{ "id": 415345, "name": "A.R., by Her Mother and Legal Guardian, M.R., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CHICAGO BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant-Appellee (Laidlaw Transit, Inc., Defendant)", "name_abbreviation": "A.R. v. Chicago Board of Education", "decision_date": "1999-12-27", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201498\u20142087", "first_page": "29", "last_page": "38", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "311 Ill. App. 3d 29" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777563 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "104-05" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "251 Ill. App. 3d 859", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1336077 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "915" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/306/0912-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 Ill. App. 3d 735", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1208124 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding School Code does not defeat immunity conferred upon public entities under the Tort Immunity Act" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/305/0735-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 Ill. 2d 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 243891 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/186/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 Ill. App. 3d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1208065 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/305/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 Ill. 2d 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 57332 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "390" }, { "page": "389" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/171/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "281 Ill. App. 3d 347", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 150181 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "357" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/281/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 Ill. 2d 374", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 783173 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389-90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/161/0374-01" ] }, { "cite": "697 N.E.2d 802", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 Ill. App. 3d 945", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 910187 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "954" }, { "page": "955" }, { "page": "955-56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/297/0945-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 Ill. App. 3d 982", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 221516 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "988" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/299/0982-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 Ill. 2d 267", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 783184 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "275-76" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/161/0267-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 Ill. App. 3d 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1156805 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "269" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/278/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 Ill. App. 3d 923", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5195725 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "section 4 - 102 barred recovery against housing authority for failure to provide adequate police services so as to prevent shooting of visitor in lobby of housing project" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/233/0923-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 Ill. App. 3d 628", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1156905 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "section 4 - 102 barred recovery against board of education for failure to operate metal detectors to prevent one student from shooting another student" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/278/0628-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 Ill. App. 3d 1024", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 906792 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "section 4 - 102 barred recovery against board of education for failure to prevent assault of one student upon another" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/275/1024-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 2d 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5576867 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/138/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 Ill. App. 3d 682", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 351180 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "686" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/289/0682-01" ] }, { "cite": "281 Ill. App. 3d 368", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 150153 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/281/0368-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 Ill. 2d 391", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 