{ "id": 261369, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PAUL C. WETT, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Wett", "decision_date": "1999-11-24", "docket_number": "No. 2-98-0645", "first_page": "729", "last_page": "735", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "308 Ill. App. 3d 729" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "175 Ill. 2d 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 295830 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "443" }, { "page": "443" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/175/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. App. 3d 778", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5295161 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "796" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/215/0778-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 Ill. 2d 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5574337 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "297" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/139/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "235 Ill. App. 3d 605", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5784570 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "610" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/235/0605-01" ] }, { "cite": "255 Ill. App. 3d 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2989242 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "331" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/255/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 Ill. 2d 188", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5596168 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206-07", "parenthetical": "discrepancies in complainant's testimony about core issue along with her motive to lie left evidence so unsatisfactory as to require reversal of conviction" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/145/0188-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 Ill. App. 3d 709", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2559531 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "715" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/206/0709-01" ] }, { "cite": "281 Ill. App. 3d 395", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 150168 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "402-03" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/281/0395-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 Ill. App. 3d 135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 847485 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "138" }, { "page": "138-39" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/293/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 Ill. App. 3d 94", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1725134 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "100" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/292/0094-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 658, "char_count": 13814, "ocr_confidence": 0.779, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0235225705565215e-07, "percentile": 0.54600519180848 }, "sha256": "7d192ee0871ff2466c5cae2cb98e0efdd2764a41d7de7e70613db624e10f1210", "simhash": "1:4b21b3f8f8426f02", "word_count": 2285 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:54:33.383803+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PAUL C. WETT, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE INGLIS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial, defendant, Paul C. Wett, was convicted of violating an order of protection (720 ILCS 5/12- \u2014 30(a)(1) (West 1996)). He was sentenced to 18 months\u2019 probation and 9 months\u2019 periodic imprisonment. He appeals, arguing that (1) he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) he was denied a fair trial when the prosecutor asked him an improper question on cross-examination; and (3) his crime was improperly classified as a felony. We affirm.\nDefendant was charged with violating an order of protection by making harassing contact by telephone. The indictment stated that his crime was enhanced by the fact that defendant had previously been convicted of violating an order of protection. See 720 ILCS 5/12\u2014 30(d) (West 1996).\nAt trial, the State introduced the following evidence. Joan Wett testified that she was married to defendant from 1983 to 1988. After their divorce in 1988, Joan and defendant reconciled and lived together until 1996. Joan had obtained custody of the couple\u2019s three children.\nOn August 28, 1997, Joan obtained an order of protection against defendant. She sought that order because defendant had repeatedly called, harassed, and threatened her. She was present when defendant was served with the order. The order stated that defendant was to have no contact with Joan. He was granted visitation with his children every other weekend and was permitted to call Joan\u2019s residence to speak with them at 8 p.m. on any day of the week. The order would be effective until August 28, 1999.\nJoan testified that, on October 13, 1997, between 6:30 and 7 p.m., she received a telephone call from defendant. He screamed, \u201cF-----whore, I want my kids,\u201d and, \u201cI want my f------kids, you f------whore.\u201d Joan told him that she would call the police if he called again in violation of the order of protection, and she hung up. The next morning, defendant called again, screaming, \u201cListen, you f------whore, I want to speak with my kids.\u201d Joan told him to stop calling and hung up. Again he called; he said, \u201cwhore,\u201d and Joan hung up. Defendant called three or four times more, and Joan finally disconnected her phone.\nOn cross-examination, Joan denied that it was her nine-year-old daughter, Katie, who called on the evening of October 13. Joan did not recall defendant mentioning anything about the purchase of insurance for their children. She acknowledged that the children were not insured. She did not recall whether the children were with her or with defendant on October 13.