{ "id": 349620, "name": "VALOR INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANNIE WALLACE, Adm'x of the Estate of Beatrice Ann Williams, a/k/a Marie Williams, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Valor Insurance v. Wallace", "decision_date": "1999-12-07", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201498\u20142802", "first_page": "65", "last_page": "71", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "309 Ill. App. 3d 65" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "684 N.E.2d 1108", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 Ill. App. 3d 1088", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 456110 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1098" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/291/1088-01" ] }, { "cite": "649 N.E.2d 561", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 Ill. App. 3d 1009", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 249068 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1013" }, { "page": "1013" }, { "page": "1013-14" }, { "page": "1013" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/271/1009-01" ] }, { "cite": "605 N.E.2d 626", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "238 Ill. App. 3d 1050", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5155135 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1053-54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/238/1050-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 N.E.2d 502", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 Ill. App. 3d 1086", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3642517 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1089" }, { "page": "1090" }, { "page": "1092" }, { "page": "1090-92" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/148/1086-01" ] }, { "cite": "701 N.E.2d 493", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209971 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "349" }, { "page": "351" }, { "page": "351-52" }, { "page": "352" }, { "page": "352" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "607 N.E.2d 1204", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 Ill. 2d 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4820940 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "102" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/154/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "659 N.E.2d 1345", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 Ill. App. 3d 971", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 927695 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "977" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/276/0971-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 583, "char_count": 14117, "ocr_confidence": 0.773, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.013338808556020062 }, "sha256": "478e7d81eea6b5553692c676580baf35ea819dba4821d04f9d2ea34b6c23dc85", "simhash": "1:a2ffafe42e6f2920", "word_count": 2292 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:36:09.526568+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "VALOR INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANNIE WALLACE, Adm\u2019x of the Estate of Beatrice Ann Williams, a/k/a Marie Williams, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McBRIDE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff Valor Insurance Company (Valor) brought suit against defendant Annie Wallace (Wallace), administratrix of the estate of Beatrice Ann Williams, a/k/a Marie Williams, seeking a declaration that it had no obligation under an automobile insurance policy to indemnify or defend Walter Hornik in an underlying cause. Following a hearing on cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court denied Wallace\u2019s motion and granted summary judgment for Valor. Wallace now appeals, contending that because there was a material issue of fact, the trial court erred in granting Valor\u2019s motion for summary judgment. Wallace also contends that the court erred in denying her motion for summary judgment where Valor had failed to maintain proof of cancellation of Hornik\u2019s insurance policy and had failed to make a reservation of rights.\nThe record on appeal consists entirely of pleadings. There is no transcript of the hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment or of any other proceeding.\nWalter Hornik at one time had an automobile insurance policy (policy) with Valor (then known as Hallberg Direct Insurance Company). The record includes a copy of a November 4, 1994, letter from Valor informing Hornik that his policy was being cancelled as of December 9, 1994, due to his accident record. Copied onto the lower right-hand corner of the letter is the corner of an envelope showing a United States postage meter mark and cancellation stamp from the Park Ridge, Illinois, United States postal facility. Both the meter mark and cancellation stamp are dated November 4, 1994.\nOn January 2, 1995, Walter Hornik was in an automobile accident that killed his passenger, Beatrice Ann Williams. Defendant Wallace, the administratrix of Williams\u2019 estate, filed a wrongful death and negligent entrustment action against Hornik and his wife, Danuta, the owner of the vehicle, in March 1996. On May 28, 1996, Valor sent a letter to Walter Hornik informing him that coverage for the accident was denied because his policy had been cancelled effective December 9, 1994. However, Valor admits that it appointed attorneys in August 1996 to undertake defense of the Horniks in the underlying cause. In October 1996, Valor filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a finding that it was not obligated to defend the Horniks under a certain policy issued to Danuta Hornik. That policy is not the policy at issue before this court on appeal. In July 1997, Valor filed an amended complaint for declaratory judgment adding a claim that it was not obligated to defend the Horniks under a policy issued to Walter Hornik (the policy at issue on appeal), because the policy had been cancelled prior to the accident due to Walter\u2019s unsafe driving record.