223617 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "399" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/174/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 Ill. App. 3d 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1260402 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "192" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/284/0190-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 Ill. 2d 370", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 385561 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "383" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/178/0370-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 812, "char_count": 18822, "ocr_confidence": 0.764, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.470658490888361e-08, "percentile": 0.5177332732526104 }, "sha256": "2fa06d6ba521a7447b6d0546618e698566bc34efec46ba54fe2e6ec1b7f3c207", "simhash": "1:ba501b5e0665446d", "word_count": 3041 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:30:26.081874+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "A.R., by Her Mother and Legal Guardian, M.R., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CHICAGO BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant-Appellee (Laidlaw Transit, Inc., Defendant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE TULLY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn December 29, 1997, plaintiffs, A.R., and her mother and legal guardian, M.R., filed an amended complaint against defendants, Laid-law Transit, Inc., and the Chicago Board of Education (Board), seeking compensation for injuries sustained by A.R. as the result of an alleged sexual assault by another student while on the school bus. Count I of the complaint sought recovery against Laidlaw for negligence. Counts II and III sought recovery against the Board for negligence and willful and wanton misconduct, respectively, for failing to prevent or intercede in the assault on A.R. The Board moved to dismiss counts II and III of plaintiffs\u2019 complaint pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619(a) (West 1996). The circuit court granted defendant\u2019s motion, holding that section 4 \u2014 102 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act or Act) (745 ILCS 10/4 \u2014 102 (West 1996)) barred plaintiffs\u2019 claims of negligence and willful and wanton misconduct. The circuit court additionally found section 34 \u2014 84a of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/34 \u2014 84a (West 1996)) barred plaintiffs\u2019 negligence claim. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)), the court entered a finding of no just reason to delay the enforcement or appeal of the order. From this dismissal, plaintiffs appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 complaint contained the following factual allegations. A.R. is a developmentally disabled female student who suffers from Down\u2019s Syndrome. In 1996, A.R. was enrolled in the Ray Graham Training Center (the Center), an educational facility for the developmentally disabled that was owned and operated by the Chicago Board of Education. At the time of her enrollment, bus transportation to and from the Center was provided by Laidlaw pursuant to a contract with the Board. An attendant named Homer Williams (Williams) was employed by the Board to accompany students during transport on the bus.\nOn July 1, 1996, A.R. was allegedly sodomized by a male student on the bus while being transported from the Center to her residence. At the time of the incident, Williams was present on the bus, but he allegedly failed to prevent or intercede in the assault upon A.R. Plaintiffs\u2019 complaint asserted that the Board, through its agent Williams, had a duty to ensure the safety of the students on the bus and negligently performed that duty when it failed to prevent or intervene in the assault on A.R. Plaintiffs\u2019 complaint also alleged the Board was guilty of willful and wanton misconduct by failing to prevent or intervene in the assault of A.R. when the Board had knowledge the male passengers on the bus were likely to commit sexual assaults on female passengers. Plaintiffs\u2019 complaint contained no specific facts to support the allegation the Board had knowledge of a propensity by male passengers to commit sexual assaults.\nIn dismissing plaintiffs\u2019 claims, the court characterized plaintiffs\u2019 allegations of negligence and willful and wanton misconduct against the Board as claims predicated upon a failure to prevent one student from committing a crime against another. The court therefore concluded section 4 \u2014 102 of the Tort Immunity Act was applicable and barred plaintiffs\u2019 claims of negligence and willful and wanton misconduct by disallowing recovery for failure to prevent a crime by a third party.\nSimilarly, applying section 34 \u2014 84a of the School Code to plaintiffs\u2019 negligence claim, the court determined that while section 34 \u2014 84a placed an affirmative duty upon the Board to maintain discipline among the students, that section served to immunize the Board from claims of ordinary negligence in the exercise of discipline.