{ "id": 349540, "name": "UCHUMI SUPERMARKETS LTD., et al., for Themselves and a Class of Persons Similarly Situated, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DINERS CLUB INTERNATIONAL, LTD., Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Uchumi Supermarkets Ltd. v. Diners Club International, Ltd.", "decision_date": "1999-12-16", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201498\u20144839", "first_page": "902", "last_page": "906", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "309 Ill. App. 3d 902" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "495 N.E.2d 1254", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 Ill. App. 3d 436", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3535131 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "438-39" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/145/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "671 N.E.2d 39", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "173 Ill. 2d 252", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 147609 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "257-58" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/173/0252-01" ] }, { "cite": "437 N.E.2d 1253", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 Ill. App. 3d 516", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3020436 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "519-20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/107/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "694 N.E.2d 649", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 Ill. App. 3d 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 222580 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/296/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 N.E.2d 881", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 Ill. 2d 80", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3097811 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/92/0080-01" ] }, { "cite": "682 N.E.2d 421", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 Ill. App. 3d 937", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 351133 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "942" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/289/0937-01" ] }, { "cite": "629 N.E.2d 520", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "class action serves as a device to litigate similar claims" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "255 Ill. App. 3d 790", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2990556 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "802-03", "parenthetical": "class action serves as a device to litigate similar claims" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/255/0790-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 N.E.2d 634", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 Ill. 2d 320", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5455758 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "337" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/69/0320-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 524, "char_count": 8978, "ocr_confidence": 0.77, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.01333784324877628 }, "sha256": "b1925a3824edd14ac386c16ba7759979fd1613c1b0d2e0a1c8072857cbf75b43", "simhash": "1:b36654e654c9b073", "word_count": 1464 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:36:09.526568+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "UCHUMI SUPERMARKETS LTD., et al., for Themselves and a Class of Persons Similarly Situated, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DINERS CLUB INTERNATIONAL, LTD., Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HOURIHANE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is an appeal from an order denying plaintiffs\u2019 petition, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 187 (134 Ill. 2d R. 187), to reinstate their case, which had been dismissed by the circuit court on forum non conveniens grounds. On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the other forum\u2019s refusal to allow the case to proceed as a representative, i.e., class, action constitutes a refusal to accept jurisdiction over the action for purposes of Rule 187. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the denial of their petition to reinstate.\nBACKGROUND\nOn May 24, 1995, plaintiffs filed a nine-count \u201cclass action complaint\u201d against Diners Club International, Ltd. (DCI), alleging fraud, conspiracy to commit fraud, negligence, willful and wanton conduct, and conversion. Plaintiffs, who are Kenyan corporations or individual residents of that country, sought the payment of moneys allegedly owed to them by Diners Finance Ltd., DCI\u2019s licensee in Kenya. Plaintiffs sought to represent two classes: an \u201cestablishment class,\u201d whose members agreed to honor the Diners Club card and who are now allegedly owed money for customer purchases made using that card; and a \u201cdepositor class,\u201d whose members are allegedly owed money from their participation in the Diners Finance bank deposit program.\nDCI filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619 (West 1998)), based on grounds of forum non conveniens. DCI argued that Kenya is the appropriate forum in that all activities underlying plaintiffs\u2019 theories of liability took place in Kenya, all of the documents, witnesses and necessary third parties are in Kenya, and all of the plaintiffs and purported class members are residents of Kenya. Plaintiffs argued, inter alia, that although Kenyan civil procedures recognize representative actions, they do not provide the scope of relief available in class actions in this state.\nOn January 31, 1996, the circuit court (Levin, J.) granted DCI\u2019s motion. The court observed that, even if the scope of relief in Kenya is not the same as in the United States, or if Kenyan substantive law is less favorable, neither provides a basis to avoid dismissal based on forum non conveniens.\nThe dismissal of plaintiffs\u2019 complaint was made subject to the provisions of Rule 187(c)(2). This rule provides that an action dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds is subject to certain conditions and, upon timely petition by plaintiffs, may be reinstated where \u201cthe court in the other forum refuses to accept jurisdiction.\u201d 134 Ill. 2d R. 187.\nOn April 10, 1998, plaintiffs petitioned the circuit court to reinstate the action. They argued that the March 13, 1998, order of the Kenyan court, declining to take the case as a representative action, constitutes a refusal to accept jurisdiction under Rule 187. DCI argued that plaintiffs\u2019 characterization of the March 13, 1998, order is simply wrong and that the litigation is proceeding in Kenya. DCI also argued that the adequacy of the Kenyan courts was already considered by the circuit court when it granted DCI\u2019s motion to dismiss, that plaintiffs never appealed that ruling, and that the issue could not be relitigated.