\nWallace, in turn, filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that Valor had not effectively cancelled Walter Hornik\u2019s policy because it had failed to maintain proof of mailing as required by law and was estopped from denying coverage because it had not filed a reservation of rights or given Hornik the opportunity to obtain his own counsel.\nOn July 17, 1998, the trial court entered an order denying Wallace\u2019s motion for summary judgment and granting Valor\u2019s motion, finding that Valor had no duty to indemnify Hornik because Hornik\u2019s automobile insurance policy had been properly cancelled prior to the accident.\nDefendant Wallace contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for Valor and in denying her own motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate if \u201cthe pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1005(c) (West 1996). Where reasonable persons could draw divergent inferences from undisputed material facts or a dispute as to a material fact exists, summary judgment should be denied. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Smiley, 276 Ill. App. 3d 971, 977, 659 N.E.2d 1345 (1995). The standard of review on appeal from a grant of summary judgment is de novo. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 102, 607 N.E.2d 1204 (1992).\nThe parties agree that the only proof of cancellation before the trial court was the letter of cancellation, with a corner of an envelope showing a United States Post Office meter stamp and cancellation stamp copied onto the lower right-hand corner. Both stamps are from the Park Ridge, Illinois, United States postal facility and are dated November 4, 1994.\nThe parties disagree as to whether the cancellation notice sent by Valor complies with section 143.14(a) of the Illinois Insurance Code. 215 ILCS 5/143.14(a) (West 1996). Section 143.14(a) states:\n\u201cNo notice of cancellation of any policy of insurance, to which Section 143.11 applies, shall be effective unless mailed by the company to the named insured and the mortgage or lien holder, at the last mailing address known by the company. The company shall maintain proof of mailing of such notice on a recognized U.S. Post Office form or a form acceptable to the U.S. Post Office or other commercial mail delivery service.\u201d 215 ILCS 5/143.14(a) (West 1996).\nThe Illinois Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Ragan v. Columbia Mutual Insurance Co., 183 Ill. 2d 342, 701 N.E.2d 493 (1998), controls the outcome of this appeal. However, because Ragan was decided subsequent to the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment in the instant cause, we will briefly discuss the conflicting lines of authority that led up to the Ragan decision.\nIn the first district case Kolias v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 148 Ill. App. 3d 1086, 500 N.E.2d 502 (1986), the plaintiffs argued that defendant State Farm had not effectively cancelled an automobile insurance policy where it failed to produce proof of mailing upon the form required in section 143.14(a). The trial court, relying in part on State Farm\u2019s inability to produce the post office form, entered judgment against State Farm. Kolias, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 1089. On appeal, the Kolias court held that, although no such form had been introduced, \u201cthe statute fails to indicate that proof of mailing cannot be shown by other methods.\u201d Kolias, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 1090. The court thus concluded that the trial court\u2019s \u201crestrictive\u201d interpretation of section 143.14 as requiring State Farm to produce the post office form was incorrect. Kolias, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 1092. Instead, proof of State Farm\u2019s customary mailing practices, in conjunction with other evidence, was sufficient to establish State Farm\u2019s compliance with section 143.14. Kolias, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 1090-92.\nThe fourth district reached a similar result in Bates v. Merrimack Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 238 Ill. App. 3d 1050, 605 N.E.2d 626 (1992). In Bates, there were defects in the post office\u2019s preparation of its form regarding mailing of the cancellation notice at issue. The Bates court, in finding that compliance with section 143.14 had been adequately established, relied on Kolias for the proposition that evidence of mailing practices was enough to satisfy the statutory requirements of section 143.14(a). Bates, 238 Ill. App. 3d at 1053-54.\nA contrary result was reached by the third district in Economy Fire & Casualty Co. v. Hughes, 271 Ill. App. 3d 1009, 649 N.E.2d 561 (1995). There, the court noted that subsequent to the decision in Kolias, the legislature had added language to section 143.14(a). Hughes, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 1013. The amended version of section 143.14(a) allowed the proof of mailing required by the section to be maintained, not just on a recognized United States Post Office form, but also on a form \u201c \u2018acceptable to the U.S. Post Office or other commercial mail delivery service.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis omitted.) Hughes, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 1013. Because the legislature, when amending the statute, could have provided for a proof of mailing methodology as set forth in Kolias but failed to do so, the court found that the \u201cclear legislative intent of section 143.14(a) in regard to proof of mailing notices of cancellation is to permit such proof to be established only by those methods enumerated in the plain language of [the] statute.\u201d Hughes, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 1013-14. Accordingly, the Hughes court disavowed \u201cthe Kolias court\u2019s attempt to overlook the plain language of the statute and read into it methods of proof of mailing which were not provided for by our legislature.