{ "id": 261330, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BRADLEY L. ADAMS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Adams", "decision_date": "1999-12-10", "docket_number": "No. 4-96-0525", "first_page": "995", "last_page": "1008", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "308 Ill. App. 3d 995" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "670 N.E.2d 606", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "620" }, { "page": "621", "parenthetical": "jury need not \"accept any possible explanation compatible with defendant's innocence and elevate it to the status of reasonable doubt\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "497 N.E.2d 1138", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1144" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 Ill. 2d 256", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3173780 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "271" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/113/0256-01" ] }, { "cite": "559 N.E.2d 1133", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1138" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 Ill. App. 3d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2587585 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/202/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 Ill. 2d 484", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 55985 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "515" }, { "page": "515-16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/172/0484-01" ] }, { "cite": "662 N.E.2d 1328", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1349-50" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 Ill. 2d 409", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 909168 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "457-58" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/169/0409-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 U.S. 610", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6181032 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "617" }, { "page": "97" }, { "page": "2244" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/426/0610-01" ] }, { "cite": "363 N.E.2d 835", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "836-37" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 546", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5464541 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0546-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 N.E.2d 1360", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1374" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 Ill. 2d 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5554525 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/125/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "623 N.E.2d 775", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "251 Ill. App. 3d 801", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2960286 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "804" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/251/0801-01" ] }, { "cite": "583 N.E.2d 515", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "519" }, { "page": "523" }, { "page": "526" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 Ill. 2d 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5596242 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364-65" }, { "page": "373" }, { "page": "379" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/145/0353-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1258, "char_count": 29673, "ocr_confidence": 0.771, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.328543058707458e-07, "percentile": 0.6284615435108379 }, "sha256": "813f6125b32fbcd550972cc68e8e93e31d4fba28bd52d86bded834ebe2154b7c", "simhash": "1:e843d62667c31545", "word_count": 4695 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:54:33.383803+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BRADLEY L. ADAMS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KNECHT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter a jury trial in April 1996, defendant, Bradley Adams, was found guilty of four counts of first degree murder, one count of aggravated battery, and one count of concealment of a homicide. 720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(a), 12 \u2014 4(a), 9 \u2014 3.1 (West 1994). In June 1996, the court vacated the aggravated battery conviction and imposed an extended term of 65 years\u2019 imprisonment for first degree murder and a consecutive 5-year term for concealment of a homicide. Defendant appeals, arguing (1) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of his prior misconduct; (2) the trial court erred in failing to compel the testimony of a defense witness; (3) the State improperly commented on his postarrest silence; (4) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for first degree murder; and (5) the trial court improperly considered an aggravating factor in imposing his sentence. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand with directions.\nI. BACKGROUND\nIn August 1995, defendant was charged with first degree murder, aggravated battery, and concealment of a homicide in connection with the February 1995 death of his girlfriend, Molly Sullivan. In March 1996, the trial court held a pretrial hearing on a motion by the State to admit evidence of defendant\u2019s prior misconduct. At the hearing, the State called Eva Golterman to testify about an incident between her and defendant in the fall of 1993.