\nThe March 13, 1998, order of the Kenyan court indicates that it was entered in response to an application by some 26 persons to be joined as substantive parties in that suit. The order, which dismissed the petition, states in relevant part:\n\u201c[W]here the claim of the plaintiff is for damages the machinery of a representative suit is absolutely inapplicable. The relief that he is seeking is a personal relief, applicable to him alone, and does not benefit in any way the class for whom he purports to bring the action.\n\u2756 H5 \u2756\nIt is accordingly inappropriate to combine the differing claims of these plaintiffs in one such suit being primarily for the purposes of claiming damages founded on differing and varied factual basis [sic]\u201d\nOn November 30, 1998, the circuit court (Preston, J.) denied plaintiffs\u2019 Rule 187 petition to reinstate. The court noted that the Kenyan court did not dismiss the case, but simply ruled that it could not go forward as a class action, and that this was an insufficient basis to reinstate the case. Plaintiffs timely appealed.\nANALYSIS\nPlaintiffs argue that, although no class action was certified in the circuit court, the \u201caction\u201d pled was a class action, and the refusal of the Kenyan court to entertain the suit as a representative action constitutes a refusal to accept jurisdiction for purposes of the reinstatement provisions of Rule 187. We disagree.\nA \u201cclass action\u201d is a \u201cprocedural vehicle\u201d under which claims by multiple persons may be decided in a single action, without the necessity of an appearance by each. Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School, 69 Ill. 2d 320, 337, 371 N.E.2d 634 (1977); see also Hess v. I.R.E. Real Estate Income Fund, Ltd., 255 Ill. App. 3d 790, 802-03, 629 N.E.2d 520 (1993) (class action serves as a device to litigate similar claims); 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 801 (West 1998) (setting forth prerequisites for maintenance of class action). It allows a representative party to initiate a mass action on behalf of similarly situated class members without their consent. In re Chicago Flood Litigation, 289 Ill. App. 3d 937, 942, 682 N.E.2d 421 (1997). Thus, the designation of an action as a \u201cclass action\u201d merely identifies the procedural device under which the class members\u2019 claims will be litigated.\nA court\u2019s refusal to entertain an action as a class action does not mean that the court lacks jurisdiction to hear the action. Indeed, an order denying class certification or dismissing class allegations is interlocutory and does not terminate the litigation; rather, the plaintiff is free to proceed on his or her individual claims. Levy v. Metropolitan Sanitary District of Greater Chicago, 92 Ill. 2d 80, 83, 440 N.E.2d 881 (1982); Arriola v. Time Insurance Co., 296 Ill. App. 3d 303, 308, 694 N.E.2d 649 (1998).\nThis is what occurred in the instant litigation. The Kenyan court refused to entertain the case as a representative action and the case proceeded as to the claims of the only named plaintiff in that suit.\nPlaintiffs argue, however, that because the Kenyan court is not empowered to hear and decide the \u201cclass of cases\u201d to which their case belongs, i.e., representative actions seeking money damages, the Kenyan court was without subject matter jurisdiction. See Kemling v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 107 Ill. App. 3d 516, 519-20, 437 N.E.2d 1253 (1982).\nThe \u201cclass of cases\u201d to which this case belongs is not \u201crepresentative actions seeking money damages\u201d. Rather, the classes of cases to which this case belongs are more properly described as ones for fraud, negligence and conversion. Plaintiffs do not suggest that the Kenyan courts lack the power to hear and determine cases for fraud, negligence and conversion.\nFurther, plaintiffs mischaracterize the ruling by Judge Levin. His order dismissing the case on grounds of forum non conveniens was in no way conditioned on the case proceeding as a class action in Kenya. Indeed, as noted above, Judge Levin acknowledged that Kenya\u2019s legal system and substantive laws may be less favorable than those of Illinois.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 arguments are really an attack on the adequacy of the other forum, an issue decided by Judge Levin in his January 31, 1996, order. Plaintiffs did not seek leave to appeal that order, although they clearly had the right to do so. See 166 Ill. 2d R. 306 (\u201cparty may petition for leave to appeal *** from an order of the circuit court allowing *** a motion to dismiss on the grounds of forum non conveniens\u201d). Thus, the time for challenging that ruling has come and gone. Miller v. Consolidated R. Corp., 173 Ill. 2d 252, 257-58, 671 N.E.2d 39 (1996); Buckland v. Lazar, 145 Ill. App. 3d 436, 438-39, 495 N.E.2d 1254 (1986).\nSimilarly, the various cases cited by plaintiffs generally address the policies underlying the doctrine of forum non conveniens and criteria for assessing the adequacy of the other forum. Significantly, plaintiffs cite to no case where the refusal of the other forum\u2019s court to entertain the action as a class action was considered tantamount to a refusal of jurisdiction. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court dismissing plaintiffs\u2019 petition to reinstate their case.\nAffirmed.\nHOFFMAN, PJ., and HALL, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HOURIHANE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Connelly & Schroeder, of Chicago (Michael P. Connelly and Colleen Konicek, of counsel), for appellants.", "Mayer, Brown & Platt (Javier H. Rubinstein and Kyle F. Waldinger, of counsel), and Cora G. Yang, of Diners Club International, Ltd., both of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "UCHUMI SUPERMARKETS LTD., et al., for Themselves and a Class of Persons Similarly Situated, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DINERS CLUB INTERNATIONAL, LTD., Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1\u201498\u20144839\nOpinion filed December 16, 1999.\nConnelly & Schroeder, of Chicago (Michael P. Connelly and Colleen Konicek, of counsel), for appellants.\nMayer, Brown & Platt (Javier H. Rubinstein and Kyle F. Waldinger, of counsel), and Cora G. Yang, of Diners Club International, Ltd., both of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0902-01", "first_page_order": 922, "last_page_order": 926 }