimony at the Board\u2019s agenda meeting when the Board approved the CON applications without allowing Dimensions to provide testimony at that meeting. We disagree.\nInitially, we note that in Southwest Energy, this court was reviewing a decision of the Illinois Pollution Control Board made pursuant to the Environmental Protection Act (Environmental Act) (415 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (West 1992)), in which the Illinois Pollution Control Board had reversed a decision by a local governing body because the procedures that body used were fundamentally unfair. Central to our decision in that case was section 40.1 of the Environmental Act, which required the Illinois Pollution Control Board to consider whether the procedures were fundamentally unfair. Southwest Energy, 275 Ill. App. 3d at 90, 655 N.E.2d at 308, citing 415 ILCS 5/40.1 (West 1992). Thus, by statute, a lack of fundamental fairness warranted the Illinois Pollution Control Board\u2019s reversal in that case.\nIn this case, the statute at issue contains no similar provision requiring reversal due to a lack of fundamental fairness. Perhaps for that reason, Dimensions insists that its due process rights were abridged by allegedly unfair procedures. .\nA reviewing court will reverse an administrative agency\u2019s decision if the procedures used by the agency violated a party\u2019s due process rights. Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 92-93, 606 N.E.2d 1111, 1119 (1992); Cochrane\u2019s of Champaign, Inc. v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm\u2019n, 285 Ill. App. 3d 28, 32, 673 N.E.2d 1176, 1179 (1996). \u201cThe starting point, in any due process analysis, is a determination of whether [a] protect[i]ble interest ] \u2014 life, liberty[,] or property \u2014 is present, \u2018for if there is not, no process is due.\u2019 \u201d Balmoral Racing Club, Inc. v. Illinois Racing Board, 151 Ill. 2d 367, 405, 603 N.E.2d 489, 505 (1992), quoting Polyvend, Inc. v. Puckorius, 77 Ill. 2d 287, 294, 395 N.E.2d 1376, 1378-79 (1979). Plaintiffs have not addressed this threshold question. In Petersen v. Plan Comm\u2019n, 302 Ill. App. 3d 461, 467, 707 N.E.2d 150, 154-55 (1998), the appellate court addressed whether objectors to a permit to expand a local museum had a property interest in the outcome of the proceedings for due process purposes and determined that they did not. In so holding, the court wrote the following:\n\u201cIn this case, the circuit court granted plaintiffs standing to sue, but this status did not create a constitutionally protect[i]ble interest such as a property interest. Standing was conferred due to [a nearby park\u2019s] recreational and aesthetic availability and given the role the park system plays for all citizens of the Chicago area. [Citation.] However, a property interest is involved only if \u2018a person clearly [has] more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.\u2019 [Citation.]\nPlaintiffs had no property interest at stake at this administrative hearing ***. While their interest as citizens entitles them to enjoy the park and to desire that it be preserved, it does not rise to the level of a protect[i]ble interest such as one\u2019s interest in property [citation], or in maintaining a professional license [citation]. Thus, plaintiffs did not have any constitutionally protected interest in the nonexpansion and renovation of the [m]useum.\u201d Petersen, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 467, 707 N.E.2d at 154-55.\nSimilarly here, Dimensions apparently claims that its interest in providing medical care in a protected market amounts to a \u201cproperty\u201d interest for due process purposes. However, nothing in the administrative record suggests that the interest Dimensions claims is at stake rises to the level of a \u201clegitimate claim of entitlement\u201d that should be afforded constitutional protection. As did the circuit court in Petersen, we have concluded that Dimensions\u2019 interest in the proceedings was sufficient to confer standing. However, that interest does not rise to the level of a constitutionally protected property interest.\nFurthermore, even if we were to conclude that Dimensions had a protectible property interest, the proceedings used by the Board in this case were not so unfair as to abridge due process. Due process is flexible and calls only for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands. East St. Louis Federation of Teachers, Local 1220 v. East St. Louis School District No. 189 Financial Oversight Panel, 178 Ill. 2d 399, 419, 687 N.E.2d 1050, 1062 (1997). In the setting of an administrative proceeding, \u201c \u2018[i]t is, of course, well recognized that not all the accepted requirements of due process in the trial of a case are necessary ***.