{ "id": 349562, "name": "WILLIAM NOLAN et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. TERRY G. HILLARD, Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department, et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Nolan v. Hillard", "decision_date": "1999-12-08", "docket_number": "Nos. 1\u201497\u20144659, 1\u201498\u20142638 cons.", "first_page": "129", "last_page": "145", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "309 Ill. App. 3d 129" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "560 N.E.2d 885", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "887" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 Ill. App. 3d 964", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2587064 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "967" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/202/0964-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 N.E.2d 448", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "450" }, { "page": "450" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 Ill. App. 3d 848", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3437374 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "851" }, { "page": "851" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/131/0848-01" ] }, { "cite": "520 N.E.2d 1012", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1016" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "167 Ill. App. 3d 121", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3473269 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "126" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/167/0121-01" ] }, { "cite": "691 N.E.2d 1162", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1166" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 Ill. App. 3d 1033", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 847554 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1038" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/293/1033-01" ] }, { "cite": "701 N.E.2d 135", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "142" }, { "page": "142" }, { "page": "142" }, { "page": "143", "parenthetical": "finding that City's personnel rules constituted a contractual promise to its employees that discharges from employment would be conducted in particular matter" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 Ill. App. 3d 579", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 221447 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "588" }, { "page": "589" }, { "page": "588" }, { "page": "590" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/299/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "529 N.E.2d 790", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "794" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "175 Ill. App. 3d 219", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3554418 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "224" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/175/0219-01" ] }, { "cite": "695 N.E.2d 1315", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1320" }, { "page": "1320" }, { "page": "1320" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 Ill. App. 3d 867", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 222673 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "874" }, { "page": "874" }, { "page": "875" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/296/0867-01" ] }, { "cite": "707 N.E.2d 600", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "609" }, { "page": "609" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 Ill. App. 3d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 511403 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12" }, { "page": "13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/303/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "659 N.E.2d 1356", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1362" }, { "page": "1362" }, { "page": "1362" }, { "page": "1362" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 Ill. App. 3d 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1172354 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373" }, { "page": "373" }, { "page": "373" }, { "page": "375" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/277/0365-01" ] }, { "cite": "667 N.E.2d 1296", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1299" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "172 Ill. 2d 399", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 55991 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "408" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/172/0399-01" ] }, { "cite": "672 N.E.2d 1207", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1214" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "174 Ill. 2d 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 223609 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86-87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/174/0077-01" ] }, { "cite": "700 N.E.2d 157", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 Ill. App. 3d 1034", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1073549 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1037" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/298/1034-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 N.E.2d 500", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "506", "parenthetical": "finding the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge validity of promotional examination where they did not pass initial written test and consequently failed to be placed on eligibility list" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 Ill. App. