{ "id": 415311, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DAMEN WILLIAMSON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Williamson", "decision_date": "1999-12-30", "docket_number": "No. 1 \u2014 98\u20142415", "first_page": "54", "last_page": "61", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "311 Ill. App. 3d 54" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "188 Ill. 2d 91", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 536114 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/188/0091-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3138930 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 Ill. App. 3d 587", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1352904 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "591" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/302/0587-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 289", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2982988 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309-10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0289-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 Ill. App. 2d 479", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1601080 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "482" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/104/0479-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 Ill. 2d 443", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5812219 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "448-49" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/67/0443-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 Ill. 250", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5245843 ], "year": 1930, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/340/0250-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 Ill. 2d 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2765380 ], "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/15/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 Ill. 2d 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5390219 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/51/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 Ill. App. 3d 454", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 910232 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/297/0454-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 Ill. App. 3d 960", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1156780 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/278/0960-01" ] }, { "cite": "43 Ill. 2d 256", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2843220 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/43/0256-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 Ill. App. 3d 968", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5370281 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/263/0968-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 Ill. App. 3d 72", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5109628 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "78-81", "parenthetical": "jury waiver cannot be inferred from silence of defendant or his attorney when case is called for trial" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/243/0072-01" ] }, { "cite": "246 Ill. App. 3d 548", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5387346 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549", "parenthetical": "vague references to a bench trial at rescheduling conferences insufficient to constitute valid jury waiver, particularly where \"record is devoid of evidence suggesting that the defendant was ever apprised of his right to a jury trial\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/246/0548-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 Ill. App. 3d 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5368598 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "351-52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/263/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 Ill. App. 3d 38", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 456119 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "43", "parenthetical": "\"where nothing is stated in defendant's presence to suggest that defendant has an option between a bench trial and a jury trial, we cannot deem defendant to have acquiesced knowingly in his counsel's participation in a bench trial\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/291/0038-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 Ill. App. 3d 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1208097 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "40" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/305/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 Ill. App. 3d 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 456096 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "20", "parenthetical": "where record is sufficiently complete jury waiver will not be found on basis of silent record" }, { "page": "21", "parenthetical": "reversal warranted where, in the absence of a written jury waiver, there \"is no express indication that the defendant was ever given a choice of a bench or a jury trial\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/291/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3152474 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332-33" }, { "page": "333" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 Ill. 