\u201d Hughes, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 1013.\nFinally, the fifth district, in Ragan v. Columbia Mutual Insurance Co., 291 Ill. App. 3d 1088, 1098, 684 N.E.2d 1108 (1997), aff'd, 183 Ill. 2d 342, 701 N.E.2d 493 (1998), after discussing the decisions in Kolias, Bates, and Hughes, followed the \u201cwell-reasoned decision\u201d in Hughes in holding that where no proof-of-mailing form was introduced, the defendant insurer had failed to meet the statutory requirements of section 143.14(a). The fifth district\u2019s decision in Ragan was subsequently appealed.\nAt the time summary judgment was granted by the trial court in the instant cause, Kolias was the controlling first district precedent and there was a split in the districts regarding the proper interpretation of section 143.14(a). However, two months after the grant of summary judgment, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the fifth district\u2019s decision in Ragan and effectively overruled the Kolias court\u2019s holding that proof of mailing under section 143.14(a) could be shown by evidence other than the form specified in the statute. Ragan v. Columbia Mutual Insurance Co., 183 Ill. 2d 342, 701 N.E.2d 493 (1998). Ragan, not Kolias, is thus controlling here.\nIn Ragan, defendant Columbia Mutual was asked to produce proof of mailing of a cancellation notice as required by section 143.14(a). Columbia produced what it alleged to be the original envelope, containing a cancellation notice. The envelope was metered and imprinted with a dated cancellation stamp, addressed to the plaintiff and was marked returned as undeliverable. Summary judgment was granted for the plaintiff. Columbia Mutual then filed a motion to reconsider and sought to introduce a copy of an unsigned form entitled \u201ccertificate of mailing,\u201d listing the cancellation letter to plaintiff and the date it was sent. The circuit court denied Columbia\u2019s motion to reconsider.\nIn Ragan, the supreme court noted that in order to determine whether summary judgment was properly granted, it must first determine \u201cwhether, under [section 143.14(a)], an insurance company must introduce evidence of mailing the cancellation notice on the proof of mailing form required by the statute or whether it may prove compliance with the statute through introduction of other evidence.\u201d Ragan, 183 Ill. 2d at 349. The court noted that the legislature had sought to strike a balance between the interest of the insured in being informed his policy had been cancelled and the burden on an insurance company to prove receipt of the cancellation by the insured. Ragan, 183 Ill. 2d at 351. In striking a balance between insured persons and insurers, the legislature had given insurance companies a \u201cvery low threshold of proof\u2019 relating to the mailing of cancellation notices, requiring only that the insurer show proof of mailing on a recognized United States Post Office form or form acceptable to the United States Post Office or other commercial mail delivery service. Ragan, 183 Ill. 2d at 351-52. The court then held that a finding that \u201cthe statute implicitly allows an insurance company to use other evidence to show that it maintained the proof of mailing when the statute explicitly requires it to maintain such a form would disturb the balance that the legislature sought to achieve in enacting [section 143.14].\u201d Ragan, 183 Ill. 2d at 352. Finding that Columbia had many opportunities to introduce the required form but had failed to do so, the court declared that Columbia\u2019s attempted cancellation was ineffective and summary judgment in favor of the insured was therefore proper. Ragan, 183 Ill. 2d at 352.\nHere, Valor contends that its cancellation letter with the meter and cancellation stamps copied onto it represents a \u201crecognized U.S. Post Office form or a form acceptable to the U.S. Post Office or other commercial mail delivery service.\u201d 215 ILCS 5/143.14(a) (West 1996). We disagree. The trial court, in granting summary judgment in favor of Valor, found that Valor had \u201cproperly cancelled the subject insurance policy\u201d prior to the accident. The trial court, however, did not have the benefit of the supreme court\u2019s opinion in Ragan. Where a metered, dated, addressed envelope and enclosed cancellation letter failed to meet the statutory requirements of section 143.14(a) in Ragan, a copy of the corner of an envelope, without even an address, is insufficient here. Thus, Valor has failed to show that it maintained proof of mailing of the cancellation notice on a recognized United States Post Office form or a form acceptable to the United States Post Office or other commercial mail delivery service. Where no such form has been maintained, the attempted cancellation of the policy was ineffective and the trial court\u2019s finding that Valor had properly cancelled Hornik\u2019s policy was erroneous.\nAccordingly, the trial court\u2019s grant of Valor\u2019s motion for summary judgment is reversed. Further, the court\u2019s denial of Wallace\u2019s motion for summary judgment is reversed and summary judgment is granted in favor of defendant Wallace on the issue of cancellation. In light of our holding, it is unnecessary to determine whether Valor properly reserved its rights in this cause.\nReversed.\nCOUSINS, EJ., and McNULTY, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McBRIDE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Marcia Gevers, of Flossmoor, for appellant.", "Bernard W Moltz & Associates, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "VALOR INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANNIE WALLACE, Adm\u2019x of the Estate of Beatrice Ann Williams, a/k/a Marie Williams, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1\u201498\u20142802\nOpinion filed December 7, 1999.\nMarcia Gevers, of Flossmoor, for appellant.\nBernard W Moltz & Associates, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0065-01", "first_page_order": 85, "last_page_order": 91 }