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2597975 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "11-12", "parenthetical": "finding the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge validity of promotional examination where they did not pass initial written test and consequently failed to be placed on eligibility list" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/57/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "545 N.E.2d 731", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "734" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 Ill. 2d 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5569994 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "280" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/131/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "640 N.E.2d 294", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "295" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "263 Ill. App. 3d 39", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5366909 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "40-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/263/0039-01" ] }, { "cite": "565 N.E.2d 264", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "206 Ill. App. 3d 580", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2560007 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/206/0580-01" ] }, { "cite": "559 N.E.2d 577", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 Ill. App. 3d 1040", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2594056 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/201/1040-01" ] }, { "cite": "502 N.E.2d 283", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "297" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 Ill. App. 3d 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3539870 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/151/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "634 N.E.2d 1154", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1162" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "261 Ill. App. 3d 911", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5373460 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "921-22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/261/0911-01" ] }, { "cite": "680 N.E.2d 445", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447-48" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 Ill. App. 3d 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1596894 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "356-57" }, { "page": "357" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/288/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.E.2d 298", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "301" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5464225 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "377" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0371-01" ] }, { "cite": "623 N.E.2d 310", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "314" }, { "page": "314" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "157 Ill. 2d 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 778585 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170" }, { "page": "171" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/157/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "673 N.E.2d 272", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "276" }, { "page": "276" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "174 Ill. 2d 335", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 223612 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "344" }, { "page": "344" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/174/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 Ill. 2d 211", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 536023 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "220", "parenthetical": "holding that lack of standing is an \"affirmative matter\" that is properly raised under section 2 - 619(a)(9)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/188/0211-01" ] }, { "cite": "680 N.E.2d 265", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "268" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "176 Ill. 2d 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 544917 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189" }, { "page": "189" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/176/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "662 N.E.2d 1377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1382" }, { "page": "1382" }, { "page": "1382" }, { "page": "1382" }, { "page": "1382" }, { "page": "1382" }, { "page": "1382" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 Ill. App. 3d 628", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1156905 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "634" }, { "page": "634" }, { "page": "634" }, { "page": "634" }, { "page": "634" }, { "page": "634" }, { "page": "634" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/278/0628-01" ] }, { "cite": "684 N.E.2d 930", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "933" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 Ill. App. 3d 872", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 456185 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "876" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/291/0872-01" ] }, { "cite": "688 N.E.2d 633", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "635" }, { "page": "635" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 252", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801341 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "256" }, { "page": "256" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0252-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1303, "char_count": 34343, "ocr_confidence": 0.773, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1283098537497855e-07, "percentile": 0.7654886443186456 }, "sha256": "92e2df49d4d94d0aedf63820b8a9117138b7994cb2e427d7967755cea4ec071b", "simhash": "1:08b4b79aafc7de06", "word_count": 5493 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:36:09.526568+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "WILLIAM NOLAN et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. TERRY G. HILLARD, Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department, et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CERDA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn this consolidated appeal, plaintiffs, the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), Chicago Lodge No. 7 (Lodge No. 7), through its president and representative William Nolan, and on behalf of William Jaconetti, a Chicago police officer, and other officers represented by Lodge No. 7, seek review of the circuit court\u2019s order denying their motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin defendants, the City of Chicago, the City\u2019s mayor, Richard M. Daley, and the superintendent of the Chicago police department (CPD), Terrance Hillard, from administering an exam for police officers seeking promotion to the rank of sergeant (case No. 1 \u2014 97\u20144659). Plaintiffs further seek review of the circuit court\u2019s order dismissing with prejudice count I of their complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief filed against the same defendants in connection with said promotion examination (case No. 1 \u2014 98\u20142638). We have jurisdiction of case No. 1 \u2014 97\u20144659 pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1), and of case No. 1 \u2014 98\u20142638 pursuant to Supreme Court Rules 301 and 303(a). 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 301, 303(a), 307(a)(1). For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with directions.\nBACKGROUND\nOn October 20, 1997, and again on November 4, 1997, the City\u2019s department of personnel (Department) announced it would be conducting a promotional examination for police officers to the rank of sergeant commencing with a written qualifying test scheduled for January 10, 1998. Per these announcements, the examination would consist of three parts \u2014 the written qualifying test, a merit selection process, and an assessment exercise.\nOfficers who passed the written test would be placed on a merit selection eligible list and would be considered for promotion pursuant to a merit selection process. Moreover, those officers attaining the highest scores on the written qualifying test would also be eligible to participate in an assessment exercise for placement on an assessment eligible list. A maximum of 30% of promotions would be made from the merit list, while the remaining percentage of promotions would be made from the assessment list. Applicants who failed to pass the qualifying test would not be placed on either the merit or assessment list and would not otherwise be eligible for promotion.\nThe announcements further stated that an applicant must possess a minimum level of college education credits for promotion. The October 20 announcement originally required an applicant to have a minimum of 60 semester hours of credit prior to December 31, 1997. This requirement was revised by the November 4 announcement, which lowered the number of necessary college credits to 45 semester hours by the December 31 date. The revised announcement further stated that an applicant would need an additional 15 semester hours of credit, for a total of 60 hours, to be eligible for promotion.\nTo prepare applicants for the qualifying test, the City made available for review a comprehensive collection of study materials to each police district and area headquarters, recognized police associations, and Chicago public libraries.\nJaconetti, a police officer with the CPD, applied for the 1998 sergeants examination. However, because he did not possess the requisite level of college education and would not achieve that educational level by December 31, 1997, Jaconetti could not be eligible for promotion under the announced promotional guidelines.\nOn November 21, 1997, the FOP and its local union, Lodge No. 7, through its president William Nolan, and on behalf of plaintiffs, Officer Jaconetti and \u201call affected members represented by Lodge No. 7,\u201d filed a verified two-count complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the City, Mayor Daley, and the former superintendent, Matt Rodriguez, seeking, in part, a declaration that the City was prohibited from administering the sergeants examination because its announced process is contrary to the City\u2019s personnel rules (Personnel Rules) and therefore violates state law.\nIn count I of the complaint, plaintiffs allege the City, when administering promotional exams, is bound by the authority granted it under the applicable portions of the Personnel Rules. Plaintiffs assert that the rules governing promotions do not allow the City to either impose an education requirement on an applicant or consider an applicant\u2019s \u201cmerit\u201d in the decision-making process. In support of their averments, plaintiffs cite Rule VI, section 3, and Rule X, section 1, as amended October 14, 1997. Section 3 of Rule VI, which addresses examinations used in conducting promotions, states in relevant part:\n\u201cA promotional examination may comprise any or all of the following job-related parts as determined by the Commissioner of Personnel:\n(a) Evaluation of training and experience;\n(b) Written, oral, performance, or other tests of fitness;\n(c) Evaluation of performance and/or promotional potential based on past performance;\n(d) Seniority in the class or classes from which promotion is sought.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Personnel Rules, City of Chicago, Rule VI, \u00a73 (October 14, 1997).\nRule X, section 1, which describes the Department\u2019s policy regarding employee promotions, provides in pertinent part:\n\u201cVacancies will be filled where appropriate through the use of promotional examinations.\nThe Commissioner of Personnel shall develop promotional procedures that give appropriate consideration to the applicants\u2019 qualifications, records of performance and abilities.\nA discrete part of a promotional examination may determine merit based on evaluation of the applicants\u2019 records of performance by the employing department. The method of evaluation shall be prescribed by the Commissioner of Personnel. In such a case, the Commissioner of Personnel may maintain two promotional lists based on a single examination; one based on evaluation of record of performance and one based on the remaining parts of the examination.