\u2019 \u201d Petersen, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 469, 707 N.E.2d at 156, quoting Fox River Valley District Council of Carpenters v. Board of Education of School District No. 231, 57 Ill. App. 3d 345, 349, 373 N.E.2d 60, 63 (1978). Instead, the only procedure required is one that is suitable and proper to the nature of the determination to be made and that conforms to fundamental principles of justice. \u201c \u2018All that is necessary is that the procedures be tailored, in light of the decision to be made, to \u201cthe capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard,\u201d [citation], to insure that they are given a meaningful opportunity to present their case.\u2019 \u201d Petersen, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 466, 707 N.E.2d at 154, quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18, 41, 96 S. Ct. 893, 909 (1976).\nUnder the Planning Act, the Board must consider both the private interests of permit applicants and the public interest in the development of well-planned health-care facilities. 20 ILCS 3960/2 (West 1996). The Planning Act provides a balanced means to insure that the public and private interests at stake in a permit application process are addressed. The Department must allow members of the public to appear at a public hearing and provide their views. Further, that testimony becomes part of the administrative record to be considered by the Board in granting or denying the permit. 20 ILCS 3960/8 (West 1996). At the same time, the Board and the Department have the investigative powers to ensure that the decision reached is in fact in the public\u2019s best interest. 20 ILCS 3960/12.2 (West Supp. 1997).\nIn our judgment, the public hearing provisions of the Planning Act and related regulations provided Dimensions with \u201c \u2018a meaningful opportunity to present [its] case.\u2019 \u201d Petersen, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 466, 707 N.E.2d at 154, quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 41, 96 S. Ct. at 909. Further, we are not persuaded that the Department\u2019s and Board\u2019s exercise of their ability to proactively seek additional information, nor an applicant\u2019s ability to respond to assertions made at the public hearing and inquiries from the Board by providing supplementary information, somehow distorted the process to such a degree that it did not conform to fundamental principles of justice. Accordingly, we conclude that Dimensions received, all the process it was due.\nB. Manifest Weight of the Evidence\nLast, Dimensions and Northwest argue that the Board\u2019s decision to grant the CONs to Memorial was not supported by the administrative record. Specifically, Dimensions and Northwest cite this court\u2019s decision in Springwood Associates v. Health Facilities Planning Board, 269 Ill. App. 3d 944, 948, 646 N.E.2d 1374, 1376 (1995), for the proposition that the Board cannot deviate from its own regulations in an arbitrary fashion. Dimensions and Northwest primarily claim that, in granting the CONs to Memorial, the Board ignored the requirements of section 1110.1540(g) of the Board\u2019s regulations (77 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 1110.1540(g) (1997)), which provides that an applicant seeking to establish an ASTC in an area where existing facilities are underutilized must demonstrate that the proposed facility will improve access to care.\nMemorial responds that the record supports the Department\u2019s conclusion, adopted by the Board, that the proposed facility would improve access to care by alleviating overcrowding in Memorial\u2019s operating rooms at its existing hospital. We agree with Memorial.\nThe Planning Act requires the Board to approve any application for a permit if it finds that (1) the applicant is fit, willing, and able to provide the proper standard of care; (2) the proposed project is economically feasible; (3) the proposed project is consistent with the public interest; and (4) the proposed project is consistent with the orderly and economic development of health-care facilities. 20 ILCS 3960/6 (West 1996); Springwood Associates, 269 Ill. App. 3d at 947-48, 646 N.E.2d at 1375-76. In Access Center for Health, Ltd. v. Health Facilities Planning Board, 283 Ill. App. 3d 227, 234, 669 N.E.2d 668, 673 (1996), the court discussed the appropriate standard of review of the Board\u2019s determination of these factors as follows:\n\u201cIn Greer [v. Illinois Housing Development Authority, 122 Ill. 2d 462, 505-06, 524 N.E.2d 561, 581 (1988)], our supreme court set out guidelines for determining whether an action by an administrative agency was arbitrary and capricious. The court stated:\n\u2018While it is probably not possible to enumerate all the kinds of acts or omissions which will constitute arbitrary and capricious conduct, the following guidelines apply. Agency action is arbitrary and capricious if the agency: (1) relies on factors which the legislature did not intend for the agency to consider; (2) entirely fails to consider an important aspect of the problem; or (3) offers an explanation for its decision which runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or which is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise. [Citation.] While an agency is not required to adhere to a certain policy or practice forever, sudden and unexplained changes have often been considered arbitrary. [Citation.] The standard is one of rationality. The scope of review is narrow and the court is not, absent a \u201cclear error of judgment\u201d [citation], to substitute its own reasoning for that of the agency.