\nReview of a trial court\u2019s order of involuntary dismissal based upon an affirmative defense is de novo. Epstein v. Chicago Board of Education, 178 Ill. 2d 370, 383 (1997). When reviewing the propriety of an involuntary dismissal, a reviewing court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Corluka v. Bridgford Foods of Illinois, Inc. 284 Ill. App. 3d 190, 192 (1996). However, an order of dismissal may be affirmed on any grounds that are called for by the record, regardless of whether the circuit court relied on those grounds or the circuit court\u2019s reasoning was correct. Wright v. City of Danville, 174 Ill. 2d 391, 399 (1996). Where facts are not at issue, the question on appeal following involuntary dismissal of claims barred by affirmative matter is whether dismissal was proper as a matter of law. Garcia v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 281 Ill. App. 3d 368, 371 (1996).\nWe first examine whether the dismissal of plaintiffs\u2019 negligence claim was proper under section 4 \u2014 102 of the Tort Immunity Act. Section 4 \u2014 102 provides, in pertinent part:\n\u201cNeither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for failure to establish a police department or otherwise provide police protection service or, if police protection service is provided, for failure to provide adequate police protection or service, failure to prevent the commission of crimes, failure to detect or solve crimes, and failure to identify and apprehend criminals.\u201d 745 ILCS 10/4\u2014 102 (West 1996).\nPlaintiffs maintain the Board was not entitled to immunity under section 4 \u2014 102 because the immunity conferred therein applies only where a public entity is sworn and charged with the duty of law enforcement. As evidence of this, plaintiffs point to the wording of article TV\u2019s title as \u201cPolice and Correctional Activities.\u201d\nWe do not believe the titling of article IV as \u201cPolice and Correctional Activities\u201d demonstrates a legislative intent to limit application of section 4 \u2014 102 to public entities strictly charged with law enforcement duties. In conjunction with section 4 \u2014 102, section 1 \u2014 206 of the Act defines the term \u201clocal public entity\u201d so as to specifically encompass school boards in its definition. 745 ILCS 10/2 \u2014 106 (West 1996). It is a basic tenet of statutory construction that, where a statute defines its own terms, those terms should be considered according to the statutory definitions provided. Holland v. City of Chicago, 289 Ill. App. 3d 682, 686 (1997). Moreover, when construing immunities under the Tort Immunity Act, a court must view the statute as a whole, with all relevant parts considered together. Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189 (1990).\nApplying these principles, it is clear section 4 \u2014 102 was intended to provide immunity not only to entities formally sworn to a duty of law enforcement, but to all public entities as defined within the confines of the Act. This interpretation of section 4 \u2014 102 is in accordance with prior decisions of this court applying section 4 \u2014 102. See Towner v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 275 Ill. App. 3d 1024 (1995) (section 4 \u2014 102 barred recovery against board of education for failure to prevent assault of one student upon another); Lawson v. City of Chicago, 278 Ill. App. 3d 628, (1996) (section 4 \u2014 102 barred recovery against board of education for failure to operate metal detectors to prevent one student from shooting another student); Hill v. Chicago Housing Authority, 233 Ill. App. 3d 923 (1992) (section 4 \u2014 102 barred recovery against housing authority for failure to provide adequate police services so as to prevent shooting of visitor in lobby of housing project).\nEven construing plaintiffs\u2019 claims in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, it is apparent plaintiffs sought to impose liability on defendant for failure to provide police services so as to prevent an assault upon A.R. Under the plain language of section 4 \u2014 102, defendant was immunized from liability for negligence on this claim. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court\u2019s dismissal of count II sounding in negligence.\nWe next examine whether dismissal of plaintiffs\u2019 claim alleging willful and wanton misconduct in count III was also barred by section 4 \u2014 102. A claim of willful and wanton misconduct must demonstrate either an actual intention to harm or a reckless disregard for the safety of others, such as a failure to exercise ordinary care to prevent harm after knowledge of impending danger, or a failure to discover the danger when it could have been discovered by exercise of ordinary care. See Pomaro v. Community Consolidated School District 21, 278 Ill. App. 3d 266, 269 (1995), citing Ziarko v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 161 Ill. 2d 267, 275-76 (1994). Plaintiffs\u2019 complaint alleged the Board had knowledge male students were likely to commit sexual assaults on female passengers, but failed to support this allegation with any specific facts from which knowledge or propensity could be inferred. Although a reviewing court must take all well-pled allegations as true when reviewing a dismissal under section 2 \u2014 619, it does not have to accept conclusions of fact that are unsupported by specific facts. Golden v. McDermott, Will & Emery, 299 Ill. App. 3d 982, 988 (1998). Plaintiffs\u2019 complaint failed to set forth specific facts supporting a claim of willful and wanton misconduct. However, even in the absence of this factual insufficiency, dismissal of count III was mandated under section 4 \u2014 102.