\u201d Personnel Rules, City of Chicago, Rule X, \u00a7 1 (October 14, 1997).\nPlaintiffs claim the announced promotional process violates section 3 of Rule VI because that provision neither authorizes the City to include an education requirement or a \u201cmerit\u201d component as part of the sergeants examination. The announced process also allegedly violates section 1 of Rule X because that provision similarly fails to allow the City to make \u201cmerit\u201d-based promotions.\nPlaintiffs lastly allege in count I that the City\u2019s distribution of study materials for the written qualifying exam resulted in a disadvantage to certain applicants and thus violated section 6 of Rule VI, which discusses the conduct of examinations for promotional employment. See Personnel Rules, City of Chicago, Rule VI, \u00a7 6 (October 14, 1997).\nBased on the foregoing alleged violations, plaintiffs seek a declaration that the Personnel Rules bind the City in developing promotional procedures and conducting their exams. Plaintiffs request a permanent injunction to enjoin the City from implementing the education requirement as a prerequisite to promotion, and from making any promotion based upon merit or any other factor other than the results of competitive testing.\nIn addition to their complaint, plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the City from administering the January qualifying test. The circuit court held a hearing on plaintiffs\u2019 motion on December 8 and 9, 1997, at which various evidentiary exhibits and testimony of several witnesses were presented. Following the hearing, the circuit court declined plaintiffs\u2019 request to enjoin the administration of the January 1998 exam. Plaintiffs filed a motion for a stay pending appeal with the circuit court on December 23, 1997, which was denied the following day. On the same day, plaintiffs filed an interlocutory appeal (No. 1 \u2014 97\u20144659) from the court\u2019s order denying its motion for a preliminary injunction. On December 30, 1997, plaintiffs petitioned this court to stay the circuit court\u2019s order pending the outcome of its appeal. This court denied plaintiff\u2019s petition on January 6, 1998, and set oral arguments in the case for November 18, 1998.\nMeanwhile, on December 2, 1997, defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs\u2019 complaint pursuant to sections 2 \u2014 615, 2 \u2014 619, and 2 \u2014 619.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615, 2 \u2014 619, 2 \u2014 619.1 (West 1996)). In their motion, defendants argue that plaintiffs\u2019 claims asserted in count I should be dismissed under section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code for failure to state a cause of action and, with specific respect to Mayor Daley and Superintendent Hillard, for failure to describe their alleged wrongdoing with the requisite particularity. Defendants alternatively contend that the claims in count I should be dismissed under section 2 \u2014 619 of the Code because plaintiffs lack standing to bring the instant action and are barred by the doctrine of laches in seeking relief. Defendants\u2019 section 2 \u2014 619 motion is supported with, inter alia, applicable portions of the Chicago Municipal Code (Municipal Code) and the Personnel Rules, notice 93 \u2014 28 issued by the CPD in June 1993, and the affidavit of the deputy commissioner of the Department, Robert Joyce.\nCPD notice 93 \u2014 28 explained, inter alia, that officers intending to seek promotion to sergeant would be required to complete two years of college education before they would be eligible for promotion and indicated that this prerequisite would take effect with the administration of the 1996 sergeants examination. Joyce\u2019s affidavit establishes that, although the Department received Jaconetti\u2019s application for the 1998 sergeants examination, he did not take the written qualifying test.\nThe circuit court granted defendants\u2019 motions and on June 19, 1998, dismissed the claims contained in count I with prejudice. Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal from this ruling on July 9, 1998 (No. 1 \u2014 98\u20142638).\nOn November 5, 1998, this court granted plaintiffs\u2019 motion to strike the oral arguments scheduled in case No. 1 \u2014 97\u20144659, and to consolidate that matter with case No. 1 \u2014 98\u20142638 for argument and consideration.\nANALYSIS\nCase No. 1 \u2014 97\u20144659\nPlaintiffs initially challenge the circuit court\u2019s ruling denying their request to preliminarily enjoin the January 1998 qualifying exam. Appellate counsel for plaintiffs acknowledged at arguments before this court that the qualifying test was administered as scheduled in January 1998 and that two rounds of promotions, resulting in the elevation of approximately 300 officers to the rank of sergeant, have been completed since that time. Consequently, we find plaintiffs\u2019 challenge moot.\nA case on appeal is moot and will be dismissed where the issue involved in the circuit court no longer exists because events occurring after the filing of the appeal render it impossible for the reviewing court to grant effectual relief to the complaining party. Richardson v. Rock Island County Officers Electoral Board, 179 Ill. 2d 252, 256, 688 N.E.2d 633, 635 (1997). Therefore, issues arising from the circuit court\u2019s order are moot when, \u201cbecause of developments following the issuance of that order, reversal of the order can have no practical effect on the controversy.\u201d In re Justin T, 291 Ill. App. 3d 872, 876, 684 N.E.2d 930, 933 (1997).