{ "id": 261404, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KEITH V. HASPREY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Hasprey", "decision_date": "1999-11-23", "docket_number": "No. 4-99-0084", "first_page": "841", "last_page": "854", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "308 Ill. App. 3d 841" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "1983 Ill. Laws 7226", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1988 Ill. Laws 1495", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1996 Ill. Laws 3775", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "431 N.E.2d 344", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 Ill. 2d 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3082585 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/88/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "494 N.E.2d 145", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 Ill. 2d 422", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5538000 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/112/0422-01" ] }, { "cite": "573 N.E.2d 339", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "343" }, { "page": "343" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "214 Ill. App. 3d 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5297653 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "84" }, { "page": "84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/214/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "692 N.E.2d 831", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "836", "parenthetical": "where no motion for mistrial was ever presented, argument that trial court failed to declare mistrial was forfeited" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 Ill. App. 3d 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 45749 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "333", "parenthetical": "where no motion for mistrial was ever presented, argument that trial court failed to declare mistrial was forfeited" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/295/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "619 N.E.2d 239", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "249 Ill. App. 3d 740", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5409215 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "745" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/249/0740-01" ] }, { "cite": "667 N.E.2d 1305", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1307" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "172 Ill. 2d 452", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 55998 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "457" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/172/0452-01" ] }, { "cite": "705 N.E.2d 850", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "886" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "185 Ill. 2d 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 122017 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "151-52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/185/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "560 N.E.2d 258", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "286" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 Ill. 2d 65", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3251434 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "126" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/137/0065-01" ] }, { "cite": "705 N.E.2d 772", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "794" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "185 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 121963 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "48" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/185/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 N.E.2d 258", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 Ill. App. 3d 974", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2625047 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/30/0974-01" ] }, { "cite": "700 N.E.2d 152", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "155" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 Ill. App. 3d 926", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1073586 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "930-31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/298/0926-01" ] }, { "cite": "606 N.E.2d 1167", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1171" }, { "page": "1171-72" }, { "page": "1171" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 Ill. 2d 195", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4738895 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201" }, { "page": "202-03" }, { "page": "203" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/153/0195-01" ] }, { "cite": "584 N.E.2d 1010", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1016" }, { "page": "1016" }, { "page": "1015" }, { "page": "1017" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "223 Ill. App. 3d 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5255573 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "410" }, { "page": "410" }, { "page": "408" }, { "page": "411" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/223/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "612 N.E.2d 106", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "110-11" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "243 