{ "id": 2711181, "name": "Roy S. Dunlop, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Crane G. McAtee, d/b/a Crane M. Construction Company and d/b/a McAtee Design & Construction, et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Dunlop v. McAtee", "decision_date": "1975-08-12", "docket_number": "No. 74-197", "first_page": "56", "last_page": "61", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "31 Ill. App. 3d 56" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "253 Ill.App. 536", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5542893 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/253/0536-01" ] }, { "cite": "2 Gilm. 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Gilm.", "case_ids": [ 2558496 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/7/0371-01" ] }, { "cite": "36 Ill. 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5215089 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/36/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 Ill. 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 821776 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/77/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "124 N.E.2d 85", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "4 Ill.App.2d 319", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5131077 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/4/0319-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 N.E. 640", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1955, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 Ill. 522", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5231146 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "526" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/336/0522-01" ] }, { "cite": "43 N.E.2d 535", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "380 Ill. 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2553447 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "95" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/380/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 N.E. 563", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1942, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 Ill. 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4937600 ], "year": 1942, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/286/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 N.E. 1068", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1918, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "251 Ill. 135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3434034 ], "year": 1918, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/251/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "124 N.E. 306", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 Ill. 589", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4958724 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "594" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/288/0589-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 N.E. 181", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1919, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 Ill. 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3378485 ], "year": 1919, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/233/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "43 N.E. 1084", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1908, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 Ill. 358", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3124715 ], "year": 1908, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "363" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/161/0358-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 N.E. 275", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1896, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 Ill. 72", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5404687 ], "year": 1896, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/126/0072-01" ] }, { "cite": "236 N.E.2d 425", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ill.App.2d 43", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2477945 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/94/0043-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 Ill. 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2704212 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/74/0354-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 582, "char_count": 10529, "ocr_confidence": 0.728, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.9795885418743105e-07, "percentile": 0.8509233549909666 }, "sha256": "6851dba09dab8ccf7359a95ba4fe5e004d0195524abe42f7ac6b5674d0d024d1", "simhash": "1:2dca1404a564f5b6", "word_count": 1765 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:34:56.206419+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Roy S. Dunlop, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Crane G. McAtee, d/b/a Crane M. Construction Company and d/b/a McAtee Design & Construction, et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE HALLETT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe instant action was brought to foreclose a mechanics\u2019 lien claim for a $1,825.38 balance due for heating and plumbing materials and services furnished by the plaintiff as a subcontractor. On the defendants\u2019 motion, the trial court held (1) that a \u201cno lien\u201d provision in the basic agreement between the owners and the contractor, filed with the recorder of deeds under the statute, barred any mechanics\u2019 lien; and (2) that Crane G. McAtee signed the acceptance of plaintiff\u2019s proposal as agent for Crane M. Construction Co., and not individually. As a result, the trial court gave the plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint at law against the corporate contractor; dismissed the complaint to foreclose the mechanics\u2019 lien claim; dismissed Crane G. McAtee, president of said contractor, as an individual defendant; and found no just cause to delay enforcement or appeal.