{ "id": 261348, "name": "GORDON McCANN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TED PRESSWOOD, d/b/a Ted Presswood Weed Cutting Service, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "McCann v. Presswood", "decision_date": "1999-12-08", "docket_number": "No. 4-99-0423", "first_page": "1068", "last_page": "1073", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "308 Ill. App. 3d 1068" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "692 N.E.2d 422", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 Ill. App. 3d 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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TED PRESSWOOD, d/b/a Ted Presswood Weed Cutting Service, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn November 1998, plaintiff, Gordon McCann, filed an amended complaint against defendant, Ted Presswood, d/b/a Ted Presswood Weed Cutting Service, alleging two counts of common-law negligence and two counts of intentional misconduct. Defendant moved to strike, arguing plaintiff s complaint improperly sought punitive damages in violation of section 2 \u2014 604.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 604.1 (West 1994)). In May 1999, the trial court dismissed plaintiffs intentional misconduct counts with prejudice, and plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the remaining counts. Plaintiff appeals, arguing the trial court erred by dismissing the intentional misconduct counts. We affirm.\nIn June 1998, plaintiff filed a four-count complaint against defendant for property damage. According to the complaint, the City of Lincoln hired defendant, as an independent contractor, to cut grass growing on two pieces of property owned by plaintiff.\nCounts I and II addressed defendant\u2019s conduct at the first property. Both counts were identical except plaintiff predicated count I on a common-law negligence theory and count II on a willful and wanton theory. Counts I and II alleged defendant, while operating his mowing equipment, damaged an automobile, cracked and scraped the sidewalk, tore branches off a pine tree, broke a window, chipped the foundation of the home, damaged landscaping timbers, destroyed a pair of tennis shoes and a swimming pool liner, ran over a compost pile, and \u201ccrush[ed] tender turf.\u201d\nCounts III and IV addressed defendant\u2019s conduct at the second property. Again, both counts were identical except plaintiff predicated count III on a common-law negligence theory and count IV on a willful and wanton theory. Counts III and IV alleged defendant damaged a building foundation, destroyed evergreens and a maple tree, ruined an embankment, and \u201ccrush[ed] tender turf.\u201d\nEach count of the complaint contained a separate prayer for relief. In counts I and III, plaintiff requested $15,000 in actual damages. However, in counts II and iy plaintiff requested \u201c$15,000 in actual damages and *** $45,000 for punitive damages plus costs of suit.\u201d In July 1998, defendant moved to strike, arguing plaintiff improperly requested punitive damages without leave of the court as required under section 2 \u2014 604.1 of the Code. The docket-sheet entry indicates that, in November 1998, the trial court dismissed plaintiffs complaint with leave to refile.\nAlso in November 1998, plaintiff filed an amended complaint. Plaintiff\u2019s amended complaint essentially contained the identical language of the original complaint except plaintiff now predicated counts II and IV on an intentional misconduct theory rather than a willful and wanton theory. Again, plaintiff requested punitive damages in counts II and IV\nIn December 1998, plaintiff filed a motion to strike, again arguing plaintiff violated section 2 \u2014 604.1 of the Code by filing a complaint requesting punitive damages. In May 1999, plaintiff filed a response, arguing section 2 \u2014 604.1 did not apply because he based counts II and IV on an intentional misconduct theory rather than negligence. Therefore, plaintiff argued, he could properly request punitive damages.\nIn May 1999, the trial court granted plaintiffs motion to voluntarily dismiss counts I and III with leave to refile. The trial court also entered an order dismissing counts II and IV with prejudice, finding plaintiff violated section 2 \u2014 604.1 by requesting punitive damages in his amended complaint. The court further noted that, in addition to plaintiffs failure to make a pretrial motion seeking the court\u2019s permission to add a claim for punitive damages under section 2 \u2014 604.1, plaintiff \u201cdeclined [the] [c]ourt\u2019s offer to hold a hearing regarding whether sufficient facts exist[ed] to warrant addition of a claim for punitive damages.\u201d Plaintiff then filed the instant appeal.\nSection 2 \u2014 604.1 of the Code states in relevant part:\n\u201cIn all actions on account of bodily injury or physical damage to property, based on negligence, or product liability based on strict tort liability, where punitive damages are permitted no complaint shall be filed containing a prayer for relief seeking punitive damages. However, a plaintiff may, pursuant to a pretrial motion and after a hearing before the court, amend the complaint .to include a prayer for relief seeking punitive damages.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 604.1 (West 1994).\nStatutory construction is a matter of law and is considered de novo. Branson v. Department of Revenue, 168 Ill. 2d 247, 254, 659 N.E.2d 961, 965 (1995). The principal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent. Solich v. George & Anna Portes Cancer Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76, 81, 630 N.E.2d 820, 822 (1994). To determine the legislature\u2019s intent, courts first look to the statute\u2019s language. Zekman v. Direct American Marketers, Inc., 182 Ill. 2d 359, 368-69, 695 N.E.2d 853, 858 (1998). Courts accord the statute\u2019s language its plain and commonly understood meaning. R.L. Polk & Co. v. Ryan, 296 Ill. App. 3d 132, 140, 694 N.E.2d 1027, 1033 (1998). If possible, courts must give effect to every word, clause, and sentence and may not read a statute so as to render any part inoperative, superfluous, or insignificant. Bauer v. H.H. Hall Construction Co., 140 Ill. App. 3d 1025, 1028, 489 N.E.2d 31, 33 (1986). Courts must not depart from a statute\u2019s plain language by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions the legislature did not express. See Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189, 561 N.E.2d 656, 661 (1990).