\nThis particular appeal originates from an order denying plaintiffs\u2019 request for a preliminary injunction and presents the sole issue of whether the circuit court erred in allowing the City to administer the qualifying test as scheduled. As mentioned, the testing at issue has been completed and several promotions have been made, in part, from the scores derived from that exam. Because we can no longer preserve the status quo of the parties by granting plaintiffs\u2019 requested relief, plaintiffs\u2019 appeal must be dismissed as moot. We are aware of the exception to the mootness doctrine that allows us to consider a moot issue that involves a substantial public or private interest (Richardson, 179 Ill. 2d at 256, 688 N.E.2d at 635), but we need not consider the applicability of that exception here where our proceeding analysis in case No. 1 \u2014 98\u20142638 will adequately address the concerns raised by plaintiffs.\nCase No. 1 \u2014 98\u20142638\nIn this case, plaintiffs appeal the dismissal of count I of their complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to sections 2 \u2014 615 and 2 \u2014 619 of the Code. We initially consider the matters raised by defendants in their section 2 \u2014 619 motion. A section 2 \u2014 619 motion raises defects or defenses that negate the plaintiffs cause of action completely or refute crucial conclusions of law or conclusions of material fact that are unsupported by allegations of specific fact. Lawson v. City of Chicago, 278 Ill. App. 3d 628, 634, 662 N.E.2d 1377, 1382 (1996). All well-pleaded facts in the complaint together with all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are deemed admitted (Lawson, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 634, 662 N.E.2d at 1382), and all pleadings and supporting documents are construed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. In re Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179, 189, 680 N.E.2d 265, 268 (1997). Conclusions of law or fact not supported by allegations of specific fact, however, are not admitted. Lawson, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 634, 662 N.E.2d at 1382. We review a dismissal motion brought under section 2 \u2014 619 de novo. Lawson, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 634, 662 N.E.2d at 1382.\nIn their motion, defendants challenge the standing of the FOP and its president, Nolan, as well as Officer Jaconetti, to maintain the instant action. See Glisson v. City of Marion, 188 Ill. 2d 211, 220 (1999) (holding that lack of standing is an \u201caffirmative matter\u201d that is properly raised under section 2 \u2014 619(a)(9)). The doctrine of standing seeks to ensure that the courts are deciding actual, specific controversies, and not abstract questions or moot issues. In re Estate of Wellman, 174 Ill. 2d 335, 344, 673 N.E.2d 272, 276 (1996). The standing doctrine requires that a party, either in an individual or representative capacity, possess a real interest in the cause of action and in its outcome. Wellman, 174 Ill. 2d at 344, 673 N.E.2d at 276. To satisfy the standing requirement, a party must suffer some injury in fact to a legally cognizable interest. Messenger v. Edgar, 157 Ill. 2d 162, 170, 623 N.E.2d 310, 314 (1993). The party must have sustained, or be in immediate danger of sustaining, a direct injury as a result of the complained-of conduct. Messenger, 157 Ill. 2d at 171, 623 N.E.2d at 314.\nAs noted, the claims asserted in count I of the complaint are brought by the FOP and Nolan on behalf of Officer Jaconetti and \u201call affected members\u201d represented by the union and subject to the terms and conditions of the 1998 promotional examination. These claims are not asserted by Nolan or Jaconetti individually or any other police officer who applied for the sergeants exam.\nUnder the well-established law of this state, an association\u2019s status is, by itself, insufficient to allow it to assert an action for declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of its members. To have standing to maintain such an action, an association must have a recognizable interest in the dispute peculiar to itself and capable of being affected. Underground Contractors Ass\u2019n v. City of Chicago, 66 Ill. 2d 371, 377, 362 N.E.2d 298, 301 (1977); Cable Television & Communications Ass\u2019n v. Ameritech Corp., 288 Ill. App. 3d 354, 356-57, 680 N.E.2d 445, 447-48 (1997); Westwood Forum, Inc. v. City of Springfield, 261 Ill. App. 3d 911, 921-22, 634 N.E.2d 1154, 1162 (1994); Forsberg v. City of Chicago, 151 Ill. App. 3d 354, 371, 502 N.E.2d 283, 297 (1986). Accordingly, an association does not have standing to sue on behalf of its members, even those members allegedly affected by the challenged action, \u201cunless it has been or will be directly injured and therefore has a personal claim related to its own property, or that it has suffered or will suffer injury to a substantive; legally protected interest in its individual capacity.\u201d Cable Television, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 357, 680 N.E.2d at 447.\nIn this case, neither the FOP nor Nolan has demonstrated any injury or threat of injury to themselves as a result of the administration of the 1998 sergeants examination. The FOP as a police association, cannot possibly participate in the exam process, and Nolan, although a police officer eligible to seek promotion, has not alleged to have applied for the test or to have any interest in doing so. In an effort to show the requisite injury, the FOP and Nolan assert that if they are not allowed to pursue this cause, the union risks losing its position as collective bargaining representative of all police officers in its bargaining unit. In turn, they argue the union would experience \u201cboth political and financial ramifications.\u201d As argued, any loss by the union of its dues-paying membership would be a result of a lack of standing on behalf of the FOP and Nolan to bring suit and would not be directly traceable to defendants\u2019 actions. We additionally fail to understand how this speculative injury could be a direct result from the exam\u2019s administration.