2d 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 243894 ], "weight": 11, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "284-85" }, { "page": "285" }, { "page": "290", "parenthetical": "Freeman, C.J., dissenting" }, { "page": "284" }, { "page": "285" }, { "page": "285" }, { "page": "286" }, { "page": "285" }, { "page": "285" }, { "page": "285", "parenthetical": "distinguishingFrey" }, { "page": "288", "parenthetical": "Bilandic, J., concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/186/0283-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3138824 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334" }, { "page": "336-37" }, { "page": "334" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 Ill. 2d 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "468" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 Ill. App. 3d 972", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 150162 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "976", "parenthetical": "and cases cited therein" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/281/0972-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 Ill. 2d 51", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 483552 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/165/0051-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 777, "char_count": 19047, "ocr_confidence": 0.76, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.799145746402331e-08, "percentile": 0.4963042246864586 }, "sha256": "20ce2b673b49d11b6d1da46d407b3c1b46fa97377f052a209e98cd7b02ce6e6e", "simhash": "1:9fb9500e3a4b8df2", "word_count": 3220 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:30:26.081874+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DAMEN WILLIAMSON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE RAKOWSKI\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial in which he was simultaneously tried with codefendants Raygene Jackson and John Warship, defendant Damen Williamson was convicted of the murder of Isaac Jackson and sentenced to 30 years in prison. He was also convicted of the attempted murder of Bernice Lovett and sentenced to six years in prison, sentences to be served consecutively. Codefendant Jackson\u2019s convictions were reversed and the cause was remanded to the circuit court for a new trial because he did not understandingly waive his right to a jury trial. People v. Jackson, No. 1 \u2014 98\u20141795 (1999) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).\nOn appeal, defendant contends (1) that he did not waive his right to a jury trial; (2) that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of any offense for which he was convicted; and (3) that the trial court improperly imposed consecutive sentences. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that defendant did not validly waive his right to a jury trial and therefore reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand this matter for a new trial.\nFACTS\nWe first address defendant\u2019s contention that he did not waive his right to a jury trial. At the status hearing on March 1, 1996, the following colloquy occurred:\n\u201cTHE COURT: All right. You want to demand at this time?\nMR. BODE [codefendant Warship\u2019s attorney]: We\u2019re demanding trial.\nTHE COURT: All right, on Williamson.\nMR. BODE: Would like a trial date.\nMR. MANN [defendant\u2019s attorney]: I\u2019ll fill out the form in a minute, on my client as well, we\u2019ll demand but without waiving, to file the motions.\nTHE COURT: Are you indicating juries at this time or benches?\n^ $\nMR. MANN: We\u2019ll take a bench Judge.\u201d\nThe trial court and the attorneys continued to discuss scheduling matters. At the conclusion of the hearing the judge stated, \u201cDefendants are demanding trial, March 29th. Each one will be a bench.\u201d\nOn March 29, 1996, the assistant State\u2019s Attorney stated, \u201cBy agreement, 4 \u2014 26, status. That\u2019s for motions and bench.\u201d At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge stated, \u201cBy agreement, 4 \u2014 26 for bench trial.\u201d Apparently, defendant\u2019s attorney and codefendant Jackson\u2019s attorney were present at that time. Although defendant Warship was present, his attorney was not.\nOn April 26, 1996, the assistant State\u2019s Attorney indicated that the case was \u201cset for motions and bench trial\u201d on defendants Williamson and Jackson and for a bench trial on defendant Warship. However, because the court was engaged in an unrelated jury trial, the assistant State\u2019s Attorney spoke with the attorneys for defendants and they had agreed to postpone this case. The court responded, \u201cYou\u2019ve got one witness here. We will get it started today.\u201d The assistant State\u2019s Attorney then replied, \u201cWe can start the bench.\u201d The case was then passed until later that afternoon. When the case was recalled, defendant\u2019s attorney and codefendants\u2019 attorneys agreed to put the matter over until May 10, 1996. The court stated, \u201cBy agreement May 10 for bench trial.\u201d Defendant\u2019s attorney responded, \u201cBench trial and hearing on motions.\u201d\nOn May 10, 1996, defendant and codefendants Jackson and Warship were before the court when the following colloquy occurred:\n\u201cTHE COURT: Did you speak with your attorneys today?\nMR. JACKSON [codefendant]: No.\nTHE COURT: I know some of them were here.