\nIn October 1993, Golterman and defendant were engaged to be married and lived in separate units at the Park West Apartment complex (Park West) in Springfield, Illinois. Golterman described an incident when she and defendant were leaving Park West. Golterman stopped to check her mail and found a letter addressed to her from Francis Krupka. Golterman opened the letter in defendant\u2019s presence and read the first few sentences, which indicated defendant and Krupka were involved in a homosexual relationship. Defendant grabbed the letter and ran to his apartment. Golterman followed and asked defendant to return the letter. When defendant refused, Golter-man confronted him about his alleged relationship with Krupka. Gol-terman then attempted to grab the letter, but defendant pinned Gol-terman\u2019s arm behind her back. Golterman managed to break free and again asked about the alleged relationship. Defendant violently grabbed Golterman\u2019s throat for more than a minute, kicked her in the abdomen and pushed her to the apartment floor. Golterman then left defendant\u2019s apartment. The trial court granted the State\u2019s motion, finding such evidence admissible.\nThe evidence presented at trial established the following. On February 25, 1995, David Stoner, Francis Krupka and the victim, Molly, attended a party at defendant\u2019s Park West apartment. At about 8 p.m., Molly and Krupka had a conversation in the bedroom. Defendant and Stoner remained in the living room. While Molly and Krupka conversed, Mary White, Molly\u2019s best friend and neighbor of defendant, arrived. After briefly talking with defendant and Stoner, Mary went to the bedroom and noticed Molly was upset. Mary and Molly left the party and walked to Mary\u2019s apartment. Molly told Mary about her conversation with Krupka and specifically recounted Krupka stated he was in love with defendant. Molly ultimately returned to defendant\u2019s apartment.\nSometime after Molly\u2019s return, defendant, Krupka and Molly were in the kitchen. Suddenly, defendant pushed Krupka against the wall. Molly intervened and questioned defendant about his conduct. Defendant released Krupka and returned to the couch in the living room. Krupka followed defendant and sat on the floor in front of defendant. When Molly saw how defendant and Krupka were sitting, she stated \u201cThis is sick. I\u2019m going home.\u201d Molly gathered her belongings, and she and Stoner left the apartment at about 11 p.m. Stoner walked Molly to her vehicle and then drove home.\nLouis Poppenhouse testified he was using the laundry facilities at Park West on February 26, 1995. At about 1:30 a.m. Poppenhouse heard two men, whom he described as intoxicated, arguing and shouting near the VFW building, which is located directly east of the Park West complex. Poppenhouse called the police after hearing several noises he described as \u201cbanging against a metal building.\u201d As he waited for the police, Poppenhouse heard one of the individuals yell \u201cMotherfucker. Why did you do it? I\u2019m going to kill you.\u201d Because of his location, Poppenhouse could not identify the individuals.\nRobert Heaton, a police officer, responded to Poppenhouse\u2019s 911 call. When Heaton arrived, he noticed a white male near the VFW building. Upon seeing Heaton\u2019s vehicle, this individual immediately turned and entered the building in which defendant\u2019s apartment was located. Heaton described the man as approximately 5 feet 9 inches tall and weighing between 180 and 200 pounds. Defendant was then 5 feet 8 inches tall and weighed approximately 200 pounds. Heaton, along with fellow police officer Brad Sack, later discovered the body of a deceased white female lying in the VFW parking lot about 10 feet from the VFW building. The body was identified as Molly at about 1 p.m. that day.\nSeveral individuals talked to defendant on the morning of February 26 concerning Molly\u2019s whereabouts. According to Molly\u2019s mother, Helen, defendant stated Molly left his apartment the night before and had not returned. She and defendant exchanged a series of telephone calls and, each time, defendant insisted Molly had to be with her friend Mary. In their last conversation, defendant said the body of a woman had been found in the parking lot but, given the description, the woman could not have been Molly. Defendant also told Mary White and her husband, David, he had no knowledge of Molly\u2019s whereabouts.\nMary Cullen and Julie Sullivan, sisters of the victim, went to defendant\u2019s apartment sometime before 11 a.m. Defendant and Krupka were in the apartment. When Cullen and Julie asked defendant about Molly\u2019s whereabouts, defendant repeatedly replied the \u201cfucking niggers\u201d killed her. Cullen and Julie saw some of Molly\u2019s personal belongings lying around defendant\u2019s apartment, including her necklace, rings, shoes, and purse.\nSpringfield detectives Charles Cox and Doug Williamson also talked to defendant. They stated defendant appeared intoxicated and became irate and verbally abusive when questioned about Molly\u2019s whereabouts. According to the detectives, defendant repeatedly yelled at them to look for the \u201cfucking niggers\u201d who killed Molly and denied knowing her location.\nPursuant to a search warrant executed later that day, police seized various items of evidence from defendant\u2019s apartment, including Molly\u2019s belongings and clothing worn by defendant the previous evening. Defendant was sleeping when the warrant was executed, but awoke before the police left. After he awoke, defendant was informed the woman found in the parking lot was Molly. Defendant immediately turned to the officers and asked \u201cAm I under arrest?\u201d Cox -asked defendant why he would be under arrest. Defendant again became belligerent and verbally abusive. The detectives suggested defendant come to the police station after he relaxed and then left the apartment.