\nThe FOP and Nolan further contend their status as a union and union president, respectively, representing police officers in collective bargaining matters is alone sufficient to confer standing in this case. In support of their proposition, the FOP and Nolan cite Local 1894, American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Holsapple, 201 Ill. App. 3d 1040, 559 N.E.2d 577 (1990), and International Ass\u2019n of Firefighters, Local No. 23 v. City of East St. Louis, 206 Ill. App. 3d 580, 565 N.E.2d 264 (1990). These decisions, however, do not address the matter of standing as to the particular unions involved and, consequently, do not support the claim made by the FOP and Nolan here. Moreover, we have found no authority that would allow us to exempt labor unions from demonstrating the necessary injury required of other voluntary associations under this state\u2019s standing doctrine.\nDefendants similarly argue Officer Jaconetti lacks standing to question the validity of the promotional exam process. Defendants maintain that since Jaconetti failed to sit and take the January 1998 qualifying test, he cannot now challenge either the imposition of the educational requirement or the implementation of the merit component. Defendants do not question Jaconetti\u2019s standing to challenge the City\u2019s distribution of its study materials.\nThe effect of the education requirement is to foreclose the promotion of any exam applicant who has not successfully completed two years of college education. Jaconetti, who seeks promotion but does not and will not possess the requisite level of college education when promotions are conducted, is clearly injured by this requirement. Contrary to defendants\u2019 suggestion, Jaconetti\u2019s injury would not have been alleviated by sitting for the January qualifying test. Even if Jaconetti took and obtained a sufficiently high score on that test, he would nevertheless be excluded from the promotional process for not attaining the necessary amount of college credits. Since the instant action presents an actual controversy between the parties, we find Jaconetti has standing to attack the validity of the exam\u2019s educational prerequisite.\nIn the alternative, defendants argue Jaconetti\u2019s challenge is barred by the equitable doctrine of laches. Laches is an affirmative and equitable defense that precludes the assertion of a claim by a party whose unreasonable delay in raising that claim has prejudiced his opponent. Hauser v. Chicago Park District, 263 Ill. App. 3d 39, 40-41, 640 N.E.2d 294, 295 (1994). According to defendants, Jaconetti should have brought this action in June 1993 when the CPD issued notice 93 \u2014 28. Since Jaconetti unreasonably waited over four years to institute the instant matter, defendants claim the laches doctrine operates to bar Jaconetti from contesting the City\u2019s actions. We disagree.\nThe laches doctrine presupposes that the party in delay could have in fact asserted his rights at a prior time. As noted, CPD notice 93 \u2014 23 simply advised officers of the City\u2019s intention to require a certain level of college, education among candidates seeking promotion to sergeant before they would be elevated in rank. This requirement was not implemented by the CPD\u2019s notice, and the record shows that the requirement was first imposed upon officers taking the 1998 sergeants exam. As such, no officer, including Jaconetti, was subject to, and thereby affected by, the educational requirement prior to the time it took effect in late 1997. Jaconetti had no standing to file suit in June 1993 because he neither had suffered an injury nor was in the immediate danger of suffering any injury as a result of the City\u2019s announced plan to revise its educational policy. Jaconetti diligently filed the instant action once the educational requirement was applied and soon after it became apparent that he would never be promoted pursuant to the 1998 sergeants exam. Further, any challenge instituted by Jaconetti when the City\u2019s intentions were announced would have been premature and, thus, would not have presented a requisite case or controversy. Since Jaconetti could not have maintained an action in 1993, we find the laches doctrine inapplicable to bar his instant challenge.\nJaconetti, however, has no standing to contest the City\u2019s authority to make merit-based promotions. As previously discussed, the primary concern of the standing doctrine is that a party have a real interest in the action brought and in its outcome. In deciding whether a party has standing, we must \u201clook at the party to see if he or she will be benefitted by the relief granted.\u201d In re Marriage of Rodriguez, 131 Ill. 2d 273, 280, 545 N.E.2d 731, 734 (1989). Jaconetti lacks a sufficient interest in the outcome of his claim because he is not on the merit promotion eligibility list. If we were to determine that the merit component of the exam process is invalid, Jaconetti would not benefit from our ruling because he withdrew from the promotional process before taking the January qualifying test. Jaconetti could not have been considered for promotion, merit-based or otherwise, without first having passed the written qualifying test. See Harney v. Cahill, 57 Ill. App. 2d 1, 11-12, 206 N.E.2d 500, 506 (1965) (finding the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge validity of promotional examination where they did not pass initial written test and consequently failed to be placed on eligibility list). Further, by not advancing to the second step of the exam process, Jaconetti has not been and will not be injured by the merit component.\nIn any event, assuming Jaconetti has standing, his challenge would fail in light of the express language contained in section 1 of Rule X, which explicitly allows the Department to consider merit as a basis for making promotions. Personnel Rules, City of Chicago, Rule X, \u00a7 1 (October 14, 1997); see also Personnel Rules, City of Chicago, Notes on Amendments (October 14, 1997) (stating that section 1 of Rule X was revised to provide for eligibility lists \u201cin order to permit their use for merit appointments\u201d).