\nMR. CAWLEY [assistant State\u2019s Attorney]: All three counselors were here today. I was speaking with [assistant State\u2019s Attorney] Mr. Gaughn [sic]. They have agreed to June 5th, 1996.\nTHE COURT: Is that for motion, supposed to be up for a motion today, or bench?\nMR. CAWLEY: Bench.\nTHE COURT: Is that what you want to do gentlemen, June 5th for motion or bench?\n[DEFENDANT]: I ain\u2019t going through no motion.\nTHE COURT: You come back anyway that day. We\u2019U see what happens on the motion and we\u2019ll set your date after that.\nJune 5th, motion.\u201d\nOn June 5, 1996, the court and the assistant State\u2019s Attorney were engaged in an unrelated jury trial and were thus unable to proceed on this matter. Accordingly, the court, the assistant State\u2019s Attorney, and defendants\u2019 attorneys were discussing available dates- on which this matter could be addressed. The trial court inquired, \u201cYou are on the motion?\u201d Defendant\u2019s attorney replied, \u201cMotion and bench.\u201d At the conclusion of the discussion, the court stated, \u201cWilliamson and Jackson, by agreement, June 27th. All right. That is for motion and for a bench.\u201d On June 27, 1996, the case was called and defendant and codefendants Jackson and Warship were instructed to sit with their attorneys. The assistant State\u2019s Attorney then informed the court that defendant and codefendant Jackson would like the court to consider their motions to suppress statements simultaneous with trial. Witnesses were excluded from the courtroom, the attorneys who elected to give opening statements did so, and the first witness was then called.\nThe record on appeal does not contain a signed jury waiver, nor is there a notation in the \u201cMemorandum of Orders\u201d (half-sheet) that defendant waived a jury trial.\nANALYSIS\nInitially, the State contends that defendant has waived consideration of this issue because he failed to object to proceeding to trial without a jury and failed to raise the issue in his written posttrial motion. Although both an objection at trial and a written posttrial motion are required to preserve an issue for review (People v. Williams, 165 Ill. 2d 51, 60 (1995)), the court may review plain errors affecting substantial rights under Supreme Court Rule 615(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)) even if those errors were not brought before the trial court. Whether a defendant has validly waived his right to a jury trial involves a substantial right (People v. Stokes, 281 Ill. App. 3d 972, 976 (1996) (and cases cited therein)), and we therefore address the merits of defendant\u2019s claim.\nThe State contends that the defendant understandingly waived his right to a jury trial because defendant was present when a bench trial was discussed and because he did not object when his attorney indicated that he would proceed by way of a bench trial. Although the State does not point to a particular date on which defendant waived his right to a jury trial, it does rely on exchanges that occurred at various status hearings.\nPursuant to section 103 \u2014 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code), a bench trial may be held if the right to trial by jury is \u201cunderstandingly waived by defendant in open court.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 5/103 \u2014 6 (West 1998). In addition, section 115 \u2014 1 provides that \u201c[a]ll prosecutions except on a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill shall he tried hy the court and a jury unless the defendant waives a jury trial in writing.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 1 (West 1998). While the written waiver requirement \u201cshould be complied with by trial courts in every case, *** the failure to do so does not result in reversal so long as the defendant\u2019s waiver was made understandingly in accordance with section 103 \u2014 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\u201d (Emphasis added.) People v. Tooles, 111 Ill. 2d 462, 468 (1997), citing 725 ILCS 5/103 \u2014 6 (West 1992); People v. Smith, 106 Ill. 2d 327, 334 (1985). Accord People v. Scott, 186 Ill. 2d 283, 284-85 (1999). \u201cThus, a defendant validly waives his right to a jury trial only if [that waiver is] made (1) understandingly; and (2) in open court.\u201d Scott, 186 Ill. 2d at 285, citing 725 ILCS 5/103 \u2014 6 (West 1992). An accused typically speaks and acts through his attorney, and therefore a jury waiver is valid when \u201cmade by defense counsel in defendant\u2019s presence where defendant [gives] no indication of any objection to the court hearing the case.\u201d People v. Frey, 103 Ill. 2d 327, 332-33 (1984).\nNo written jury waiver has been included in the record on appeal nor does the half-sheet include a notation indicating that defendant waived a jury. In fact, the State concedes in its brief that \u201c[i]t is clear that because of the many trial dates, the motion and bench trial having been heard simultaneously, and the three-defendant trial, the court did not secure a formal jury waiver.\u201d Nonetheless, the State maintains that defendant waived his right to a jury trial because he was present at various hearings when a bench trial was mentioned and because he acquiesced in his attorney\u2019s indication that the case should be set for a bench trial.