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d\nIn addition, an agency cannot ignore its own regulations in issuing a decision. Springwood Associates, 269 Ill. App. 3d at 948, 646 N.E.2d at 1376. Thus, the Board was required to follow section 1110.1540(g)(3) of its regulations, which provides, in relevant part, as follows:\n\u201cAny applicant proposing to establish an [ASTC] will be approved only if one of the following conditions exists:\n^ ^ ^\n3) The applicant can document that the facility is necessary to improve access to care. Documentation shall consist of evidence that the facility will be providing services which are not currently available in the geographic service area, or that existing underutilized services in the geographic service area have restrictive admission policies.\u201d 77 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 1110.1540(g)(3) (1997).\nThe Department found that the proposed project was necessary to improve access to care because Memorial\u2019s existing surgical facilities at the hospital were overcrowded and not adequately designed to accommodate outpatient surgery patients. Because Memorial\u2019s proposed ASTC would draw solely from Memorial\u2019s existing patient base, the Department concluded that the ASTC would improve access to care for those patients by eliminating the need for them to choose between changing physicians or using the overcrowded hospital facilities.\nAs we earlier noted, Memorial supplied documentation supporting this conclusion, and no one attending the public hearing seriously challenged Memorial\u2019s assertions. Even in this appeal, Dimensions and Northwest do not claim that the Department\u2019s finding regarding the overcrowding of Memorial\u2019s facilities was not supported by evidence. Instead, Dimensions and Northwest focus on the second sentence of section 1110.1540(g)(3), requiring that \u2018\u2018[documentation [of improved access to care] shall consist of evidence that the facility will be providing services which are not currently available in the geographic service area, or that existing under[ ]utilized services in the geographic service area have restrictive admission policies.\u201d 77 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 1110.1540(g)(3) (1997). Dimensions claims that because it offers a full range of outpatient surgical procedures, all the services to be offered in Memorial\u2019s proposed ASTC are available within the geographic area. Dimensions and Northwest also claim that Memorial did not document that other ASTCs in the area have restrictive admission policies.\nA document Memorial provided in support of its application includes the following explanation:\n. \u201cAll ASTCs and hospitals have restrictive admission policies. No surgeon can admit a patient for surgery or perform surgical procedures unless the surgeon has been granted medical[-]staff membership and privileges (77 Ill. Adm. Code [\u00a7\u00a7 205.530, 205.320 (1996)]). The vast majority of patients to be treated at [the proposed ASTC] could not be treated at any other facility because their surgeons are not on the medical staffs and do not have privileges at those facilities.\nAs part of our process, we surveyed the 65 members of [Memorial\u2019s] surgical staff who signed the [l]etters of [i]ntent to refer patients to the [ASTC] *** in order to ascertain their medical[-] staff privileges at existing ASTCs. *** Fifty-seven of the 65 surgeons responded to the survey, of whom 35 do not have medical [-] staff privileges at any other ASTC.\nAs noted above, the projected caseload for the [proposed ASTC] is based solely upon outpatient surgical cases which were performed at [Memorial], regardless of whether any of the surgeons performing those cases also had medical[-]staff privileges at any ASTC.\u201d\nA hypothetical situation could exist in which Memorial\u2019s suggested interpretation of what constitutes a \u201crestrictive admission policy\u201d would give rise to abuse. After all, if the only showing necessary to demonstrate need for a new facility was that existing facilities obeyed the law by only allowing physicians with privileges to perform surgical procedures (77 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7\u00a7 205.530, 205.320 (1996)), then section 1110.1540(g)\u2019s requirement that a CON applicant demonstrate need for the facility would become vacuous.