\nWe next consider defendant\u2019s section 2 \u2014 615 motion to dismiss. A motion to dismiss brought pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615 attacks the legal sufficiency of the complaint and presents the question of whether the complaint states a cause of action upon which relief could be granted. Grund v. Donegan, 298 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1037, 700 N.E.2d 157, 159 (1998). All pleadings must be construed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party (In re Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d at 189, 680 N.E.2d at 268)), and all well-pleaded facts in the complaint, as well as all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, are taken as true. Lawson v. City of Chicago, 278 Ill. App. 3d 628, 634, 662 N.E.2d 1377, 1382 (1996). Conclusions of law or conclusions of fact not supported by allegations of specific fact, however, are not admitted. Lawson, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 634, 662 N.E.2d at 1382. A complaint should be dismissed under section 2 \u2014 615 only where the court can clearly determine that no set of facts could be proved under the pleadings that would entitle the plaintiff to recovery. Bryson v. News America Publications, Inc., 174 Ill. 2d 77, 86-87, 672 N.E.2d 1207, 1214 (1996). Since this determination is one of law, our review is conducted de novo. Lawson, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 634, 662 N.E.2d at 1382.\nAs defendants Daley and Hillard contend, the complaint\u2019s allegations are inadequate to state a claim against them. Because Illinois is a fact-pleading jurisdiction, a complaint must allege ultimate facts sufficient to set forth the essential elements of the cause of action being asserted. Anderson v. Vanden Dorpel, 172 Ill. 2d 399, 408, 667 N.E.2d 1296, 1299 (1996). Accordingly, a complaint must set forth facts sufficient to identify the wrongful actions allegedly committed by the defendant.\nHere, the complaint simply alleges that Daley, as mayor, has the power to \u201cexecute and implement all ordinances\u201d enacted by the City. No other allegations concerning Daley are contained in the complaint. In Hillard\u2019s case, the complaint alleges that Hillard\u2019s powers as superintendent do not include the ability to make promotions based upon \u201cmerit.\u201d Yet, the complaint does not contest, let alone identify, any specific, merit-based promotion conducted by the CPD. Accordingly, Mayor Daley and Hillard were properly dismissed by the circuit court.\nWe now turn to Jaconetti\u2019s contention that the City is precluded, as a matter of law, from imposing the requirement that officers complete two years of college education in order to be eligible for promotion to sergeant. According to Jaconetti, the consideration of a candidate\u2019s educational background is not provided under the Personnel Rules.\nTo determine the propriety of the educational requirement, we must necessarily examine the applicable provisions of the Municipal Code and the Personnel Rules. The law is well established that an administrative agency, like the Department, exercises purely statutory powers and possess no inherent or common law powers. McArdle v. Rodriguez, 277 Ill. App. 3d 365, 373, 659 N.E.2d 1356, 1362 (1995). The Department\u2019s powers are limited to those granted by an express provision of the law it administers, or found by fair implication or intendment from the agency\u2019s express authority to be incident to accomplishing the objectives for which the agency was created. McArdle, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 373, 659 N.E.2d at 1362. The limitation placed on an administrative agency is applied with added force to civil service rules because such rules are generally deemed part of the employment contract. McArdle, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 373, 659 N.E.2d at 1362.\nJudicial review of the interpretation given an administrative agency of its own rules is conducted de novo. Finnerty v. Personnel Board, 303 Ill. App. 3d 1, 12, 707 N.E.2d 600, 609 (1999)). Yet, the agency\u2019s interpretation is entitled to \u201crespectful consideration\u201d (Brown v. Chicago Park District, 296 Ill. App. 3d 867, 874, 695 N.E.2d 1315, 1320 (1998)) and enjoys a presumption of validity. Hoffman v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 175 Ill. App. 3d 219, 224, 529 N.E.2d 790, 794 (1988). This determination, however, is not binding on this court and will not be followed where clearly erroneous, arbitrary or unreasonable. McArdle, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 375, 659 N.E.2d at 1362; Brown, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 874, 695 N.E.2d at 1320.\nThe same rules used in construing statutes are also applied when interpreting the meaning of a municipal ordinance or agency rule. Brown, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 875, 695 N.E.2d at 1320; McTigue v. Personnel Board, 299 Ill. App. 3d 579, 588, 701 N.E.2d 135, 142 (1998). The primary aim in all such cases is to ascertain and give effect to the drafter\u2019s intent. McTigue, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 589, 701 N.E.2d at 142. The best indicator of this intent is the language used in the ordinance or rule (American National Bank v. Powell, 293 Ill. App. 3d 1033, 1038, 691 N.E.2d 1162, 1166 (1997)), which is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Finnerty, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 13, 707 N.E.2d at 609.\nThe Municipal Code directs the Department\u2019s commissioner to promulgate rules \u201c[f]or promotions which shall give appropriate considerations to the applicant\u2019s qualifications, record of performance and ability.