\nOur supreme court recently addressed the issue of jury waiver in People v. Scott, which we find to be instructive. In that case, the defendant, who had prior convictions (Scott, 186 Ill. 2d at 290 (Freeman, C.J., dissenting)), executed a written jury waiver in his attorney\u2019s office, which was later filed outside of the defendant\u2019s presence. On the day of trial and in the defendant\u2019s presence, the following colloquy occurred:\n\u201cMR WILLIAMS [defendant\u2019s counsel]: And we would proceed to the bench trial today.\nTHE COURT: Okay, Defendant files motion to dismiss. States Attorney given two weeks to file responsive pleading. Okay, we\u2019ll proceed to the bench trial, then?\n* *\nTHE COURT: Okay, appreciate that., [sic] okay. We will then proceed with the bench trial. Mr. Vaughan, you may proceed.\u201d Scott, 186 Ill. 2d at 284.\nThe court concluded that this exchange between the trial court and the defendant\u2019s attorney was insufficient to constitute an acknowledgment of the waiver in open court. Scott, 186 Ill. 2d at 285. In rejecting the State\u2019s contention that references on the day of trial to proceeding with a bench trial constituted an acknowledgment of the waiver in open court, our supreme court stated, \u201cWe have never found a valid jury waiver where the defendant was not present in open court when a jury waiver, written or otherwise, was at least discussed.\u201d Scott, 186 Ill. 2d at 285. The Scott court also noted that references to proceeding with a bench trial were not particularly significant because they arose in a dialogue between the trial court and defendant\u2019s attorney regarding a motion to dismiss. The Scott court determined that, in this context, defendant\u2019s attorney was \u201cmerely indicating that despite the pending motion to dismiss, defendant was ready to proceed.\u201d Scott, 186 Ill. 2d at 286.\nIn the instant case, at the status hearing on March 1, 1996, defendant\u2019s attorney apparently decided to demand trial because the State was unprepared to proceed with a hearing on a motion. The trial court inquired, \u201cAre you indicating juries at this time or benches?\u201d Defendant\u2019s attorney replied, \u201cbench.\u201d The trial court and the attorneys continued to discuss scheduling matters, and the trial court concluded by stating, \u201cDefendants are demanding trial, March 29th. Each one will be a bench.\u201d At each of the other dates on which the case was before the trial court, March 29, 1996, April 26, 1996, May 10, 1996, and June 5, 1996, either the assistant State\u2019s Attorney or the trial judge indicated that the case was set for bench trial, and on two of these occasions defendant\u2019s attorney so indicated. However, nothing was said at any of these pretrial hearings that would have indicated to defendant that he had a right to a jury trial or that his right to a jury trial was being waived. Likewise, on the day of trial, there was no discussion of defendant\u2019s right to trial by jury or waiver of that right. Neither defendant\u2019s attorney nor the trial court made any mention of whether the trial would be a jury trial or a bench trial. Rather, the trial court inquired whether the motion to suppress statements would be heard before trial or simultaneous with trial, and then proceeded directly to opening statements.\nWe conclude that these references to a bench trial are insufficient to constitute a \u201cdiscussion\u201d of jury waiver in open court. See Scott, 186 Ill. 2d at 285. The majority of references were made either by the assistant State\u2019s Attorney or the trial court. On one date defendant indicated that he did not want to go through a motion but otherwise remained silent. Defendant\u2019s attorney made only three references to a bench trial. The first reference occurred on March 1, 1996, when he apparently decided to demand trial because the State was unprepared to proceed with a hearing on a motion. Similar to the situation in Scott, in this context his statement did not constitute waiver of defendant\u2019s right to trial by jury but was merely an indication that despite the unresolved motion he would demand trial in an effort to avoid further delay. On April 26, 1996, the court stated that the case was continued by agreement to May 10 for bench trial. In replying, \u201c[blench trial and motions,\u201d defendant\u2019s attorney merely reminded the trial court that the motion to suppress had not yet been considered. Likewise, on June 5, 1996, when engaged in scheduling discussions, defendant\u2019s attorney clarified that the matter had to be set for \u201c[m]otion and bench\u201d not just for a hearing on the motion.\nMoreover, from the record on appeal, which is apparently complete, we cannot discern with certainty whether defendant was in open court at any time other than the status hearing on May 10, 1996, and trial on June 27, 1996. On the only two dates when we know that defendant was in open court neither defendant nor his attorney made any statement regarding jury waiver or proceeding by bench trial. See People v. Taylor, 291 Ill. App. 3d 18, 20 (1997) (where record is sufficiently complete jury waiver will not be found on basis of silent record), citing Smith, 106 Ill. 2d at 336-37. But see People v. Lombardi, 305 Ill. App. 3d 33, 40 (1999). Under similar circumstances, courts have repeatedly concluded that the defendant did not understandingly waive his right to a jury trial. Scott, 186 Ill. 2d at 285; People v. Eyen, 291 Ill. App. 3d 38, 43 (1997) (\u201cwhere nothing is stated in defendant\u2019s presence to suggest that defendant has an option between a