\nThe detectives interviewed defendant that evening at the police station, but were unable to obtain any information because defendant was still belligerent. They conducted a final interview on February 28, 1995, at the home of defendant\u2019s father. Defendant was then fully cooperative and maintained he did not know what happened to Molly.\nAfter Golterman recounted the October 1993 incident, Drs. Joan Barrenfanger and Edmund Donoghue testified on the cause of Molly\u2019s death. Dr. Barrenfanger, a pathologist, explained the upper portion of Molly\u2019s right arm had been fractured. She concluded the fracture occurred before Molly\u2019s death and, after reviewing X rays with an orthopedic surgeon, determined the injury was characteristic of a fall. She also noted Molly had aspirated. While unable to determine the exact cause of death, Dr. Barrenfanger concluded within a reasonable degree of medical certainty Molly had died of asphyxiation.\nOn cross-examination, Dr. Barrenfanger explained the effects of Kugelberg-Welander disease, a form of muscular dystrophy that afflicted the upper portion of Molly\u2019s body. Molly\u2019s condition would have caused extreme weakness in her chest, arms and hands and the muscles around Molly\u2019s ribs and diaphragm would have been deteriorating, which, in her opinion, would have inhibited her ability to breathe.\nDr. Barrenfanger further described markings on Molly\u2019s upper body. She highlighted bruising, specifically an abrasion on the right side of Molly\u2019s neck. She concluded this abrasion could have been caused by Molly\u2019s necklace seized from defendant\u2019s apartment. She outlined several physical characteristics she would expect to find on a person who had died of strangulation, such as conjunctiva hemorrhages around the eyes, hemorrhaging around the muscles and bones of the neck, a break of the hyoid bone, and abnormalities around the trachea and larynx. Dr. Barrenfanger\u2019s examination of Molly failed to uncover any of these features. She stated no particular damage to the throat and the hyoid bone is visible in approximately two-thirds of all strangulation cases. Although acknowledging the mark on Molly\u2019s neck was consistent with the necklace, Dr. Barrenfanger stated, if Molly had been strangled with this item, she would have expected to find a longer abrasion as well as defense wounds. Dr. Barrenfanger found no evidence of defense wounds.\nDr. Barrenfanger also explained \u201ccompressional asphyxiation,\u201d which occurs when a person is unable to breathe properly due to continued compression of the rib cage. She stated, in light of Molly\u2019s muscular anomaly, the necessary weight to suffocate her would be less than required to suffocate an individual with a normal muscular structure. She said compressional asphyxiation could have been the cause of Molly\u2019s death, but conceded no evidence existed to support this finding.\nDr. Donoghue, a forensic pathologist from Cook County, Illinois, conducted a retrospective review of 25 strangulation cases to identify different types of injuries on the human body. He noted three distinct types of cases: (1) instances where only external injuries were present; (2) instances where only internal injuries were present; and (3) instances where both external and internal injuries were present. Upon reviewing Molly\u2019s autopsy materials, Dr. Donoghue testified within a reasonable degree of medical certainty Molly died of strangulation. The marks on Molly\u2019s neck were consistent with having been made by her necklace, and, in his opinion, were caused by the necklace being pressed against the neck when she was was strangled.\nOn cross-examination, Dr. Donoghue conceded he would have been better informed if he participated in the examination of Molly\u2019s body. He nonetheless stated any difference would have been inconsequential because the findings of Dr. Barrenfanger were sufficiently competent to make an accurate determination. He acknowledged, with the exception of the abrasion on the neck, the autopsy materials revealed no other indicia of strangulation. He disagreed with Dr. Barrenfanger\u2019s characterization of the neck abrasion as trivial because, in his opinion, even small injuries to the neck can be significant. He concluded the abrasion in this case revealed the cause of death as strangulation.\nOutside the presence of the jury, defendant called Krupka as a witness. Krupka was asked to describe his activities on the evening of February 25, 1995, and early morning hours of February 26. Krupka asserted his fifth amendment rights and declined to answer. Defense counsel asked the trial court to compel Krupka to testify claiming he had been granted immunity by the State. Defendant tendered a proffer of immunity executed by the State, Krupka and his attorney, and an order entered by Judge Leo Zappa purporting to grant Krupka immunity. The State maintained the order merely authorized a grant of immunity and, alternatively, any grant thereof had not been effectuated because Krupka failed to comply with the terms of its proffer. After hearing argument, the court determined Judge Zappa\u2019s order did not grant Krupka immunity and, in any event, any grant of immunity had not been effectuated. Defendant\u2019s request to compel Krupka\u2019s testimony was denied.\nDefendant testified on his own behalf. He initially denied attacking Golterman in October 1993 and then described the events of February 25 and 26. He claimed Molly returned to his apartment after leaving with Stoner and they discussed the comments made by Krupka earlier that evening. At some point, Molly turned and began to walk away from defendant. Defendant attempted to grab Molly\u2019s shoulders as she turned but inadvertently grabbed the back of her necklace, causing it to break and fall to the floor. Defendant retrieved the necklace and tried to fix it at the living room table, while Molly stood directly behind him. Defendant continued the discussions and, in an effort to console Molly, turned to hug her. When he turned, they stumbled to the floor, causing defendant to fall on Molly\u2019s chest.