Ill. App. 3d 731", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5107363 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "735-36" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/243/0731-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1102, "char_count": 30215, "ocr_confidence": 0.767, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.2274598939355577e-07, "percentile": 0.7786092934375711 }, "sha256": "07090e500a68b054d8a07fc9a3ada2afc7c9c31787dd4e74c8710b6474b4820f", "simhash": "1:631a315dbbfd7af3", "word_count": 5058 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:54:33.383803+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KEITH V. HASPREY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CARMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Keith V Hasprey was convicted of one count of reckless driving, a Class A misdemeanor, under section 11 \u2014 503 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Vehicle Code) (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 503 (West 1998)). The trial court sentenced him to 18 months\u2019 probation, a $1,000 fine plus costs, and $1,500 in restitution to Charles Robertson. Defendant argues the following on appeal: (1) the trial court erred by allowing the State to argue in its closing argument that, in order to convict defendant, it had to prove that defendant acted either willfully or wantonly, and not both; (2) the trial court erred in not declaring a mistrial when the jury delivered a note to the court asking, \u201cHow do you vote if you feel at this point and time both parties are at fault?\u201d; and (3) the trial court erred in ordering defendant to pay restitution because restitution was not authorized under the Vehicle Code or the Unified Code of Corrections (Corrections Code) (730 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 1\u20141 et seq. (West 1998). We affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nOn the morning of May 10, 1998, as Charles Robertson was driving to work in his Ford Escort on Fifth Street in Lincoln, Illinois, defendant attempted to pass him in his Dodge Ram pickup truck. As defendant passed, Robertson edged over the centerline, as a \u201creminder not to pass in town.\u201d Fifth Street is a two-lane street, and defendant had to edge almost over the curb on the other side to avoid the Escort. Defendant and Robertson agree that the two vehicles made contact during this incident, but dispute whose vehicle did the contacting. After passing Robertson, defendant pulled in front of him and stopped. Robertson also stopped. Defendant began to exit his truck, at which point Robertson backed up and took off on a side street. Robertson testified that he left the scene because he did not think there was any damage to the cars, he did not want to be late for work, defendant looked fairly angry at the time, and he felt he was in danger.\nDefendant\u2019s friend, Chuck Taylor, was driving not far behind defendant because he and defendant had been on their way to play golf. Taylor stopped behind defendant on Fifth Street and asked what happened. Defendant told Taylor that Robertson had just hit him. Defendant had not obtained Robertson\u2019s license plate number or taken a good look at Robertson at that point. Taylor suggested, \u201c[Ljet\u2019s go get him.\u201d\nDefendant and Taylor decided to pursue Robertson. Shortly thereafter, defendant spotted Robertson\u2019s Escort on a nearby side street. Defendant pursued Robertson on the side street, while Taylor took Fifth Street to attempt to cut Robertson off, in the event he emerged there. Defendant eventually caught up to Robertson, pulled beside him and motioned for him to pull over. Robertson did not pull over. Defendant pulled in front of Robertson and stopped as he did previously. Robertson again backed up his Escort and pulled away, heading toward Lincoln Parkway. Defendant again failed to obtain Robertson\u2019s license plate number or to take a good look at Robertson. Defendant continued the pursuit.\nDefendant caught up to Robertson on Lincoln Parkway, a four-lane road, pulled beside him, and again motioned for him to pull over. Both vehicles were headed southbound in the southbound lanes at this point. During this pursuit, Robertson swerved behind defendant a couple of times and drove through the grassy center median of Lincoln Parkway into the northbound lanes, still heading southbound, attempting to escape from defendant. Defendant continued to pursue him. Defendant was able to catch up, and he again pulled in front of Robertson and stopped. By that time, Taylor had caught up to them and he pulled behind Robertson to \u201cbox him in.\u201d Defendant had maneuvered his truck so that it was perpendicular to Lincoln Parkway, straddling both lanes. Robertson began to back up, attempting to flee, and defendant began backing up simultaneously. Robertson testified that defendant slammed his truck into Robertson\u2019s Escort, pushed it sideways about three to four feet, and caused it to spin around so that Robertson\u2019s car was now facing Taylor\u2019s truck. Robertson looked at Taylor and raised his hands, which Taylor interpreted as Robertson asking, \u201cWhat is going on?