{ "id": 349599, "name": "CAROL J. WOOD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WABASH COUNTY, d/b/a Wabash County Health Department, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Wood v. Wabash County", "decision_date": "1999-12-16", "docket_number": "No. 5\u201499\u20140200", "first_page": "725", "last_page": "730", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "309 Ill. App. 3d 725" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "115 Ill. 2d 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3179637 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "489" }, { "page": "490" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/115/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "212 Ill. App. 3d 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2600615 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "415" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/212/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 Ill. App. 3d 983", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1260328 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "989" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/284/0983-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 506, "char_count": 11603, "ocr_confidence": 0.78, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.824464604536184e-08, "percentile": 0.457983264661376 }, "sha256": "4317779bb6c3684114127e827acf5572fdedf3efe99e67f31579693481d72e1f", "simhash": "1:81746b13630e7c9f", "word_count": 1774 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:36:09.526568+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "CAROL J. WOOD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WABASH COUNTY, d/b/a Wabash County Health Department, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HOPKINS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Carol J. Wood, appeals the trial court\u2019s dismissal with prejudice of her complaint for breach of an implied employment contract against defendant, Wabash County Health Department, for failure to state a cause of action. The basis of plaintiffs complaint is defendant\u2019s personnel policy handbook, which plaintiff alleges defendant violated by wrongfully terminating her employment. The only issue on appeal is whether the personnel policy handbook contained sufficiently clear promises such that plaintiff would reasonably have believed that an offer had been made and that an implied contract was formed. We reverse and remand for the reasons set forth below.\nThe essential facts are as follows: Plaintiff was employed by defendant from October 1994 until April 16, 1998. At the time of plaintiffs discharge, defendant\u2019s personnel policy handbook, which had been in effect since July 1996, contained a section entitled \u201cDisciplinary Procedure.\u201d The disciplinary procedure section stated in pertinent part as follows:\n\u201cThe following disciplinary actions have been adopted for dealing with violations of conduct and/or poor job performance. They are intended to be primarily progressive, corrective measures and have been designed to insure a smooth running organization in the best interest of employees, the department and its clients. The infractions and disciplinary actions listed are not all-inclusive. Repeated infractions or combined infractions or offenses may result in accelerated or compound disciplinary action as determined by the administrator. The department retains absolute discretion to skip action steps when it is deemed by the administrator to be in the best interest of the department.\nAny of the steps listed below may be used as disciplinary measures or in conjunction with a plan of remediation. ***\nVerbal Warning: ***\nWritten Warning: ***\nSuspension: ***\nDismissal: The administrator may dismiss any employee for any reasonable cause. Prior to dismissal, the employee will be given written notification, stating the grounds for dismissal, and a hearing will be scheduled with the administrator. All dismissal notices shall be in writing, setting forth the reason(s) for dismissal and the effective date of termination. Each Board of Health member shall receive a copy of dismissal notices.\nActions which are causes for immediate termination of employment without warning could include, but are not limited to:\n\u2014Refusing to obey a reasonable order of supervisor (pertaining to work);\n\u2014Deliberate destruction or damage of department property or property of a fellow employee;\n\u2014Falsifying information on department records, employee time-sheets, etc.;\n\u2014Theft of property of the health department or other employee;\n\u2014Willfully falsifying application for employment or other data requested by the department;\n\u2014Illegal conduct during working hours;\n\u2014Brandishing a weapon during working hours;\n\u2014Harassing (sexually or otherwise), threatening, intimidating, or assaulting another employee, client, or member of the public;\n\u2014Reporting to work under the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs; \u2014Conviction of a felony.\u201d\nOn April 16, 1998, plaintiff received a written notice from defendant that her employment was terminated as of 11:59 a.m. that day. The written notice did not give a reason for plaintiffs termination, and a hearing was not scheduled with the administrator. Plaintiff filed a complaint for breach of implied contract, stating that defendant failed to follow the terms and conditions of the employment contract as set forth in the personnel policy handbook. Defendant moved to dismiss plaintiffs complaint for failure to state a cause of action under section 2 \u2014 615(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615(a) (West 1998)). Defendant asserted that the language of the personnel policy is discretionary and insufficient to establish an implied contract and that without an employment contract, plaintiffs complaint fails to state a cause of action.\nThe trial court determined that the language of defendant\u2019s personnel policy was insufficient to amount to a clear promise such that plaintiff could reasonably believe that an offer had been made and that no implied-in-fact contract existed. The court found that plaintiff was an at-will employee with no contractual rights against defendant and no viable cause of action. The trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint, and plaintiff appeals.\nThe review of a section 2 \u2014 615 motion requires a court to determine whether a complaint sufficiently states a cause of action. See Davis v. Temple, 284 Ill. App. 3d 983 (1996). In reviewing such a motion, a court considers disputed questions of law de novo. See Davis, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 989. An implied-in-fact contract exists when a promissory expression may be inferred from the facts and circumstances and the expressions on the part of the promisor. See Lampe v. Swan Corp., 212 Ill. App. 3d 414 (1991). Whether an implied-in-fact contract exists is a threshold question of law. See Lampe, 212 Ill. App. 3d at 415.