{
  "id": 349586,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROBERTO ESCALANTE, Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Escalante",
  "decision_date": "2000-01-19",
  "docket_number": "No. 2\u201498\u20140592",
  "first_page": "994",
  "last_page": "996",
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
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        4820340
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      "year": 1992,
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          "page": "445"
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          "page": "445"
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          "page": "445"
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          "page": "445-46"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:36:09.526568+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROBERTO ESCALANTE, Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE McLAREN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe State appeals from the trial court\u2019s order granting the motion to suppress statements of defendant, Roberto Escalante. We affirm.\nDefendant was charged with unlawful use of weapons (720 ILCS 5/24 \u2014 1(a)(4) (West 1996)). He subsequently filed a motion to suppress the statements he made to Rockford police detective Theotis Glover on January 21, 1997. The original motion contained six grounds upon which defendant sought to suppress his statements; however, defendant withdrew five of the grounds before the hearing, leaving only the allegation that his statement was elicited from him as \u201cthe direct result of mental coercion, promises, or threats, and was, therefore, involuntary.\u201d\nAt the hearing, the State called Detective Glover, who testified that he interviewed defendant in the Public Safety Building on January 21, 1997. No one other than defendant and Glover was present during the interview, which lasted approximately 2xh hours. Glover gave defendant a soft drink after defendant asked for one. Glover was dressed casually, in jeans and a shirt or sweatshirt, and was unarmed at the time. Glover testified that he exhibited \u201can Information [sic] type of demeanor,\u201d never yelling, raising his voice, or threatening defendant. He also never made any promises to defendant. During the interview, defendant never indicated that he was tired or needed to stop.\nDefendant did not cross-examine Glover. No additional witnesses were called. Defendant then moved for a directed finding. After argument, the court took the motion under advisement. The court eventually ruled in defendant\u2019s favor and granted the motion to suppress statements. The State\u2019s motion for reconsideration was denied. The State then filed a certificate of impairment and a timely notice of appeal.\nThe voluntariness of a statement needs to be established by a preponderance of the evidence. People v. Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d 414, 445 (1992). The burden is upon the State to establish voluntariness; once a prima facie case has been established, the burden of going forward with the proofs shifts to the defendant. Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d at 445. The test of voluntariness is whether the statement is made freely, voluntarily, and without compulsion or inducement of any kind or whether the defendant\u2019s will was overcome at the time the statement was made. Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d at 445. A trial court\u2019s ruling on the voluntariness of a statement will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d at 445-46.\nIn its ruling, the trial court stated:\n\u201cThere\u2019s no information here for me to indicate what statements, if any, he gave in response to what questions, if any. While the State put on evidence indicating the officer didn\u2019t make any specific threats to the Defendant or coerce him, there\u2019s nothing indicating to me in affect [sic] what was asked of him and the circumstances surroundings [sic] any statement. I don\u2019t even know what statement, if any, the Defendant made, quite frankly. *** It would be helpful for the Court to know under what circumstances, if any, he made a statement.\u201d\nWe agree. Although defendant\u2019s motion limited itself to the allegation that his statements were elicited by mental coercion, promises, or threats, more than the testimony given by Detective Glover was necessary to determine whether the statement was voluntary. Glover\u2019s testimony was nothing more than a testimonial denial of defendant\u2019s motion. Prima facie evidence is defined as a quantum of evidence sufficient to satisfy the burden of production concerning a basic fact that allows an inference of a presumed fact. People v. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d 53, 75 (1995). The simple denial of defendant\u2019s allegations, with very little more, simply is not sufficient to satisfy the burden of proof such that the court can infer that the statements were given voluntarily. The interview with Glover took approximately 21 2/2 hours; the State provided almost no evidence of what occurred during that period, let alone what occurred prior to Glover\u2019s interview. This paucity of evidence fails to sustain the State\u2019s burden of establishing a prima facie case. The trial court did not err in granting the motion to suppress statements and is affirmed.\nFor these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nGEIGER and RAPR JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE McLAREN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Paul A. Logli, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (John X. Breslin and Gary F. Gnidovec, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.",
      "G. Joseph Weller and Linda A. Johnson, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROBERTO ESCALANTE, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201498\u20140592\nOpinion filed January 19, 2000.\nPaul A. Logli, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (John X. Breslin and Gary F. Gnidovec, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nG. Joseph Weller and Linda A. Johnson, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0994-01",
  "first_page_order": 1014,
  "last_page_order": 1016
}