\u201d Defendant testified that he did not intend to hit the Escort and that, in fact, it was the Escort that hit his truck. Taylor testified that because defendant\u2019s truck was three times the size of Robertson\u2019s Escort, the Escort was crushed from the collision. Robertson was afraid and scared \u201cout of [his] wits\u201d during the course of these events. Officer David Sieloff, who prepared the police report, testified that when Robertson came to the police station, he seemed \u201cfearful of the other driver.\u201d\nImmediately after the collision on Lincoln Parkway, Robertson again swerved over the center median into the northbound lanes and pulled off Lincoln Parkway onto a road leading to the Illinois Department of Corrections. Robertson called the police from there. Defendant and Taylor aborted their pursuit, proceeded to the golf course, and called the police from there.\nRobertson was charged with reckless driving for edging over the centerline while defendant was attempting to pass him. Robertson pleaded guilty to the charge. Defendant was charged with two counts of reckless driving, but one charge was dismissed on the State\u2019s own motion before the trial. The two-day trial began on November 17, 1998.\nAt the beginning of the second day of trial, the court received a written question from the jury asking, \u201cHow do you vote if you feel at this point and time both parties are at fault?\u201d After agreeing initially that an admonition to the jury not to discuss the case until all of the evidence was presented would be a sufficient response, defendant\u2019s counsel asked that a paragraph be added to the response also instructing the jury that the State was required to prove more than fault and that this case was not about fault. Defendant feared that the jury misunderstood the law. The State objected, arguing that instructing the jury on the law before all of the evidence was concluded would only compound the problem. During the discussion, defendant\u2019s counsel stated at various times that he would move for a mistrial if he was not satisfied with the court\u2019s response to the jury. He stated, \u201cI\u2019m going to move for a mistrial. I really don\u2019t honestly think this problem can be cured unless the jury is told right now that this case is not about fault. He also said, \u201cUnless [the jury is] corrected *** immediately[,] I don\u2019t see how this can be anything other than a mistrial,\u201d and that he was \u201cmoving for a mistrial unless the court will instruct that the issue in this case is not fault.\u201d After considerable discussion, the trial judge suggested that the problem could be cured by adding a sentence to the bottom of the court\u2019s written response that, \u201cThis case is not about fault. It is about reckless driving.\u201d The State\u2019s Attorney agreed, as did defendant\u2019s counsel, stating: \u201cI think we would agree to that sentence.\u201d Defendant\u2019s counsel also asked that the word \u201cfault\u201d be placed in quotation marks, and the trial judge agreed. We have reviewed a copy of the written response to the jury that was included in the record, and it conforms with these stipulations. Finally, defendant\u2019s counsel confirmed that the response would be sent to the jury and read. The trial judge concluded the discussion by indicating that he was going to \u201ctell [the jury] not to discuss among themselves, and that [he would] instruct as to the law, and *** [that they should] wait until [they] hear everything before [they] discuss it.\u201d Presumably, the trial judge meant he would give this oral admonition to the jury in addition to sending back the written response.\nThe trial judge then addressed the jury, stating:\n\u201cEach case is individual, each case is different, and we deliberate a verdict as jurors after all the evidence has been presented and after you\u2019re instructed as to what the law is.\nIn this particular case[,] it is not proper to be discussing the case before all the evidence is in and before the instructions. *** [Y]ou have to wait until you have heard all the evidence and [been] instructed as to the law before you make any determination on guilt or innocence.\u201d\nThe court then asked if defendant was ready to proceed. Defendant\u2019s counsel responded in the affirmative and proceeded by calling defendant as a witness. Defendant\u2019s counsel did not object to the trial judge\u2019s admonition to the jury or make any motion for mistrial.\nAt the close of all of the evidence, the record indicates that defendant\u2019s counsel made a motion in limine, off the record, asking that the court prohibit the State from arguing in its closing argument that it could establish the offense of reckless driving under section 11 \u2014 503 of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 503 (West 1998)) by proving that defendant acted either willfully or wantonly. The parties\u2019 arguments with respect to defendant\u2019s motion were made on the record. Defendant argued that under People v. Paarlberg, 243 Ill. App. 3d 731, 612 N.E.2d 106 (1993), a showing of both willfulness and wantonness was required. In Paarlberg, the court discussed types of reckless driving under section 11 \u2014 503 of the Vehicle Code. Although the Paarlberg court stated that reckless driving requires proof of a willful or wanton mental state, the court proceeded to define three categories of reckless driving that each required willful and wanton behavior. Paarlberg, 243 Ill. App. 3d at 735-36, 612 N.E.2d at 110-11.