\nDefendant sat on Molly\u2019s chest as he continued to discuss the situation concerning Krupka. After three minutes, defendant observed no reaction from Molly and realized she was dead. Krupka telephoned a short time later and later arrived at the apartment. After arguing whether they should call the police or seek medical attention, they decided to drive Molly to the hospital. Defendant carried Molly\u2019s body to the VFW parking lot and placed her in the passenger seat of his vehicle. He believed Krupka would drive Molly to the hospital and claimed he saw Krupka drive his car out of the parking lot. Once Krupka left, defendant ran back to his apartment and passed out on the couch.\nDefendant detailed several conversations with Molly\u2019s friends and family members the morning of February 26 and his later discussions with police. He acknowledged lying on each occasion about Molly\u2019s whereabouts and the events of February 25 and 26. He explained he was untruthful because he panicked and was afraid nobody would believe him. Although defendant accepted responsibility for Molly\u2019s death, he stated he never intended to kill her and maintained her death was an accident.\nFollowing his testimony, defendant again tried to call Krupka as a witness. The trial court, after argument, again denied defendant\u2019s request. The juiy returned a verdict of guilty on all six counts.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Evidence of Defendant\u2019s Prior Misconduct\nDefendant first contends the trial court erred in admitting Goiter-man\u2019s testimony on the October 1993 incident. He argues (1) this evidence was not relevant as to whether he murdered Molly and (2) any probative value was greatly outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The State maintains the evidence was relevant to prove criminal intent, lack of accident, and sobriety.\nGenerally, evidence of other crimes or wrongs is not admissible for the purpose of showing the defendant\u2019s disposition or propensity to commit such conduct. Such evidence is admissible when relevant to establish intent, motive, or absence of mistake or accident, or for any purpose other than to show a propensity to commit crime. People v. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 364-65, 583 N.E.2d 515, 519 (1991). The admissibility of evidence at trial is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and this court will not overturn the trial court\u2019s decision absent a clear abuse of discretion. People v. Harper, 251 Ill. App. 3d 801, 804, 623 N.E.2d 775, 777 (1993).\nWe find Golterman\u2019s testimony was relevant. Defendant admitted causing Molly\u2019s death, but maintained it was accidental. The State refuted defendant\u2019s accident claim, arguing he strangled Molly after being confronted with allegations of a homosexual relationship with Krupka. Testimony of the October 1993 incident provided insight on defendant\u2019s reactions when confronted with allegations of homosexuality and was relevant to show defendant\u2019s state of mind at the time of Molly\u2019s death and refute any claim of accident. Defendant stresses one isolated abusive episode toward one person cannot be construed as an intent to injure another or be a valid basis for refuting a later claim of accident toward that person. Unlike instances where evidence of prior misconduct is introduced to show modus operandi, or that the crime was part of a common design or plan, the degree of identity between the two offenses is not necessary when such evidence is offered for some other purpose. When, as here, evidence of prior misconduct is offered to prove intent or the absence of accident, mere general areas of similarity will suffice. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d at 373, 583 N.E.2d at 523.\nAlthough the victims and end results differ, the circumstances surrounding the attack of Golterman and the death of Molly are strikingly similar. The differences between the two incidents do not eliminate the relevancy of Golterman\u2019s testimony. Moreover, given the charge to the jury to receive Golterman\u2019s testimony for the limited purpose of determining defendant\u2019s intent, knowledge, intoxication, and accident, the probative value of such evidence was not substantially outweighed by any prejudice to defendant. See People v. Evans, 125 Ill. 2d 50, 83, 530 N.E.2d 1360, 1374 (1988). Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion.\nB. Krupka\u2019s Immunity\nDefendant next contends he was denied a fair trial when the trial court refused to compel Krupka\u2019s testimony. Under the proffer, the State intended to grant Krupka use immunity under section 106\u2014 2.5(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/106 \u2014 2.5(b) (West 1994)) in exchange for full cooperation in its investigation of Molly\u2019s death. The State intended to grant Krupka immunity on the condition he provided \u201ccomplete and truthful information to law enforcement officials regarding criminal conduct and everything he knows or has reason to believe about the criminal conduct of others.\u201d In addition, Krupka was required \u201cto produce any and all documents and physical evidence of any kind in his possession or under his control which relates to the information he provides.\u201d The State argues the grant of immunity was contingent upon Krup-ka\u2019s full cooperation with investigating authorities and expressly provided \u201cthe State [would] be relieved of its obligation[ ] [to grant immunity] should [Krupka] fail to be entirely candid and forthright in providing information.