\nApplied to the particular circumstances of this case, however, Memorial\u2019s suggested interpretation is appropriate. Here, Memorial demonstrated that the proposed facility\u2019s target population would be Memorial\u2019s existing patient base, and no one has seriously challenged that position in either the administrative hearing or on appeal. From the perspective of those patients \u2014 as opposed to some abstract at-large population in the geographic area \u2014 access to existing facilities was hindered by their own physicians\u2019 lack of access to those facilities. Thus, the Board could appropriately conclude that the proposed facility was \u201cnecessary to improve access to care\u201d for Memorial\u2019s existing patient base, just as section 1110.1540(g) requires.\nIndeed, if we are to take the supreme court at its word that \u201c[t]he standard is one of rationality,\u201d then it would be difficult to defend Dimensions\u2019 and Northwest\u2019s suggested application of section 1110.1540(g). Under their proposed standard, a successful medical-care provider, such as Memorial, would be forbidden from expanding to provide for the needs of its own patients just because some other facilities in the area cannot maintain an adequate patient base. The public would, under Dimensions\u2019 and Northwest\u2019s proposed regime, be forced to seek medical services at facilities that \u2014 for whatever reason \u2014 it had not chosen for that purpose. As a secondary effect, part of the incentive for medical-care providers to do good work would disappear. Those that do well would be forbidden from enjoying the fruits of their efforts, and those that do poorly would be guaranteed a patient base because the Board would simply deny permits to build new facilities in the area until the reluctant public finally made sufficient use of all existing facilities.\nAn agency\u2019s interpretation of its own regulations is subject to some deference on review. Springwood Associates, 269 Ill. App. 3d at 948, 646 N.E.2d at 1376. Consistent with that deference, we are not prepared to conclude that the Board\u2019s application of section 1110.1540(g) constituted arbitrary and capricious conduct.\nFinally, Dimensions and Northwest point to several additional regulations requiring certain types of documentation and claim that Memorial\u2019s CON applications did not meet the requirements of those regulations. Addressing each of these contentions in detail would only serve to unnecessarily lengthen this opinion. Suffice it to say that (1) beyond conclusory comments, Dimensions did not point out any of these alleged deficiencies at the public hearing; and (2) we have carefully reviewed the administrative record and conclude that Memorial provided documentation that (a) the facility\u2019s location would not create a maldistribution of beds and services (77 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 1110.230(a)(2) (1996)); (b) the facility would serve a population in need of services (77 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 1110.230(f) (1996)); (c) the proposal was the least costly alternative (77 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 1110.230(e) (1996)); and (d) an adequate supply of manpower existed to staff the facility (77 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 1110.230(c) (1996)).\nIV CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court\u2019s judgment.\nAffirmed.\nCOOK and MYERSCOUGH, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Andrew J. Creighton (argued), of Arlington Heights, for appellants.", "Thomas C. Shields and Daniel J. Lawler (argued), both of Bell, Boyd & Lloyd, of Chicago, and Paul R. Welch, of Costigan & Wollrab, P.C., of Bloomington, for appellee Elmhurst Outpatient Surgery Center, L.L.C.", "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, and Karen J. Dimond, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for other appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DIMENSIONS MEDICAL CENTER, LTD., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ELMHURST OUTPATIENT SURGERY CENTER, L.L.C., et al., DefendantsAppellees.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201499\u20140030\nArgued July 21, 1999.\nOpinion filed September 29, 1999.\nAndrew J. Creighton (argued), of Arlington Heights, for appellants.\nThomas C. Shields and Daniel J. Lawler (argued), both of Bell, Boyd & Lloyd, of Chicago, and Paul R. Welch, of Costigan & Wollrab, P.C., of Bloomington, for appellee Elmhurst Outpatient Surgery Center, L.L.C.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, and Karen J. Dimond, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for other appellees." }, "file_name": "0781-01", "first_page_order": 799, "last_page_order": 818 }