\nAfter considering Paarlberg, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion in limine, noting that the plain language of section 11 \u2014 503 defines reckless driving as driving with a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of others.\nThe parties proceeded with their closing arguments. The State argued that it was required to \u201cshow that the defendant was either wilful or wanton in his disregard,\u201d but that the evidence showed that defendant was both. The State asked the jury \u201cto find that the evidence showed that both [mental states] were present here.\u201d At the conclusion of the arguments, the court gave the jury the instructions tendered by the parties. Included was a jury instruction given pursuant to Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 23.31, at 258 (3d ed. 1992) (hereinafter IPI Criminal 3d No. 23.31), which states: \u201cA person commits the offense of reckless driving when he drives a vehicle with a wilful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.\u201d (Emphasis added.) The record indicates that this instruction was given with no objection. The jury then deliberated and found defendant guilty of the offense of reckless driving.\nThe sentencing hearing was held on December 31, 1998. At the hearing, the court was asked to also address a \u201cPetition to Revoke Conditional Discharge or in the Alternative to Hold the Defendant in Contempt\u201d (petition to revoke), which was filed by the State in case No. 97 \u2014 CM\u2014317, in which defendant was convicted of attempted unlawful use of weapons on July 28, 1997. Defendant pleaded guilty and, as part of his sentence, he was placed on conditional discharge for two years. One of the conditions of his discharge was that he not violate a criminal statute of any jurisdiction. The State filed the petition to revoke based upon its belief that, as a result of his reckless driving, defendant had violated his conditional discharge.\nThe court heard arguments with respect to the appropriate sentence under both convictions. With respect to the reckless driving conviction, the State specifically addressed the issue of whether the court was authorized to order restitution under the Vehicle Code. Citing People v. Nasser, 223 Ill. App. 3d 400, 584 N.E.2d 1010 (1991), and People v. Lowe, 153 Ill. 2d 195, 606 N.E.2d 1167 (1992), the State argued that the legislature intended for courts to have broad authority to order restitution for all offenses. The State also cited People v. Fox, 298 Ill. App. 3d 926, 700 N.E.2d 152 (1998), in which the First District Appellate Court held that courts are not authorized to order restitution for offenses under the Vehicle Code. The State argued that the Fox decision was in conflict with the legislative intent underlying section 5 \u2014 5\u20146 of the Corrections Code and urged the court to reject it. Defendant urged the court to follow Fox, arguing that the plain language of the restitution statute did not allow courts to order restitution for any offenses except those under the Criminal Code of 1961 (Criminal Code) (720 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 1998)).\nUpon the conclusion of the arguments, the court sentenced defendant to 18 months\u2019 probation, a $1,000 fine plus costs, and $1,500 in restitution for the reckless driving conviction. With respect to the petition to revoke, the court revoked the conditional discharge and sentenced defendant to two weekends in jail and costs.\nThis appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. State\u2019s Closing Argument\nDefendant first argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to argue in closing that reckless driving could be proved by a showing of either willful or wanton conduct. Defendant asks us to reverse defendant\u2019s conviction for reckless driving and remand for further hearing and, also, to reverse the trial court\u2019s finding that defendant violated the order of conditional discharge.\nBefore reaching the merits of defendant\u2019s argument, we must address the State\u2019s contention that defendant forfeited his right to raise this argument because he agreed to the jury instruction given pursuant to IPI Criminal 3d No. 23.31, which defines reckless driving as driving a vehicle with a \u201cwilful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Defendant contends that he is not objecting to the language of the jury instruction. Rather, he argues that the State\u2019s closing argument was prejudicial because it misstated the law. Because defendant properly raised his objection to the State\u2019s closing argument in his posttrial motion, he argues that he did not forfeit his right to object to it on appeal. We agree and will address the merits of defendant\u2019s argument.\nDefendant argues that despite the plain language of section 11\u2014 503 of the Vehicle Code, that a person commits the offense of reckless driving when he \u201cdrives any vehicle with a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property\u201d (emphasis added) (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 503 (West 1998)), the legislature actually intended to require proof of both a willful and wanton disregard as elements of reckless driving. He contends that the legislature intended the term \u201creckless,\u201d as used in section 11 \u2014 503 of the Vehicle Code, to have the definition adopted in section 4 \u2014 6 of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 6 (West 1998)), which includes elements of both willfulness and wantonness. Defendant points to case law in which courts looked for both willful and wanton conduct in determining whether the offense of reckless driving was committed under section 11 \u2014 503, and contends that such case law is an indication that these courts agree the legislature intended to require both willful and wanton conduct as elements of reckless driving. See, e.g., Paarlberg, 243 Ill. App. 3d 731, 612 N.E.2d 106; People v. Johnson, 30 Ill. App. 3d 974, 333 N.E.2d 258 (1975). Accordingly, defendant argues, the State misstated the law in its closing argument by suggesting to the jury that it could show either willful or wanton conduct, and not both.