\u201d\nSection 106 \u2014 2.5(b) of the Code authorizes a court, upon motion of the State, to order \u201ca witness be granted [use] immunity from prosecution in a criminal case as to any information directly or indirectly derived from the production of evidence from the witness if the witness has refused or is likely to refuse to produce the evidence on the basis of his or her privilege against self-incrimination.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/106 \u2014 2.5(b) (West 1994). Use immunity granted under section 106 \u2014 2.5 is different than a grant of transactional immunity found in sections 106 \u2014 1 and 106 \u2014 2 of the Code. Transactional immunity af- . fords broader protection from future prosecution than use immunity and acts to completely bar the State from prosecuting an immunized witness for any offenses to which the immunity relates. On the other hand, a grant of use immunity does not act as an absolute bar from prosecution but, rather, prohibits the State from using any evidence obtained under the grant of immunity, or leads derived from that evidence, against the immunized witness in a later criminal proceeding. People ex rel. Cruz v. Fitzgerald, 66 Ill. 2d 546, 549, 363 N.E.2d 835, 836-37 (1977).\nWe believe immunity was conferred upon Krupka by the agreement. The State suggests the order entered by Judge Zappa merely approved the process of granting immunity, but Krupka would have received immunity only if he complied with the terms of the agreement and cooperated with the police. It would appear Krupka, after receiving immunity, failed to cooperate or provide expected information. The State argues the immunity was never consummated because of this lack of cooperation. We disagree. On April 24, 1996, Judge Zappa entered an order that granted Krupka use immunity. Nothing further needed to occur. The State may not have received any benefit from the grant of immunity, but the law does not permit the State, in these circumstances, to withdraw the immunity because it is not satisfied with the level of cooperation of the witness.\nEach prosecutor in each county of our state may have a different process for negotiating for a grant of immunity, striking an agreement, seeking an order of court and then deciding how to proceed. This case presents interesting questions on the best procedure to follow, but we need not address what constitutes the best practice. Here, Krupka was granted immunity and the defendant was entitled to call him as a witness. The trial court erred when it denied defendant\u2019s request to compel Krupka\u2019s testimony.\nWe also conclude this error does not require reversal. We note defense counsel did not know how Krupka would have responded to his questioning. Defense counsel advised the trial court he had not spoken with Krupka prior to trial. Defense counsel simply maintained Krupka\u2019s testimony would have been \u201cof substantial value to the defendant.\u201d Defendant asserts in his brief Krupka\u2019s testimony would have substantially corroborated his version of events. Nothing in .the record supports this contention. Defendant\u2019s own testimony indicated Krupka did not return to defendant\u2019s apartment until after Molly died. Whether Krupka\u2019s testimony would have been favorable to defendant\u2019s case is entirely speculative. Defendant does not know what Krupka would have said on the witness stand. Defendant was not denied a fair trial when he was not permitted to call Krupka as a witness.\nC. Prosecutorial Comments\nRelying on Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91, 96 S. Ct. 2240 (1976), defendant contends he was denied a fair trial when the State made improper references to his postarrest silence at trial. During its cross-examination of defendant, the State focused on the lies he told immediately after Molly\u2019s disappearance and his admission at trial he caused her death. The State further remarked in closing argument defendant carried his lies into the courtroom by obtaining the State\u2019s pretrial evidence to formulate his accident defense. According to defendant, the State\u2019s comments amounted to an attack on his constitutional right to remain silent. We disagree.\nUnder Doyle, the prosecution may not use an accused\u2019s postarrest silence to impeach an exculpatory story offered for the first time at trial. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 97, 96 S. Ct. at 2244. Here, however, the State challenged defendant\u2019s credibility. The State highlighted defendant\u2019s numerous misstatements to both authorities and Molly\u2019s family members to raise the inference defendant\u2019s exculpatory claim was a mere fabrication. When read in context, the questions and remarks were references to the course of lying defendant undertook after the February 25 incident and not, as defendant contends, references to his right to remain silent.\nD. Sufficiency of Evidence\nDefendant also contends the State failed to prove him guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. When presented with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court, considering the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, is limited to determining whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Oaks, 169 Ill. 2d 409, 457-58, 662 N.E.2d 1328, 1349-50 (1996). A defendant\u2019s conviction will not be set aside unless the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable doubt of the defendant\u2019s guilt. People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 515, 670 N.E.2d 606, 620 (1996).