\nPlaintiffs cite to Cadena v. Chicago Fireworks Manufacturing Co., 297 Ill. App. 3d 945, 697 N.E.2d 802 (1998), as recognizing a general exception to immunity under section 4 \u2014 102 for willful and wanton misconduct. Plaintiffs misconstrue the holding of that case.\nIn Cadena, plaintiffs, who were spectators at a public fireworks display, alleged they were injured as a result of the city\u2019s failure to provide adequate police services in the form of crowd control. The court held plaintiffs\u2019 claim was barred by section 4 \u2014 102. Cadena, 297 Ill. App. 3d at 954. However, the court distinguished plaintiffs\u2019 claim predicated upon the city\u2019s failure to provide adequate crowd control from a claim alleging police affirmatively directed spectators to unsafe areas. Cadena, 297 Ill. App. 3d at 955. The court reasoned that section 4 \u2014 102 would not immunize the city from claims predicated upon willful and wanton misconduct in the actual execution and enforcement of the law, such claims being permitted under section 2 \u2014 202 of the Tort Immunity Act. Cadena, 297 Ill. App. 3d at 955-56.\nIn reaching this determination, the court relied upon our supreme court\u2019s decision in Doe v. Calumet City, 161 Ill. 2d 374 (1994), holding that section 4 \u2014 102 did not bar recovery against the city where plaintiffs alleged police officers willfully and wantonly failed to secure a crime scene while an assailant committed a sexual assault. The Cadena court also relied upon Fatigato v. Village of Olympia Fields, 281 Ill. App. 3d 347 (1996), where the court held section 4 \u2014 102 did not bar plaintiffs from recovering against the village where plaintiffs alleged police officers acted willfully and wantonly in directing an intoxicated person to drive an automobile. In both cases, the courts found the conduct at issue fell within the exception to immunity under section 2 \u2014 202. Doe, 161 Ill. 2d at 389-90; Fatigato, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 357.\nCadena merely reiterates the principle, as pronounced in Doe and Fatigato, that section 4 \u2014 102 does not bar claims premised upon a public entity\u2019s willful and wanton misconduct in the actual execution and enforcement of the law; such claims falling within the exception to immunity under section 2 \u2014 202. This holding is fundamentally different from plaintiffs\u2019 proposition that section 4 \u2014 102 allows for a general exception to immunity for willful and wanton misconduct where a public entity fails to provide any or adequate police services.\nWe note, however, that section 2 \u2014 202 is inapplicable to the present action. Immunity under section 2 \u2014 202 applies only where a public entity is actually engaged in execution or enforcement of the law. Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 390 (1996). Unlike the police conduct at issue in Doe and Fatigato, the Board\u2019s conduct here did not encompass execution and enforcement of the law. In this case, section 34 \u2014 84a of the School Code placed an affirmative duty upon the Board, through its agent Williams, to maintain discipline among the students, providing:\n\u201cA public employee is not liable for his act or omission in the execution or enforcement of any law unless such act or omission constitutes willful and wanton conduct.\u201d 745 ILCS 10/2 \u2014 202 (West 1996).\n\u201c[Tjeachers, other certificated educational employees, and any other person, whether or not a certificated employee, providing a related service for or with respect to a student shall maintain discipline in the schools, including school grounds which are owned or leased by the board and used for school purposes and activities. In all matters relating to discipline in and conduct of the schools and the school children, they stand in relation of parents and guardians to the pupils.\u201d 105 ILCS 5/34 \u2014 84a (West 1996).\nHowever, while section 34 \u2014 84a posits a duty of enforcement in educators, it is not a law enforced or executed in the sense contemplated by section 2 \u2014 202. Grandalski v. Lyons Township High School District 204, 305 Ill. App. 3d 1, 7 (1999). Moreover, while section 34 \u2014 84a does not bar an action for willful and wanton misconduct, neither does it defeat immunity for willful and wanton misconduct separately conferred upon public entities under the Tort Immunity Act. See Henrich v. Libertyville High School, 186 Ill. 2d 381 (1998); D.M. v. National School Bus Service, Inc., 305 Ill. App. 3d 735 (1999) (holding School Code does not defeat immunity conferred upon public entities under the Tort Immunity Act).\nWe similarly reject plaintiffs\u2019 contention that a recent amendment to section 3 \u2014 108(a) demonstrates a legislative intent to comprehensively limit immunity under the Act to instances of ordinary negligence. 