\nIt is well established that prosecutors are afforded wide latitude in closing arguments. People v. Maori, 185 Ill. 2d 1, 48, 705 N.E.2d 772, 794 (1998).\nThe Supreme Court of Illinois has held:\n\u201c[B]ecause a cold record cannot convey the actual effect of an attorney\u2019s comments, appellate courts accept a trial judge\u2019s judgment (unless it is a clear abuse of discretion) that a prosecutor has not exceeded that wide latitude by making a prejudicial comment.\u201d People v. Bean, 137 Ill. 2d 65, 126, 560 N.E.2d 258, 286 (1990).\nAlso, the supreme court has said:\n\u201cImproper remarks warrant reversal only where they result in substantial prejudice to the defendant, considering the content and context of the language, its relationship to the evidence, and its effect on the defendant\u2019s right to a fair and impartial trial.\u201d People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 151-52, 705 N.E.2d 850, 886 (1998).\nOur determination involves a two-step process. First, we must decide if the State\u2019s remarks indeed misstated the law. If we find that they did, we must then determine if the remarks were sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal. However, if we find they did not misstate the law, we need not reach the substantial prejudice inquiry.\nWhere the interpretation of a statute is involved, the standard of review on appeal is de novo. People v. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d 452, 457, 667 N.E.2d 1305, 1307 (1996). The primary rule of statutory interpretation and construction is to ascertain and effectuate the true meaning and intent of the legislature. If the language of the statute is plain, clear, and unambiguous, it must be given effect and a court need not resort to other aids for construction. Department of Central Management Services v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 249 Ill. App. 3d 740, 745, 619 N.E.2d 239, 243 (1993).\nWe find that the language of section 11 \u2014 503 of the Vehicle Code is plain, clear, and unambiguous, and it is unnecessary to resort to other aids of construction such as legislative history. Here, the language of section 11 \u2014 503 clearly defines reckless driving as involving either willful or wanton conduct. Accordingly, the State did not misstate the law in suggesting that it could establish either willful or wanton behavior. Because we do not find that the State misstated the law, we need not reach the substantial prejudice inquiry.\nHowever, we note that even if the legislature did indeed intend to specifically require proof of both willful and wanton behavior under section 11 \u2014 503 of the Vehicle Code, as defendant contends, no substantial prejudice occurred as a result of the State\u2019s remarks. Our review of the record shows overwhelming evidence that defendant acted both willfully and wantonly. Indeed, defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence or contend that he did not act both willfully and wantonly.\nBecause we find that the State correctly stated the law, we cannot find any prejudice to the defendant and find no basis for reversal or for further hearing.\nB. Declaration of Mistrial\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred by failing to declare a mistrial when the jury asked the court, \u201cHow do you vote if you feel at this point and time both parties are at fault?\u201d Defendant requests that we reverse his conviction and grant a new trial. The State again contends that defendant has forfeited his right to make this argument because (1) defendant acquiesced at the trial to the court\u2019s response to the jury and (2) defendant\u2019s argument in his post-trial motion was different.\nWe note, as a threshold matter, that it is unclear whether defendant argues that the trial court improperly denied his motion for a mistrial or that the trial court should have declared a mistrial sua sponte. In any event, we have reviewed the record and find that although defendant, in several instances, threatened to move for a mistrial unless the court instructed the jury that this case was not about fault, no motion was ever actually presented. In fact, defendant explicitly expressed satisfaction with the court\u2019s written response to the jury and neither requested that the court also orally admonish the jury that this case was not about fault nor objected once the court gave its oral admonition. Because defendant only threatened to move for mistrial and never actually presented such motion, and because he clearly acquiesced to the court\u2019s response to the jury\u2019s question, we agree with the State that defendant forfeited his right to argue that the trial court erred in not declaring a mistrial. See People v. Westpfahl, 295 Ill. App. 3d 327, 333, 692 N.E.2d 831, 836 (1998) (where no motion for mistrial was ever presented, argument that trial court failed to declare mistrial was forfeited).