\nTo convict defendant of first degree murder, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt at least one of the following: defendant (1) intended to kill or do great bodily harm, (2) knew his acts would cause death or great bodily harm, (3) knew his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm, or (4) was committing the offense of aggravated battery when Molly died. Defendant specifically contends the evidence fails to show he possessed the requisite state of mind in causing Molly\u2019s death. Mental states, such as the intent to kill or to cause great bodily harm, are not commonly established by direct evidence and may be inferred from the character of the defendant\u2019s conduct and the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense. People v. Summers, 202 Ill. App. 3d 1, 10, 559 N.E.2d 1133, 1138 (1990).\nConstruing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, we find the evidence sufficient to support defendant\u2019s murder conviction. Defendant\u2019s conduct preceding Molly\u2019s death, and his actions the following day, suggest he had the requisite criminal culpability. Defendant and Molly discussed the issue of defendant\u2019s homosexuality immediately before Molly\u2019s death. The record highlights defendant\u2019s violent temper when confronted with such accusations. Defendant acknowledged he knew something was wrong with Molly on the evening of February 25 yet did not seek medical treatment. Instead, he waited for Krupka to arrive at his apartment so they could discuss how to handle the situation. When later asked about Molly\u2019s whereabouts by authorities and several members of Molly\u2019s family, defendant lied, claiming he had not seen Molly since she left his apartment the night of February 25 and must be with friends at some other location. Defendant further maintained Molly was murdered by a group of unnamed individuals at a time when Molly\u2019s whereabouts were unknown and before the woman found in the parking lot had been identified. Upon being informed the woman had been identified as Molly, defendant immediately asked investigating officers if he was under arrest.\nIn addition, the physical evidence and medical testimony suggest Molly was strangled. Both pathologists described the bruising and abrasions on the right side of Molly\u2019s neck and concluded these markings were consistent with the necklace seized from defendant\u2019s apartment. Dr. Donoghue opined the markings resulted from pressure being applied on the necklace and concluded Molly\u2019s- death was caused by strangulation. Although Dr. Barrenfanger was unable to determine the exact cause of Molly\u2019s death, she never eliminated the possibility of strangulation. Defendant stresses several of the attributes characteristic of strangulation were not present in Molly\u2019s case. However, according to Dr. Barrenfanger, no particular damage would be visible to the hyoid bone or other areas of the throat in approximately two-thirds of such cases. Moreover, Dr. Donoghue testified, in some cases, the victim would not sustain any internal injuries. Although Dr. Barrenfanger stated Molly could have died from compressional asphyxiation, neither she nor Dr. Donoghue found any evidence to support such a finding.\nThe jury was responsible for assessing the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence. The determination of how Molly died rested with the jury, and it was not required to accept defendant\u2019s exculpatory claim that her death was an accident. See Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d at 515-16, 670 N.E.2d at 621 (jury need not \u201caccept any possible explanation compatible with defendant\u2019s innocence and elevate it to the status of reasonable doubt\u201d). Given the circumstances of Molly\u2019s death and the medical testimony, we conclude a rational trier of fact could have found defendant guilty of first degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt.\nE. Sentencing\nDefendant finally argues the trial court erred in imposing sentence when it found \u201cthe conduct here caused serious harm.\u201d (Emphasis added.) We disagree. As evident by the above statement, the court considered the nature and manner of defendant\u2019s actions in causing Molly\u2019s death, and not the death itself, in fixing punishment. See People v. Saldivar, 113 Ill. 2d 256, 271, 497 N.E.2d 1138, 1144 (1986). Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in defendant\u2019s sentence. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d at 379, 583 N.E.2d at 526.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, defendant\u2019s conviction and sentence for murder are affirmed. However, only the conviction on the most serious charge, count I, may stand. We therefore vacate the murder convictions on counts II, III, and IV (see 155 Ill. 2d R. 366(a)(5)) and remand the cause for issuance of an amended judgment of sentence showing the murder conviction is on count I.\nAffirmed in part and vacated in part; cause remanded with directions.\nSTEIGMANN and GARMAN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KNECHT" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and Jeff Page, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Patrick W. Kelley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Springfield (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Jeffrey K. Davison, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BRADLEY L. ADAMS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4 \u2014 96\u20140525\nArgued December 16, 1997.\nOpinion filed December 10, 1999.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Jeff Page, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nPatrick W. Kelley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Springfield (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Jeffrey K. Davison, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0995-01", "first_page_order": 1013, "last_page_order": 1026 }