745 ILCS 10/3 \u2014 108(a) (West 1996). Prior to amendment, section 3 \u2014 108(a) of the Act provided:\n\u201c(a) Except as otherwise provided by this Act *** neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury caused by a failure to supervise an activity on or the use of any public property.\u201d 745 ILCS 10/3 \u2014 108(a) (West 1996).\nIn 1998, the legislature amended this section to expressly narrow the scope of immunity to exclude willful and wanton misconduct. Pub. Act 90 \u2014 805, eff. December 2, 1998 (amending 745 ILCS 10/3 \u2014 108 (West 1996)). However, at the time the legislature amended section 3 \u2014 108, it also amended section 1 \u2014 210 of the Act, which defines the term \u201cwillful and wanton misconduct.\u201d 745 ILCS 10/1 \u2014 210 (West 1996). That amendment now states: \u201cThis definition shall apply in any case where a \u2018willful and wanton\u2019 exception is incorporated into any immunity under this Act.\u201d Pub. Act 90 \u2014 805, eff. December 2, 1998 (amending 745 ILCS 10/1 \u2014 210 (West 1996)). The amendment serves to verify that only the explicit language of the Tort Immunity Act can exclude willful and wanton conduct from its coverage. National School Bus Service, Inc., 305 Ill. App. 3d at 742.\nOur supreme court cautions courts not to depart from the plain language of the Tort Immunity Act by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict with express legislative intent. Barnett, 171 Ill. 2d at 389. The language of section 4 \u2014 102 includes no exception to immunity for willful and wanton misconduct. In the absence of an express exception, it can only be concluded the legislature intended section 4 \u2014 102 to provide unqualified immunity to local public entities for both negligent and willful and wanton misconduct. Hernandez v. Kirksey, 306 Ill. App. 3d 912, 915 (1999), citing In re Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179, 195-96 (1997); Platacis v. Village of Streamwood, 224 Ill. App. 3d 336, 340 (1991). Accordingly, we find plaintiffs\u2019 claim of willful and wanton misconduct was barred by section 4 \u2014 102.\nFinally, we address whether dismissal of count II of plaintiffs\u2019 complaint for negligence was also mandated under section 34 \u2014 84a of the School Code. Section 34 \u2014 84a has been interpreted as conferring upon educators the same immunity parents enjoy in relation to their children. Kobylanski v. Chicago Board of Education, 63 Ill. 2d 165, 170 (1976); Stiff v. Eastern Illinois Area of Special Education, 251 Ill. App. 3d 859, 862 (1993). However, parental immunity, and hence the immunity of educators under the statute, is limited to negligence in conduct inherent to the parent-child relationship, i.e., conduct that concerns discretion in the discipline, supervision, and care of children. Cates v. Cates, 156 Ill. 2d 76, 104-05 (1993); Stiff, 251 Ill. App. 3d at 863. Thus, parents can be held liable to their children for negligence in operating a motor vehicle because that conduct is not inherent to the parent-child relationship. Cates, 156 Ill. 2d 76.\nApplying this principle to the present action, plaintiffs maintain section 34 \u2014 84a does not confer immunity for negligence upon defendant because defendant\u2019s conduct involved the operation of a motor vehicle. However, plaintiffs\u2019 argument is belied by their own allegation that defendant\u2019s negligence arose from breach of its duty to maintain discipline among the students. The mere fact that defendant\u2019s disciplinary omissions took place on a school bus does not transform defendant\u2019s conduct into conduct involving operation of a motor vehicle. Under section 34 \u2014 84a, educators that stand in relation of parent to child cannot be subject to negligence liability where the conduct constitutes the exercise of authority and supervision over a child or the exercise of discretion in the provision of care to a child. Stiff, 251 Ill. App. 3d at 863. The conduct complained of in the present action clearly falls within the ambit of disciplinary conduct contemplated under section 34 \u2014 84a. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court\u2019s dismissal of count II on the basis section 34 \u2014 84a also conferred immunity upon defendant.\nAffirmed.\nRAKOWSKI and GALLAGHER, JJ., concur.\nSection 2 \u2014 202 of the Tort Immunity Act provides:", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE TULLY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Philip J. McGuire, of Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, L.L.E, of Chicago, for appellant.", "John Patton, Todd Bresney, and David Edsey, all of Rusin Patton Maciorowski & Friedman, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "A.R., by Her Mother and Legal Guardian, M.R., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CHICAGO BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant-Appellee (Laidlaw Transit, Inc., Defendant).\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1\u201498\u20142087\nOpinion filed December 27, 1999.\nPhilip J. McGuire, of Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, L.L.E, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJohn Patton, Todd Bresney, and David Edsey, all of Rusin Patton Maciorowski & Friedman, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0029-01", "first_page_order": 47, "last_page_order": 56 }