\nOn appeal, the plaintiff contends (1) that the said provision barring liens, although filed with the recorder as provided by statute, was not legally effective to bar them because beneficiaries under an Illinois land trust are, as a matter of law, not \u201cowners\u201d within the meaning of our mechanics\u2019 lien statute; and (2) that the contract between him as subcontractor and the contractor was so executed as to make both the corporation and its president individually liable thereon as a matter of law. We disagree on both points and affirm.\nIn May of 1969 the defendant Batavia Bank, as trustee of its land trust No. 198, took title to the property here involved. The beneficiaries were the defendant Crane M. McAtee and his wife and Maurice P. Raizes, who were jointly given the complete management and control of the property. In July of 1971, Raizes, as agent for said beneficiaries, entered into a written agreement with the Crane M. Construction Co., an Illinois corporation, of which Crane M. McAtee was president, under which Crane, as contractor, undertook to do certain construction work on the premises here involved, which were therein legally described. This agreement expressly provided that no liens or claims could be filed by said contractor or any subcontractors, and the document was duly .filed with the county recorder of Kane County on July 23, 1971, under the provisions of the Illinois Mechanics\u2019 Lien Act (HI. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 82, \u00a7 21), which provides that such a provision, if so recorded, is effective and bars such.liens.\nOn November 16, 1971, the plaintiffs proposal for furnishing heating and plumbing materials for the property was accepted, the acceptance being worded as follows:\n\u201cCrane M. Construction Co., by C. G. McAtee.\u201d\nOn that same day the plaintiff signed and delivered a waiver of lien for materials in which he recited that he \u201chad been employed by Crane M. Construction Co.\u201d to furnish plumbing and heating material and labor for said premises. On December 8, 1971, the corporate style of the contractor was officially changed to McAtee Design and Construction Co. and the plaintiff, in March of 1972, executed and delivered further ..waivers of lien in which he stated that his contract was with that company.\nOn November 7, 1972, the plaintiff filed a complaint to foreclose a mechanics\u2019 lien, alleging that he had, as subcontractor, furnished materials and labor on the premises totaling $11,975.38 and had been paid only $10,150, leaving a balance due of $1,825.38, for which he claimed a hen. He made McAtee, the bank, the present owners of the premises and the local savings and loan, which holds a mortgage, defendants.\nOn the defendants\u2019 motion, the trial court made the findings and took the actions set out in the first paragraph of this opinion.\nThe plaintiff s first contention is that the agreement between the beneficiaries and the corporate contractor Crane M. Construction Co., express!)7 barring liens, although duly filed with the county recorder as provided for in the Mechanics\u2019 Lien Act, was not here legally effective to- bar- liens because ben\u00e9ficiaries under -an Illinois land trust are not \u201cowners\u201d within the meaning of said Act.\nPlaintiff cites Taylor v. Gilsdorff (1874), 74 Ill. 354, and Levine v. Pascal (1968), 94 Ill.App.2d 43, 236 N.E.2d 425, for this contention. Although the dissent in Taylor in some ways reflects the plaintiffs position, the majority, at page 357, expressly holds that Frank Taylor, as one of the beneficiaries, was \u201can owner, within the meaning of the statute.\u201d And Levine had nothing whatsoever to do with the Mechanics\u2019 Lien Act and involved only security interests under the Uniform Commercial Code.\n\"The Illinois courts have repeatedly and consistently held that a holder of an equitable interest in the land, including a beneficiary under a land trust, is an \u201cowner\u201d within the meaning of the Illinois Mechanics\u2019 Lien Act, and we again so hold. Paulsen v. Manske (1888), 126 Ill. 72, 75, 18 N.E. 275; Springer v. Kroeschell (1896), 161 Ill. 358, 363, 43 N.E. 1084; Sorg v. Crandall (1908), 233 Ill. 79, 84, 84 N.E. 181; Hacken v. Isenberg (1919), 288 Ill. 589, 594, 124 N.E. 306.\n-In passing it should be noted that, even were we to hold that such a beneficiary is not an \u201cowner,\u201d the plaintiff\u2019s claim here would still fail because it is likewise well established under Illinois law that the lien of a subcontractor can only exist by virtue of a contract between a contractor and an \u201cowner.\u201d (Kelly v. Johnson (1911), 251 Ill. 135, 95 N.E. 1068; North Side Sash & Door Co. v. Goldstein (1918), 286 Ill. 209, 121 N.E. 563; Douglas Lumber Co. v. Chicago Home for Incurables (1942), 380 Ill. 87, 95, 43 N.E.2d 535.) In North Side Sash and Door, the court, at page 211, pointed out that:\n\u201cThe lien of a sub-contractor can only exist by virtue of the original contract, and in case such contract provides that there shall be no lien upon the premises improved for labor performed or material furnished, a sub-contractor is not entitled to any lien.