\nWe do note that a trial court must \u201cuse \u2018sound discretion\u2019 to assure that manifest necessity exists to declare sua sponte a mistrial.\u201d People v. Pondexter, 214 Ill. App. 3d 79, 84, 573 N.E.2d 339, 343 (1991). The trial court must consider all reasonable alternatives to a declaration of mistrial. Pondexter, 214 Ill. App. 3d at 84, 573 N.E.2d at 343. We find that no manifest necessity existed here, because any prejudice that may have resulted from the jury\u2019s question was corrected by the court\u2019s written response and several oral admonitions to the jurors that they should refrain from discussing the case until all of the evidence is in and they are instructed as to the law.\nHaving found that defendant forfeited the issue by his acquiescence to the court\u2019s actions, we need not address whether defendant also forfeited the issue by raising a different argument in his posttrial motion.\nC. Restitution\nDefendant\u2019s last argument is that the trial court erred in ordering defendant to pay restitution to Robertson because the court was not authorized to do so under the Vehicle Code or the Corrections Code. Defendant asks us to vacate and set aside the trial court\u2019s order. The determination and imposition of a sentence are matters involving considerable judicial discretion, and a trial court\u2019s sentence will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Younger, 112 Ill. 2d 422, 427, 494 N.E.2d 145, 147 (1986), quoting People v. La Pointe, 88 Ill. 2d 482, 492, 431 N.E.2d 344, 348 (1981).\nSection 5 \u2014 5\u20143 of the Corrections Code (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20143 (West 1998)) sets forth the appropriate dispositions for misdemeanors. One such appropriate disposition under section 5 \u2014 5\u20143(b)(7) (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20143(b)(7) (West 1998)) is an order directing the offender to make restitution to the victim under section 5 \u2014 5\u20146 of the Corrections Code (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20146 (West 1998)). Prior to December 31, 1996, section 5 \u2014 5\u20146 of the Corrections Code provided, in relevant part, as follows:\n\u201cIn all convictions for offenses in violation of the [Criminal Code] committed against any person 65 years of age or older in which the person received any injury to their person or damage to their real or personal property as a result of the criminal act of the defendant ***, the court shall order restitution as provided in this [s]ection. In all other cases[,} the court shall[,] at the sentence hearing[,] determine whether restitution is an appropriate sentence ***.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20146 (West 1994).\nThe legislature passed Public Act 89 \u2014 689 (Pub. Act 89 \u2014 689, \u00a7 100, eff. December 31, 1996 (1996 Ill. Laws 3775, 3795) (amending 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20146 (West Supp. 1995)), which amended section 5 \u2014 5\u20146 of the Corrections Code to read as follows:\n\u201cIn all convictions for offenses in violation of the [Criminal Code] in which the person received any injury to their person or damage to their real or personal property as a result of the criminal act of the defendant, the court shall order restitution as provided in this Mection.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20146 (West 1998).\nPublic Act 89 \u2014 689 broadened section 5 \u2014 5\u20146 of the Corrections Code to allow restitution for any person receiving an injury, hot just persons 65 or older. Public Act 89 \u2014 689 also deleted the second sentence of section 5 \u2014 5\u20146, which provided for the method of determining restitution in cases involving offenses other than those committed under the Criminal Code.\nDefendant argues that because the legislature deleted the second sentence of section 5 \u2014 5\u20146 of the Corrections Code, restitution is now authorized only for offenses under the Criminal Code. This amended version of section 5 \u2014 5\u20146 was in effect at the time of defendant\u2019s conviction and sentencing. Because defendant was convicted under the Vehicle Code, not the Criminal Code, defendant argues that the trial court was not authorized to order restitution under the Corrections Code and that no similar restitution statute exists under the Vehicle Code. Defendant cites Fox, 298 Ill. App. 3d 926, 700 N.E.2d 152, as authority for his position. The first district in Fox held that the plain language of section 5 \u2014 5\u20146, as amended, expressly limits restitution only to convictions for offenses contained in the Criminal Code. The Fox court held further that it would be improperly engaging in judicial lawmaking to hold otherwise. Fox, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 930-31, 700 N.E.2d at 155.