\nGenerally, an employment relationship with no fixed duration is terminable at will by either party. See Duldulao v. Saint Mary of Nazareth Hospital Center, 115 Ill. 2d 482 (1987). The presumption that an employee is \u201cat will\u201d can be overcome if it is demonstrated that the parties contracted otherwise. See Duldulao, 115 Ill. 2d at 489. An employee handbook or other policy statement can create enforceable contractual rights if the traditional requirements for contract formation are met, i.e., the language of the policy contains a promise clear enough that an employee reasonably believes that an offer has been made, the policy statement has been disseminated to the employee so that the employee is aware of the promise and believes it to be an offer, and the employee accepts the offer by commencing or continuing to work after learning of the policy statement. See Duldulao, 115 Ill. 2d at 490.\nThe only issue raised by this appeal is whether the language of defendant\u2019s personnel policy handbook contained a sufficiently clear promise under the disciplinary procedure that plaintiff could reasonably believe that an offer was made. Plaintiff contends that the language of the disciplinary procedure in the personnel policy handbook was sufficiently clear to lead plaintiff to reasonably believe that she would be discharged only for reasonable cause, that a written notice of dismissal would state the reason for her dismissal, and that a hearing would be scheduled with the administrator. Defendant contends that the phrases \u201c[t]he department retains absolute discretion to skip action steps\u201d and \u201cimmediate termination of employment without warning\u201d grant defendant discretion to discharge plaintiff at any time without reason and that defendant need not follow any given procedure when dismissing an employee. Defendant also asserts that the phrase \u201c[t]he administrator may dismiss\u201d is discretionary, rather than mandatory, and that plaintiff could not have reasonably believed that the disciplinary procedure promised that she would be discharged only for reasonable cause.\nWe find that the language of the disciplinary procedure is a sufficiently clear promise that plaintiff could reasonably believe amounted to an offer and that the personnel policy handbook created an implied-in-fact contract, giving rise to contractual rights for plaintiff. The initial paragraph of the disciplinary procedure states that the disciplinary actions \u201chave been adopted\u201d by defendant, and this language implies that the steps set forth in the disciplinary procedure will be employed. The language that the \u201cdepartment retains absolute discretion to skip action steps\u201d allows defendant to skip the progressive steps; however, the language contained in the steps states that defendant \u201cshall\u201d do certain actions if that step is employed, i.e., mandates that defendant follow the procedure enumerated in that step. The language that an employee will be discharged for \u201cany reasonable cause\u201d is sufficiently clear to lead an employee to believe that a reasonable cause must exist before an employee will be discharged, and that belief is reinforced by the fact that written notices of discharge are to state the grounds for discharge.\nDefendant argues that the paragraph which allows immediate termination without warning gives defendant the right to terminate any employee at any time without following the dismissal procedure. This paragraph is a separate paragraph but it comes under the step entitled \u201cDismissal.\u201d The paragraph on immediate termination simply lists what egregious actions will result in the immediate termination of an employee. Because the paragraph on immediate termination is part of the dismissal step, the language that all dismissals will receive a written notification containing reasons for the dismissal and that a hearing shall be scheduled still applies. The only apparent difference between an immediate termination and a dismissal is that an immediate termination does not require prior notice of the termination, while an employee dismissed for less egregious actions will receive notice prior to the dismissal.\nDefendant could have included a disclaimer, if properly phrased, in the handbook to ameliorate the legal consequences of the handbook, but defendant included no disclaimer anywhere in the policy handbook.\nThe trial court, in its order, relied upon Lampe to support its decision. Lampe, 212 Ill. App. 3d 414. In Lampe, the employer did not provide disciplinary steps that it would follow but listed causes for dismissal which were not all-inclusive. The employer in Lampe did not use the term \u201creasonable causes\u201d and also did not state that it would give reasons for discharge in a written notice. Unlike Lampe, defendant herein did set forth, in detail, the action steps it could take and, if taken, what actions would be taken under each step. Defendant also said that a dismissal would be for \u201creasonable cause,\u201d that all dismissals would follow the procedure wherein a written notice, listing reasons for the dismissal, would be issued, and that a hearing would be scheduled with the administrator. Defendant only reserved to itself the discretion not to use each step of the disciplinary procedure. Thus, the general language used in Lampe does not compare with the specific language used by defendant in this case. Therefore, Lampe is not dis-positive.\nWe find that the language of defendant\u2019s disciplinary procedure in its personnel policy handbook sufficiently and clearly stated a promise that plaintiff could reasonably believe amounted to an offer and created contractual rights for plaintiff. Because an implied-in-fact contract was created by defendant\u2019s personnel policy manual, plaintiffs complaint stated a cause of action for breach of her implied employment contract. Therefore, the trial court\u2019s judgment granting defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint is reversed, and this cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nGOLDENHERSH, EJ., and CHAPMAN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HOPKINS" } ], "attorneys": [ "John A. Clark, of Croegaert, Clark & Hough, Ltd., of Olney, for appellant.", "William E Hardy and John E. Nolan, both of Hinshaw & Culbertson, of Springfield, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CAROL J. WOOD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WABASH COUNTY, d/b/a Wabash County Health Department, Defendant-Appellee.\nFifth District\nNo. 5\u201499\u20140200\nOpinion filed December 16, 1999.\nJohn A. Clark, of Croegaert, Clark & Hough, Ltd., of Olney, for appellant.\nWilliam E Hardy and John E. Nolan, both of Hinshaw & Culbertson, of Springfield, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0725-01", "first_page_order": 745, "last_page_order": 750 }