bench trial and a jury trial, we cannot deem defendant to have acquiesced knowingly in his counsel\u2019s participation in a bench trial\u201d); Taylor, 291 Ill. App. 3d at 21 (reversal warranted where, in the absence of a written jury waiver, there \u201cis no express indication that the defendant was ever given a choice of a bench or a jury trial\u201d); People v. Roberts, 263 Ill. App. 3d 348, 351-52 (1994) (\u201cdefendant\u2019s silence during the trial court\u2019s few references to a bench trial and her simple acquiescence to the bench trial at the time it occurred are not sufficient to show she knowingly waived her right to a jury trial, in the absence of some affirmative action by her or by her attorney while she was present\u201d); People v. Watson, 246 Ill. App. 3d 548, 549 (1993) (vague references to a bench trial at rescheduling conferences insufficient to constitute valid jury waiver, particularly where \u201crecord is devoid of evidence suggesting that the defendant was ever apprised of his right to a jury trial\u201d). See People v. Evans, 243 Ill. App. 3d 72, 78-81 (1993) (jury waiver cannot be inferred from silence of defendant or his attorney when case is called for trial).\nThose cases relied upon by the State are distinguishable from the case at bar. In Frey, 103 Ill. 2d at 333, the court specifically noted that the defendant was in court prior to trial \u201cwhen the jury waiver was discussed.\u201d See Scott, 186 Ill. 2d at 285 (distinguishingFrey). Similarly, in People v. George, 263 Ill. App. 3d 968 (1993), several discussions occurred in the defendant\u2019s presence which would have indicated to him that he could choose whether to proceed by jury trial or bench trial. Unlike the instant case, where there is no mention of waiver, in both People v. Sailor, 43 Ill. 2d 256 (1969), and People v. Asselborn, 278 Ill. App. 3d 960 (1996), there was an affirmative statement that a jury was being waived.\nTo the extent that our decision is inconsistent with People v. Lake, 297 Ill. App. 3d 454 (1998), we decline to follow that decision. We also note that it was decided prior to our supreme court\u2019s decision in Scott.\nAlthough no set admonition or advice is required before an effective waiver of the right to trial by jury may be made, the decisions of our supreme court \u201chave imposed on the circuit courts the duty of ensuring that a defendant\u2019s waiver of his right to a jury trial be made expressly and understandingly. \u2019 \u2019 Smith, 106 Ill. 2d at 334, citing County of McLean v. Kickapoo Creek, Inc., 51 Ill. 2d 353 (1972), People v. Surgeon, 15 Ill. 2d 236 (1958), and People ex rel. Swanson v. Fisher, 340 Ill. 250 (1930). Thus, we again reiterate:\n\u201c \u2018It takes but a few moments of a trial judge\u2019s time to directly elicit from a defendant a response indicating that he understands that he is entitled to a jury trial, that he understands what a jury trial is, and whether or not he wishes to be tried by a jury or by the court without a jury. This simple procedure incorporated in the record will reduce the countless contentions raised in the reviewing courts about jury waivers.\u2019 \u201d People v. Chitwood, 67 Ill. 2d 443, 448-49 (1977), quoting People v. Bell, 104 Ill. App. 2d 479, 482 (1969).\nAccord Scott, 186 Ill. 2d at 288 (Bilandic, J., concurring).\nWe have examined the evidence solely to avoid the risk of subjecting defendant to double jeopardy. See People v. Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d 289, 309-10 (1979); People v. Lack, 302 Ill. App. 3d 587, 591 (1998). After reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, as we must (People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985)), we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found all of the elements of each offense beyond a reasonable doubt.\nFinally, defendant challenges the trial court\u2019s imposition of consecutive sentences. In the event that this issue recurs on remand, we direct the trial court\u2019s attention to People v. Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d 91 (1999).\nFor the reasons previously set forth, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand this matter for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nO\u2019HARA FROSSARD, EJ., and GALLAGHER, J, concur.\nAlthough the mittimus reflects that defendant was also convicted of aggravated battery with a firearm and sentenced to a six-year prison term to be served consecutively with his other sentences, the State concedes that the trial court did not intend to sentence defendant on that offense and that the mittimus should be corrected. The report of proceedings is unclear with respect to this matter. However, due to our disposition of this appeal and the unlikelihood that this situation will recur, we need not address this issue.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE RAKOWSKI" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Eelletier and Debra R. Salinger, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Mary L. Boland and Linda Halperin, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DAMEN WILLIAMSON, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 98\u20142415\nOpinion filed December 30, 1999.\nMichael J. Eelletier and Debra R. Salinger, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Mary L. Boland and Linda Halperin, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0054-01", "first_page_order": 72, "last_page_order": 79 }