\nKatie Wett, daughter of Joan and defendant, testified on defendant\u2019s behalf. She stated that she was at defendant\u2019s house on October 13, 1997. She called Joan that evening, and defendant told her to ask Joan if she had insurance. Katie did so. She then gave the phone to defendant and heard him ask Joan if she had insurance.\nOn cross-examination, Katie testified that she did not remember exactly what defendant said to Joan or how long he spoke. She did not remember anything else that happened on that day, during the previous weekend, or during the following weekend. Defendant told her that she was going to testify in court but did not tell her what he wanted her to say.\nJudith Wett, defendant\u2019s mother, testified that defendant lived with her on October 13, 1997. At that time, defendant\u2019s children had no health insurance, and defendant had arranged for an insurance salesman to visit him at 7 p.m. At approximately 6:30 p.m., Katie called Joan, and defendant told Katie to ask Joan what kind of insurance he should order. Katie got \u201cantsy\u201d and handed the phone to defendant.\nJudith heard defendant explain to Joan that he needed to know how much insurance she could afford, as she would be responsible for half of the cost. Defendant took the phone away from his ear, and Judith heard a loud voice coming through it. Defendant said, \u201cNow, please calm down.\u201d Judith suspected that someone other than Joan was on the line because defendant said, \u201cWell, I really wasn\u2019t talking to you.\u201d Defendant hung up. Judith did not hear defendant use profanity or raise his voice during the course of the call. Upon Judith\u2019s suggestion, defendant called the police.\nDefendant testified that, on October 13, 1997, his children were at his house for their weekend visitation. He had scheduled a meeting for 7 p.m. with a representative of an insurance company to discuss the procurement of insurance for defendant\u2019s children. At approximately 6:30 p.m., Katie called Joan because she wanted to spend additional time with defendant. Defendant asked Katie to find out what Joan could afford to pay for an insurance policy. Katie did not understand his request and gave the phone to him.\nDefendant explained to Joan the reasons for his inquiry. He heard Joan\u2019s boyfriend screaming in the background. Joan\u2019s boyfriend got on the line and asked why defendant was calling. Defendant said, \u201cI wasn\u2019t talking to you,\u201d hung up, and called the police. Defendant testified that he was \u201cvery nice and polite\u201d and \u201cwould never say any bad words.\u201d He denied that he called Joan a whore or otherwise harassed her.\nDefendant testified that he did not place a call to Joan\u2019s home on the morning of October 14. He attempted to call at 8 p.m. to speak to his children but got no answer.\nOn cross-examination, the following exchange occurred:\n\u201cQ. You indicated that you didn\u2019t call your [ex-]wife a whore on October 13th, is that right?\nA. Yes.\nQ. But you do call your [ex-]wife a whore, don\u2019t you?\nA. No.\u201d\nThe court sustained defense counsel\u2019s objection but denied his motion for a mistrial.\nOutside the jury\u2019s presence, the trial court admitted a certified statement of conviction showing that, on November 22, 1996, defendant was convicted of violating a different order of protection. Over defendant\u2019s objection, the court stated that the prior conviction enhanced to a felony the crime charged in the current case.\nThe jury found defendant guilty, and the court denied defendant\u2019s motion for a new trial. The court\u2019s judgment classified defendant\u2019s offense as a Class 4 felony. Defendant timely appeals.\nDefendant first argues that the State did not prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This argument must fail if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Boyd, 292 Ill. App. 3d 94, 100 (1997).\nTo prove a violation of an order of protection by harassment, the State must prove that (1) the defendant committed \u201cknowing conduct which is not necessary to accomplish a purpose that is reasonable under the circumstances\u201d; (2) the conduct \u201cwould cause a reasonable person emotional distress\u201d; and (3) the conduct did \u201ccause emotional distress to the petitioner.\u201d 750 ILCS 60/103(7) (West 1996); People v. Karich, 293 Ill. App. 3d 135, 138 (1997). The repeated telephoning of the petitioner\u2019s residence is presumed to cause emotional distress unless the presumption is rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence. 750 ILCS 60/103(7)(ii) (West 1996).\nDefendant does not appear to contest the fact that, if Joan\u2019s testimony was accurate, defendant violated the order of protection. Instead he argues that Joan\u2019s testimony was \u201csuspect,\u201d as she could not recall details such as where her children were when she received the alleged calls. Because defendant\u2019s account was corroborated by his mother and his daughter, defendant concludes, no rational jury could have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree.\nWhen accounts of events conflict, it is the jury\u2019s task to decide which account is more credible, and a reviewing court may not overturn that determination unless the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant\u2019s guilt. People v. Fisher, 281 Ill. App. 3d 395, 402-03 (1996). Although Joan was unable to describe the precise circumstances under which the alleged calls occurred, a complainant\u2019s testimony need not be perfect to support a conviction. See People v. Foley, 206 Ill. App. 3d 709, 715 (1990). We observe that Joan testified unequivocally about the identity of the caller and the content of the calls. Therefore, we cannot say that her testimony was so fraught with inconsistencies and contradictions that the jury was not entitled to believe it. Cf. People v. Schott, 145 Ill. 2d 188, 206-07 (1991) (discrepancies in complainant\u2019s testimony about core issue along with her motive to lie left evidence so unsatisfactory as to require reversal of conviction).