\u201d\nIt is here undisputed that the memorandum of agreement between the owner and contractor was duly recorded pursuant to the provisions of \u00a7 21. We therefore hold that the trial court properly ruled that the plaintiff had no mechanics\u2019 lien upon which to base a foreclosure action. It should also be noted, in passing, that the plaintiff, in seeking to enforce a mechanics\u2019 fien, is attempting to collect from subsequent purchasers and a mortgagor with whom he had not dealings whatsoever.\nThis brings us to the plaintiffs second contention \u2014 that the contract between him as subcontractor and the contractor was so executed as to make both the corporation and its president individually liable thereon as a matter of law.\nIn 3 Am. Jur.2d Agency \u00a7 190, at 573-74 (1962), it is said that:\n\u201cA signing by which the name of the'principal appears \u2018by\u2019 of per\u2019 the agent is uniformly regarded as a proper method of Executing the agency so as to impose liab\u00fcity upon the principal and, conversely, no personal liability upon the agent.\u201d\nIn Restatement (Second) of Agency \u00a7 156, at 372 (1958), it is said in comment:\n\u201cIn the absence of a contrary manifestation in the document, the following signatures and descriptions, among others, create an inference that the principal and not the agent is a party: the principal\u2019s name followed by the agent\u2019s name preceded by a preposition such as Try\u2019 or per\u2019; the principal\u2019s name foHowed by the agent\u2019s name with the word \u2018agent\u2019 added; the agent\u2019s name foHowed by the principal\u2019s name, the two names being separated by a pirrase such as \u2018agent of,\u2019 \u2018agent for,\u2019 on behalf of,\u2019 \u2018for,\u2019 or \u2018as agent of.\u2019 \u201d\nIllinois foHows this view and holds that where an agent discloses the name of his principal or where the party deahng with the' agent knows that the agent is acting as an agent, the agent is not personaUy Hable on the contract unless he so agrees. (Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. De Lasaux (1929), 336 Ill. 522, 168 N.E. 640; Petrando v. Barry (1955), 4 Ill.App.2d 319, 124 N.E.2d 85.) In the latter case, the court, at page 322, said:\n\u201cThe rule is clearly stated in Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. De Lasaux, 336 Ill. 522, 526. It is there said:\n\u2018Where an agent in making a contract discloses his agEncy and the name of his principal, or where the party deahng with the agent knows that the agent is acting as an agent in making the contract, the agent is not Hable on the contract unless he agrees to become personally liable. (Millikin v. Jones, 77 Ill. 372; Wheeler v. Reed, 36 Ill. 81; Chase v. Debolt, 2 Gilm. 371.)\u2019\u201d\nThe plaintiff here relies entirely upon Herman v. Metropolitan Petroleum Co. (1929), 253 Ill.App. 536, which held that the word \u201cby,\u201d following the principal\u2019s name, rendered both liable. Not only is that case distinguished by the facts (1) that it involved a negotiable instrument, not a simple contract, and (2) said \u201cwe,\u201d but even on its limited facts it has been superseded by section 3 \u2014 403 of the Uniform Commercial Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 26, \u00a7 3 \u2014 403). The IHinois Code Comment notes as follows:\n\u201cThis paragraph [(2)(b)] changes IHinois law in cases where the name of the principal appears on the instrument, but the agent\u2019s signature does not indicate his representative capacity. In Herman v. Metropolitan Petroleum Co., 253 Ill.App. 536 (1st Dist. 1929), an action, between the immediate parties, the 'cdurt held that evidence of an individual defendant that he signed the instrument as . secretary of the corporate defendant was properly excluded by the trial court.\u201d Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 26, \u00a7 3 \u2014 403, Illinois Code Comment, at 222 (Smith-Hurd 1963).\n: Furthermore, the waivers executed by the plaintiff clearly demonstrate that plaintiff knew he was dealing with Crane M. Construction Co. and that C. G. McAtee was merely its agent. Significantly the first waiver of lien was executed by plaintiff on the same date the proposal was signed by McAtee.\nWe therefore conclude that the plaintiffs second contention is without merit, and that the trial court correctly dismissed Crane G. McAtee as a party defendant.\nWe therefore affirm the order.\nAffirmed.\nSEIDENFELD, P. J., and GUILD, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE HALLETT" } ], "attorneys": [ "Alvin L; Catella, of Konstans & Catella, of St. Charles, for appellant.", "Robert A. Sternberg, of Cohon, Raizes & Regal, of Chicago, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Roy S. Dunlop, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Crane G. McAtee, d/b/a Crane M. Construction Company and d/b/a McAtee Design & Construction, et al., Defendants-Appellees.\n(No. 74-197;\nSecond District (1st Division)\nAugust 12, 1975.\nAlvin L; Catella, of Konstans & Catella, of St. Charles, for appellant.\nRobert A. Sternberg, of Cohon, Raizes & Regal, of Chicago, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0056-01", "first_page_order": 80, "last_page_order": 85 }