{ "id": 261309, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARC M. HAYES, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Hayes", "decision_date": "1999-10-20", "docket_number": "No. 2-98-0632", "first_page": "194", "last_page": "198", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "308 Ill. App. 3d 194" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "288 Ill. App. 3d 438", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1597015 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/288/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209986 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335" }, { "page": "336" }, { "page": "336" }, { "page": "336" }, { "page": "337" }, { "page": "337" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 Ill. 2d 532", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 121990 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "541" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/185/0532-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 438, "char_count": 8244, "ocr_confidence": 0.777, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.147611809342842e-08, "percentile": 0.3245399635268311 }, "sha256": "a417bff624245daf3f162f3393092222e7eeee06deea4585eace5ce26794010e", "simhash": "1:baae50603d0dde47", "word_count": 1363 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:54:33.383803+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARC M. HAYES, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McLAREN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nA jury found defendant, Marc M. Hayes, guilty of unlawful use of weapons (720 ILCS 5/24 \u2014 1(a)(4) (West 1996)) and possession of a weapon without a firearm owner\u2019s identification (FOID) card (430 ILCS 65/2(a)(l) (West 1996)). The trial court sentenced defendant to 21 days\u2019 periodic imprisonment and 24 months\u2019 probation for the unlawful use of weapons conviction. The trial court imposed an identical concurrent sentence for defendant\u2019s FOID card violation. On appeal, defendant challenges his unlawful use of weapons conviction, arguing that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was not on his property at the time of the arrest. We agree, and we reverse defendant\u2019s unlawful use of weapons conviction. Defendant does not challenge his conviction of the FOID card violation.\nThe parties do not dispute the relevant facts. The record reveals that on the night of May 27, 1997, defendant was inside his detached garage, which faced an alley. When he heard a person attempt to open the garage door, defendant placed a .45-caliber handgun in his rear waistband and a .22-caliber handgun in his front pants pocket. Defendant confronted the intruder outside the garage and fired a warning shot as the intruder approached.\nWhile working in his office nearby, Fran Kammes heard the warning shot and entered the alley to investigate. Kammes saw defendant holding a gun and standing in the center of the alley near a person who was lying facedown. The person on the ground told Kammes that he tried to enter Kammes\u2019 building because he was looking for someone. Kammes told defendant to call the police after he noticed that the man was intoxicated. Defendant handed the gun to Kammes, retrieved handcuffs from his house, and handcuffed the person on the ground. Defendant testified that he had suffered property damage and theft 5 or 6 times during the past 2V2 years, and he did not believe the police regularly patrolled the alley.\nWest Chicago police officers Christian Davidson, Julio Calabrese, and Michael Rosenwinkel learned that a shot had been fired and went to the alley. When Calabrese entered the alley, he ordered defendant to lie on the ground, and defendant complied. As Davidson handcuffed defendant, he saw a .45-caliber handgun in defendant\u2019s rear waistband. Davidson searched defendant and seized the two loaded handguns. Ca-labrese and Rosenwinkel carried the handcuffed intruder to a patrol car. The man had urinated in his pants and was so intoxicated that he could not walk.\nDavidson testified that he thought the alley was open to the public but acknowledged that the alley was only 10 to 15 feet wide. While testifying, Davidson and Calabrese referred to the alley as \u201cTye Court.\u201d The Kammes real estate office and several other businesses abutted the alley, and people often walked or drove down the alley. The parties presented no evidence of whether defendant owned any part of the alley. Defendant concedes that he did not possess a valid FOID card at the time of the arrest.\nOn appeal, defendant first argues that he is entitled to a reversal of his unlawful use of weapons conviction because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not on his property when he possessed the handguns in the alley. Defendant also argues that he acted out of necessity when he carried the weapons into the alley to confront the intruder. We agree with defendant that the State failed to introduce sufficient evidence. Because we reverse defendant\u2019s unlawful use of weapons conviction based on the insufficiency of the evidence, we need not address defendant\u2019s necessity defense.