\nWe agree with defendant that Fox supports his position but, because we do not agree with the analysis in Fox, we reject his argument and affirm the trial court\u2019s order of restitution. In Nasser, 223 Ill. App. 3d at 410, 584 N.E.2d at 1016, we also interpreted section 5 \u2014 5\u20146 of the Corrections Code, albeit for a different reason. The question in Nasser was whether section 5 \u2014 5\u20146(b) limited restitution to victims of violent crimes, as opposed to nonviolent crimes. We held that section 5 \u2014 5\u20146(b) did not limit restitution to victims of violent crimes. We stated the legislative intent underlying section 5 \u2014 5\u20146(b) to be as follows: \u201c(1) to make victims whole for any injury received at the hands of the convicted criminal; and (2) to make criminals pay all of the costs which arise as a result of injuries the victim suffered.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Nasser, 223 Ill. App. 3d at 410, 584 N.E.2d at 1016. We felt that limiting restitution to cases of violent crimes was in conflict with this intent. In support of our holding, we also noted that the legislature had added a new subsection (g) to section 5 \u2014 5\u20146 (added by Public Act 85 \u2014 1194 (Pub. Act 85 \u2014 1194, eff. August 19, 1988 (1988 Ill. Laws 1495, 1505-06))), which made restitution mandatory for certain offenses that were not violent crimes. Nasser, 223 Ill. App. 3d at 408, 584 N.E.2d at 1015.\nOur holding in Nasser was affirmed by the supreme court in Lowe, 153 Ill. 2d 195, 606 N.E.2d 1167. The court stated that, in interpreting a statute, a court \u201cmust presume that, in enacting legislation, the legislature did not intend an absurd result.\u201d Lowe, 153 Ill. 2d at 201, 606 N.E.2d at 1171. The court declined to read section 5 \u2014 5\u20146(b) of the Corrections Code as authorizing restitution only for victims of violent crime. In so doing, the court noted that statements of the Illinois House of Representatives considering House Bill 67, enacted as Public Act 83 \u2014 1061 (Pub. Act 83 \u2014 1061, eff. July 1, 1984 (1983 Ill. Laws 7226)), which added subsection (b) to section 5 \u2014 5\u20146, showed a clear intent to expand the scope of the restitution statute. Lowe, 153 Ill. 2d at 202-03, 606 N.E.2d at 1171-72. Therefore, the court concluded that construing section 5 \u2014 5\u20146(b) to limit restitution to victims of violent crime \u201cwould be absurd, as it is contradictory to expand and simultaneously to narrow the applicability of a statute.\u201d Lowe, 153 Ill. 2d at 203, 606 N.E.2d at 1171.\nIn the instant case, we are presented with a similar situation. The legislative intent in passing Public Act 89 \u2014 689 was clearly to broaden section 5 \u2014 5\u20146 of the Corrections Code to authorize restitution for all victims of crimes committed under the Criminal Code, not just victims ages 65 or older. It would be contradictory to this intent to hold that the legislature simultaneously intended to narrow section 5 \u2014 5\u20146 to limit restitution only for offenses committed under the Criminal Code.' Such a holding would bar the trial courts in the future from ordering restitution for the countless number of offenses not listed under the Criminal Code, such as reckless driving and other crimes under the Vehicle Code, all of the offenses against persons codified from the Communications Consumer Privacy Act through the Wrongs to Children Act (720 ILCS 110/1 through 3 (West 1998) through 720 ILCS 150/0.01 et seq. (West 1998)), all of the offenses against property codified from the Aircraft Crash Parts Act through the Wild Plant Conservation Act (720 ILCS 205/0.01 et seq. (West 1998) through 720 ILCS 400/0.01 et seq. (West 1998)), and all of the offenses against the public codified from the Abandoned Refrigerator Act through the Use of Intoxicating Compounds Act (720 ILCS 505/0.01 et seq. (West 1998) through 720 ILCS 690/0.01 et seq. (West 1998)), to name only a few. We find it extremely unlikely that the legislature intended to exclude victims of offenses committed under these and countless other statutes from the benefit of restitution, and it would be absurd, at minimum, to hold as such. We conclude that if the legislature indeed intended to make such a sweeping and comprehensive change in the policy of restitution, it would have made such change clear by codifying an affirmative statement to that effect.\nWe choose to adhere to the view we expressed in Nasser, that the legislative intent underlying section 5 \u2014 5\u20146 of the Corrections Code imposes a duty upon trial courts to order restitution, to the extent possible, to benefit victims so they can avoid the bother, expense, and delay often present in the civil justice system. Nasser, 223 Ill. App. 3d at 411, 584 N.E.2d at 1017. Accordingly, we respectfully decline to follow the decision of our colleagues in the first district in Fox and, not having found any abuse of discretion, affirm the restitution order of the trial court.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nSTEIGMANN and MYERSCOUGH, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CARMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Thomas W. Funk, of Lincoln, for appellant.", "William G. Workman, State\u2019s Attorney, of Lincoln (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and James C. Majors, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KEITH V. HASPREY, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4 \u2014 99\u20140084\nOpinion filed November 23, 1999.\nThomas W. Funk, of Lincoln, for appellant.\nWilliam G. Workman, State\u2019s Attorney, of Lincoln (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and James C. Majors, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0841-01", "first_page_order": 859, "last_page_order": 872 }