\nFurthermore, although Joan\u2019s account was not corroborated, the credible testimony of only one witness is sufficient to convict, even when the accused contradicts it. People v. C.H., 255 Ill. App. 3d 315, 331 (1993). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational jury could have credited Joan\u2019s testimony and found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\nKarich, upon which defendant relies, is distinguishable. There, the trial court found that the State failed to prove the content of the defendant\u2019s allegedly harassing calls. This court held that, as a result, the State did not prove that the calls were not necessary to accomplish a reasonable purpose. We therefore reversed the defendant\u2019s conviction of violating an order of protection. Karich, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 138-39.\nHere, however, Joan\u2019s testimony was sufficient to allow the jury to conclude that defendant repeatedly called her home and swore at her. Thus, we hold that the State proved defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of violating an order of protection by harassment. See 750 ILCS 60/103(7)(ii) (West 1996).\nDefendant next argues that he was denied a fair trial when the prosecutor asked him: \u201cBut you do call your [ex-]wife a whore, don\u2019t you?\u201d He contends that this question was improper and was so inflammatory that it affected the outcome of the case. Although defendant did not raise this issue in his posttrial motion, we may review it under the \u201cplain error\u201d doctrine (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)). See People v. Davidson, 235 Ill. App. 3d 605, 610 (1992). We conclude, however, that no error occurred.\nThe State may not ask a defense witness questions presuming facts not in evidence as a precursor to impeachment of that witness, unless the State has admissible evidence to substantiate the inquiry. People v. Enis, 139 Ill. 2d 264, 297 (1990). On the other hand, if a fact is already in evidence, a prosecutor may appropriately challenge a witness\u2019s credibility by bringing the fact to the jury\u2019s attention. See People v. O\u2019Banner, 215 Ill. App. 3d 778, 796 (1991). Contrary to defendant\u2019s suggestion, the question at issue here falls into the latter category.\nDuring the State\u2019s case, Joan testified that defendant repeatedly called her a whore. Defendant disputed that assertion, stating that he \u201cwould never say any bad words.\u201d The prosecutor was then permitted to attack defendant\u2019s credibility, relying upon facts that Joan\u2019s testimony had already introduced. By asking if defendant called Joan a whore, the prosecutor did exactly that. The question was not improper, and defendant is not entitled to a new trial.\nFinally, defendant argues that his crime was improperly classified as a felony. At the time of the current offense, the applicable statute, which has since been amended, stated in relevant part:\n\u201cViolation of an order of protection *** is a Class A misdemeanor. A second or subsequent offense is a Class 4 felony.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 30(d) (West 1996).\nDefendant had been convicted of violating a previous order of protection in 1996. His conviction in this case was his second for violating an order of protection. He contends, however, that the statute\u2019s enhancement provision is effective only if a defendant commits two or more violations of the same order of protection. Apparently, this is an issue of first impression. We disagree with defendant\u2019s reading of the statute.\nThe primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, and that inquiry appropriately begins with the language of the statute. When an enactment is clear and unambiguous, we may not depart from the plain language and meaning of the statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not express. People v. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d 435, 443 (1997).\nThe plain language of the statute at issue does not support defendant\u2019s interpretation. On November 22, 1996, defendant was convicted of violating an order of protection. Subsequently, in this case, defendant was again convicted of violating an order of protection. By common definition, the current offense is defendant\u2019s \u201csecond\u201d offense. To say that a second offense is a felony only if it derives from the same order of protection as the first offense is to read into the statute a condition that it does not express. We are not permitted to do so. See Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d at 443. Therefore, we hold that defendant\u2019s second conviction of violating an order of protection was properly declared a Class 4 felony.\nFor these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nTHOMAS and HUTCHINSON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE INGLIS" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller and Linda A. Johnson, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, and David N. Rechenberg, of Law Offices of David N. Rechen-berg, of Hebron, for appellant.", "Michael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Martin E Moltz, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PAUL C. WETT, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2 \u2014 98\u20140645\nOpinion filed November 24, 1999.\nG. Joseph Weller and Linda A. Johnson, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, and David N. Rechenberg, of Law Offices of David N. Rechen-berg, of Hebron, for appellant.\nMichael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Martin E Moltz, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0729-01", "first_page_order": 747, "last_page_order": 753 }