\u201d Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 2 \u2014 74\u2014050(6) (1990). The Municipal Code therefore contemplates that the Department would develop rules that, with a certain degree of detail, touch upon these matters. In response, the Department drafted Rule VI, section 3. Section 3 specifically discusses the composition of exams used in making promotions and sets forth a nonexclusive list of certain \u201cjob-related parts,\u201d such as the evaluation of a candidate\u2019s training, performance, and/or experience, the administration of fitness tests, and/or the consideration of the candidate\u2019s class seniority. Upon a reading of this provision, it is clear that the promotional parts explicitly listed, or those that may be subsequently developed, pertain to matters concerning a candidate\u2019s employment. Consequently, matters beyond the candidate\u2019s professional duties, such as his or her educational background, are not proper considerations during the promotional process.\nWe stress that the Department is under a legal duty to follow its own rules. Felle v. Metropolitan Sanitary District of Greater Chicago, 167 Ill. App. 3d 121, 126, 520 N.E.2d 1012, 1016 (1988); Little v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n, 131 Ill. App. 3d 848, 851, 476 N.E.2d 448, 450 (1985). Such rules have the force and effect of law and, as such, are binding on the Department. McTigue, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 588, 701 N.E.2d at 142; Little, 131 Ill. App. 3d at 851, 476 N.E.2d at 450. The requirement that officers taking the 1998 sergeants exam successfully complete two years of college education as a precondition to promotion does not conform to the promotional process as described by the Personnel Rules. Review of a candidate\u2019s educational background is not explicitly listed in the rules governing promotions, nor can we reasonably construe the rules to allow for such a consideration. We note that under section 2 of Rule VI, the Department is expressly allowed to consider the educational background of a person applying to take a general employment exam. Personnel Rules, City of Chicago, Rule VI, \u00a7 2 (October 14, 1997). Yet, section 3 of the same rule governing promotions fails to contain similar language. Where a particular provision appears in legislation, the failure to include that same provision in another section of the legislation will not be deemed to have been inadvertent but, rather, intended by the drafters. Siciliano v. Village of Westchester Firefighters\u2019 Pension Fund, 202 Ill. App. 3d 964, 967, 560 N.E.2d 885, 887 (1990).\nPer the language of Rule VI, section 3, the Department promised officers interested in taking the 1998 sergeants examination that the promotional process would be composed of certain \u201cjob related\u201d components. Those officers had a reasonable expectation that the Department would develop promotional criteria on that basis. See McTigue, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 590, 701 N.E.2d at 143 (finding that City\u2019s personnel rules constituted a contractual promise to its employees that discharges from employment would be conducted in particular matter).\nWe conclude the Department violated its own rules by imposing the two-year college education requirement for the 1998 sergeants exam. As for Jaconetti\u2019s relief, we direct that Jaconetti be allowed to take the next scheduled examination. We note that if the Department amends its rules before that examination to allow for the consideration of a candidate\u2019s education, Jaconetti would not be subject to that change. Accordingly, the imposition of the same or similar educational prerequisite involved in this case would not bar Jaconetti from being promoted provided he successfully completes each stage of the exam process. If Jaconetti is unsuccessful in his bid to be promoted through that process, Jaconetti would be subject to any educational requirement applied to other exams. Because our decision affords Jaconetti the opportunity to seek promotion through the next scheduled sergeants examination, we need not consider the sufficiency of Jaconetti\u2019s claim against the City\u2019s for its alleged inequitable distribution of study materials.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the following reasons, the order of the circuit court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.\nAffirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.\nCAHILL, EJ., and WOLFSON, J., concur.\nPlaintiffs originally included Matt Rodriguez, the former superintendent of the Chicago police department, as a defendant. They later substituted Terry Hillard, the current superintendent, as a party.\nCount II of the complaint sought a declaration that the announced sergeant\u2019s examination violated the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) then in effect between the City and the FOR Lodge No. 7. The circuit court determined it lacked jurisdiction of this claim, and ordered the matter to be resolved at arbitration. An arbitrator later determined in a ruling dated May 11, 1998, that the FOP and its president Nolan did not have standing to assert the claims in count II because the matter of promotions to the rank of sergeant is outside the scope of the CBA.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CERDA" } ], "attorneys": [ "Baum, Sigman, Auerbach, Pierson & Newman, Ltd., (Dale D. Pierson, Brian C. Hlavin, and Jennifer L. Dunitz-Geiringer, of counsel), and Thomas J. Pleines, both of Chicago, for appellants.", "Brian L. Crow, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Lawrence Rosenthal, Benna Ruth Solomon, and Sonja D. Rajkovich, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "WILLIAM NOLAN et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. TERRY G. HILLARD, Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department, et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNos. 1\u201497\u20144659, 1\u201498\u20142638 cons.\nOpinion filed December 8, 1999.\nBaum, Sigman, Auerbach, Pierson & Newman, Ltd., (Dale D. Pierson, Brian C. Hlavin, and Jennifer L. Dunitz-Geiringer, of counsel), and Thomas J. Pleines, both of Chicago, for appellants.\nBrian L. Crow, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Lawrence Rosenthal, Benna Ruth Solomon, and Sonja D. Rajkovich, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0129-01", "first_page_order": 149, "last_page_order": 165 }