\nSection 1 \u2014 106 of the Code requires that we construe the Code liberally. 735 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 106 (West 1998). The'legislature enacted section 2 \u2014 604.1 of the Code to discourage plaintiffs from seeking and receiving punitive damage awards. See Spires v. Mooney Motors, Inc., 229 Ill. App. 3d 917, 919, 595 N.E.2d 225, 226 (1992). Illinois courts have consistently held that punitive damages are disfavored at law and are generally inappropriate absent evidence of outrageous conduct or acts committed with malice or a reckless indifference toward the rights of others. See, e.g., Loitz v. Remington Arms Co., 138 Ill. 2d 404, 414, 563 N.E.2d 397, 401 (1990); Tucker v. Illinois Power Co., 232 Ill. App. 3d 15, 30, 597 N.E.2d 220, 231 (1992).\nHere, plaintiff clearly sought punitive damages on a complaint based, in part, on negligence. Plaintiff argues that while counts II and IV (intentional misconduct) contained prayers for punitive damages, counts I and III (negligence counts) contained no such prayer, and therefore section 2 \u2014 604.1 does not apply. We disagree. Whether counts I and III contained a prayer for punitive damages is irrelevant to our analysis. Section 2 \u2014 604.1 speaks of the entire action and does not narrowly restrict punitive damages requests in all counts based on negligence but, rather, in all complaints based on negligence. Construing the Code liberally and in view of the strong policy considerations against punitive damages, we find section 2 \u2014 604.1 applies and precludes plaintiffs from requesting punitive damages on the face of any complaint based, even in part, on negligence.\nPlaintiff\u2019s complaint uses the term \u201cnegligence\u201d in the strict \u201cordinary negligence\u201d sense. We are mindful that punitive-damages are not generally available for acts of ordinary negligence. See Loitz, 138 Ill. 2d at 415, 563 N.E.2d at 402. Further, we agree with the first district\u2019s finding in Stojkovich v. Monadnock Building, 281 Ill. App. 3d 733, 741, 666 N.E.2d 704, 710 (1996), that section 2 \u2014 604.1 does not operate to allow punitive damages for ordinary negligence but, rather, speaks of \u201cnegligence\u201d in the generic sense, referring to acts such as willful and wanton misconduct. As the court noted in Stojkovich, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 741, 666 N.E.2d at 710, the difference between ordinary negligence and willful and wanton misconduct is often one of slight degree.\nWe hold section 2 \u2014 604.1 precludes plaintiffs from requesting punitive damages on the face of any complaint based, even in part, on a negligence theory. Such plaintiffs may, upon leave of court and in accordance with section 2 \u2014 604.1, amend their complaint to seek punitive damages upon a showing of facts sufficient to support a punitive damages award (e.g., evidence of willful and wanton misconduct, malice, or reckless indifference).\nPlaintiff raises no argument as to whether the trial court should have stricken plaintiffs punitive damages requests rather than dismiss counts II and IV with prejudice. In any event, we find no abuse of discretion, especially considering plaintiffs repeated disregard of section 2 \u2014 604.1 and his refusal of the trial court\u2019s offer to conduct a hearing to determine whether sufficient facts existed to support a punitive damages claim.\nFinally, plaintiff questions whether section 2 \u2014 604.1 of the Code remains valid in light of our supreme court\u2019s decision in Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (1997). Plaintiff correctly notes section 2 \u2014 604.1 was amended by Public Act 89 \u2014 7 (Pub. Act 89 \u2014 7, \u00a7 15, eff. March 9, 1995 (1995 Ill. Laws 284, 289)), as part of the legislature\u2019s attempt to reform tort claims. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 604.1 (West 1998). In Best, our supreme court struck down Public Act 89 \u2014 7 in its entirety. Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 467, 689 N.E.2d at 1104.\nWe note plaintiff failed to raise this issue prior to oral argument. Arguments neither raised nor advanced in plaintiffs brief, but instead raised for the first time at oral argument, are generally forfeited under Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) (177 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7)). See also People v. Stewart, 121 Ill. 2d 93, 105, 520 N.E.2d 348, 354 (1988). However, even if we were to reach the merits of plaintiffs claim, we would conclude it lacks merit. Assuming Best vitiates Public Act 89 \u2014 7, it is well settled that the effect of an unconstitutional statutory amendment is to leave the statute in force as it existed prior to the amendment. People v. Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d 384, 390, 553 N.E.2d 281, 283 (1990); People v. Wilson, 295 Ill. App. 3d 228, 240, 692 N.E.2d 422, 430 (1998). The amendment under Public Act 89 \u2014 7 was minor, merely substituting \u201cany theory or doctrine\u201d for \u201cstrict tort liability.\u201d Pub. Act 89 \u2014 7, \u00a7 15, eff. March 9, 1995 (1995 Ill. Laws at 289). Thus, the amendment related to actions predicated under a product liability theory, which is not the case here. We therefore conclude that, even under the preamended version of section 2 \u2014 604.1 (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 604.1 (West 1994)), our analysis would remain unchanged.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.\nAffirmed.\nSTEIGMANN and GARMAN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Jack C. Vieley (argued), of Bloomington, for appellant.", "Barbara B. Collins (argued), of Springfield, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "GORDON McCANN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TED PRESSWOOD, d/b/a Ted Presswood Weed Cutting Service, Defendant-Appellee.\nFourth District\nNo. 4 \u2014 99\u20140423\nArgued October 13, 1999.\nOpinion filed December 8, 1999.\nJack C. Vieley (argued), of Bloomington, for appellant.\nBarbara B. Collins (argued), of Springfield, for appellee." }, "file_name": "1068-01", "first_page_order": 1086, "last_page_order": 1091 }