\nWhen a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court will reverse the conviction only if, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532, 541 (1999). To convict a defendant of unlawful use of weapons, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not on his land or in his abode or place of business. People v. Laubscher, 183 Ill. 2d 330, 335 (1998). Defendant concedes that he was not in his abode or place of business but argues that the State failed to prove that he was off his land at the time of the arrest. Section 24 \u2014 1(a)(4) provides in relevant part:\n\u201c(a) A person commits the offense of unlawful use of weapons when he knowingly:\n* * *\n(4) Carries or possesses *** concealed on or about his person except when on his land or in his own abode or fixed place of business any pistol, revolver, stun gun or taser or other firearm!.]\u201d (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/24 \u2014 1(a)(4) (West 1996).\nIn Laubscher, the defendant and the complainant lived in different units in an apartment building. Residents routinely crossed an unenclosed lawn on their way into the building. While on the lawn, the complainant attempted to stop an argument between the defendant and two individuals. The complainant seized a .45-caliber handgun from the defendant\u2019s rear waistband, and the defendant was arrested. The State introduced no evidence of the defendant\u2019s interest in his apartment or the surrounding land. The State merely asserted that the defendant \u201clived in the building.\u201d Laubscher, 183 Ill. 2d at 336.\nThe supreme court affirmed the appellate court\u2019s reversal of the defendant\u2019s unlawful use of weapons conviction. The court concluded that, although the trial court reasonably assumed that defendant had no ownership interest in the premises, permitting such an inference without an evidentiary basis would improperly shift the burden to defendant to prove that he was on his land. Laubscher, 183 Ill. 2d at 336. In this case, the State similarly failed to introduce evidence of defendant\u2019s ownership interest in the alley. As the trier of fact, the jury improperly inferred the negation of the \u201con his land\u201d exception from the absence of evidence regarding it. See Laubscher, 183 Ill. 2d at 336.\nThe State argues that, even if defendant owned the part of the alley where he was arrested, defendant may not invoke the \u201con his land\u201d exception because the alley was readily accessible to the public. Section 24 \u2014 1(a)(4) explicitly excepts from culpability a defendant carrying a weapon on land over which he enjoys an ownership interest. Laubscher, 183 Ill. 2d at 337. When determining whether a defendant was \u201con his land\u201d pursuant to section 24 \u2014 1(a)(4), a jury may not consider the exclusivity of the defendant\u2019s possession or the degree of public access he permits. Laubscher, 183 Ill. 2d at 337. We reverse defendant\u2019s unlawful use of weapons conviction because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was not on his land when he possessed the handguns in the alley. See Laubscher, 183 111. 2d at 337. We reach no conclusion about whether the handguns were \u201cconcealed\u201d pursuant to section 24 \u2014 1(a)(4) because we reverse defendant\u2019s conviction on other grounds. See People v. Laubscher, 288 Ill. App. 3d 438, 440 (1997).\nDefendant argues that, even if the State proved the essential elements of unlawful use of weapons beyond a reasonable doubt, his conviction should be reversed because he acted out of necessity when he carried the weapons into the alley. Because the State\u2019s failure to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt warrants a reversal, we need not address defendant\u2019s necessity defense.\nFor these reasons, defendant\u2019s unlawful use of weapons conviction is reversed, and defendant\u2019s FOID card conviction is affirmed.\nAffirmed in part and reversed in part.\nINGLIS and GEIGER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McLAREN" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, and David N. Rechenberg, of Law Offices of David N. Rechenberg, of Hebron, for appellant.", "Joseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Martin E Moltz, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), and David A. Hibben, of Chicago, for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARC M. HAYES, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2 \u2014 98\u20140632\nOpinion filed October 20, 1999.\nG. Joseph Weller, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, and David N. Rechenberg, of Law Offices of David N. Rechenberg, of Hebron, for appellant.\nJoseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Martin E Moltz, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), and David A. Hibben, of Chicago, for the People." }, "file_name": "0194-01", "first_page_order": 212, "last_page_order": 216 }